Sellers v. Renewable Fuels, LLC et al
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: it is hereby ORDERED as follows: 1. The court finds in favor of Philip Sellers and against the Defendant Renewable Fuels, LLC on Plaintiff's claim for Breach of Joint Venture Agreement/Contract and assess es damages at $34,255.03 plus $5,253.48 in interest. 2. The court finds in favor of Philip Sellers against John F. Colquitt on a breach of contract claim and assesses damages at $95,058.23 plus $14,172.91 in interest. 3. The court finds in favor of John F. Colquitt and Renewable Fuels, LLC on all other claims. 4. Judgment will be entered accordingly, with costs taxed against the Defendants. Signed by Honorable Judge W. Harold Albritton, III on 10/11/2016. (kh, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
PHILIP LIGHTFOOT SELLERS,
) Civil Action No. 2:15cv236-WHA
RENEWABLE FUELS, LLC and JOHN F. )
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Plaintiff, Philip Lightfoot Sellers, brings the following claims in this case: breach of
Joint Venture Agreement/Contract against Renewable Fuels, LLC;1 suppression against John F.
Colquitt (“Colquitt”); breach of contract against Colquitt based on a May 25, 2012 agreement;
promissory fraud against Colquitt; and unjust enrichment against Renewable Fuels and Colquitt.
A one-day bench trial was held in this case on August 24, 2016. Based on the entire
record, including the post-trial briefs, and the testimony presented at the trial, the court makes the
following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The court has taken this statement of the Plaintiff’s claims, and the Defendant or Defendants
against whom they are brought, from the Pre-Trial Order, which takes the place of the pleadings
in this case. (Doc. #59). Defense counsel objected at trial to a characterization of the claim as one
against Colquitt individually. The confusion arises, as demonstrated by the facts, because it was
at times unclear whether Colquitt was acting on his own behalf or as an agent of Renewable
Fuels, LLC. Colquitt testified that the agreement was with Renewable Fuels. Sellers testified at
trial that his agreement was with Colquitt individually, but the factual statement upon which he
based that opinion was that Colquitt controlled Renewable Fuels. The court finds that the Joint
Venture Agreement/Contract to share commissions was between Sellers and Renewable Fuels.
A. Findings of Fact
The court finds the following facts by a preponderance of the evidence.
The Plaintiff, Philip Lightfoot Sellers (“Sellers”), has brought claims against his former
business associate Colquitt, and against a Limited Liability Company formed by Colquitt,
Renewable Fuels, to sell wood pellets.
Sellers and Colquitt had worked together in a previous business venture involving a wood
pellet plant in Nova Scotia, Canada. In early 2010, Colquitt and Sellers began working together
in their new pellet mill venture. Colquitt was the Director of the company, Defendant Renewable
Fuels. Colquitt offered Sellers a membership interest in Renewable Fuels, which Sellers refused.
In various business dealings thereafter, however, Sellers held himself out as acting as a
representative of Renewable Fuels.
Eventually, Renewable Fuels entered into a written contract with a pellet mill company,
Lee Energy Solutions (“Lee Energy”). Under the agreement, Lee Energy would pay
commissions to Renewable Fuels on the sales of wood pellets secured by Renewable Fuels.
Sellers and Colquitt agreed that Sellers would receive one-half of the commissions paid
by Lee Energy to Renewable Fuels, less expenses. There is a dispute as to the consideration paid
by Sellers pursuant to this agreement. Colquitt testified at trial, however, that there was an
agreement to pay half of every commission that involved Lee Energy pellets to Sellers. The
agreement was not written down at that time. Subsequently, however, Colquitt sent e-mails to
Sellers which reflected this agreement and sought Sellers’ agreement with the handling of his
share of commission payments. One such e-mail, Plaintiff’s Exhibit 25, from Sellers, dated
December 20, 2010, states as follows:
You and I should discuss how we are going to handle all of our “riches”
from the Lee account. My thoughts are that we will have the payment wired into
our company account I already have at the Bank of America and I will
immediately either wire or write a RFLLC check to you. I will split it so
you and I will receive 50%.
Four payments were made to Sellers pursuant to that agreement, once each time that Lee
Energy paid Renewable Fuels a commission payment. The payments were from Lee Energy to
Renewable Fuels, deposited in a Renewable Fuels account, and then paid to Sellers, or Sellers’
separate, unrelated company. Colquitt paid a share of each commission, less any amount they
agreed to withhold for travel and other expenses. Colquitt issued checks on behalf of Renewable
Fuels pursuant to this agreement for $38,983.23 on February 3, 2011; $51,070.28 on May 31,
2011; $35,356.22 on September 22, 2011; and $37,132.76 on December 8, 2011. (Plaintiff’s
In April of 2012, Renewable Fuels received another commission payment from Lee
Energy in the amount of $95,876.86. On May 25, 2012, Colquitt placed a phone call to Sellers.
Both men were in their cars at the time, and Margie Sellers, Sellers’ wife, was also in the car and
heard the conversation over the car’s loudspeaker. Sellers testified at trial that he had an
agreement with Colquitt individually to lend him Sellers’ half of two commission payments.
Sellers testified that Colquitt said that he wanted to borrow the April commission payment
amount and half of the next commission payment because of a financial problem related to taxes.
Margie Sellers also characterized the agreement as being to allow Colquitt to use Sellers’
commission payments for personal financial problems.
After the phone call, Sellers sent Colquitt an e-mail involving several matters in separate
paragraphs, one of which set forth the scope of the agreement reached in that phone call. Colquitt
responded by sending back the e-mail with his comments below other paragraphs, but he did not
comment on the paragraph regarding the substance of the agreement in the phone call.
The paragraph of the e-mail which Colquitt sent back to Sellers but which was left
without comment states as follows:
In summarizing the Lee money issue I understand that you are borrowing
from me my part of the last shipment commission and the next shipment—
roughly $80-100,000. Then you will pay me back from money received
from the Century project or the next commissions from the next Lee payments
which ever happens first.
(Plaintiff’s Exhibit 79). The Century project referred to in the e-mail was a proposed pellet mill in
Century, Florida, which never came to fruition.
When asked at trial, Colquitt testified that it was his understanding that there was an
agreement for Renewable Fuels to pay the April commission payment from Lee Energy to Sellers,
but that Sellers agreed to forbear that payment for a period of time, and that the obligation would
be triggered by more Lee Energy commission payments or the Century Project closing. Colquitt
characterized the future payments as being made by Renewable Fuels. When offering an
explanation in his testimony, however, as to why he did not correct the e-mail in Plaintiff’s Exhibit
79 if it was not correct, Colquitt testified that he had anticipated that if it were a loan, there would
be paperwork. The court finds that the e-mail characterization of a loan is consistent with an
agreement by Sellers not to be paid money owed by Renewable Fuels at that time, and for Colquitt
individually to pay the money owed by Renewable Fuels at a later time.
On August 15, 2012, Renewable Fuels received a sixth commission payment in the amount
of $94,239.59. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit #93). Colquitt did not pay Sellers a share of the commission
payment at that time, which was consistent with their May 2012 agreement. Colquitt testified at
trial, however, that despite the May 2012 agreement, he never paid Sellers for his share of either
the April or August commission payments.
Lee Energy did not make any commission payment to Renewable Fuels after August 2012.
Sellers and Colquitt discussed filing a lawsuit against Lee Energy. Renewable Fuels eventually
did so, and settled the lawsuit with Lee Energy. Colquitt did not tell Sellers about the settlement.
When Sellers inquired about the status of the case, Colquitt told him that he had settled the case,
but there was not enough money left over from the settlement to pay Sellers.
Colquitt testified at trial that the payment from Lee Energy did not represent commission
payments. Plaintiff’s Exhibit 90, however, is a Settlement Agreement with Lee Energy with an
attachment showing the attorney’s breakdown of the distribution of funds received from Lee
Energy. The Settlement Agreement itself shows $350,000 as the settlement paid for dismissal of
the lawsuit with no admission of liability, but the attachment also identifies two payments as
commission payments. It states that there was an $86,833.09 payment for a July 2013 shipment
and a $27,350.32 payment for a November 2013 shipment. These amounts were reduced by
payments to the attorney, and Sellers claims $26,049.92, $8,205.10, and $105,000.00, for the two
commission payments and dismissal amount, respectively.
Conclusions of Law
Sellers brings claims for breach of a Joint Venture Agreement/Contract based on a failure
to pay Sellers a share of an April 2012 and August 2012 commission payment from Lee Energy,
a breach of contract claim based on the failure to repay a loan of the same two commission
payments, and a breach of contract claim based on the failure to pay half of a lawsuit settlement
which included July and November 2013 commission payments. Sellers’ claims for additional
damages are based on fraud theories, and he also has an alternative claim for unjust enrichment.
The court begins with the breach of contract claims.
Breach of Contract and Joint Venture Agreement Claims
i. Joint Venture Agreement
The facts, set out above, are that Sellers and Colquitt, on behalf of Renewable Fuels,
entered into an agreement by which Sellers would be paid a 50% share of the commission
payments, less expenses, to be paid by Lee Energy for wood pellet sales secured by Renewable
Fuels, and this agreement was followed, and confirmed, four times when checks were issued to
Sellers pursuant to that agreement. This agreement was between Sellers and Renewable Fuels.
The issue of the breach of contract based on the settlement proceeds of the lawsuit
against Lee Energy is an issue of breach of the Joint Venture Agreement, by which Renewable
Fuels agreed to pay Sellers a share of all of the commission payments received by Renewable
Fuels from Lee Energy. The Settlement Agreement with Lee Energy, (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 90),
states that there was an $86,833.09 payment for a July 2013 shipment and a $27,350.32 payment
for a November 2013 shipment. The Settlement Agreement also includes a $350,000.00 payment
for an unspecified purpose. The Joint Venture Agreement/Contract between Sellers and
Renewable Fuels only included commission payments, less expenses. There is no evidence
before the court that the $350,000 payment was for commissions. Because the original contract,
or Joint Venture Agreement, included only commissions, and there is no proof that the $350,000
was to pay for commissions, the court cannot conclude that the $350,000 payment in the
Settlement Agreement is within the scope of the Joint Venture Agreement between Sellers and
ii. Contract with Colquitt
A separate agreement was entered into in May of 2012 between Sellers and Colquitt
individually. In a phone conversation, Sellers and Colquitt entered into this new agreement that
Sellers would not be paid a share of the April Lee Energy commission payment, or one future
commission when it came in (which turned out to be August 2012), but instead that Colquitt
would pay Sellers later for those commission payments.
Therefore, although Sellers has claimed that Renewable Fuels is also liable for failure to
pay the April and August commission payments, the failure to pay the commission payments
from April and August is not an issue of breach of the Joint Venture Agreement/Contract
because of the new, separate May agreement. It was Colquitt who individually entered into the
new agreement to use, for his personal tax purposes, Sellers’ share of the April and August
commission payments, and to later pay Sellers what Sellers was owed from the April and August
commissions. Sellers can only recover his share of the April and August payments from Colquitt
Although Colquitt admitted at trial that he orally agreed that half of all Renewable Fuels’
commissions from Lee Energy would be paid to Sellers, in fact paying Sellers in accordance with
that agreement, and he admitted that when he spoke to Sellers by phone in May of 2012, they
agreed that he would pay personally two commission payments owed at a later date, the
Defendants have taken the position that neither of those agreements is enforceable. The court,
therefore, will now address the defenses to those contracts.
b. Defenses to Agreements
The Defendants argue that there was no meeting of the minds, or mutual assent, as to the
initial agreement for Renewable Fuels to pay half of its commissions from Lee Energy sales to
Sellers. The Defendants state that the parties did not agree why Renewable Fuels paid Sellers a
share of the commissions.
There is evidence in the record that Colquitt offered to have Sellers be a member of
Renewable Fuels, but that Sellers declined. Sellers, Colquitt, and Renewable Fuels, however,
held Sellers out to prospective customers as being a part of Renewable Fuels, even referring to
him as the Chief Financial Officer. See, e.g., Defendants’ Exhibit 12. Colquitt also testified that
one reason why he offered to share commissions with Sellers was to ensure that Sellers could
keep the company going if something happened to Colquitt, and there would be someone to take
care of Colquitt’s widow.
The facts, therefore, support the conclusion that Sellers was not a formal officer or even a
member of Renewable Fuels, but in exchange for his acting as though he were a part of
Renewable Fuels in its business transactions with Lee Energy and other companies, Sellers was
paid a share of the commissions paid to Renewable Fuels from Lee Energy. The court concludes,
therefore, that there is sufficient evidence of mutual assent.
Statute of Frauds
Before the court examines the application of the Statute of Frauds defense, the court
notes that at various points in this litigation Colquitt has defended against two claims, breach of
the Joint Venture Agreement, and breach of the May 2012 agreement, by arguing that the oral
agreements are barred by the Statute of Frauds. In his post-trial brief, however, in which he
asserts trial defenses, Colquitt does not invoke the Statute of Frauds with respect to the initial
Joint Venture Agreement, but instead specifically invokes the Statute of Frauds only with respect
to Count III of the Amended Complaint, which is the claim based on the May 2012 agreement.
(Doc. #67 at p.8). Colquitt either concedes, and the court agrees, that the multiple e-mails
exchanged which confirmed commission sharing satisfy the Statute of Frauds, see Truck Rentals
of Alabama, Inc. v. M.O. Carroll-Newton, Co., Inc., 623 So. 2d 1106, 1111-1112 (Ala.
1993)(writings considered together can constitute a writing for the Statute of Frauds), or has
waived the affirmative defense. Cf. Hewitt v. Mobile Research Technology, Inc., 285 Fed. App’x
694 (11th Cir. 2008)(Statute of Frauds is a waivable affirmative defense under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure). Therefore, the court concludes that the Statute of Frauds does not bar a
claim based on the original commission sharing agreement. The court will address the Statute of
Frauds defense only in connection with the May 2012 agreement.
Alabama's Statute of Frauds provides that “every agreement is void unless such
agreement or some note or memorandum thereof expressing the consideration is in writing and
subscribed by the party to be charged therewith or some other person by him thereunto lawfully
authorized in writing: . . . (3) Every special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage
of another . . . (7) Every agreement or commitment to lend money, delay or forebear repayment
thereof or to modify the provisions of such an agreement or commitment except for consumer
loans with a principal amount financed less than $25,000.” Ala. Code § 8–9–2(3),(7).
Sellers disputes that the Statute of Frauds applies to the May 2012 agreement because he
argues that Colquitt asked to use the money which would have been paid to Sellers for a tax
obligation of Colquitt, so that this was an original agreement, not an agreement to pay the
obligation of another, citing Waide v. Bingham, 583 So. 2d 263 (Ala. 1991).
As noted above, the court has concluded that the evidence supports a conclusion that the
May 2012 agreement was an agreement by which Colquitt agreed to be responsible for
Renewable Fuels’ obligation toward Sellers for his share of two commission payments. The
court need not decide, however, whether that May 2012 contract is one which falls within the
Statute of Frauds, because the court agrees with Sellers’ alternative argument that the Statute of
Frauds has been met.
Sellers and Colquitt both testified that they made an agreement by phone that Sellers
would not be paid his share of the April commission payment, or the next, from Lee Energy.
Colquitt agreed that he would pay the commissions at a later point. Although Colquitt testified
that he did not make a payment pursuant to that agreement because the Century project did not
close, he also acknowledged that the agreement included payment in the future from either the
Century project deal, or from additional Lee Energy Commission payments.
The facts of the e-mail memorializing that agreement, as found earlier, are that Sellers
sent an e-mail confirming their agreement that the commission already owed, as well as the next,
would be loaned to Colquitt and repaid by him in the future. Colquitt responded to the e-mail by
incorporating Sellers’ e-mail into Colquitt’s own e-mail, and including Colquitt’s notations after
various sentences in Sellers’ original message. There is no comment after the paragraph in the
email regarding the “Lee money issue,” and no indication by Colquitt that he did not agree with
the statement which he incorporated into his own e-mail. In fact, when Colquitt testified at trial,
he agreed that he never told Sellers anything was wrong in the e-mail, because he assumed for a
loan there would be paperwork. When specifically asked, Colquitt agreed in his trial testimony
that the e-mail accurately described the conversation between himself and Sellers.
An e-mail can be sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds because the “Statute of Frauds
does not require that the writing supporting a contract or modification take any particular form,
only that it be ‘subscribed by the party to be charged.’” LSREF2 Baron, LLC v. Wyndfield
Properties, LLC, Civil Action No. 2:12cv965, 2013 WL 6388597, at * (M.D. Ala. Dec. 6, 2013).
Colquitt’s incorporation of Sellers’ e-mail into his own is sufficient to constitute a writing
subscribed by the party to be charged. Cf. Preston Law Firm, LLC v. Mariner Health Care
Management Co., 622 F.3d 384, 391 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting that emails can qualify as signed
writings, and finding sufficient writings to form a contract where an email when read together
with a previous email provided evidence of acquiescence to the terms previous email). The court
concludes that neither of the Defendants’ defenses is availing.
c. Conclusions as to Breaches of the Agreements
Based on the facts and conclusions set forth above, the court concludes that Colquitt
breached the May 2012 agreement by failing to pay Sellers a share of the April 2012 and August
2012 commissions, and that Renewable Fuels breached the Joint Venture Agreement by failing
to pay Sellers a share of the commission payments included in the settlement with Lee Energy.
The court concludes, therefore, that judgment will be entered against Colquitt individually for
$47,938.43 and $47,119.80, plus prejudgment interest2 and against Renewable Fuels, LLC for
$26,049.93 and $8,205.10, plus prejudgment interest.
Sellers seeks prejudgment interest at a rate of 6% pursuant to Ala. Code §8-8-8. The
Defendants do not appear to dispute that the award of prejudgment interest at this rate is
2. Promissory Fraud
A claim of promissory fraud requires a plaintiff to prove by substantial evidence (1) a
false representation (2) of a material existing fact (3) reasonably relied upon by the plaintiff (4)
who suffered damage as a proximate consequence of the misrepresentation, (5) proof that at the
time of the misrepresentation, the defendant had the intention not to perform the act promised,
and (6) proof that the defendant had an intent to deceive. Southland Bank v. A & A Drywall
Supply Co., 21 So. 3d 1196, 1210 (Ala. 2008); Wade v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 994 F.
Supp. 1369, 1378, aff’d without op., 132 F.3d 1461 (11th Cir. 1997).
Sellers claims that Colquitt committed promissory fraud when he promised to repay
Sellers for the April and one future Lee Energy commission. Sellers argues that based on
Colquitt’s testimony at trial Colquitt only intended to pay Sellers from the closing of the Century
project and not from the Lee Energy commissions.
Colquitt’s position in his post-trial brief is that Colquitt’s intent was to pay Sellers, and he
did not know at the time that he promised to pay the commissions in the future that the Century
project would fail, or that Lee Energy would take the position that it did not owe additional
commission payments to Renewable Fuels.
“The only basis upon which one may recover for fraud, where the alleged fraud is
predicated on a promise to perform or abstain from some act in the future . . . is when the
evidence shows that, at the time of the promises of future action or abstention were made, the
promisor had no intention of carrying out the promises, but rather had a present intent to
deceive.” Purcell Co. v. Spriggs Enterprises, Inc., 431 So. 2d 515, 519 (Ala. 1983).
The Alabama Supreme Court has examined evidence to determine whether inferences of
intent not to perform and to deceive could be drawn and reasoned that if “the most that might
reasonably be inferred from the evidence introduced was that . . . promise was a reckless
misrepresentation,” fraud is not proven because “it must be shown that the person making the
misrepresentation intended not to do the act promised at the time the misrepresentation was
made.” Russellville Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Frost, 484 So. 2d 1084, 1087 (Ala. 1986). A promise
hastily made is not fraud if there is no “intent to deceive, or the present intent not to perform.” Id.
In this case, Colquitt made a promise to repay money owed to Sellers. The promise, as
adopted in an e-mail, was that payment would be triggered by the Century Project or future
commission payments by Lee Energy, whichever occurred first. Colquitt testified at trial that he
agreed to pay for the commission payments when the Century project deal closed or when
additional Lee Energy commission payments were received, and when asked why he did not pay
Sellers for the commission payments, he answered that the Century Project did not close. When
Colquitt was asked at trial if he ever told Sellers that if the Century project did not close, Colquitt
was not going to pay Sellers, he answered, “No. He was so sure it was going to close.” At trial,
Colquitt also testified that he and Sellers had expected Century to close “close by,” an October
2012 date pointed to by the attorney in questioning Colquitt.
The evidence before the court is that Colquitt made a promise to pay at a time when the
parties felt sure that the Century project would close, and that they thought the closing would be
soon. This is not a case, therefore, in which a promise was made by a person who knew at that
time that the promise could not be fulfilled. See Byrd v. Lamar, 846 So. 2d 334, 348 (Ala. 2002).
It is undisputed that Colquitt did not perform as promised, but that is not sufficient to
prove intent not to perform or to deceive. Russellville Prod. Credit Ass’n, 484 So. 2d at 1986.
Colquitt did not testify that it was his intent at the time of his promise not to pay Sellers. His
testimony was that he ultimately did not pay Sellers because the Century project did not close,
which may be sufficient to infer that he recklessly made a promise to pay Sellers based on his
expectation that funds would be forthcoming from some source, but it does not establish present
intent not to perform, or an intent to deceive. See North Alabama Elec. Co-op. v. Tennessee
Valley Auth., 862 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1302 (N.D. Ala. 2012) (finding insufficient evidence of
intent where speaker may have believed he had more authority than he actually did, or simply
chose his words poorly). The court concludes, therefore, that Sellers has failed to prove by
substantial evidence all of the elements of a claim for promissory fraud.3
The elements of a suppression claim are (1) a duty to disclose the facts, (2) concealment
or nondisclosure of material facts by the defendant, (3) inducement of the plaintiff to act, and (4)
action by the plaintiff to his injury. Foremost Ins. Co. v. Parham, 693 So. 2d 409, 423 (Ala.
1997). Silence is not fraud unless an obligation to communicate a material fact exists. Id.
Colquitt did not inform Sellers about the settlement of the lawsuit against Lee Energy.
Sellers argues that Colquitt had a duty to inform him about the settlement, but Sellers does not
present any argument as to how he relied on the failure to disclose the settlement to him. There is
The court notes at any rate that Sellers has claimed the same amount in compensatory damages
for promissory fraud as the compensatory damages clamed for breach of contract, the court has
found Colquitt liable for those damages, and the Plaintiff has not offered any evidence to support
an award of additional damages.
no evidence before the court that Sellers was induced to act in any way by Colquitt’s silence.
The court concludes, therefore, that Sellers has not proven a claim of suppression.
4. Unjust Enrichment
Having concluded that Sellers is entitled to judgment based on his contracts with
Renewable Fuels, LLC and Colquitt, the court concludes that Sellers is not also entitled to
equitable relief. Univalor Trust, SA v. Columbia Petroleum, LLC, 315 F.R.D. 374, 382 (S.D. Ala.
2016) (stating that the existence of an express contract extinguishes an unjust enrichment claim
altogether because unjust enrichment is an equitable remedy which issues only where there is no
adequate remedy at law).
The Defendants have not disputed that prejudgment interest would be due at 6% on the
contract claims, and the court accepts as accurate the Plaintiff’s interest computations set out in
Exhibit 2 to his Post-Trial Brief (Doc. #66-2).
a. Renewable Fuels
On March 3, 2014, Renewable Fuels received from the Lee Entergy settlement a net
commission, after attorney’s fees, of $52,099.85, for the July 2013 shipment, to which Plaintiff is
entitled to ½, or $26,049.92, plus 6% interest from that date to the date of this Order in the
amount of $4,016.61, for a total of $30,066.54.
Renewable Fuels received on March 24, 2014, net commissions of $16,410.19 for a
November 2013 shipment from which the Plaintiff is entitled to $8,205.10, as claimed by him,
plus 6% interest from that date to the date of this Order in the amount of $1,236.87, for a total of
b. John F. Colquitt
The amount due from Colquitt on the contract claim totals $95,058.23, plus six percent
interest on that amount from April 4, 2014, the date when Colquitt receive enough funds from
the settlement with Lee Energy to pay this amount owned to Sellers, as claimed by him, in the
amount of $14,172.11, for a total of $109,231.14.
Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth above, it is hereby
ORDERED as follows:
1. The court finds in favor of Philip Sellers and against the Defendant Renewable Fuels,
LLC on Plaintiff’s claim for Breach of Joint Venture Agreement/Contract and
assesses damages at $34,255.03 plus $5,253.48 in interest.
2. The court finds in favor of Philip Sellers against John F. Colquitt on a breach of
contract claim and assesses damages at $95,058.23 plus $14,172.91 in interest.
3. The court finds in favor of John F. Colquitt and Renewable Fuels, LLC on all other
4. Judgment will be entered accordingly, with costs taxed against the Defendants.
Done this 11th day of October, 2016.
/s/ W. Harold Albritton
W. HAROLD ALBRITTON
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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