United States of America v. State of Alabama, et al.
Filing
10
OPINION. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/18/2015. (wcl, )
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF ALABAMA and
ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:15cv368-MHT
(WO)
OPINION
Pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized
Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et seq., plaintiff United
States
of
defendants
America
the
filed
State
of
this
lawsuit
Alabama
and
naming
the
as
Alabama
Department of Corrections (hereinafter jointly referred
to as “the State”) and claiming that the State has
subjected prisoners at the Julia Tutwiler Prison for
Women to an ongoing and systemic practice of sexual
abuse and sexual harassment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.
The court has jurisdiction over this action
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question) and 1345
(proceeding commenced by United States).
This cause is
before the
court on the
joint motion to enter settlement agreement.
parties’
For the
reasons that follow and based on the representations
made at an on-the-record hearing on June 8, 2015, the
court
will
consent
dismiss,
adopt
decree
of
albeit
the
terms
this
of
court;
conditionally
the
grant
and
agreement
the
without
as
motion
a
to
prejudice,
that is, with final dismissal dependent on compliance
with the settlement agreement; and retain jurisdiction
for
the
purpose
of
enforcing
the
consent
decree,
including as well to resolve any disputes arising out
of the agreement and to enter final dismissal of the
matter as contemplated by the agreement in accordance
with federal law.
I.
Before the United States filed this complaint, the
parties had already engaged in protracted negotiations
2
and come to an agreement as to what needed to be done
to
remedy
alleged
sexual
abuse
at
Tutwiler.
Their
detailed plan, which is set forth in their settlement
agreement, is the product of commendable cooperation on
both sides.
In reaching this settlement, the parties
determined that they need the injunctive power of this
court to ensure that women confined at the Tutwiler
facility
will
be
treated
constitutional standards.
the
United
States
filed
in
accordance
with
As such, the same day that
its
complaint,
the
parties
jointly filed a motion for the court to enter their
agreement as an order of the court.
embodied
asked
in
their
the
court,
proposed
first,
order,
to
As succinctly
the
dismiss
parties
the
also
complaint
“conditionally” and “WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to Rule
41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” that
is,
to
make
compliance
order
“Final
with
(doc.
jurisdiction
the
no.
over
dismissal
Settlement
2-2);
the
and,
...
Agreement,”
second,
agreement
3
conditioned
for
to
on
Proposed
retain
enforcement
purposes, including as well “to resolve any disputes
arising out of the Settlement Agreement and to enter
final dismissal of the matter as contemplated by the
Settlement Agreement.” Id.
II.
As stated above, this case arises from the United
States’
allegations
prisoners
at
harassment.
that
Tutwiler
the
to
State
sexual
has
abuse
subjected
and
sexual
Accordingly, in assessing the agreement,
the court relies on these allegations (unchallenged by
the
State
for
the
limited
purpose
of
assessing
the
agreement) as set forth in the complaint.
Tutwiler
is
a
maximum-security
women’s
operated by the State in Wetumpka, Alabama.
prison
In 2013,
the Department of Justice investigated allegations of
staff sexual abuse and sexual harassment there.
What
it asserts to have found is, if true, gut-wrenching and
horrific.
It is alleged that staff at Tutwiler raped
and sexually abused women in their custody; required
4
them to submit to sexual advances in order to obtain
necessities or avoid punishment; and knowingly allowed
a
sexually
violent
environment
to
persist.
It
is
further alleged that the State does not provide women
any means to file administrative grievances to report
sexual abuse and that the State failed to investigate
allegations
of
alleged that
abuse
adequately.
Moreover,
it
is
staff retaliated against those who did
attempt to report abuse by placing them in segregation
and
threatening
them
with
physical
further alleged that the State
appropriately
both
low-level
assault.
It
is
failed to discipline
staff
and
high-level
officials who engaged in, encouraged, or deliberately
disregarded the abuse and that some staff members were
permitted to resign in lieu of termination, others were
reassigned
to
different
facilities,
and
others
were
promoted.
It
is
also
alleged
that
the
State
failed
to
implement policies or manage the facility in a way that
met constitutional standards and failed to institute
5
gender-responsive
policies
and
procedures
to
address
sexual abuse and harassment, to staff the facility at
safe levels, or to develop a classification system that
would protect potential victims of abuse.
These
allegations
are
not
new.
In
1995,
the
Department of Justice notified the State of allegations
of sexual abuse by staff at Tutwiler; and, in 2007, it
identified
highest
Tutwiler
rate
of
as
the
women’s
sexual-assault
prison
with
allegations
the
in
the
country.
Several reports have been issued since then
by
organizations
other
that
discuss
the
continuing
nature of the alleged problem.
The proposed settlement agreement mandates numerous
changes in prison policies and establishes procedures
to ensure more rigorous protection from sexual abuse
for prisoners at Tutwiler.
The agreement requires the State to implement fully
all changes within nine months.
At that time, and
every six months thereafter, it requires that the court
receive
a
compliance
report
6
from
the
parties’
independent
monitor,
a
corrections
expert
who
ensure that the terms of the agreement are met.
will
After
the State has achieved substantial compliance with all
substantive
provisions
of
the
agreement
consecutive
compliance
reports,
that
in
is,
three
for
18
consecutive months, the agreement will terminate.
III.
Federal
law
requires
litigation
over
prison
conditions to comply with the Prison Litigation Reform
Act
(PLRA),
18
U.S.C.
§
3626.
“The
PLRA
strictly
limits the prospective relief a federal court may order
in
cases
concerning
prison
conditions.”
Gaddis
v.
Campbell, 301 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1313 (M.D. Ala. 2004)
(Thompson,
J.).
consent decrees.
The
PLRA’s
restrictions
18 U.S.C. § 3626(c)(1).
private
settlement
subject
to
agreements
federal-court
whose
enforcement
extend
to
By contrast,
terms
(but
are
may
not
be
enforceable under state law) do not need to abide by
the PLRA’s requirements.
18 U.S.C. § 3626(c)(2).
7
In
this case, the parties confirmed orally during the June
8 hearing that their settlement agreement
should be
treated as a “consent decree” governed by the PLRA and
is enforceable by this court.
The PLRA provides that “a court shall not grant or
approve any prospective relief unless the court finds
that such relief [(1)] is narrowly drawn, [(2)] extends
no further than necessary to correct the violation of a
Federal right, and [(3)] is the least intrusive means
necessary
right.”
to
correct
the
violation
of
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
the
Federal
The court must
also “give substantial weight to any adverse impact on
public safety or the operation of a criminal justice
system
caused
by
the
relief.”
18
U.S.C.
§ 3626(a)(1)(B).
The PLRA generally requires that the court “engage
in
[a]
a
specific,
consent
provision-by-provision
decree[],
measuring
against the statutory criteria.”
231
F.3d
777,
785
(11th
Cir.
8
examination
each
of
requirement
Cason v. Steckinger,
2000).
However,
the
district court does not need to “conduct an evidentiary
hearing
about
or
enter
particularized
findings
concerning any facts or factors about which there is
not dispute.”
Id. at 785 n.8.
“The parties are free
to make any concessions or enter into stipulations they
deem appropriate.”
Id.
The PLRA allows the court, upon the motion of any
party or intervener, to terminate prospective relief
two years after the court approves or grants the relief
or
one
year
after
the
court
has
denying termination of relief.
entered
an
order
18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1).
However, should any party move for termination while
violations of federal rights continue to exist, the
PLRA makes clear that relief need not terminate merely
because a party has so moved.
Rather, the law requires
the court to assess whether prospective relief remains
necessary
at
that
time.
See
id.
at
§ 3626(b)(3)
(“Prospective relief shall not terminate if the court
makes
written
prospective
findings
relief
based
remains
9
on
the
necessary
record
to
that
correct
a
current and ongoing violation of the Federal right,
extends
no
violation
further
of
prospective
the
relief
than
necessary
Federal
is
right,
narrowly
drawn
to
correct
and
the
that
and
the
the
least
intrusive means to correct the violation.”).
In
this
case,
the
parties
all
agree
that
the
proposed settlement, which, according to them, should
be treated as a proposed consent decree, satisfies the
so-called
“need-narrowness-intrusiveness”
of the PLRA.
requirements
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A); see also Laube
v. Campbell, 333 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1239 (M.D. Ala.
2004) (Thompson, J.).
They stipulate accordingly in
Section XII of their agreement.
Furthermore, in the
June 8 hearing, the parties stated their reasons for
believing the agreement meets these requirements.
They
argued that the remedy is narrowly tailored because it
is
limited
to
the
Tutwiler
prison
and
because
it
exclusively addresses the problem of sexual abuse and
sexual
harassment
at
that
facility.
The
parties
further noted that the abuses alleged in this case were
10
pervasive
and
severe,
so
the
extensive
level
of
oversight provided for in this agreement is necessary.
Finally, the parties took care in their negotiations
not to interfere with the State’s penal mission, and
the State was willing to agree only to provisions it
felt were necessary to address the identified problems,
and
nothing
more.
Based
on
its
assessment of the settlement, the
finds
that
the
settlement’s
relief,
own
independent
court agrees and
as
it
will
be
embodied in a consent decree, is necessary, narrowly
tailored and no more intrusive than necessary to remedy
the identified constitutional violations.
The
court
further
finds
that
the
settlement
agreement will have no adverse effect on public safety
or the operation of the criminal-justice system.
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(B).
See
As the parties themselves
have noted, the settlement will promote public safety
by not only protecting the prisoners at Tutwiler from
sexual abuse and harassment, it will also protect the
prison guards. In sum, the court is satisfied that the
11
terms
of
the
settlement
agreement,
as
they
will
be
embodied in a consent decree, are in full compliance
with the PLRA, and approves the agreement.
In the event that any party moves for termination
of prospective relief after two years but before the
parties have maintained at least 18 consecutive months
of
substantial
compliance,
the
court
will
assess
whether prospective relief remains necessary at that
time.
IV.
The parties request that the court “conditionally”
dismiss the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(a)(2), but retain jurisdiction while the terms of
the agreement are being carried out.
Rule
41(a)(2)
provides
that,
except
in
circumstances not applicable here, “an action may be
dismissed
at
the
plaintiff’s
request
only
by
order, on terms that the court considers proper.”
R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) (emphasis added).
12
court
Fed.
In Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, the Supreme Court
explained that, “If the parties [to a case] wish to
provide
for
the
court’s
enforcement
of
a
dismissal-producing settlement agreement, they can seek
to
do
so.”
511
U.S.
375,
removed).
Under
enforcement
jurisdiction
settlement
dismissal
Kokkonen,
agreement
either
jurisdiction”
or
381
is
a
court
over
made
(1994)
a
a
separate
by
incorporating
may
matter
part
by
of
the
retain
if
the
provision
agreement into the order itself.
(emphasis
order
the
of
“retaining
terms
of
the
Id.; see also Anago
Franchising, Inc. v. Shaz, LLC, 667 F.3d 1272, 1278-79
(11th
Cir.
Federal
2012).
Rule
of
“When
Civil
dismissal
Procedure
is
pursuant
42(a)(2)
...
to
the
parties’ compliance with the terms of the settlement
contract (or the court’s ‘retention of jurisdiction’
over
the
settlement
discretion,
order.”
be
one
contract)
of
the
may,
terms
Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 381.
13
in
set
the
forth
court’s
in
the
Here,
the
parties
have
asked
for
the
court
to
dismiss the case conditionally and without prejudice,
but to preserve jurisdiction over the case while the
terms of the agreement are being carried out.
The
court obliges, and will retain enforcement under both
mechanisms provided by Kokonnen: by express provision
and
by
incorporating
the
terms
agreement into a consent decree.
of
the
parties’
In other words, the
court dons both belt and suspenders.
An appropriate consent decree and judgment will be
entered.
DONE, this the 18th day of June, 2015.
_ /s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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