Hayden v. Vance, et al. (MAG+)
Filing
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ORDER it is ORDERED that: (1) Plaintiff's Objections (Docs. # 65 , 66 , 68 ) are OVERRULED. (2) The Recommendation is ADOPTED. (3) Plaintiff's Motion to Amend (Doc. # 55 ) is DENIED. (4) Defendants William B. Cashion, Western Steel Inc. , and Merchants Commercial Bank's motions to dismiss (Docs. # 25 , 42 ) are GRANTED. (5) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 24 ) is GRANTED in part and DENIED as moot in part. The motion is GRANTED as to the claims against Defendants Anne-Marie Adams, Houston Brown, Scott Donaldson, James Allen Main, Terry A. Moore, Thomas Francis Parker, Craig Sorrell Pittman, Gregory Shaw, Lyn Stuart, Terri Willingham Thomas, William C. Thompson, Robert S. Vance, Jr., J. Scott Vowell, and Alisa Kelli Wise. The motion is DENIED as moot for the claims against Roy Moore in his individual capacity because Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the individual capacity claims. (6) Defendant Roy Moore's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 50 ) the claims ag ainst him in his official capacity is GRANTED. (7) Defendant Joyce Vance's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 35 ) is GRANTED and her alternative Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED as moot. (8) The Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 37 ) filed by the United States and the U.S. Department of Justice is GRANTED. (9) The federal claims in the original and amended complaints (Docs. # 1 , 33 ) are DISMISSED with prejudice. (10) The court declines supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims and the state law claims are DISMISSED without prejudice. (11) Plaintiff's remaining motions (Docs. # 1 , 32 , 41 , 48 , 53 ) are DENIED. (12) This matter is REFERRED back to the Magistrate Judge for a determination regarding attorneys' fees. A separate final judgment will be entered. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 3/14/2016. (kh, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION
STEVEN MARK HAYDEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
ROBERT S. VANCE JR., et al.,
Defendants.
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CASE NO. 2:15-CV-469-WKW
[WO]
ORDER
On January 25, 2016, the Magistrate Judge filed a Recommendation (Doc.
# 4).
On February 8, 2016, Plaintiff filed a timely Objection.
(Doc. # 65.)
On February 11, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Supplemental Objection.
(Doc. # 66.)
Defendants William Cashion, Western Steel, Inc. (“Western Steel”), and
Merchants Commercial Bank filed a Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s
Objection (Doc. # 67) to which Plaintiff filed a Reply (Doc. # 68).
The court has
conducted an independent and de novo review of those portions of the
Recommendation to which objections are made, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and
concludes that the objections are due to be overruled. The Recommendation will be
adopted, and the case will be referred back to the Magistrate Judge for further
proceedings.
Plaintiff makes numerous objections to the Recommendation.
Twelve
objections are addressed in this opinion. Objections not addressed in the opinion
lack merit and warrant no additional discussion. The objections are addressed in
turn.
Plaintiff first objects to the allegedly inadequate amount of time he was given
to object to the Recommendation.
(Doc. # 65, at 1–2.)
He did not request
additional time to object, however, and he filed a timely objection. He also filed a
supplemental objection and a reply to Defendants’ opposition. All of Plaintiff’s
objections have been considered by the court. This objection is without merit.
Plaintiff’s second objection is that the Magistrate Judge’s continued
participation in the proceedings is manifest injustice and plain error. (Doc. # 65,
at 2.) He asserts that the Magistrate Judge has not responded to his affidavit (Doc.
# 60) and motion to recuse (Doc. # 62). The court has already addressed these
matters by separate orders. (Docs. # 61, 63.) Plaintiff also asserts that he never
consented to proceed before the Magistrate Judge. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, a
district judge may “designate a magistrate judge” to make determinations or
recommendations about pretrial matters as appropriate.
The section does not
require consent of the parties for referral of pretrial matters.
See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b). Therefore, this objection is without merit.
Plaintiff’s third objection is that judicial immunity should not apply and the
§ 1983 claims for conspiracy should proceed against all Defendants. (Doc. # 65,
at 2–10.) The Recommendation analyzes the § 1983 claims and immunity of
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Defendants. (Doc. # 64, at 14–29.) Plaintiff does not raise new arguments or facts
that change this analysis. This objection is without merit.
Plaintiff’s fourth objection is that the court improperly raised quasi-judicial
immunity without Defendants having raised it first and that it is solely an affirmative
defense so that it does not apply. (Doc. # 65, at 10–12.) Defendants raised judicial
immunity in their motion to dismiss. (Doc. # 24, at 2, 7–12.) Judicial immunity
applies to all Defendants who brought the motion to dismiss except Defendant
Anne-Marie Adams. “Absolute quasi-judicial immunity derives from absolute
judicial immunity.” Roland v. Phillips, 19 F.3d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1994). It was
not improper for the Magistrate Judge to analyze quasi-judicial immunity for
Defendant Anne-Marie Adams when she raised judicial immunity.
Plaintiff’s
objection to the grant of quasi-judicial immunity for Defendant Anne-Marie Adams
is without merit.
Plaintiff’s fifth objection is that it is plain error and manifest injustice to treat
Defendants’ exhibits as undisputed. (Doc. # 65, at 13.) Plaintiff challenges the
authenticity of Defendants’ exhibits and insists that because they are disputed, they
should be stricken from the record. In the Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge
explained the differences between a facial attack and a factual attack to the court’s
subject-matter jurisdiction. (Doc. # 64, at 7–9.)
In a 12(b)(1) facial attack, the court evaluates whether the plaintiff “has
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sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction” in the complaint and
employs standards similar to those governing Rule 12(b)(6) review. Houston v.
Marod Supermarkets, Inc., 733 F.3d 1323, 1335 (11th Cir. 2013). A Rule 12(b)(1)
factual attack, however, “challenge[s] the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in
fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside the pleadings, such as
testimony and affidavits, are considered.” Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525,
1529 (11th Cir. 1990) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). When the
attack is factual, “the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to
the existence of its power to hear the case.” Id. Therefore, “no presumptive
truthfulness attaches to [the] plaintiff’s allegations, and the existence of disputed
material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluation for itself the merits of
jurisdictional claims.” Id. “The district court has the power to dismiss for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction on any of three separate bases: (1) the complaint alone;
(2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or
(3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of
disputed facts.” McElmurray v. Consol. Gov’t of Augusta-Richmond Cty., 501 F.3d
1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413
(5th Cir. 1981) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Defendants asserted that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine and attached the disputed exhibits in a factual attack on
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the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. (Doc. # 25, at 12–13.) In his analysis of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Magistrate Judge reviewed the disputed exhibits, and
determined that they “clearly establish that Hayden has a lengthy history in the
Alabama state courts on [the same precise issues that he presents in this case].”
(Doc. # 64, at 13.) Based on this determination, he found that the court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction. (Doc. # 64, at 14.) The Magistrate Judge had the
power to review and resolve the disputed factual issues in order to determine
whether the court had subject-matter jurisdiction. Therefore, this objection is
without merit.
Plaintiff’s sixth objection is that he is only proceeding for himself and not as
a representative of the William B. Cashion Trust. (Doc. # 65, at 15–16.) The
Recommendation addresses Plaintiff’s representation of the trust due to a lack of
clarity by Plaintiff, because although he claims he is only proceeding on his own
behalf, he “repeatedly references his status as the trustee.” (Doc. # 64, at 11.)
Plaintiff’s objection on the matter is similarly unclear because he asserts that his
causes of action are only for himself and not the trust, but also asserts that he is
protecting his rights as the trustee. (Doc. #65, at 15–16.) As the Recommendation
states, to the extent he attempts to proceed as the trustee, he cannot proceed pro se.
To the extent that he is not trying to represent the trust, his claims are otherwise
addressed by the Recommendation. This objection is without merit.
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Plaintiff’s seventh objection is that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not
apply because the state court was a “sham court” and therefore not a court of
competent jurisdiction as required under Rooker-Feldman. (Doc. # 65, at 16–19.)
Plaintiff makes essentially the same arguments that the Magistrate Judge considered
and rejected. (Doc. # 64, at 11–14.) This objection is without merit.
Plaintiff’s eighth objection is that Western Steel’s motion to dismiss was
unauthorized because he and his wife, Angela Hayden, are the president and
secretary of Western Steel and did not authorize the filing of the motion. (Doc.
# 65, at 20.) He also argues that the Magistrate Judge made Defendants’ arguments
for them.
Defendants Western Steel, William B. Cashion, and Merchants
Commercial Bank assert that Plaintiff failed to state a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim
against them because they are not state actors.
(Doc. # 25, at 11.)
The
Recommendation analyzes the issue and considers the tests under which private
parties can be viewed as state actors, including the “State Compulsion Test,” the
“Public Function Test,” and the “Nexus/Joint Action Test.” (Doc. # 64, at 15–17.)
Plaintiff objects to the use of the state compulsion test and the public function test.
(Doc. # 65, at 21.) The court finds it unremarkable that Defendants did not present
the exceptions under which they could have been found to be state actors. Plaintiff
bears the burden to show that Defendants are state actors for § 1983 purposes.
See Catron v. City of St. Petersburg, 658 F.3d 1260, 1266 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting
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Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003)). The Magistrate Judge
did not err by analyzing the circumstances and situations under which Defendants
could be state actors for the purposes of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim. Plaintiff’s
objection does not make the argument that Defendants are state actors in this case,
and, therefore, it is without merit.
Plaintiff also asserts that either he or his wife had to authorize Western Steel
to file its motion to dismiss.
(Doc. # 65, at 20.)
The Magistrate Judge
recommends dismissal of the claims against Western Steel because the court lacks
jurisdiction over the claims based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Doc. # 64,
at 14.)
“[I]t is well settled that a federal court is obligated to inquire into
subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking.” Bochese v.
Town of Ponce Inlet, 405 F.3d 964, 975 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Univ. of S. Ala. v.
Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir.1999)). The court has the authority
to raise and review the matter sua sponte, even if Western Steel had not filed the
motion to dismiss. Plaintiff’s objection is without merit.
Plaintiff’s ninth objection is that res judicata does not apply. (Doc. # 65,
at 23–24.) The Recommendation does not apply res judicata to the claims in this
case. This objection is without merit.
Plaintiff’s tenth objection is that Defendants should not receive attorneys’
fees because the Magistrate Judge did not make a finding that the action is frivolous,
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unreasonable, or without foundation.
(Doc. # 65, at 24 –25.)
Because the
Recommendation did not address attorneys’ fees and attorneys’ fees do not pertain
to the merits of dismissal of this action, the court will not address this objection.
The issue of attorneys’ fees will be referred back to the Magistrate Judge for further
proceedings.
Plaintiff’s eleventh objection is that his motions for contempt (Docs. # 41, 53)
and motion to amend (Doc. # 55) are unopposed and therefore should be granted.
(Doc. # 65, at 28–29.) The court did not require Defendants to brief these motions
because the motions to dismiss defeated the motions filed by Plaintiff. Therefore,
this objection is without merit.
Plaintiff’s twelfth objection is that the Magistrate Judge improperly raised the
argument applying the Younger abstention doctrine. (Doc. # 65, at 29.) The
Recommendation analyzed the Younger doctrine with respect to Plaintiff’s motions
for contempt. (Doc. # 64, at 25.) This analysis is jurisdictional, and pursuant to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12, “[i]f the court determines at any time
that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(h)(3). As discussed supra, the court has the authority to raise the matter
of subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s objection to
application of the Younger abstention doctrine is without merit.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:
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(1)
Plaintiff’s Objections (Docs. # 65, 66, 68) are OVERRULED.
(2)
The Recommendation is ADOPTED.
(3)
Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend (Doc. # 55) is DENIED.
(4)
Defendants William B. Cashion, Western Steel Inc., and Merchants
Commercial Bank’s motions to dismiss (Docs. # 25, 42) are GRANTED.
(5)
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 24) is GRANTED in part and
DENIED as moot in part. The motion is GRANTED as to the claims against
Defendants Anne-Marie Adams, Houston Brown, Scott Donaldson, James Allen
Main, Terry A. Moore, Thomas Francis Parker, Craig Sorrell Pittman, Gregory
Shaw, Lyn Stuart, Terri Willingham Thomas, William C. Thompson, Robert S.
Vance, Jr., J. Scott Vowell, and Alisa Kelli Wise. The motion is DENIED as moot
for the claims against Roy Moore in his individual capacity because Plaintiff
voluntarily dismissed the individual capacity claims.
(6)
Defendant Roy Moore’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 50) the claims
against him in his official capacity is GRANTED.
(7)
Defendant Joyce Vance’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 35) is GRANTED
and her alternative Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED as moot.
(8)
The Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 37) filed by the United States and the
U.S. Department of Justice is GRANTED.
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(9)
The federal claims in the original and amended complaints (Docs. # 1,
33) are DISMISSED with prejudice.
(10) The court declines supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims
and the state law claims are DISMISSED without prejudice.
(11) Plaintiff’s remaining motions (Docs. # 1, 32, 41, 48, 53) are DENIED.
(12) This matter is REFERRED back to the Magistrate Judge for a
determination regarding attorneys’ fees.
A separate final judgment will be entered.
DONE this 14th day of March, 2016.
/s/ W. Keith Watkins
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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