West Alabama Women's Center et al v. Miller
OPINION AND ORDER: it is ORDERED as follows: (1) Plfs West Alabama Women's Center and William J. Parker's 32 motion to lift the stay and file a supplemental complaint is granted; (2) This case is reopened; (3) The stay previously entered (doc. no. 31 ) is dissolved; (4) The proposed first supplemental complaint (doc. no. 32 -1) may be filed. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/5/2016. (wcl, )
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION
WEST ALABAMA WOMEN’S
CENTER and WILLIAM J.
PARKER, M.D., on behalf of )
themselves and their
THOMAS M. MILLER,
M.D., in his official
capacity as State Health
CIVIL ACTION NO.
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs West Alabama Women’s Center, a Tuscaloosa
Fourteenth Amendment challenge to an abortion regulation
with which they could not comply and which had forced the
clinic to close.
The defendant is the State Health
Officer for the Alabama Department of Public Health.
action at the request of the parties so as to give the
Department an opportunity to modify the regulation.
This litigation is currently before the court on West
Alabama and Parker’s motion to lift the stay and for
primarily impact West Alabama and one other abortion
clinic in the State.
Based on the representations made
by the parties in briefs and at oral argument, the court
concludes that West Alabama and Parker’s motion should
The clinic found a new physician,
Parker, who agreed to replace the retiring physician.
However, West Alabama and Parker were unable to comply
applicable to abortion clinics and physicians.
hospital or, alternatively, that any facility at which a
physician who has such privileges.1
While West Alabama’s
1. Enforcement of an Alabama statute requiring that
all physicians providing abortions have admitting
privileges was enjoined by this court in a separate
lawsuit, Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange (Strange
III), 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1378 (M.D. Ala. 2014)
(Thompson, J.) (finding that 1975 Ala. Code § 26-23E-4(c)
creates an undue burden, at least as to the plaintiff
See also Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v.
Strange (Strange V), -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2016 WL 1167725
(M.D. Ala. March 25, 2016) (Thompson, J.) (declaring the
retiring physician had held staff privileges at a local
hospital, Parker was not able to obtain staff privileges
or secure a contract with a covering physician for the
As a result, in January 2015, the clinic closed.
On July 10, 2015, West Alabama and Parker filed this
as-applied constitutional challenge to the regulation.
In early August 2015, after the parties had submitted
substantial evidence and briefed and orally argued the
At the time this West Alabama
litigation commenced, the regulation had been amended in
light of the statute and in the wake of the Strange
litigation; it still allowed for compliance in either of
two ways. As this court previously explained in August
of last year, “the regulation now states that the
statutory requirement that all physicians obtain staff
privileges is ‘stayed until such time that the
restraining order is lifted or there has been a final
disposition allowing for enforcement of this requirement
in Planned Parenthood Southeast, et al. v. Strange, et
al., Civil Action No. 2:13–cv–504–MHT,’ and that, ‘until
that time,’ clinics may comply with the regulation by
contracting with a covering physician.
revised language of the regulation is a bit abstruse, it
appears that both sides in this litigation agree that the
current regulation retains the same two alternative
routes for compliance: staff privileges for the doctor
or a covering-physician contract for the clinic.”
Ala. Women's Ctr. v. Williamson, 120 F. Supp. 3d 1296,
1301 n.2 (M.D. Ala. 2015) (Thompson, J.).
complex legal and factual issues, and because the clinic
was then set to lay off staff and shut down permanently,
regulation until August 18 and promised that an opinion
W. Ala. Women’s Ctr. v. Williamson, No.
15cv497, 2015 WL 4932810, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 4, 2015)
In mid-August, the court issued an
81-page opinion setting forth in detail the legal and
factual basis for the injunction.
W. Ala. Women’s Ctr.
v. Williamson, 120 F. Supp. 3d 1296 (M.D. Ala. 2015)
The clinic reopened shortly thereafter.
extended by agreement of the parties, the court approved
provided that, for one year, while the Health Department
sought to modify the regulation, this litigation would
be stayed and enforcement of the regulation would be
waived as to West Alabama.2
W. Ala. Women’s Ctr. v.
2. This waiver was subject
conditions not relevant here.
(M.D. Ala. Aug. 31, 2015) (Thompson, J.).
In June 2016, West Alabama and Parker filed the
supplement their complaint as follows: to continue their
challenge to the abortion regulation, albeit as amended
since the stay was entered, and to add challenges to two
recently enacted Alabama statutes that primarily impact
West Alabama and one other abortion clinic.
During the stay, the regulation was amended to add
an additional alternative for compliance: any abortion
clinic that is unable to comply with the staff-privileges
ensuring that every woman who receives an abortion at the
facility “receive[s] a copy of her medical record that
In their proposed supplemental complaint challenging
the amended regulation, West Alabama and Parker allege
that: “A patient’s medical records from [West Alabama]
contain her most personal and sensitive information.
addition to details of the abortion procedure itself,
this information includes but is not limited to ... the
patient’s medical and surgical history, including her HIV
including number of children, miscarriages, and prior
counseling session about her reasons for seeking the
abortion; and the name and signature of the person who
will drive her home from the clinic.”
Compl. (doc. no. 32-1) at 16.
They further allege that:
“The medical records requirement jeopardizes the privacy
of [West Alabama]’s patients by increasing the likelihood
patient’s decision to have an abortion, will be exposed
to third parties.”
Id. at 19.
And they continue that:
“Forcing a woman who has just had an abortion to receive
a copy of her medical record reflecting her entire sexual
and medical history and the care she received at [West
For victims of abuse, this could jeopardize
their wellbeing, safety, or even their lives.”
The Health Department adopted the amended regulation
supplemental complaint, the department had, during the
comments period, "received multiple comments opposing the
medical records requirement on the basis that it would
pose an unacceptable threat to patient confidentiality
and singled out abortion providers for a requirement not
imposed on any other healthcare providers."
Id. at 11.
Since the stay was entered, the State Legislature
enacted and the Governor signed two new statutes the
plaintiffs also seek to challenge.
The first of these
is Senate Bill 205, which prohibits the licensure of
abortion clinics located within 2,000 feet of a K-8
public school, and which primarily impacts West Alabama
and one other abortion clinic.
This court will refer to
this Act as the “school-proximity law.”
The second newly enacted statute is Senate Bill 363,
the Alabama Unborn Child Protection from Dismemberment
prohibits the dilation and evacuation (D&E) abortion
procedure used in second-trimester abortions, and which
primarily impacts West Alabama, the primary provider (and
one of only two providers) of second-trimester abortions
in the State.
Tr. of June 17, 2016, Telephone Conference
on Pls.’ Mot. to Suppl. (doc. no. 48) at 16-17.
West Alabama and Parker refer to this act as the “D & E
law,” this court will temporarily do so as well.3
3. The court should not be understood to agree with
West Alabama and Parker that the statute in fact covers
or bans the D & E procedure; the statute’s coverage is
uncertain at this point. The court is merely relying--as
it must at this time--upon the allegations of the
West Alabama and Parker request that the court allow
them to supplement their complaint with three new claims:
amended; (2) a challenge to the school-proximity law; and
(3) a challenge to the D&E law.
Because the State Health Officer has conceded on the
record that it is appropriate to lift the stay and to
challenge to the amended regulation, id. at 4, the stay
will be lifted and West Alabama and Parker’s motion to
supplement will be granted as to that claim.4
issue that needs discussion is whether to allow the
addition of the challenges to the school-proximity law
4. The State Health Officer also contends that West
Alabama and Parker are misreading the regulation as being
more burdensome than it actually is. West Alabama and
Parker respond that it is counsel for the State Health
Officer who is misreading the regulation--and that the
interpretation the State Health Officer offers is not
binding on the Department of Public Health. These are
substantive matters that remain to be litigated.
A. Legal Standard
Supplemental pleadings are governed by Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 15(d), which provides:
“On motion and reasonable notice, the
court may, on just terms, permit a party
occurrence, or event that happened
after the date of the pleading to be
The court may permit
original pleading is defective in
stating a claim or defense. The court
may order that the opposing party plead
to the supplemental pleading within a
standards at all to guide the district court's analysis;
it merely authorizes the district court to permit service
of a supplemental pleading ‘on just terms.’”
rel. Gadbois v. PharMerica Corp., 809 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.
2015), cert. denied, No. 15-1309, 2016 WL 1643545 (U.S.
June 27, 2016).
The Rule “is intended to give the court
broad discretion in allowing a supplemental pleading.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) advisory committee’s note to 1963
However, there is still the question of how
this discretion should be exercised.
obviously places upon a court a corresponding obligation
reached based on the exercise of that discretion--not
simply so as to facilitate appellate review, but also to
reasoned judgment and not arbitrarily or out of mere
overarching flexibility of Rule 15, courts customarily
have treated requests to supplement under Rule 15(d)
Gadbois, 809 F.3d at 7.
See also Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 984 (11th Cir.
2000) (noting "the liberal allowance of amendments or
supplements to ... pleading under Rule 15"). Indeed, the
Supreme Court has stated that supplementation can even
include new claims and new parties.
See Griffin v. Cty.
Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cty., 377 U.S. 218, 227 (1964).
"This liberality is reminiscent of the way in which
courts have treated requests to amend under Rule 15(a)'s
leave ‘freely give[n]’ standard.”
7 (citations omitted).
Gadbois, 809 F.3d at
As Judge Haynsworth famously put
it, “a supplemental pleading ... is a useful device,
enabling a court to award complete relief, or more nearly
complete relief, in one action, and to avoid the cost,
separately tried and prosecuted.
So useful they are and
justice that they ought to be allowed as of course, unless
some particular reason for disallowing them appears ...."
New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Waller, 323 F. 2d 20, 28-29
(4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 963 (1964).
Nevertheless, while the court's discretion is broad,
and while that discretion should be exercised liberally,
limitation that any supplementation must be based on a
"transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d).
And there is the obvious and
"some relation" to what is sought to be supplemented.
(4th Cir. 1970).
teaches that there are a number of factors that courts,
in reaching their reasoned judgment, should weigh when
Would the supplementation be futile?
nonmovant be prejudiced?
Has there been unreasonable
delay in presenting the supplementation?
And would the
supplementation facilitate the efficient resolution of
current claims as well as any new ones?
F.3d at 7; see also 6A Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. &
Proc. Civ. § 1504 (3d ed.).
Of course, none of these
factors is necessarily dispositive in and of itself.
Gadbois, 809 F.3d at 7.
"[e]verything depends on context."
In other words,
The bottom line
is: Would the supplementation promote “the efficient
administration of justice”?
New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 323
F. 2d at 28-29.
B. West Alabama and Parker’s Challenges
to the School-Proximity and D&E Laws
Applying the above principles and guidelines, the
court finds that supplementation with West Alabama and
Parker’s challenges to the school-proximity and D&E laws
1. School-Proximity Law
There are a number of compelling reasons why West
Alabama and Parker's school-proximity claim should be
added to this litigation.
First, the stipulation the parties entered into as a
part of the stay of these proceedings expressly permitted
West Alabama and Parker, at the end of the stay, to “amend
the complaint” and “seek other appropriate relief,” W.
Ala. Women’s Ctr., 2015 WL 5164054, at *2--and notably
without setting forth any limitation on what that amended
complaint could include or what that other appropriate
relief could be.
Therefore, as a general matter, not
only does the school-proximity claim meet Rule 15(d)'s
requirement that it arise out of events that occurred
after this litigation was filed, but the stipulation
reflects that, as a practical matter, the litigation has
not progressed to the point where the parties no longer
expected new claims and new requests for relief based on
Second, the current plaintiffs, West Alabama and
Parker, are also plaintiffs for the school-proximity
And the current defendant, the State Health
school-proximity claim, he is perhaps the only clearly
appropriate one for that claim.
Based on the plain text
Officer--who presides over the Alabama Department of
enforcing the law.
The law provides that, “The Alabama
Department of Public Health may not issue or renew a
reproductive health center that performs abortions and
is located within 2,000 feet of a K-8 public school.”
Ex. B, Pls.’ Mot. to Lift Stay and to File Suppl. Compl.
(doc. no. 32-1) at 1.
Indeed, in proceedings in this
court, defense counsel conceded that the Health Officer
is responsible for declining to issue or renew a license
for a clinic that violates the law, and counsel admitted
that the Health Officer might even be the individual who
would measure the distance between a K-8 public school
and an abortion clinic or reproductive health center if
a dispute arose as to whether a facility’s license should
Tr. of June 17, 2016, Telephone Conference
As no other State department, agency, or
official is mentioned in the statute by name, the State
Health Officer would likely be called upon to defend any
plaintiffs were permitted to supplement their original
complaint in this case or were forced to bring the
challenge in a separate suit.
See Am. Civil Liberties
Union v. Fla. Bar, 999 F.2d 1486, 1490 (11th Cir. 1993)
(“Under United States Supreme Court precedent, when a
plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of a rule of
law, it is the state official designated to enforce that
rule who is the proper defendant, even when that party
has made no attempt to enforce the rule.”). Thus, because
the parties appear to be appropriately the same, they
will, with the addition of the school-proximity claim,
save the costs, both in money and time, of litigating a
separate proceeding between them.
litigation (in particular, the challenge to the original
regulation) bear a substantial legal and evidentiary
relationship to each other, and the resolution of the
school-proximity claim in the context of this ongoing
expeditious resolution of that claim.
To begin, there is significant overlap between the
legal analysis that the court has already performed, at
length, in the litigation of the original claim in this
case and the analysis it will need to perform in the
litigation of the school-proximity claim.
the original regulation, this court applied the following
analysis: The court observed that “‘An undue burden is
an unconstitutional burden,’ and a ‘finding of an undue
burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion of a nonviable fetus.’”
W. Ala. Women's Ctr.,
120 F. Supp. 3d at 1307 (quoting Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (plurality
To determine whether the regulation imposed
examining the regulation in its real-world context, the
obstacle is more significant than is warranted by the
State's justifications for the regulation.” Id. (quoting
Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange (Strange III),
33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1337 (M.D. Ala. 2014) (Thompson, J.)
(internal citations and additional citations omitted)).
The court analyzed “the obstacles and justifications for
the regulation ... , as applied to plaintiffs, and then
evaluate[d] whether the obstacles [were] more severe than
warranted by the State's justifications.”
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, No. 15-274, 2016 WL
3461560, at *20 (U.S. June 27, 2016) (in applying the
undue-burden standard, considering closures of abortion
clinics due to an admitting-privileges requirement that
“meant fewer doctors, longer waiting times, and increased
crowding ... in
absence of any health benefit”).
In evaluating the
obstacles, the court undertook a “two-step inquiry ... :
[enquiring] first, whether the regulation will force
[West Alabama] to remain closed; and second, if [West
Alabama] remains closed, and no other clinic takes its
place, determining the effect on Alabama women who seek
W. Ala. Women's Ctr., 120 F. Supp. 3d at
While the justifications for the original regulation
differed from those that will probably be proffered for
the school-proximity law, the analytical approach the
parties and the court will employ for assessing the
constitutionality of the school-proximity law will likely
largely be the same.
Thus, it appears that the court and
the parties are already fully familiar with the complex
legal framework within which the school-proximity claim
will need to be considered.
considered by, the court will likely be directly relevant
to consideration of the school-proximity claim.
the original regulation would allegedly have resulted in
the permanent closure of West Alabama and because the
Alabama's closure as well, a good bit of evidence already
presented to the court on the alleged impact of the
clinic's closure on Alabama women seeking an abortion,
see id. at 1309-1312, will most likely also be directly
relevant to the school-proximity claim.
because the school-proximity law will allegedly result
in the closure of not only West Alabama but a second
school-proximity claim will likely be more extensive.
However, this difference does not detract from the fact
that a good deal of the evidence already before the court
will be relevant to the school-proximity claim.
neither West Alabama and Parker nor the State Health
stating that they intend to present much of the same
evidence on the school-proximity claim that this court
heard during the litigation of the initial challenge to
the staff privileges/covering physician regulation); id.
at 12 (counsel for State Health Officer stating that “a
lot of the evidence [presented as to the school-proximity
claim] would be the same” as that presented in the
Without question, the litigation
of the school-proximity claim in this case will be much
less costly and time-consuming, and will thus better
promote “the efficient administration of justice.”
Amsterdam Cas. Co., 323 F. 2d at 28-29.
Fourth, one of the primary goals of Rule 15(d) is to
pleading “enabl[es] a court to award complete relief, or
more nearly complete relief, in one action, and to avoid
the cost, delay and waste of separate actions which must
observed, West Alabama and Parker filed the challenge to
the original regulation to prevent permanent closure of
the clinic due to a legal requirement enforced by the
amended, but West Alabama still faces the threat of
closure due to a law that will prevent the reissuance of
its license by the State Health Officer.
between West Alabama and the Health Officer, therefore,
In this straightforward and compelling
sense, because this dispute over whether the clinic can
continue to operate has not been completely resolved,
supplementation is in the true spirit of Rule 15(d).
school-proximity claim's relationship with the challenge
to the original regulation.
The school-proximity claim
also bears a relationship to the challenge to the amended
regulation, a challenge which all parties agree should
now be part of this litigation.
warranted, in this regard, because resolution of the
challenge to the amended regulation and that of the
school-proximity claim are somewhat interdependent.
school-proximity law is unsuccessful and West Alabama is
litigation of the amended-regulation challenge in this
court and on appeal would become moot; it would make
little sense to hold a trial or grant permanent relief
as to West Alabama and Parker’s amended-regulation claim
until a preliminary assessment is made that the clinic
school-proximity law, and thus likely to remain open.
Given the interrelated nature of the two challenges, it
determination of how these claims should be resolved so
as to keep down litigation costs and conserve judicial
resources can be more easily and efficiently made in one
lawsuit rather than two.
Admittedly, on the one hand, there was
much evidentiary development in this case with regard to
needed expeditious resolution.
However, on the other
hand, this court now has a new challenge to the regulation
as amended; the Health Officer has yet to respond to this
new claim; no uniform scheduling order with discovery and
other deadlines has ever been entered; and no pretrial
essentially come at the outset of the new challenge to
the amended regulation.
In conclusion, for the numerous reasons given above,
school-proximity claim against the State Health Officer.
2. The D&E Law
Whether, with an eye on the big picture as well as
the details, supplementation is appropriate as to West
Alabama and Parker's challenge to the D&E law is a closer
Unlike with regard to the original regulation
and the school-proximity law, West Alabama and Parker do
not contend that the D&E law, which they allege bans the
D&E abortion procedure, would result in the closure of
Further, West Alabama and Parker have
named additional defendants in their challenge to the D&E
However, for several reasons--including that the
D&E claim is sufficiently related to the claim that has
been and one of the two that will be presented in this
litigation--the court holds that the D&E claim should be
added to this litigation.
First, the same general circumstances that support
adding the school-proximity claim to this litigation also
support adding the D&E claim.
As a predicate for the
application of Rule 15(d), the D&E claim arose after the
stipulation reflects that they understood that new claims
could be added to this litigation.
And the D&E claim is
challenges to the new regulation and the school-proximity
Second, the analysis of and evidence relevant to the
D&E claim will likely significantly overlap not only with
that previously presented with regard to the challenge
to the original regulation but also with that likely to
Although the D&E law applies statewide, its
primary impact is alleged to be on West Alabama.
West Alabama is one of only two clinics in the State that
provide abortions after 15 weeks and because all such
provide) are performed using the D&E method that they
eliminate access to abortions after 15 weeks even though
the State allows abortion up to 20 weeks.5
17, 2016, Telephone Conference at 16.
Tr. of June
In short, for the
relevant group of women (those seeking D&E abortions),
the impact of the D&E law will, in a sense, be quite
school-proximity law: West Alabama and the other clinic’s
doors will be shut to women in Alabama seeking abortions
after 15 weeks.
As a result, the undue-burden analysis discussed
above will in some measure also apply to West Alabama and
Parker's challenge to the D&E law, and the evidence
already received with regard to the original-regulation
5. West Alabama and Parker admit that abortions after
15 weeks may also be performed using an induction
However, they contend that neither West
Alabama nor the other clinic that provides abortions
after 15 weeks is equipped to perform this procedure; it
involves the induction of labor and, accordingly, can be
a multi-day procedure. Induction must be performed in a
hospital, so neither clinic would be an adequate setting.
school-proximity claim will be relevant.
analyze the obstacles to abortion access for the “group
for whom the law is a restriction.”
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894 (1992) (plurality
While that group presumably would be smaller
in regards to the challenge to the D&E law, the evidence
nonetheless still overlap significantly.
Third, there is an important practical link between
the D&E law and the school-proximity law that supports
adding the D&E law claim to this litigation.
decision would allegedly result in the closure of West
Alabama by the end of 2016, a result that would arguably
render the D&E challenge moot.
Permitting these claims
to be litigated together will avoid the possibility of
unnecessary adjudication of a claim and will eliminate
the possible need for coordination between different
Finally, the addition of the following different
defendants does not warrant denial of leave to supplement
this litigation with the challenge to the D&E law: Luther
Strange, in his official capacity as Alabama Attorney
General; Lyn Head, in her official capacity as District
Attorney for Tuscaloosa County; Robert L. Broussard, in
his official capacity as District Attorney for Madison
County; Dr. H. Joseph Falgout, in his official capacity
as Chairman of the Alabama Board of Medical Examiners;
and Dr. James E. West, in his official capacity as
Chairman of the Medical Licensure Commission of Alabama.
supplemental pleadings under Rule 15(d) are appropriate
vehicles for the addition of new parties--including new
filing of the original complaint.
See Griffin, 377 U.S.
supplementation is nothing unusual.
Moreover, as a practical matter, there is nothing
to indicate that the addition of these defendants would
make the resolution of any claim in these proceedings
Nor would these defendants' presence
prejudice the State Health Officer.
The State Health
Officer already has to defend two of the three claims in
Moreover, because there is an evidentiary
overlap between the school-proximity and D&E claims, the
State Health Officer, though not a party to the D&E claim,
will have the advantage, if he wants, of monitoring the
evidence that is developed with regard to that claim.
In any event, that a defendant defends fewer than
all the claims in a case is common, and nothing special
in this litigation makes it otherwise unusual.
extent that the State Health Officer is uninvolved in the
participate in defending against this claim.
In conclusion, because of the relationship, both as
to law and evidence, the D&E claim, the school-proximity
claim, and the amended-regulation challenge bear to the
claim this court has already addressed; because of the
relationship the three claims have among themselves;
because supplementation will not unfairly prejudice the
State Health Officer; and because of the current posture
of this litigation, the court concludes that it would be
more efficient and just to try the three claims together
in this lawsuit.
Or, to put it another way, the benefit
of trying these three claims together strongly outweighs
any disadvantage that might arise.
amended regulation, the school-proximity law, and the D&E
law determine how, to what extent, and even whether, at
all, West Alabama can provide abortions, West Alabama and
Parker could certainly have brought a single lawsuit
challenging all three.
For the same reason, West Alabama
and Parker should now be able to add and challenge at one
time all three in this litigation.
C. Alabama Women’s Center and Robinson-White's
Challenges to the School-Proximity and D&E Laws
The court has already concluded that West Alabama
complaint with their challenges to the school-proximity
and the D&E laws.
The additional question now before the
complaint, Alabama Women’s Center, located in Huntsville,
and its medical director, Yashica Robinson-White, M.D.,
should be allowed to join in these challenges. The answer
First, West Alabama and Parker's claims and Alabama
Women’s Center and Robinson-White's claims are virtually
Indeed, it appears at this time that the law
and the evidence will be essentially the same.
In considering West Alabama’s claims, the court will
challenge to the alleged ban on D&E, mid-second-trimester
abortions--elsewhere in the State, in order to determine
how severely women’s rights would be burdened by the
mid-second-trimester abortion) at West Alabama.
Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange (Strange III),
33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1342 (M.D. Ala. 2014) (Thompson, J.)
(assessing whether an abortion restriction imposed an
undue burden by “first, determining the effect of the
providers”); see also West Ala. Women’s Ctr., 120 F.
Supp. 3d at 1309-12 (assessing the effect of the closure
of one clinic on women by considering evidence regarding
the capacity and accessibility of the other remaining
abortion providers in the State).
Whether the challenged
laws will force other clinics, such as Alabama Women’s
Center, to close or to stop providing certain procedures
adjudication of West Alabama’s claims.
Thus, the court
will need to hear evidence and determine the impact of
Robinson-White regardless of whether they are plaintiffs
in this case.
It would be a total waste for resources
and time to force Women's Center and Robinson-White to
file a separate lawsuit and present this evidence again.
Second, had West Alabama and Parker not sought to
include the Alabama Women’s Center and Robinson-White as
plaintiffs, these new plaintiffs certainly could have
moved to intervene, and this court would have granted
overlapping evidence and because the new plaintiffs’
“claim[s] ... share with the main action  common
question[s] of law or fact.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)
intervention is appropriate).
* * *
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, it is
ORDERED as follows:
William J. Parker’s motion to lift the stay and file a
supplemental complaint (doc. no. 32) is granted.
(2) This case is reopened.
(3) The stay previously entered (doc. no. 31) is
(doc. no. 32-1) may be filed.
DONE, this the 5th day of July, 2016.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson____
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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