Carroll v. Colvin

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM OPINION: The court has carefully and independently reviewed the record and concludes that the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence and is due to be affirmed. A separate order will be entered. Signed by Honorable Judge Charles S. Coody on 1/19/2017. (dmn, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION
BARBARA SUE CARROLL,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
CAROLYN W. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, )
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,1 )
)
Defendant.
)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:15cv883-CSC
(WO)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction
The plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits pursuant to Title II of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., and for supplemental security income benefits under
Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq., alleging that she was
unable to work because of a disability.

Her application was denied at the initial

administrative level. The plaintiff then requested and received a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Following the hearing, the ALJ concluded that the
plaintiff was not under a “disability” as defined in the Social Security Act, and denied the
plaintiff’s claim for benefits. The Appeals Council rejected a subsequent request for review.
The ALJ’s decision consequently became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social

1

Carolyn W. Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on February 14, 2013.

Security (“Commissioner”).2 See Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986).
The case is now before the court for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have consented to entry of final judgment by the
United States Magistrate Judge. Based on the court’s review of the record in this case and
the briefs of the parties, the court concludes that the decision of the Commissioner should
be affirmed.
II. Standard of Review
Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), a person is entitled to disability benefits when the
person is unable to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result
in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than 12 months . . .
To make this determination,3 the Commissioner employs a five-step, sequential
evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.
(1) Is the person presently unemployed?
(2) Is the person’s impairment severe?
(3) Does the person's impairment meet or equal one of the specific
impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1?
(4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation?
2

Pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub.L. No.
103-296, 108 Stat. 1464, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services with respect to Social
Security matters were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security.
3

A “physical or mental impairment” is one resulting from anatomical, physiological, or
psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques.

2

(5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy?
An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next
question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative
answer to any question, other than step three, leads to a determination of “not
disabled.”
McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).4
The standard of review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one. This court
must find the Commissioner’s decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial evidence.
42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997). “Substantial
evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is such relevant evidence
as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A reviewing court may not look only to those parts of
the record which supports the decision of the ALJ but instead must view the record in its
entirety and take account of evidence which detracts from the evidence relied on by the ALJ.
Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir. 1986).
[The court must] . . . scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the
reasonableness of the [Commissioner’s] . . . factual findings . . . No similar
presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner’s] . . . legal
conclusions, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in
evaluating claims.
Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987).

4

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026 (11th Cir. 1986) is a supplemental security income case (SSI).
The same sequence applies to disability insurance benefits. Cases arising under Title II are appropriately
cited as authority in Title XVI cases. See e.g. Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1981) (Unit A).

3

III. The Issues
A. Introduction. The plaintiff was 52 years old at the time of the hearing before the
ALJ and had completed the eighth grade. (R. 24, 39). Following the hearing, the ALJ
concluded that the plaintiff has severe impairments of “chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease (COPD), status post arthroscopic surgery of bilateral knees, osteoarthritis of knees,
bilateral knee edema no (sic) otherwise specified, morbid obesity, and dysthymic disorder
versus major depressive disorder.” (R. 13). Her prior work experience includes work as a
cashier. (R. 24). The ALJ concluded that Carroll could perform her past relevant work, and
thus, she was not disabled. (Id.). In the alternative, relying on the testimony of a vocational
expert, the ALJ concluded that there were jobs existing in significant numbers in the
national economy that Carroll could perform. (R. 24-25). Consequently, the ALJ concluded
that she was not disabled. (R. 25-26).
B. Plaintiff’s Claims. Carroll presents three issues for the court’s review. As stated
by the plaintiff, the issues are as follows:
1.

The Commissioner failed to fully and fairly develop the medical
evidence.

2.

The Commissioner failed to sufficiently assess Ms. Cameron’s (sic)
credibility.

3.

The Commissioner improperly determined the claimant’s residual
functional capacity (RFC).

(Doc. # 18 at 5-6).

4

IV. Discussion
A disability claimant bears the initial burden of demonstrating an inability to return
to her past work. Lucas v. Sullivan, 918 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1990). In determining
whether the claimant has satisfied this burden, the Commissioner is guided by four factors:
(1) objective medical facts or clinical findings, (2) diagnoses of examining physicians, (3)
subjective evidence of pain and disability, e.g., the testimony of the claimant and her family
or friends, and (4) the claimant’s age, education, and work history. Tieniber v. Heckler, 720
F.2d 1251 (11th Cir. 1983). The court must scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine
the reasonableness of the ALJ’s decision. See Walker, 826 F.2d at 999. The ALJ must
conscientiously probe into, inquire of and explore all relevant facts to elicit both favorable
and unfavorable facts for review. Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735-36 (11th Cir.
1981). The ALJ must also state, with sufficient specificity, the reasons for his decision
referencing the plaintiff’s impairments.
Any such decision by the Commissioner of Social Security which involves a
determination of disability and which is in whole or in part unfavorable to
such individual shall contain a statement of the case, in understandable
language, setting forth a discussion of the evidence, and stating the
Commissioner’s determination and the reason or reasons upon which it is
based.
42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) (emphases added).
A. Fully and Fairly Develop the Record. Carroll first argues that the ALJ failed
to properly develop the record when he failed to reconcile an ambiguity in the opinion of the

5

consultative examiner. (Doc. # 18 at 6-7). On January 21, 2014, Carroll underwent a
consultative physical examination by Dr. Oluyinka Adediji. Dr. Adediji observed the
following.
Station is normal, walks with reduced stance with no ataxia, Gait is antalgic
without and any assistive devise (sic). She uses Cane on Rt hand periodically
but able to walk without one.
Minimal problems getting on and off examination table. No regional or
generalized spasticity. Squatting observed with no difficulty.
Claimant stands/walks on heels and toes with minimal difficulty.
Claimant walks in tandem satisfactorily. Romberg is negative.
(R. 433).
Dr. Adediji noted knee joint pain with active and passive range of motion but “no
palpable effusion, tenderness or increased warmth bilaterally.” (R. 434). There was
“[p]alpable crepitus bilaterally,” but no effusion. (Id.) Based on his examination, Dr.
Adediji diagnosed “Bilateral Knee Pain: Osteoarthritis.” (R. 435). Dr. Adediji observed
that “[p]ain is the main limiting factor is pain. (sic) She would need knee protective
restrictions like sitting job and avoidance of prolonged standing or repetitive climbing and
kneeling.” (Id.) Dr. Adediji then completed a medical source statement detailing Carroll’s
physical abilities. (R. 436-441). Dr. Adediji opined that Carroll could sit for three hours at
one time without interruption, stand for thirty minutes at one time without interruption, and
walk for thirty minutes at one time without interruption. (R. 437). He further opined that

6

Carroll could sit for six hours total in an eight hour work day, stand for three hours total in
an eight hour work day, and walk for three hours total in an eight hour work day. (Id.) The
ALJ gave significant but not great weight to Dr. Adediji’s opinion specifically reducing
Carroll’s RFC to light work because of “a limitation to standing and/or walking one hour
without interruption and a total of six hours is consistent with Dr. Adediji’s conclusion that
claimant could engage in each for 30 minutes at a time and a total of three hours.” (R.23).
According to Carroll, Dr. Adediji’s opinion is ambiguous.
Dr. Adediji stated in his consultative examination (CE) report Ms.
Carroll “would need knee protective restrictions like sitting job and avoidance
of prolonged standing . . .etc. Tr. 435. However, in his Medical Source
Statement of Ability To Do Work-Related Activities (MSS), he states she
could walk three hours total in an eight hour day and stand three hours total
in an eight hour day. Tr. 437.
When taken without Dr. Adediji’s opinion that Ms. Carroll would need
“a sitting job,” his MSS is ambiguous, as it is unclear whether Dr. Adediji was
asserting that Ms. Carrol (sic) could either stand or walk three hours total in
an eight hour day, or whether he was asserting that she could do both, stand
for three hours and walk for three, for a total of six hours in an eight hour day.
However, when taken in context with the statement regarding the need for a
sitting job, it appears the MSS was intended to imply sedentary restrictions on
walking, standing, and sitting. The ALJ appears to have interpreted the MSS
to mean Ms. Carroll could walk for three hours and stand for three hours, with
a combined total of six hours on her feet as the ALJ afforded Dr. Adediji’s
opinion significant weight and uses it to justify a light RFC. Tr. 23. The ALJ
never addresses the conflict or ambiguity, nor made any attempt to resolve it.
This ambiguity/inconsistency is critical in this case because, if adopted by the
ALJ, these restrictions likely result in a favorable decision, as the Medical
Vocational Grid Rules direct a finding of disabled should Ms. Carroll be
found unable to perform activities at the light level of exertion.
(Doc. # 18 at 6-7).

7

Although Carroll complains that there is an ambiguity in Dr. Adediji’s source
statement, the ALJ was not required to accept Dr. Adediji’s opinion in whole in forming
Carroll’s RFC. Jobs in the category of light work require “a good deal of walking or
standing,” or “sitting most of the time.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) (emphasis added). More
importantly, however, Carroll’s argument is based on inference, “extrapolation and
conjecture [which] remains insufficient to disturb the ALJ’s RFC determination, where it
is supported by substantial evidence.” See Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1213 (11th
Cir. 2005). The ALJ evaluated the evidence before him which led him to conclude that
Carroll could perform light work with limitations. The RFC adequately accounts for
Carroll’s limitations, and it is not the province of this court to reweigh evidence, make
credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Instead the court
reviews the record to determine if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.
Id. at 1211.
While the ALJ has the responsibility to determine the plaintiff’s RFC, it is plaintiff
who bears the burden of proving her RFC, i.e., she must establish through evidence that her
impairments result in functional limitations and that she is “disabled” under the Social
Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512 (instructing claimant that the ALJ will consider
“only impairment(s) you say you have or about which we receive evidence” and “[y]ou must
provide medical evidence showing that you have an impairment(s) and how severe it is
during the time you say that you are disabled”). See also Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d
8

1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001) (it is claimant’s burden to prove RFC, and ALJ’s responsibility
to determine RFC based on medical records, observations of treating physicians and others,
and claimant’s description of limitations). The court has independently considered the
record as a whole and finds that the record provides substantial support for the ALJ’s RFC
determination.
B. Credibility Analysis. Carroll next argues that the ALJ failed to properly assess
her credibility. As explained below, the ALJ did not fully credit Carroll’s testimony.
“Subjective pain testimony supported by objective medical evidence of a condition that can
reasonably be expected to produce the symptoms of which the plaintiff complains is itself
sufficient to sustain a finding of disability.” Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007 (11th Cir. 1987).
The Eleventh Circuit has established a three-part test that applies when a claimant attempts
to establish disability through her own testimony of pain or other subjective symptoms.
Landry v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1551, 1553 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d
1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991). This standard requires evidence of an underlying medical
condition and either (1) objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged
pain arising from that condition or (2) an objectively determined medical condition of such
severity that it can reasonably be expected to give rise to the alleged pain. Landry, 782 F.
2d at 1553. In this circuit, the law is clear. The Commissioner must consider a claimant’s
subjective testimony of pain if she finds evidence of an underlying medical condition and
the objectively determined medical condition is of a severity that can reasonably be expected
9

to give rise to the alleged pain. Mason v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 1460, 1462 (11th Cir. 1986);
Landry, 782 F.2d at 1553. Thus, if the Commissioner fails to articulate reasons for refusing
to credit a claimant’s subjective pain testimony, the Commissioner has accepted the
testimony as true as a matter of law. This standard requires that the articulated reasons must
be supported by substantial reasons. If there is no such support then the testimony must be
accepted as true. Hale, 831 F.2d at 1012.
At the administrative hearing, Carroll testified that knee pain and COPD are the
reasons she cannot work. (R. 44). The ALJ thoroughly detailed the medical evidence and
discussed her testimony. The ALJ acknowledged that Carroll has “medically determinable
impairments that could reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms;
however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects
of these symptoms are not credible for the reasons explained in this decision.” (R. 17). If
this were the extent of the ALJ’s credibility analysis, the plaintiff might be entitled to some
relief. However, a review of the ALJ’s analysis demonstrates that the ALJ properly
considered and discredited Carroll’s testimony. Rather than give a synopsis of it, the court
will quote it.
The claimant engages in activities of daily living that are inconsistent with
disabling pain or functional limitations. She admits she gets her children
ready for school and her daughter is totally dependent on her to dress her. The
claimant indicated she lives alone, takes her medications, gets her children
ready for school, does small tasks, provides care for her disabled daughter,
takes care of pets, takes care of her personal needs, makes sandwiches and
frozen meals, cooks a full meal sometimes, does laundry, sweeps, mops,
10

drives, goes out alone, shops, pays bills (Exhibit 6E). The medical evidence
fails to support significant limitation of activities of daily living since the
claimant has no muscle atrophy, full strength, good range of motion of
extremities, normal reflexes and sensations, and normal gait. The claimant
testified medication makes her drowsy, disoriented and nauseous sometimes.
However, the medical records reveal no complaints of medication side effects.
There is no medical evidence to support a need for other medical treatment,
aggravating and precipitating factors or need for other measures to alleviate
symptoms.
The undersigned finds the claimant is not a reliable witness based on her
unsupported and inconsistent allegations. The claimant testified on bad days
she takes pain pill (sic) and lies in bed all day. However, she also testified she
gets her children to school and sponge bathes her daughter even on bad days.
The claimant testified she cannot work due to knee pain and COPD. Yet, the
objective medical evidence show the claimant was alert, fully oriented, and in
no acute distress. She was ambulatory without an assistive device. She did
not have significant loss of knee motion and no evidence of knee instability,
effusion, warmth or deformity. At first the claimant testified the cane is
prescribed. However, later the claimant conceded that the cane is not
prescribed and is only used occasionally. The claimant’s impairments likely
cause some pain and limitation of function, which is addressed by the assessed
residual functional capacity. However, the objective medical evidence simply
does not support disabling pain, or physical and mental limitations. The
claimant’s ability to maintain her household, care for herself, her young son
and her disabled adult child are inconsistent with disabling mental or physical
impairments.
*

*

*

In sum, the above residual functional capacity assessment is supported by type
of impairments, surgical history and objective mental and physical signs. It
adequately addresses the claimant’s subjective complaints of pain and
functional limitations in light of the objective observations. The claimant
asserts disabling pain; however, examinations show she was alert, oriented
and in no acute distress. She asserts inability to stand/walk for long periods;
however, she has no joint instability, loss of muscle tone, or loss of strength,
reflexes or sensation. She has no significant loss of bilateral knee range of
motion and no tenderness, warmth or effusion. Despite some history of
11

wheezes, she continued to smoke until three months prior to the hearing. The
consultative examinations show clear lungs without wheezes. The record fails
to show any respiratory distress or need for breathing treatments during
medical visits. Although the claimant alleges disabling depression, she take
(sic) only medication prescribed by physical treating source that she did not
see from May 2012 until March 2013 and not since then. The examinations
show no significant mental signs and no abnormal mood and affect. The
mental health clinic records show only one assessment and one therapy
session. In addition, the claimant maintains her household, takes care of her
son, takes care of her disabled adult daughter, manages finances, shops,
drives, interacts with neighbors and interacts appropriately with all medical
sources.
(R. 21-22, 23-24).
Where an ALJ decides not to credit a claimant’s testimony, the ALJ must articulate
specific and adequate reasons for doing so, or the record must be obvious as to the
credibility finding. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561-62 (11th Cir. 1995); Jones v. Dept.
of Health & Human Servs., 941 F.2d 1529, 1532 (11th Cir. 1991) (articulated reasons must
be based on substantial evidence). If proof of disability is based on subjective evidence and
a credibility determination is, therefore, critical to the decision, “‘the ALJ must either
explicitly discredit such testimony or the implication must be so clear as to amount to a
specific credibility finding.’” Foote, 67 F.3d at 1562, quoting Tieniber, 720 F.2d at 1255
(although no explicit finding as to credibility is required, the implication must be obvious
to the reviewing court). The ALJ has discretion to discredit a plaintiff’s subjective
complaints as long as he provides “explicit and adequate reasons for his decision.” Holt,
921 F.2d at 1223. Relying on the treatment records, objective evidence, and Carroll’s own

12

testimony, the ALJ concluded that her allegations regarding the extent of her pain were not
credible to the extent alleged and discounted that testimony. After a careful review of the
ALJ’s careful, detailed and thoughtful analysis, the court concludes that the ALJ properly
discounted the plaintiff’s testimony and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s credibility
determination. It is undisputed that the plaintiff suffers from pain. However, the ALJ
concluded that while Carroll’s underlying conditions are capable of giving rise to some pain
and other limitations, her impairments are not so severe as to give rise to the disabling
intractable pain she alleged.
The medical records support the ALJ’s conclusion that while Carroll’s impairments
could reasonably be expected to produce some pain, the records do not corroborate her
testimony of debilitating pain. On December 17, 2008, Carroll presented to Dr. Thornbury
complaining of pain, swelling and stiffness in both knees. (R. 266). A physical examination
revealed
multiple nodular lesions around both knees. She has a mild effusion with
some limited extension, upwards of 10 degrees in both knees. Flexion is to
about 130 degrees. She is tender medially, retropatellarly, and has mild
crepitus to range of motion in both knees. She has no gross medial, lateral,
anterior, or posterior instability, negative Lachman sign, and pivot shift. She
has a good bit of pain with a McMurray’s-type maneuver, but no clunk or
catch in either knee.
(R. 267).
Dr.Thornbury diagnosed “early degenerative arthritis with chondromalacia, medial
compartment and probably patellofemoral also.” (Id.). He injected both knees with Depo13

Medrol and Xylocaine, and prescribed Relafen. (Id.).
On January 19, 2009, Carroll returned to Dr. Thornbury complaining that she was
having more pain and swelling in her right knee. (R. 265). An examination revealed “mild
effusion” of the right knee, tenderness in the medial joint space and retropatellarly, and
reduced range of motion. (Id.) Dr. Thornbury suspected “[p]ossible internal derangement
of the right knee with a degenerative meniscal tear.” (Id.) He ordered a MRI. (Id.)
On January 29, 2009, Carroll again complained to Dr. Thornbury of pain and popping
in her right knee. (R. 264). At that time, she had “a lot of tenderness retropatellarly, crepitus
to range of motion, and medial and lateral joint line tenderness.” (Id.) The MRI did not
reveal a tear but indicated “mild to moderate osteoarthritis.” (Id.; R. 268).
On August 10, 2009, Carroll returned to Dr. Thornbury complaining of pain, swelling
and stiffness in her right knee. (R. 263). On August 21, 2009, Carroll underwent
arthroscopic surgery for “debridement of the patella femoral joint . . . [and] synovectomy.”
(R. 269). Surgery revealed a “small tear in the posterolateral right meniscus” which was
repaired. (Id.). On August 26, 2009, Carroll returned to Dr. Thornbury five days after her
right knee surgery. (R. 262). At that time, she had “absolutely no pain.” (Id.) She had
“minimal palpable tenderness.” (Id.)
On October 5, 2010, Carroll presented to Dr. Kenneth Taylor complaining of left
knee pain. (R. 279). An examination revealed Carroll
ambulates with a moderate left antalgic gait. She has no effusion or synovitis
14

of the left knee. She has full extension of the left knee and 120 degrees of
flexion. There is moderate tenderness and a positive McMurray’s sign of the
medial joint line of the left knee. Negative Lachman, negative drawer, and
negative pivot shift sign. She has not left patella tenderness, crepitus, or
instability. No pain or instability is produced varus or valgus stressing of the
left knee at 0 and 30 degrees. There is no asymmetric atrophy of quadriceps
musculature. Neurovascular function of the lower extremities is intact.
(Id).
Dr. Taylor recommended an MRI to “[r]ule out internal derangement versus
inflammatory process.” (Id.). On October 19, 2010, Carroll complained to Dr. Taylor of
unchanged left knee pain. (R. 278). She “ambulates with a left antalgic gait” but there was
“no effusion or synovitis of the left knee.” (Id.). A MRI “showed no internal derangement.”
(Id.). Dr. Taylor diagnosed “[m]edial compartment gonarthrotis of the left knee.” (Id.)
Carroll returned to Dr. Taylor on March 24, 2011 complaining of pain in her left
knee. An x-ray revealed “mild degenerative changes in the medial compartment of the left
knee.” (R. 277). Dr. Taylor injected the knee with Dexamethasone and prescribed Toradol.
(Id.) On April 21, 2011, Dr. Taylor recommended a “left knee arthroscopic debridement.”
(R. 276).
On May 4, 2011, Carroll underwent arthroscopic surgery on her left knee. (R. 284).
Dr. Taylor repaired a partial tear of the medial meniscus and resected a portion of the medial
synovial plica. (Id.). On May 19, 2011, Carroll reported that she was only have “mild left
knee pain.” (R. 275). She had full extension of her left knee. (Id.).
Thereafter, Carroll did not return to Dr. Thornbury or Dr. Taylor but on April 23,
15

2013, she complained to Dr. Sargent, her primary care physician of pain in both knees. (R.
443). The musculoskeletal examination revealed normal gait and station. Her lower right
extremity was normal. Her left knee and lower leg had no edema, normal reflexes and
normal pulses. (R. 446). She had moderate knee joint effusion but no masses or crepitation.
(Id.). Dr. Sargent diagnosed bilateral osteoarthritis in the knee joints and prescribed
Naprosyn. (R. 447). Thus, despite Carroll’s complaints, after her 2009 right knee surgery
and her 2011 left knee surgery, she did not complain again of knee pain until April 2013.
After a careful review of the record, the court concludes that the ALJ’s reasons for
discrediting the plaintiff’s testimony were both clearly articulated and supported by
substantial evidence. To the extent that the plaintiff is arguing that the ALJ should have
accepted her testimony regarding her pain, as the court explained, the ALJ had good cause
to discount her testimony. This court must accept the factual findings of the Commissioner
if they are supported by substantial evidence and based upon the proper legal standards.
Bridges v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 622 (11th Cir. 1987).
C. Residual Functional Capacity. Finally, Carroll asserts that the ALJ failed to
include the nonexertional limitation of pain in his residual functional capacity assessment.
(Doc. # 18 at 13). The ALJ concluded that the plaintiff has the residual functional capacity
to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR § 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b).
except the claimant can sit at least three hours without interruption and a total
of at least six hours over the course of an eight-hour workday. The claimant
can stand and/or walk for at least one hour without interruption and a total of
at least six hours over the course of an eight-hour workday. The claimant can
16

frequently use her lower extremities for pushing, pulling and the operation of
foot controls. The claimant can occasionally use her upper extremities to push
and pull while standing/walking. The claimant does not suffer any additional
limitation in the use of her upper extremities. The claimant cannot climb
ladders, ropes, poles or scaffolds. The claimant can occasionally balance,
stoop, kneel, and crouch. She cannot crawl. The claimant can occasionally
work in humidity, wetness, and temperature extremes. The claimant can
occasionally work in dusts, gases, odors, and fumes. The claimant cannot
work in poorly ventilated areas. The claimant can occasionally work while
directly exposed to vibration affecting her lower extremities. The claimant
cannot work at unprotected heights. The claimant cannot work with operating
hazardous machinery. The claimant can occasionally operate motorized
vehicles. The claimant cannot respond to rapid and/or frequent multiple
demands.
(R. 16).
An ALJ is required to independently assess a claimant’s residual functional capacity
“based upon all of the relevant evidence.” 20 CFR § 404.1545(a)(3) (“We will assess your
residual functional capacity based on all of the relevant medical and other evidence.”); 20
C.F.R. § 404.1546(c) (“Responsibility for assessing residual functional capacity at the
administrative law judge hearing . . . level. If your case is at the administrative law judge
hearing level . . ., the administrative law judge . . . is responsible for assessing your residual
functional capacity.”) See also Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997)
(“The residual functional capacity is an assessment, based upon all of the relevant evidence,
of a claimant’s remaining ability to do work despite [her] impairments.”). “Residual
functional capacity, or RFC, is a medical assessment of what the claimant can do in a work
setting despite any mental, physical or environmental limitations caused by the claimant’s

17

impairments and related symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a).” Peeler v. Astrue, 400 F. App’x
492, 494 n.2 (11th Cir. 2010).
Carroll’s argument that the ALJ’s RFC determination is flawed because it does not
include any mention of pain is without merit. In determining Carroll’s RFC, the ALJ
specifically considered Carroll’s limitations arising from her complaints of pain.
In sum, the above residual functional capacity assessment is supported by type
of impairments, surgical history and objective mental and physical signs. It
adequately addresses the claimant’s subjective complaints of pain and
functional limitations in light of the objective observations. The claimant
asserts disabling pain; however, examinations show she was alert, oriented
and in no acute distress. She asserts inability to stand/walk for long periods;
however, she has no joint instability, loss of muscle tone, or loss of strength,
reflexes or sensation. She has no significant loss of bilateral knee range of
motion and no tenderness, warmth or effusion
(R. 23-24).
It is undisputed that Carroll suffers from pain in her knees but as already explained,
the medical records do not demonstrate that her pain is as severe as alleged. The ALJ took
into consideration Carroll’s pain by limiting her to light work, and the RFC adequately
accounts for her knee pain. It is clear from the context of the ALJ’s opinion, and from the
record as a whole, that the ALJ reviewed and considered all the medical evidence in the
record in determining Carroll’s RFC. The court has independently considered the record as
a whole and finds that the record provides substantial support for the ALJ’s conclusions.
Pursuant to the substantial evidence standard, this court’s review is a limited one; the
entire record must be scrutinized to determine the reasonableness of the ALJ’s factual
18

findings. Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992). Given this standard of
review, the court finds that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.
V. Conclusion
The court has carefully and independently reviewed the record and concludes that the
decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence and is due to be affirmed.
A separate order will be entered.
Done this 19th day of January, 2017.

/s/Charles S. Coody
CHARLES S. COODY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

19