Garrett v. U.S. Department of Justice et al (INMATE 3)
Filing
110
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: construing 108 as objections to the Recommendation, as further set out in order. it is ORDERED as follows that: 1) the Plaintiff's objections (doc. 108 ) are OVERRULED; 2) the Recommendations of the Magistrate Judge (doc. 102 and 103 ) are ADOPTED; 3) the United States Marshal service is DISMISSED as a defendant in this action; 4) the Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration and request for stay pending discovery (doc. 108 ) are DENIED 5) the Defen dants' motion for summary judgment (doc. 50 ) is GRANTED; 6) judgment is ENTERED in favor of the Defendants; 7) the Plaintiffs motion for order compelling discovery (doc. 109 ) is DENIED;8) this case is DISMISSED with prejudice. A separate final judgment will be entered. Signed by Chief Judge Emily C. Marks on 2/11/2022. (cwl, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION
LARRY DEAN GARRETT, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
ERNEST WILLIAMS and
DAVID ONOFRY,
Defendants.
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) CIVIL ACT. NO. 2:17-cv-470-ECM
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(WO)
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MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER
Now pending before the court is the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (doc.
103) which recommends that the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (doc. 50) be
granted and judgment be entered in favor of the Defendants. (Doc. 103 at 17). The Plaintiff
filed a motion for reconsideration and request for stay pending discovery (doc. 108) which
the Court construes as objections to the Recommendation. Also pending before the Court
is the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (doc. 102) that the United States Marshals
Service should be dismissed, to which no timely objections have been filed. Upon an
independent and de novo review of the record, the Plaintiff’s objections are due to be
overruled, the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendations are due to be adopted, and the
Defendants’ properly supported motion for summary judgment is due to be granted.
When a party objects to a Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, the
district court must review the disputed portions de novo. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The
district court “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further
evidence; or resubmit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b)(3). De novo review requires that the district court independently consider factual
issues based on the record. Jeffrey S. ex rel. Ernest S. v. State Bd. of Educ., 896 F.2d 507,
513 (11th Cir. 1990). If the party does not object to specific factual findings, the court
reviews them only for clear error. Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 779 n.9 (11th Cir.
1993).
DISCUSSION
The Court has carefully reviewed the record in this case, the Recommendations of
the Magistrate Judge, and the Plaintiff’s objections. To the extent the Plaintiff makes
conclusory assertions that he is entitled to relief against the Defendants but does not point
to any legal error committed by the Magistrate Judge, his general objections are reviewed
for clear error, and are due to be overruled.
However, the Plaintiff’s objection to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation
granting summary judgment on his excessive force claim is sufficiently specific to warrant
de novo review.
The crux of the Plaintiff’s objection is the evidence before the Court does not
demonstrate that the Defendants did not assault him when he was arrested on April 15,
2016. (Doc. 108 at 1). While the Plaintiff concedes he was assaulted in Birmingham the
day before his arrest by the Defendants, he asserts that this fact “does not rule out the
Defendants using additional force when they arrested him,” and argues that “[t]here is no
in-court testimony that supports that the Defendants didn’t assault the Plaintiff.” (Id.).
The Defendants filed a special report supported by relevant evidentiary materials,
2
including affidavits, medical records and the sworn testimony offered by the Plaintiff in
his 2017 criminal trial. The Defendants adamantly deny that they struck, beat or kicked
the Plaintiff during his arrest. Rather, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that the
Plaintiff was assaulted the day before in Birmingham, Alabama.
The Plaintiff was arrested at the residence of Ketenia Miller (“Miller”) in Eufaula
Alabama. When the Plaintiff was arrested, the Defendants noticed “obvious signs of
trauma to Garrett’s face and head,” and called for medical treatment. (Doc. 50-10 at 4,
para. 13). The emergency medical technician’s report described a head laceration and
detailed that the Plaintiff said he “was assaulted the day before in B[irming]ham.” (Doc.
50-9 at 17). The Plaintiff described his injuries as possible broken ribs and jaw as well as
side and back pain. (Id.).
The United States Marshal Service’s report of investigation notes that the Plaintiff
“stated that approximately 4 men from the Birmingham, AL area had jumped him on the
prior day over a misunderstanding with the sale or purchase of video recordings or CDs.”
(Id. at 20).
The Plaintiff was transported to Medical Center Barbour in Eufaula, Alabama.
(Doc. 50-11 at 5). His medical records note the date of injury as April 14, 2016, and that
the Plaintiff stated he had been assaulted with fists and “kicked by unknown person(s),
some dude(s).” (Id. at 16) (internal quotations omitted). The Plaintiff reported that he “was
jumped yesterday.” (Id. at 21).
3
Finally, Ketenia Miller gave an audio statement and provided a sworn declaration.1
Miller reported that when she picked Garrett up, “he was badly injured.” (Doc. 61-1 at 2,
para. 4). According to Miller, Garrett
complained of injuries to his chest, back, and head. He told me
that he had been jumped by some guys and their brothers over
a dispute about money.
*
*
*
I did not see any officer’s [sic] strike or beat Garrett during his
arrest. I saw him handcuffed in the driveway before the
ambulance came and the injuries he had were the same injuries
he had the day before when I picked him up.
I understand that he is now claiming that the Marshals caused
his injuries when they arrested him. This is false.
(Id. at 2-3, para. 4, 8 and 9).
The Plaintiff was charged in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama with sexual exploitation of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a)
and (e). (Doc. 50-1 at 2). At his criminal trial in 2017, Garrett represented himself. In his
opening statement, Garrett described the April 2016 assault as follows: “I was brutally
beaten, urinated on, ejaculated on by a couple of the offenders and this was not made record
of [sic], but the assault was filed with the police, but it was never investigated.” (Doc. 505 at 7).
During his criminal trial, the Plaintiff testified as follows:
Q.
1
And the first question that you wanted me to ask you is,
during the trial, you mentioned about getting beat up. I
would like to show you what’s been marked as
Miller has subsequently died.
4
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Defendant’s Exhibit 14. Do you recognize the
individual in that picture?
Yes, sir.
Who is it?
It’s me.
And where was that picture taken?
Eufaula Hospital, Eufala [sic] Medical Center.
Why were you in Eufala [sic] Hospital, Eufala [sic]
Medical Center?
I had been assaulted by some guys in Valley Brook
apartment.
(Doc. 50-4 at 4-5).
On cross-examination, the Plaintiff repeated that Anthony Jones and others
assaulted him in Birmingham. (Id. at 18–21, 25, 28–31). According to the Plaintiff, the
men punched him, kicked him in the back, and “stomp[ed] me on the floor.” (Id. at 33).
When describing his arrest the next day, the Plaintiff testified that the Marshals “got me in
Eufala [sic] and took me to the medical center from my aunt’s house, took me to the
medical center.” (Id. at 35). At no time during his criminal trial did the Plaintiff allege
that the Marshals had also assaulted him. Finally, during the testimony of Jones, the
Plaintiff introduced into evidence a photograph of his injuries and asked Jones about the
injuries.
Jones declined to answer questions about the assault, invoking the Fifth
Amendment. (Doc. 50-3 at 13).
Based on the evidence before her, the Magistrate Judge declined to “adopt [the
Plaintiff’s] version of the facts for the purpose of ruling on the motion for summary
judgment” because the Plaintiff’s version of the facts was so “blatantly contradicted by the
record[] so that no reasonable jury could believe it.” (Doc. 103 at 14).
In his allegations in his amended complaint, Garrett asserts that
5
Defendants severely beat him when effecting his arrest, and he
submits medical records and a photograph purporting to
demonstrate the injuries were caused by Defendants.
Defendants deny that they beat Garrett or that they caused the
injuries about which he complains. But besides Defendants’
denials, the record contains evidentiary materials, in the form
of Garrett’s testimony and his statements at his criminal trial
and the photograph introduced at that trial, that have the effect
of so utterly discrediting Garrett’s factual assertions in his
amended complaint that no reasonable jury could believe the
assertions in his amended complaint. This court will not rely
on the evident fictions in Garrett’s amended complaint where
the record shows that Garrett, in his criminal case, testified
under oath that he was severely beaten by Anthony Jones and
two other men on April 14, 2016; testified that the beating by
Jones and the two other men caused the injuries that led to his
admission and treatment at the hospital in Eufaula on April 15,
2016; and introduced a photograph at this criminal trial to
demonstrate the injuries resulting from the beating by Jones
and the two other men where he presents the very same
photograph with his amended complaint in this Bivens action
purporting to show the injuries he now says were caused by
Defendants when they arrested him. With this civil matter,
Garrett is trying to falsely attribute to Defendants the injuries
he suffered at the hands of others in the April 14, 2016, beating
in Birmingham.
(Id. at 14–15).
Thus, the Magistrate Judge concluded that “[b]ecause the record utterly discredits
Garrett’s allegations,” there are no genuine disputes of material fact and recommended that
the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment be granted. (Id. at 15–16).
The Plaintiff first objects that the Magistrate Judge improperly relied on “out-ofcourt testimony, and thus he was denied his rights under the Confrontation Clause. (Doc.
108 at 1). The Plaintiff’s objection based on the Confrontation Clause is due to be
overruled. The law is well settled that the Sixth Amendment’s constitutional protections,
6
including the Confrontation Clause, apply only to criminal prosecutions. United States v.
Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980); U.S. Steel, LLC v. Tieco, Inc., 261 F.3d 1275, 1287 n.13
(11th Cir. 2001) (“Of course, the Confrontation Clause is not applicable to civil cases”).
The Plaintiff’s other objections to the Court’s reliance on the Defendants’ evidence
is also due to be overruled. The Magistrate Judge properly considered the evidence before
her and explained her reasons for recommending granting the Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment.
The Plaintiff objects to the Recommendation asserting that he needs additional
discovery and requests a stay pending discovery. (Doc. 108). This objection is due to be
overruled. On November 20, 2020, the Plaintiff filed a motion for discovery requesting
the same discovery he now seeks. (Doc. 100). On January 14, 2021, the Magistrate Judge
denied the motion. (Doc. 101). Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), when a party disagrees
with a non-dispositive written order of the Magistrate Judge, the “party may serve and file
objections to the order within 14 days after being served with a copy.” The Plaintiff did
not file any objections to the Magistrate Judge’s order. Because the Plaintiff did not timely
object to the Magistrate Judge’s January 14, 2021 order, the Court will not permit an
objection that circumvents the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by recasting an untimely
objection to the Court’s January 14, 2021 order as a timely one by tethering it the more
recent Report and Recommendation.2
2
After the Recommendation was entered, the Plaintiff again filed a motion to compel discovery.
(Doc. 109). He offers no cogent reason for the Court to permit discovery after the entry of the
Recommendation. This motion will be denied as moot.
7
The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment is due to be granted. Based on the record before the Court, the
Plaintiff’s allegations in his amended complaint are blatantly contradicted by the evidence
in the record including his criminal trial testimony, and no reasonable jury could believe
the Plaintiff’s contradictory story in this case.3
Furthermore, the Court also concludes that the Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment based on the doctrine of judicial estoppel.4 “The doctrine of judicial estoppel
prevents a party from asserting a claim in a legal proceeding that is inconsistent with a
claim taken by that party in a previous proceeding.” 18 Moore's Federal Practice § 134.30,
p. 134–62 (3d ed. 2000). The purpose of the doctrine of judicial estoppel is to “prevent the
perversion of the judicial process” and “to protect the integrity of the judicial process by
prohibiting parties from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the
moment.” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749–50 (2001) (citations and internal
quotations omitted).
The Eleventh Circuit “employs a two-part test to guide district courts in applying
judicial estoppel: whether (1) the party took an inconsistent position under oath in a
separate proceeding, and (2) these inconsistent positions were ‘calculated to make a
3
The Plaintiff does not object to the Magistrate Judge’s finding his story is blatantly contradicted
by the evidence of record in this case.
4
The Court properly raises judicial estoppel sua sponte. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S.
742, 750 (2001) (noting that because judicial estoppel “is intended to prevent improper use of
judicial machinery, [it] is an equitable doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion.”) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
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mockery of the judicial system.’” Slater v. U.S. Steel Corp., 871 F.3d 1174, 1181 (11th Cir.
2017) (en banc) (citation omitted). “[T]o determine whether a [party]’s inconsistent
statements were calculated to make a mockery of the judicial system, a court should look
to all the facts and circumstances of the particular case.” Id. at 1185. “When considering
a party’s intent for the purpose of judicial estoppel, we require “intentional contradictions,
not simple error or inadvertence.” Robinson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 595 F.3d 1269, 1275
(11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Am. Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville v. FDIC, 710 F.2d 1528, 1536
(11th Cir.1983). In New Hampshire v. Maine, the Supreme Court declined to “establish
inflexible prerequisites or an exhaustive formula for determining the applicability of
judicial estoppel,” commenting that “the circumstances under which judicial estoppel may
appropriately be invoked are probably not reducible to any general formulation of the
principle.” 532 U.S. at 750–51.
In this case, it is appropriate to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel to the
Plaintiff’s claims. It is clear that the Plaintiff’s testimony in his criminal trial was under
oath in a prior proceeding. Moreover, his multiple statements that his injuries were the
result of an assault by men in Birmingham is inconsistent with his statements in this case
that his injuries were caused by the Defendants. In his attempt to recover monetary
damages for his injuries in this case from the Defendants, his inconsistent statements in
this case evinces an intent to create a mockery of the judicial system. Consequently, the
Court concludes that the Plaintiff is judicially estopped from offering contradictory
statements in this case and is bound by his prior statements. Based on those statements,
the Court finds that there are no genuine disputes of material fact about whether these
9
Defendants caused the Plaintiff’s injuries.5
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons as stated and for good cause, it is
ORDERED as follows that:
1.
the Plaintiff’s objections (doc. 108) are OVERRULED;
2.
the Recommendations of the Magistrate Judge (doc. 102 and 103) are
ADOPTED;
3.
the United States Marshal service is DISMISSED as a defendant in this
4.
the Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and request for stay pending
action;
discovery (doc. 108) are DENIED
5.
the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (doc. 50) is GRANTED;
6.
judgment is ENTERED in favor of the Defendants;
7.
the Plaintiff’s motion for order compelling discovery (doc. 109) is DENIED;
8.
this case is DISMISSED with prejudice.
A separate final judgment will be entered.
DONE this 11th day of February, 2022.
/s/ Emily C. Marks
EMILY C. MARKS
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
5
The Plaintiff does not object to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that any alleged injury caused by
Defendant Williams allegedly kicking him in the groin were de minimis and thus, not violative of
the Fourth Amendment.
10
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