Archie et al v. Covington County et al

Filing 71

OPINION AND ORDER: it is ORDERED that: (1) Defendants Covington County, Dennis Meeks, Alan Syler, and Melissa Leslie's corrected motion for leave to file amended answers (Doc. 64 ) and defendants Southern Health Partners, Inc., Pamela Barber , and Wanda Craft's motion for leave to file a second amended answer (Doc. 66 ) are granted. (2) Defendants are allowed to file their amended answers by no later than 9/23/2021. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/16/2021. (cwl, )

Case 2:19-cv-00508-MHT-JTA Document 71 Filed 09/16/21 Page 1 of 14

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION
TERRY ARCHIE, as
)
Administrator of the
)
Estate of Teria C. Archie, )
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
COVINGTON COUNTY, et al., )
)
Defendants.
)

CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:19cv508-MHT
(WO)

OPINION AND ORDER
This case comes before the court on two motions for
leave to file amended answers.
defendants”:

Covington

County,

Syler, and Melissa Leslie.

One is by the “County
Dennis

Meeks,

Alan

And the other is by the

“medical defendants”: Southern Health Partners, Inc.,
Pamela

Barber,

and

Wanda

Craft.

Plaintiff

Terry

Archie, as the administrator of the estate of Teria
Archie, brought numerous claims against the defendants
arising out of their alleged roles in Teria Archie’s
death at the age of 36 while detained pretrial at the
Covington County Jail.

See Archie v. Covington County,

Case 2:19-cv-00508-MHT-JTA Document 71 Filed 09/16/21 Page 2 of 14

No.

2:19cv508-MHT,

2021

WL

1182370

(M.D.

Ala.

2021)

(Thompson, J.) (discussing case in more detail).

The

defendants now move for leave to amend their answers to
assert additional defenses.

For the reasons discussed

below, the defendants’ motions for leave to amend will
be granted.
Amendments

to

pleadings

Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

are

governed

by

Federal

Under Rule 15(a)(2), once

the time to amend as a matter of course has expired, a
party may amend only with the opposing party’s written
consent or the court’s leave.
15(a)(2).

See Fed. R. Civ. P.

In the instant case, the defendants seek the

court’s leave to amend.

The decision whether to grant

leave to amend a pleading is “committed to the sound
discretion

of

the

trial

court,”

Shipner

v.

E.

Air

Lines, Inc., 868 F.2d 401, 406 (11th Cir. 1989), though
Rule
leave

15

urges

when

15(a)(2).

that

justice

“[t]he
so

court

requires,”

should
Fed.

freely
R.

give

Civ.

P.

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
2

Case 2:19-cv-00508-MHT-JTA Document 71 Filed 09/16/21 Page 3 of 14

therefore

United

“accepted

States

a

for

policy

Use

&

of

liberal

Benefit

of

amendment.”

Krupp

Steel

Products, Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 831 F.2d 978, 983
(11th

Cir.

1987).

District

courts

“should

grant

a

motion to amend ‘unless there are substantial reasons

Bowers v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, Warden,

to deny it.’”
760

F.3d

1177,

1185

(11th

Cir.

2014)

(alterations

omitted) (quoting Espey v. Wainwright, 734 F.2d 748,
750 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam)).

Still, a motion to

amend may be denied “(1) where there has been undue
delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, or repeated failure
to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed;
(2)

where

allowing

amendment

would

cause

undue

prejudice to the opposing party; or (3) where amendment
would be futile.”

Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161,

1163 (11th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff

administrator

Archie

asserts

that

the

motions to amend should be denied because the proposed
amendments would be futile and would unduly prejudice
3

Case 2:19-cv-00508-MHT-JTA Document 71 Filed 09/16/21 Page 4 of 14

him.

He additionally argues that the County defendants

should be estopped from pleading the proposed defense
of lack of standing.

The court will first address the

estoppel

then

argument,

turn

to

the

remaining

arguments.
Administrator
defendants

Archie

should

be

argues

estopped

that

from

the

County

pleading

as

an

affirmative defense in their amended answer that Archie

See Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 69) at 3–5.

lacks standing.
Archie

contends

inconsistent

that

with

this

positions

proposed
taken

by

defense
the

is

County

defendants in their brief in support of their partial
motion

to

dismiss.

In

their

brief,

the

County

defendants argued that then-plaintiffs B.R.A. and A.A.
lacked standing to bring the claims asserted in the
complaint because “under Alabama law only the personal
representative of Teria Archie’s estate has standing to
bring

[42

death.”

U.S.C.
Defs.

§

1983]

Covington

claims
County,

4

alleging
Meeks,

wrongful

Syler,

and

Case 2:19-cv-00508-MHT-JTA Document 71 Filed 09/16/21 Page 5 of 14

Leslie’s Mem. Br. in Support of Defs.’ Partial Mot. to
Dismiss (Doc. 8) at 7.
further

stated

appointed
Teria

that

“only

administrator

Archie’s

Archie,

Citing to the complaint, they

in

and

estate”

his

capacity

and
as

Terry
legal

Archie

is

duly

representative

concluded

that

administrator

of

of

“Terry
Teria

Archie’s estate, is the only plaintiff that with [sic]
standing to pursue wrongful death claims under § 1983
in accordance with Alabama’s Wrongful Death Statute.”
Defs. Covington County, Meeks, Syler, and Leslie’s Mem.
Br. in Support of Defs.’ Partial Mot. to Dismiss (Doc.
8) at 7.

The partial motion to dismiss was denied as

moot after the administrator moved to file a second
amended complaint that, among other changes, dismissed
the individual plaintiffs.
Administrator

Archie

cites

cases

articulating

principles of both judicial and equitable estoppel, but
neither

theory

justifies

preclusion

of

the

defendants’ proposed defense of lack of standing.
5

County

Case 2:19-cv-00508-MHT-JTA Document 71 Filed 09/16/21 Page 6 of 14

“Judicial

estoppel

is

an

equitable

doctrine

designed to prevent a party from asserting a position
in

later

proceedings

that

is

inconsistent

with

a

position upon which that party prevailed in an earlier
proceeding.”

Inc.,

695

Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa. v. Skilstaf,

F.

Supp.

2d

1256,

1260

(M.D.

Ala.

2010)

(Thompson, J.); see also Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S.
211,

227

n.8

(2000)

(“Judicial

estoppel

generally

prevents a party from prevailing in one phase of a case
on

an

argument

and

then

relying

on

a

argument to prevail in another phase.”).

contradictory
The Supreme

Court has identified several factors that “typically
inform the decision whether to apply the doctrine in a
particular case.”
742, 750 (2001).

New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S.
“First, a party’s later position must

be ‘clearly inconsistent’ with its earlier position.”

Id. (citations omitted).

Additionally, courts should

consider “whether the party has succeeded in persuading
a court to accept that party’s earlier position” and
6

Case 2:19-cv-00508-MHT-JTA Document 71 Filed 09/16/21 Page 7 of 14

“whether the party seeking to assert an inconsistent
position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an
unfair

detriment

Id.

estopped.”

on
at

the

opposing

750–51.

party

Consistent

if

with

not
these

instructions, the Eleventh Circuit “employs a two-part
test

to

guide

district

courts

in

applying

judicial

estoppel: whether (1) the party took an inconsistent
position under oath in a separate proceeding, and (2)
these inconsistent positions were ‘calculated to make a
mockery of the judicial system.’”

Slater v. U.S. Steel

Corp., 871 F.3d 1174, 1181 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc)
(quoting Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282,
1285

(11th

Cir.

2002),

overruled by Slater v. U.S.

Steel Corp., 871 F.3d 1174 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc)).
In light of these factors, judicial estoppel is
inappropriate

in

the

instant

case.

The

County

defendants have not succeeded in persuading a court to
accept that Archie, as administrator of the estate, has
standing to pursue his claims.
7

See New Hampshire, 532

Case 2:19-cv-00508-MHT-JTA Document 71 Filed 09/16/21 Page 8 of 14

U.S. at 750–51 (“Absent success in a prior proceeding,
a

party’s

later

inconsistent

position

introduces

no

‘risk of inconsistent court determinations,’ and thus
poses little threat to judicial integrity.”

C.I.T.

Constr.,

Inc., 944 F.2d 253, 259 (5th Cir. 1991))).

Nor is

omitted)

there

(quoting

indication

United

that

States

any

v.

(citation

inconsistency

between

the

County defendants’ partial motion to dismiss and their
proposed

amended

answers

was

“calculated

mockery of the judicial system.”

to

make

a

Transamerica Leasing,

Inc. v. Inst. Of London Underwriters, 430 F.3d 1326,
1335

(11th

Foods,

2005);

Cir.

Inc.,

595

see

also

F.3d

1269,

1275

Robinson
(11th

v.

Tyson

Cir.

2010)

(“When considering a party’s intent for the purpose of
judicial

estoppel,

contradictions,

not

we
simple

require
error

or

‘intentional
inadvertence.’”

(quoting Am. Nat’l Bank of Jacksonville v. FDIC, 710
F.2d

1528,

administrator

1536

(11th

Archie

Cir.
fails
8

1983))).
to

In

establish

short,
any

Case 2:19-cv-00508-MHT-JTA Document 71 Filed 09/16/21 Page 9 of 14

“intentional

manipulation

of

the

Spann

courts,”

v.

DynCorp Tech. Servs., LLC, 403 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1086
(M.D. Ala. 2005) (Thompson, J.), and judicial estoppel
is thus unwarranted.
Administrator
argument

in

Archie

terms

of

alternatively
the

doctrine

estoppel, but this too is unavailing.

frames
of

his

equitable

Although similar

to judicial estoppel, “[e]quitable estoppel focuses on
the

relationship

between

the

parties

to

the

prior

litigation and requires a demonstration that a party
claiming equitable estoppel relied to its detriment on
a position maintained by its adversary in an earlier
proceeding.”

Chandler v. Samford Univ., 35 F. Supp. 2d

861, 863 n.2 (N.D. Ala. 1999) (Acker, J.).
to

Archie,

defendants’
dismiss

when

he

detrimentally

statement
the

in

relied

their

second

on

partial

amended

According
the

County

motion

complaint

to

omitted

individual plaintiffs B.R.A., A.A., and Sarah Archie.

See Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 69) at 4–5.
9

However, Archie

Case 2:19-cv-00508-MHT-JTA Document 71 Filed 09/16/21 Page 10 of 14

fails to establish why the voluntary omission of other
plaintiffs
County

is

a

defendants

detriment
have

to

him.

clarified

Moreover,

that

they

seek

the
to

raise the defense of lack of standing not with respect
to Archie’s standing to bring wrongful-death claims as
administrator of the estate, but rather “in response to
any

attempt

by

Plaintiff

declaratory relief.”

to

seek

injunctive

or

Defs. Covington County, Meeks,

Syler, and Leslie’s Reply to Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 70) at
6–7.

In

unfairness

light
that

of

this

warrants

clarification,
estoppel

of

there
the

is

no

County

defendants’ proposed amendment.1
Administrator Archie further argues that both the
County and medical defendants’ proposed amendments to

1. Administrator Archie’s argument raises the
complicated issue of whether a party may be estopped
from asserting a defense that implicates the court’s
jurisdiction. See Cone Corp. v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp.,
921 F.2d 1190, 1203 (11th Cir. 1991) (“The standing
doctrine is an aspect of [the Article III] case or
controversy requirement ....”).
Because this court
concludes that estoppel is unwarranted, this court need
not address the issue in the instant case.
10

Case 2:19-cv-00508-MHT-JTA Document 71 Filed 09/16/21 Page 11 of 14

include additional defenses would be futile.
Resp. (Doc. 69) at 5.

See Pl.’s

Archie specifically addresses

the County defendants’ proposed amendments to assert
the defenses of lack of standing, set-off, and failure
to

exhaust

defendant
defense

administrative
Covington

of

failure

remedies,

County’s
to

file

a

as

proposed
notice

of

well

as

additional
claim

that

complies with Alabama law.
The Eleventh Circuit has held that “denial of leave
to amend [a complaint] is justified by futility when
the

‘complaint

dismissal.’”
1310,

1320

as

amended

is

still

subject

to

Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d
(11th

Cir.

1999)

(quoting

Halliburton

&

Assocs., Inc. v. Henderson, Few & Co., 774 F.2d 441,
444 (11th Cir. 1985)).

“Translating that standard to

the amended answer context, a finding of futility is,
in effect, a legal conclusion that the proposed defense
would necessarily fail.”

Bartronics, Inc. v. Power-

11

Case 2:19-cv-00508-MHT-JTA Document 71 Filed 09/16/21 Page 12 of 14

One,

Inc.,

245

F.R.D.

532,

535

(S.D.

Ala.

2007)

(Steele, J.).
Administrator Archie has not established that the
defendants’ additional defenses would necessarily fail
and are therefore futile.

He refers the court to the

Letters of Administration on the Estate of Teria C.
Archie and the Affidavit of Claim and contends that
these documents respectively demonstrate his standing
and

satisfactory

notice

of

claim.

However,

he

has

developed no argument based on these documents that the
proposed defenses cannot succeed as a matter of law.
Accordingly, the court cannot conclude that futility
constitutes

a

substantial

reason

to

deny

leave

to

amend.
Finally, administrator Archie argues that he would
be unduly prejudiced by both the County and medical
defendants’ proposed amendments, given that discovery
has already commenced and he would need to “double back
to make sure that third party discovery has taken the
12

Case 2:19-cv-00508-MHT-JTA Document 71 Filed 09/16/21 Page 13 of 14

new defenses into account.”
5–6.

Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 69) at

However, “[a]ny amendment to an original pleading

necessarily

involves

some

additional

expense

to

the

Loggerhead Turtle v. Cty. Council of

opposing party.”

Volusia Cty., Fla., 148 F.3d 1231, 1257 (11th Cir.
1998).
prior

The defendants filed their motions to amend
to

the

deadline

for

amending

pleadings,

See

discovery remains open for another five months.
Uniform Scheduling Order (Doc. 61).
remaining

time
the

to

shown

how

delay

proceedings

conduct

defendants’
or

discovery,
proposed

unduly

and

In light of the
Archie

has

amendments

prejudice

him

in

not

would
his

preparations.2

2. Administrator Archie does not argue that the
defendants’ motions should be denied due to undue
delay,
and
any
such
argument
would
have
been
unavailing.
The Eleventh Circuit has noted that
“generally, the mere passage of time, without more, is
an insufficient reason to deny leave to amend,” In re
Engle Cases, 767 F.3d 1082, 1109 (11th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Hester v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 941
F.2d
1574,
1578–79
(11th
Cir.
1991)),
and
the
defendants’ three-month delay in filing their motions
for leave to amend did not amount to delay that was
13

Case 2:19-cv-00508-MHT-JTA Document 71 Filed 09/16/21 Page 14 of 14

Given Rule 15(a)’s liberal standard and the lack of
a substantial reason to deny the defendants’ motions,
the court finds that the amendments should be allowed.
* * *
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:
(1) Defendants Covington County, Dennis Meeks, Alan
Syler, and Melissa Leslie’s corrected motion for leave
to

file

Southern

amended
Health

answers

(Doc.

64)

and

Partners,

Inc.,

Pamela

defendants
Barber,

and

Wanda Craft’s motion for leave to file a second amended
answer (Doc. 66) are granted.
(2) Defendants are allowed to file their amended
answers by no later than September 23, 2021.
DONE, this the 16th day of September, 2021.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

undue,

see

Loggerhead

Turtle,

148 F.3d at 1256–57
(holding that three-month delay in moving for leave to
file amended complaint, still “within the time period
prescribed in the district court’s scheduling order,”
did not support a finding of undue delay).
14