Hinson v. Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Alabama, LLC

Filing 60

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: For the reasons discussed as further set out in the opinion and order, it is hereby ORDERED as follows: 1. Hyundai's motion for summary judgment (doc. 24 ) is GRANTED in part to the extent that Hinson's fai lure to accommodate claim (Count I) is DISMISSED. 2. Hyundai's motion for summary judgment (doc. 24 ) is GRANTED in part to the extent Hinson claims she was terminated because of an actual disability and that claim is DISMISSED. 3. Hyundai' ;s motion for summary judgment (doc. 24 ) is DENIED in part to the extent that Hinson's claim of unlawful termination based on a perceived disability (Count II) will proceed to trial for a jury to determine whether Hyundai regarded Hinson as d isabled and undertook adverse action on that basis which resulted in Hinson's termination. 4. Hinson's motion to exclude (doc. 41 ) is DENIED as moot. 5. Hyundai's motion to strike (doc. 43 ) is DENIED. Signed by Chief Judge Emily C. Marks on 2/7/2024. (DMN)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION
MONICA SCOTT HINSON,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
HYUNDAI MOTOR MANUFACTURING )
ALABAMA, LLC,
)
)
Defendant.
)

CIVIL CASE NO. 2:22-cv-530-ECM
[WO]

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER
Now pending before the Court is a motion for summary judgement (doc. 24) filed
by Defendant Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Alabama, LLC (“Hyundai”) on September
27, 2023; a motion to exclude (doc. 41) filed by Plaintiff Monica Hinson (“Hinson”) on
October 18, 2023; and a motion to strike (doc. 43) filed by Hyundai on October 25, 2023.
The motions are fully briefed and with the benefit of oral argument, are due to be ruled on.
In her complaint, Hinson brought two counts against Hyundai under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), as amended by the Americans with Disabilities Act
Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”): failure to accommodate (Count I) and unlawful
termination (Count II). (Doc. 1).
For the reasons that follow, Hyundai’s motion for summary judgment (doc. 24) is
due to be DENIED in part and GRANTED in part; Hinson’s motion to exclude (doc. 41)
is due to be DENIED as moot; and Hyundai’s motion to strike (doc. 43) is due to be
DENIED.

I. JURISDICTION
The Court has original subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Personal jurisdiction and venue are uncontested, and the Court concludes that venue
properly lies in the Middle District of Alabama. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“Summary judgment is proper if the evidence shows ‘that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”
Hornsby-Culpepper v. Ware, 906 F.3d 1302, 1311 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting FED. R. CIV.
P. 56(a)). “[A] court generally must view all evidence and make all reasonable inferences
in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Fla. Int’l Univ. Bd. of Trs. v. Fla. Nat’l
Univ., Inc., 830 F.3d 1242, 1252 (11th Cir. 2016). However, “conclusory allegations
without specific supporting facts have no probative value.” Jefferson v. Sewon Am., Inc.,
891 F.3d 911, 924–25 (11th Cir. 2018). If the record, taken as a whole, “could not lead a
rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,” then there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact. Hornsby-Culpepper, 906 F.3d at 1311 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact, and the movant must identify the portions of the record which
support this proposition. Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)).
The movant may carry this burden “by demonstrating that the nonmoving party has failed
to present sufficient evidence to support an essential element of the case.” Id. The burden

2

then shifts to the non-moving party to establish, by going beyond the pleadings, that a
genuine issue of material fact exists. Id. at 1311–12.
The Court construes the facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant plaintiff
and draws all reasonable inferences in her favor. Stewart v. Booker T. Washington Ins., 232
F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 2000) (“In assessing whether there is any ‘genuine issue’ for trial,
the court ‘must view all the evidence and all factual inferences reasonably drawn from the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party’ and ‘resolve all reasonable
doubts about the facts in favor of the non-movant.’ Moreover, the court must avoid
weighing conflicting evidence or making credibility determinations.” (citations omitted)).
III. FACTS
The facts, viewed in a light most favorable to the non-movant, are as follows: 1
Hinson was hired by Hyundai in June 2005 as a production team member on its
assembly line. (Doc. 25-1 at 5). After several years in this role, Hinson began experiencing
medical issues. As the Court understands the medical evidence, these issues largely
stemmed from concentric disc bulges at L3-4 and L4-5 in Hinson’s spine. (See doc. 33-5
at 19). From December 2012 until 2015, Hyundai accommodated Hinson’s restrictions
associated with this condition by restricting Hinson from processes on the line which
involved stepping on and off the automated guided vehicle (“AGV”). (See doc. 28-1 at 2;
doc. 33-5 at 17–18; doc. 28-5; doc. 28-7 at 2). For instance, on or about April 24, 2013,
The parties used a format of listing facts and then responding to those facts as “denied” or “admitted”
which is neither required nor desired by this Court. Despite the format adopted by the parties, the Court
has set forth a narrative summary of the facts which, while not exhaustive of the exchange of documents
and communications between the parties or the medical documentation in the record, appear to the Court
to be the facts relevant to the pending motions by Hinson and Hyundai.

1

3

Hinson delivered a medical report to Hyundai’s medical clinic which indicated that
Hinson’s lumbar MRI showed concentric disc bulges at L3-4 and L4-5. (Doc. 33-5 at 19).
Hinson’s doctor recommended that she stop performing the “centerpipe process,” which
involves stepping on and off the AGV. (Doc. 33-5 at 19; Doc. 28-1 at 2). These restrictions
were accommodated by Hyundai. (Doc. 28-1 at 2).
Such accommodations came to a halt in July 2015 when Hinson’s team leader
assigned her to work on the AGV. (Doc. 28-7 at 1). Concerned, Hinson visited the onsite
medical clinic and explained that, as a result of her sciatic nerve issue, she had a permanent
restriction for stepping on and off the AGV. The clinic told Hinson that she needed a
doctor’s note which identified her physical limitations rather than restrictions related to a
process at work. (Doc. 28-7 at 1). The next day, Hinson delivered a physician’s note to
Hyundai which stated: “P[atien]t restricted from stepping off [and] on AGV until further
evaluation with NCV/EMG. Neuro testing on Aug 26th 2015.” (Doc. 28-8; Doc. 33-5 at
15).

The restrictions were accommodated (doc. 28-1 at 2) and Hinson submitted

subsequent notes to continue the restrictions. (Docs. 28-9 & 28-10). But on September 10,
2015, Hyundai advised Hinson that she needed to bring in new paperwork which describes
a “specific physical limitation instead of [] a particular process.” (Doc. 28-11). Hyundai
delivered a letter to Hinson the following day which told her it would no longer
accommodate her restriction of stepping on and off the AGV and needed a restriction based
on a physical limitation. Hinson was also reminded that the safety department will usually
“only accommodate restrictions for 30 days” and to take that into consideration when

4

bringing in updated duty status reports. (Doc. 28-12). Nonetheless, Hyundai continued to
accommodate the restrictions. (Doc. 28-1 at 3).
Finally, on December 21, 2015, Hinson delivered a letter from her doctor to
Hyundai stating that she was being treated for “chronic lumbar L5 S1 nerve root lesion,”
and provided a physical limitation rather than a process-based restriction. (Doc. 28-13).
Hyundai accepted this note. (Doc. 28-1 at 3).
In April 2016, Hinson updated her restrictions by submitting another letter from her
doctors identical to the one she submitted on December 21, 2015, except for a request that
the accommodation be provided “[f]or the next six months.” (Doc. 28-15). Hyundai
accommodated these restrictions. (Doc. 28-14). Once more, Hinson provided a similar
note and Hyundai accommodated the restrictions in October 2016. (Docs. 28-16 & 28-17).
At this point Hinson alleges that, “[d]espite Hyundai’s statements that Hinson’s
accommodation would be for 6 months, Hyundai continued to accommodate Hinson’s
impairment without any further doctor’s notes for four years.” (Doc. 40 at 17). Hyundai
conceded this fact at oral argument.
On April 2, 2019, Hinson suffered an on the job injury to her right shoulder (doc.
28-18) and was seen at the onsite medical clinic several times over the ensuing months.
Consequently, Hinson had right rotator cuff repair surgery on August 29, 2019. (Doc. 2819 at 3). Hinson returned to work on January 6, 2020 (id. at 3–4) and was released to full
duty from her right shoulder injury on September 22, 2020 (id. at 1).
In November of 2020, Hinson delivered a note from Dr. Rosa Bell to Hyundai’s
medical clinic, at Hyundai’s request, which reiterated the nature of Hinson’s impairment
5

and recommended that Hinson “avoid repetitive stepping up and down throughout the day
at work since this can exacerbate her Neurological condition.” (Doc. 28-20; doc. 33-5 at
9). These restrictions were accommodated by Hyundai. (Doc. 28-1 at 4).
Additionally, Hinson reported pain in her left shoulder throughout late 2020 into
2021. (Doc. 31-19 at 1–4). Eventually, a physician determined that Hinson needed physical
therapy and would likely require surgery in the future. (Doc. 31-22 at 13). On March 9,
2021, Hinson was diagnosed with a partial thickness tear in her left rotator cuff. (Doc. 3122 at 12).
Unfortunately, Hinson suffered yet another work-related injury in Spring of 2021.
On April 20, 2021, Hinson went to Hyundai’s medical clinic and reported weakness and
pain in her right arm and wrist. (Doc. 28-1 at 5; doc. 28-24 (First Report of Injury to State
of Alabama)). Hyundai relieved Hinson of all work-related duties, and Hyundai sent her
home with instructions not to use her right arm. She was directed to follow up with
Hyundai’s medical clinic prior to the start of her next shift. (Docs. 28-25; 28-6; 31-1).
Hinson arrived at work for her next scheduled shift and could not use her right arm.
Accordingly, Hyundai sent her home. (Doc. 28-29). Hyundai’s Duty Disposition Report
indicates that the restriction was from April 26, 2021 to May 10, 2021 with “No Use of RT
arm until MRI” written under the “Category Description.” (Doc. 28-29).
Concurrently, Hinson’s group leader told her to get an updated restriction for
stepping on and off the AGV for her new team leader. (Doc. 28-1 at 5). Hinson complied
by delivering a note from her neurologist on April 27, 2021, which stated that “due to her
Neurological

Conditions,

She

should

Avoid
6

Repetitive

stepping

up

and

down,” (doc. 29-1).

Hyundai sent Hinson home with instructions to see her doctor

regarding the note. (Doc. 29-5; doc. 29-6). Hinson returned the next day with a similar
note, which was also rejected by Hyundai. (Doc. 28-1 at 6; see also doc. 31-8).
Hinson had her MRI on April 27, 2021. Clinic notes from that day indicate that the
MRI was reviewed and that Hinson was to return to work. (Doc. 29-17 at 1–2). However,
her other restrictions prevented her return to work. (See doc. 29-2).
In the meantime, Hinson brought in two subsequent notes which were rejected by
Hyundai:
• April 29, 2021: Hinson made another attempt at providing a note from her
doctor. Again, she was sent home. But this time she was told the note needed
to include a frequency and an end date. (Doc. 29-7).
• May 10, 2021: Hinson brought a note with revisions, which stated: “She
should completely avoid stepping up and down on the AGV equipment, this
aggravates her condition. This should be considered during time frame of 53-2021 until next consultation on 5-25-2021.” (Doc. 29-10). Brandon Evans,
who is part of the Safety Department, rejected the note and said it needed
clarifications and “unable to list process as a[] restriction.” (Doc. 29-11).
Importantly, an internal email from Kyle Sampsell, a prevention program manager
at Hyundai, on May 13, 2021 noted to employees that a “physician cannot dictate processes
a [Team Member] works” when listing the various notes Hinson brought in during April
and May of 2021. (Doc. 29-13).

7

Turning back to Hinson’s shoulder issues, Dr. Hussein Turki, Hyundai’s worker’s
compensation doctor, reviewed the MRI of Hinson’s right arm and wrist on May 14, 2021.
(Doc. 29-21). Dr. Turki diagnosed Hinson’s problem as overuse and put her on therapy
for the next month, restricted her lifting to 5 pounds, and prescribed medications. He
projected Hinson could be released to return to work without any arm restrictions on June
13, 2021. (Doc. 29-12). Hyundai excluded Hinson from the workplace on the grounds that
there was no accommodation which would allow Hinson to perform her job. (Doc. 29-12
at 2; doc. 31-6).
The next day, May 14, 2021, Dr. Dexter Walcott, the Hyundai doctor who had
treated Hinson’s previous work-related injury to her left upper extremity, re-examined her. 2
(Doc. 28-1 at 7). Dr. Walcott determined that Hinson should have no overhead use of her
left shoulder until June 10, 2021. (Docs. 29-14 & 29-15). Hyundai, per Kristine Ziglar,
determined that this was a work-related injury and directed Hinson to go home because
there were no accommodations available that would not involve overhead use of her left
shoulder. (See docs. 29-14 & 29-15).
On June 8, 2021, Hinson was examined by her neurologist, who completed the NonWork Related Restriction Form provided by Hyundai. On this form, the doctor captured
all of the restrictions which she believed could be applicable to Hinson as of that date,
including overhead restrictions. The Neurologist’s note stated these restrictions would be

In her affidavit, Hinson states that this exam occurred on May 13, 2021 (doc. 28-1 at 7), but other
documents have the exam as occurring on May 14, 2021 (see doc. 40 at 22–23).
2

8

temporary until July 14, 2021, 3 and suggested, but did not prescribe, a full capacity
examination. (See doc. 29-19). Hinson delivered this form to Hyundai’s medical clinic.
Upon receiving this form, Hyundai determined that it could not accommodate Hinson’s
restrictions. (Docs. 29-20 & 29-21).
Hyundai sent Hinson an “off-base” letter dated July 15, 2021 in which they asked
Hinson to provide documentation by July 29, 2021 showing that her absences from April
27, 2021, through July 15, 2021, had been approved. (Doc. 30-2). A week later, Hyundai
representatives Keith Boling and Will Ware met with Hinson. (Doc. 28-1 at 8). Boling
told her that according to her restrictions, he believed her condition had “worsened” and
that there were no jobs for her at Hyundai. (Doc. 25-1 at 33).
Hinson filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) on August 17, 2021. Hinson checked the “Disability” box and identified the
earliest “Date(s) Discrimination Took Place” as April 27, 2021, and the “latest” date as
“ongoing” in her EEOC complaint. (Doc. 1-1 at 2). Additionally, she checked the
“Continuing Action” box on the EEOC complaint form and provided a narrative which
stated in part, “Hyundai has refused to allow me to return to work and has not given me
clear instructions as to what information they need in order for me to return to work.” (Id.
at 2–4).
Two days later, Hinson was terminated pursuant to Hyundai’s “Serious Misconduct
Policy” with chronic absences cited as the reason. (Doc. 30-4).

Delecia McIntyre,

The Court will address contentions made in briefs and at oral argument regarding this statement in greater
detail below.

3

9

Hyundai’s HR Talent Administration Manager, as part of the Employment Review
Committee (“ERC”), was ultimately the decisionmaker who decided to terminate Hinson.
(Doc. 25-22 at 11–21). She relied solely on a summary packet (doc. 30-3), which Ta’lon
Brown prepared. (Id.). The summary packet contained no information regarding Hinson’s
medical conditions or the reasons for her absences. (See doc. 30-3).
Based on these events, the present action was filed on September 9, 2022. (Doc. 1).
Hinson brought two counts against Hyundai under the ADA, as amended by the ADAAA:
failure to accommodate (Count I) and unlawful termination (Count II).
IV. DISCUSSION
The ADA makes it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against a qualified
individual on the basis of disability in regard to ... discharge of employees ... and other
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (emphasis added).
“Under

the

ADA

unlawful

discrimination

includes

‘not

making

reasonable

accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability’ unless doing so ‘would impose an undue hardship’ on the
employer.” Beasley v. O'Reilly Auto Parts, 69 F.4th 744, 754 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)).
“An individual is ‘qualified’ if ‘with or without reasonable accommodation, [she]
can perform the essential functions of the employment position.’” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
12111(8)).

In assessing whether a particular function is “essential,” an employer’s

judgment is afforded substantial weight, but is not dispositive. Lewis v. City of Union City,
Georgia, 934 F.3d 1169, 1182 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing various cases) (Lewis II).
10

The ADAAA defines “disability” as including both (1) “a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual;”
or (2) “being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). The ADAAA
further provides that an individual is “regarded as” disabled if she “establishes that ... she
has been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or
perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is
perceived to limit a major life activity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A).
A.

Motion to Exclude (Doc. 41) and Motion to Strike (Doc. 43)
The Court first turns to Hinson’s motion to exclude (doc. 41) and Hyundai’s motion

to strike (doc. 43).
1.

Hinson’s Motion to Exclude (Doc. 41)

Hinson seeks to exclude Keith Boling’s affidavit (doc. 25-25) based on the
contention, among others, that “Boling’s affidavit does not accurately reflect his personal
knowledge of the items contained therein.” (Doc. 41 at 1). However, the Court’s decision
does not rely upon the portions of Boling’s affidavit testimony which Hinson finds
problematic. Accordingly, for that reason, Hinson’s motion to exclude (doc. 41) is due to
be DENIED as moot.
2.

Hyundai’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 43)

As to Hyundai’s motion to strike (doc. 43), the Court will address in turn each set
of documents which Hyundai seeks to strike. For the reasons that follow, Hyundai’s
motion to strike (doc. 43) is due to be DENIED.

11

a.

Hinson’s Affidavit (Doc. 28-1)

Hyundai first contends that Hinson’s affidavit should be disregarded because Dana
Anderson is the individual named by the Notary Public as claiming the contents of the
affidavit (doc. 43 at 3; doc. 28-1 at 1). However, a review of the entire affidavit reveals
that this is a harmless clerical error.

To begin with, right above the paragraph in

controversy, the document is entitled “AFFIDAVIT OF MONICA SCOTT HINSON.”
(Doc. 28-1 at 1) (capitalization in original). Further, Hinson appropriately signed the
affidavit under the penalty of perjury with her name in clear typeface right below the
signature. (See id. at 9). Therefore, the document, when taken as a whole, makes clear to
any reasonable reader that the inclusion of Dana Anderson’s name was a harmless clerical
error.
Next, Hyundai states that Hinson’s affidavit lacks relevance due to the timing and
contents of her EEOC charge. For the reasons stated further in this Memorandum Opinion
and Order, Hinson’s testimony regarding her discharge claim is relevant.
Finally, Hyundai states that portions are due to be stricken as inadmissible because
they are irrelevant or immaterial. (Doc. 43 at 4–11). In doing so, Hyundai makes factual
and legal contentions which are more appropriate for trial or their brief in support of
summary judgment, not a motion to strike evidence.
For the forgoing reasons, the Court will not strike Hinson’s affidavit (doc. 28-1).
b.

Doc. 28-2: Deposition of Keith Boling

Hyundai seeks to strike portions of doc. 28-2, the deposition of Keith Boling, for
containing hearsay and not being best evidence. (Doc. 43 at 11). Hyundai failed to identify
12

and explain said portions which they object to in their motion, simply asserting that
“[p]ortions are hearsay,” and “[p]ortions . . . are not the best evidence.” (Id.). The Court
declines to strike doc. 28-2 on these ephemeral grounds.
c.

Docs. 29-1, 29-3, 29-4, and 29-9

Hyundai moves to strike portions of docs. 29-1, 29-3, 29-4, and 29-9. However,
docs. 29-3, 29-4, and 29-9 were not relied upon by the Court in reaching the legal
conclusions in the Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order. Accordingly, Hyundai’s
request to strike these documents is due to be denied as moot.
Hyundai seeks to strike doc. 29-1, a physician note written on behalf of Hinson, on
hearsay, lack of foundation, authenticity, and relevance grounds. (Doc. 43 at 12–13). Once
again, Hyundai’s arguments weigh evidence and make factual contentions inappropriate
for a motion to strike at the summary judgment stage. However, the Court will directly
address Hyundai’s hearsay arguments.
Hyundai argues that the portion of Hinson’s physician note in which the doctor
states Hinson requested she write the note is hearsay. (Id.). The comment in controversy
is likely subject to a hearsay exception or not hearsay at all, but even if it were not, the
Court may “consider a hearsay statement in passing on a motion for summary judgment if
the statement could be reduced to admissible evidence at trial or reduced to admissible
form.” Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1293–94 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Macuba v. Deboer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 1999)). Here, the comment by the
physician that Hinson requested that she write the note meets this standard. Therefore, the
Court will not strike doc. 29-1.
13

d.

Doc. 32-1: Hyundai’s EEOC Position Statement

Hyundai seeks to strike their EEOC position statement (doc. 32-1) 4 on multiple
grounds, including that “[d]ocuments of this kind are regularly excluded as not evidence at
all.” (Doc. 43 at 13). As the Court will fully explain in a later section, the Court will not
strike doc. 32-2 as it is relied upon by the Court simply to demonstrate the scope of the
EEOC investigation rather than substantive reasons. Additionally, Hyundai fails to explain
its other bases, like hearsay, for striking the document.
e.

Doc. 28-2: Deposition of Keith Boling (Labeled as Doc. 28-1 in the

Motion)
Hyundai labels these arguments as seeking to strike doc. 28-1, but context clues
indicate to the Court that Hyundai is referring to doc. 28-2. If Hyundai is referring to doc.
28-1, then it can refer to the Court’s previous declination of Hyundai’s invitation to strike
doc. 28-1. Regardless, the Court similarly declines to strike doc. 28-2 for the second time.
First, Hyundai once again states that “[p]ortions are hearsay” without identifying said
portions.

The Court simply cannot rule on such an objection unadorned with any

semblance of explanation. Second, Hyundai charges that certain portions of the document
contain speculation on the part of Boling. However, the Court does not rely upon these
statements in rendering its decision; thus, Hyundai’s objection on speculation grounds is
due to be denied as moot.

4

Hyundai mistakenly labels its EEOC statement as doc. 32-2 in their motion; it is doc. 32-1.

14

f.

Docs. 28-3 through 28-11, 29-12, 29-16, 29-17, 30-1, 30-10, 30-14

through 30-19, 31-1 through 30-4, 31-6, 31-7, 31-9 through 31-12, 31-17,
and 31-22
Hyundai seeks to strike the above referenced documents on the grounds that
portions are not properly authenticated, hearsay, and not relevant. The motion does not
identify the specific portions which Hyundai finds problematic. (Doc. 43 at 14–15). To
start, the Court did not rely upon docs. 28-3, 28-4, 28-6, 30-1, 30-10, 30-14 through 30-19,
31-2 through 31-4, 31-7, 31-9 through 31-12, and 31-17 in reaching its conclusions
contained in this Memorandum Opinion and Order. As a result, Hyundai’s proposal to
strike these documents is due to be denied as moot.
The Court will not strike the remaining documents for two reasons. First, Hyundai
does not explain their contentions on authentication, hearsay, or relevance as it pertains to
certain documents. For instance, the entirety of Hyundai’s argument as to why the abovereferenced documents should be stricken for hearsay is: “Portions of the documents are
hearsay.” (Doc. 43 at 14). It is not for the Court to guess what Counsel meant by their
single sentence statements seeking to strike a lengthy list of documents consisting of
hundreds of pages. Second, the remaining documents upon which the Court relies are
relevant to issues before the Court to the extent cited to in this Memorandum Opinion and
Order.
After finding various objections to either be moot, unclear, or lacking in merit,
Hyundai’s motion to strike (doc. 43) is due to be DENIED.

15

B.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Before the Court begins its analysis of Hinson’s two counts, the Court addresses

Hyundai’s arguments regarding Hinson’s alleged failure to exhaust her administrative
remedies.

Specifically, Hyundai argues that Hinson’s failure to amend her EEOC

complaint or file a new complaint with the EEOC following her discharge from Hyundai
forecloses her ability to raise her unlawful termination count (Count II). (Doc. 26 at 17).
However, such an argument ignores the fact that though “allegations of new acts of
discrimination are inappropriate[,] ... the scope of an EEOC complaint should not be strictly
interpreted,” and a plaintiff can bring a claim if the claim amplifies or clarifies an allegation
in the EEOC complaint. Gregory v. Georgia Dep't of Human Res., 355 F.3d 1277, 1279–
80 (11th Cir. 2004). Here, in her August 17, 2021 EEOC complaint, Hinson checked the
“Disability” box and identified the earliest “Date(s) Discrimination Took Place” as April
27, 2021, and the “latest” date as “ongoing.” (Doc. 1-1 at 2). Additionally, she checked
the “Continuing Action” box on the EEOC complaint form and provided a narrative which
stated in part, “Hyundai has refused to allow me to return to work and has not given me
clear instructions as to what information they need in order for me to return to work.” (Doc.
1-1 at 2–4). Soon thereafter Hinson was terminated with chronic absences cited as the
reason. (Doc. 30-4).
This information points to Hinson’s termination as being an amplification of the
allegations in her EEOC complaint. Notably, Hyundai presented arguments regarding
Hinson’s termination in its response to the EEOC complaint (doc. 32-1 at 8–9), which
clearly indicates that Hinson’s termination was part of the EEOC’s investigation, and that
16

Hyundai understood it to be. And while Hyundai cites case law to say Hyundai’s EEOC
statement should not be considered, the EEOC statement here is not being used for
substantive reasons but to show the scope of the EEOC investigation and that Hyundai
considered Hinson’s termination to be a part thereof. See Kinsey v. Enter. Leasing Co.,
2007 WL 9711502, at *10 (N.D. Ala. May 18, 2007). The Court finds that Hinson properly
exhausted her administrative remedies at the EEOC prior to filing the complaint in this
action.
C.

Failure to Accommodate
“To establish a prima facie claim for failure to accommodate, [Hinson] must show

that (1) she is disabled; (2) she was a ‘qualified individual’ at the relevant time, meaning
she could perform the essential functions of the job in question with or without reasonable
accommodations; and (3) she was discriminated against by way of the defendant's failure
to provide a reasonable accommodation.” Solloway v. Clayton, 738 F. App’x 985, 987
(11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (citing Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1255
(11th Cir. 2001)).
To trigger an employer’s duty to provide a reasonable accommodation, a plaintiff
must make a specific demand for such an accommodation. Adigun v. Express Scripts, Inc.,
742 Fed. Appx. 474, 476 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Gaston v. Bellingrath Gardens & Home,
Inc., 167 F.3d 1361, 1363 (11th Cir. 1999)). This demand “need only identify a statutory
disability and explain generally how a particular accommodation would assist her.” Owens
v. Governor's Off. of Student Achievement, 52 F.4th 1327, 1336 (11th Cir. 2022), cert.
denied sub nom. Owens v. Georgia Governor's Off. of Student Achievement, 143
17

S. Ct. 2465 (2023). 5 Thus, an employer is not required to accommodate a perceived
disability. Further, “[w]hen an employee requests an accommodation, it may be necessary
for an employer and the employee to engage in an informal, interactive process to
determine whether and which reasonable accommodations are feasible.” Umbarger v. Ga.
Dep’t of Revenue, 2007 WL 9700751, at *21 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 30, 2007), aff’d, 262 F. App’x
982 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citation and internal marks omitted). 6
In the Eleventh Circuit, demonstrating a requested accommodation is reasonable
requires that “an employee put her employer on notice of the disability for which she seeks
an accommodation and provide enough information to allow an employer to understand
how the accommodation would address the limitations her disability presents.” Owens, 52
F.4th at 1334. Other circuits address this issue in a similar manner:
The Tenth Circuit, for example, has explained that a plaintiff
“need not use magic words,” but “should provide enough
information about his or her limitations and desires [ ] to
suggest at least the possibility that reasonable accommodation
may be found in a reassignment job within the company.”
Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1172 (10th Cir.
1999). Similarly, the Third Circuit has held that a plaintiff
making a failure to accommodate claim must have provided
“enough information that, under the circumstances, the
employer can be fairly said to know of both the disability and
desire for an accommodation.”
Adigun v. Express Scripts, Inc., 742 F. App’x 474, 476 (11th Cir. 2018).

The Court notes that though this is a Rehabilitation Act case, the standards for ADA cases are the same in
the context of employment discrimination. Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing
Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1305 n.2 (11th Cir. 2000)).
5

Though the Court is not bound by district court cases, the Court nonetheless finds the case persuasive.
Similarly, the Court will cite caselaw throughout this Memorandum Opinion and Order which the Court
finds persuasive despite it not being binding upon the Court.

6

18

As clarified at oral argument, Hinson alleges that Hyundai failed to accommodate:
(1) her shoulder issues as they relate to overhead work; and (2) her back and neurological
issues, which encompass several maladies. The Court will analyze each in turn.
1. The Overhead Restrictions
The Court will first address the overhead accommodation issues. As a starting
point, Hinson must demonstrate that she is a “qualified individual” under the ADA which
means she could perform the essential functions of the job in question with or without
reasonable accommodations. Solloway, 738 F. App’x at 987. As applied to Hinson’s case,
it is undisputed among the parties that Hinson would need to be able to perform at least
four processes per shift to satisfy this criterion. (See doc. 45 at 7; doc. 40 at 39). Hinson
was trained on a total of nine processes. (Doc. 30-8 at 1).
Hinson provided a note to Hyundai which indicated restrictions on overhead work.
(Doc. 29-19). Though Hinson stated in her deposition that she was still able to perform
processes 3L, 3R, 6L, 6R, 7, and 1 with the June 8th overhead restrictions (doc. 25-1 at
33), she does not provide any evidence of such beyond her own conclusory, subjective
beliefs. In fact, Hyundai’s internal descriptions of these processes indicate that overhead
reaching was either “constantly” or “frequently” called for. (See doc. 25-25). The same
document also indicates that many of these processes required overhead work. (Id.). The
Eleventh Circuit has historically afforded substantial weight to the employer’s job
description for these types of assessments. See Lewis II, 934 F.3d at 1182 (citing various
cases). Moreover, Bobbie Ford, a production supervisor at Hyundai, provided an affidavit
with picture attachments and deposition testimony which further supports these findings in
19

Hyundai’s internal documents. (See doc. 25-28 at 2–3, 40–47; doc. 25-20 at 21–23).
Defeating such specific evidence at the summary judgment stage, even as the non-movant,
requires more than providing conclusory subjective beliefs in deposition testimony. See
Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2000).
The number of processes which do not require overhead work in some form and for
which Hinson is trained is two. (Doc. 25-34 at 3; see also doc. 25-28 at 2–3, 40–47; doc.
25-20 at 21–23). Falling short of the four processes requirement, Hinson would not be a
“qualified individual” under the ADA and therefore a failure to accommodate claim in
connection with the overhead restrictions cannot be sustained on this record.
2. Accommodations Associated with Hinson’s Back and Neurological Issues
The Court now turns to Hinson’s failure to accommodate claim as it relates to her
back and neurological issues. Hyundai concedes that had the restrictions only affected the
two processes associated with the AGV, then Hinson could have performed at least four
processes on a shift (doc. 45 at 51) and would accordingly be a “qualified individual” under
the ADA. Additionally, the Court will credit Hinson’s arguments on the issue (doc. 40 at
58) to the extent that the Court will assume without deciding that Hinson has a disability
for purposes of the ADA.
Without repeating every detail, the Court takes note of the extensive back and forth
between Hyundai, Hinson, and Hinson’s healthcare providers between April and June of
2021 regarding accommodations tied to Hinson’s back and neurological issues.
Importantly, it is undisputed that the notes provided by Hinson to Hyundai during this time
period gave process restrictions rather than physical restrictions. (See doc. 40 at 20–22).
20

And in that sense, the notes were deficient because Hyundai was unable to apply such
accommodation requests to their workplace. For example, a factory could have a variety
of stepping heights throughout the factory floor. If a physician gave a general restriction
of “no stepping up on the platform,” then the employer would not know to which platform
the restriction refers. It could refer to the platform with a two-inch step, an eight-inch step,
or both. Indeed, Hinson should have understood this following a similar episode in 20152016 when Hyundai asked for physical limitations rather than process limitations, and
Hinson complied. Moreover, dictating process restrictions to employers deprives them of
the opportunity to tailor accommodations to the needs of their workplace through the
interactive process—a process which is beneficial to employees and employers alike.
Put another way, while Hinson was not required to use “magic words,” she did have
to “put her employer on notice of the disability for which she seeks an accommodation and
provide enough information to allow [Hyundai] to understand how the accommodation
would address the limitations her disability presents.” Owens, 52 F.4th at 1334. And even
though Hyundai accepted deficient notes at certain points throughout Hinson’s
employment, such a fact does not dispense with this requirement described by the Eleventh
Circuit. So, without specifically addressing the physical limitations, i.e. stepping height
limitations, Hyundai could not understand how the proposed accommodation would
address the limitations that Hinson’s disability presents.

Thus, the accommodation

requests in the record from late April until early June 2021 were unreasonable.
The string of deficient notes, however, came to an end on June 8, 2021. On that day
Hinson provided a note regarding her neurological restrictions which satisfied Hyundai’s
21

physical limitations requirement. 7 (See doc. 29-19; doc. 45 at 27 n.4). As previously
discussed, this restriction form from Hinson’s healthcare provider also had overhead
restrictions which could not be accommodated. Consequently, Hinson could not be
accommodated at all due to the overhead restrictions which were in place until at least July
14, 2021, per the terms of the physician’s note. (See doc. 29-19).
Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant (Hinson), the
restrictions associated with the June 8, 2021 note expired on July 14, 2021. (See doc. 2919; doc. 40 at 38).

Specifically, both the overhead accommodations and the

accommodations associated with the back/neurological issues in the June 8, 2021 note
expired on July 14, 2021 as the expiration date applied to the note as a whole rather than
particular restrictions. (See id.). As a result, there appears to be no acceptable note in the
record from which Hyundai would be obligated to accommodate Hinson on her
back/neurological issues following the expiration of the June 8, 2021 physician’s note.
Accordingly, the failure to accommodate claim in connection with Hinson’s
neurological/back issues cannot be sustained.
Due to Hinson not being a “qualified individual” in connection with her shoulder
issues and her failure to demonstrate a time period in which she was a “qualified
individual” with a reasonable accommodation request in connection with her

The parties seemingly stipulate to the fact that the June 8, 2021 note (doc. 29-19) is an acceptable
physician’s note despite the fact that it does not include a specific stepping height restriction. Indeed, both
parties stated at oral argument that the June 8, 2021 note was valid for Hinson’s restrictions. And counsel
for Hyundai specifically stated that the June 8, 2021 note included appropriate physical limitations rather
than improper process restrictions. Therefore, the Court will accept this fact as stipulated to by the parties.
7

22

neurological/back issues, the failure to accommodate claim (Count I) is due to be
dismissed.
D.

Unlawful Termination
The Court now turns to Hinson’s claim of unlawful termination under the ADA

against Hyundai. Hinson alleges that Hyundai terminated her because of her actual
disability and because it regarded her as having a disability.
1.

McDonnell Douglas Analysis

Hinson does not present direct evidence of discrimination but instead relies upon
circumstantial evidence. “When a plaintiff [in ADA discrimination cases] seeks to satisfy
her burden with circumstantial evidence, we evaluate that evidence under the familiar
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework that governs Title VII employmentdiscrimination claims.” Todd v. Fayette Cnty. Sch. Dist., 998 F.3d 1203, 1215 (11th Cir.
2021) (citing Hilburn v. Murata Elecs. N. Am., Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1226 (11th Cir. 1999)).
Under the McDonnell-Douglas framework, Hinson must first demonstrate a prima facie
case of intentional discrimination under the ADA. And if Hinson demonstrates this prima
facie case, then “the burden of production shifts to [Hyundai] to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.” Holland v. Gee, 677 F.3d 1047, 1055 (11th Cir.
2012) (citation omitted). Once Hyundai articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for Hinson’s termination, then Hinson must demonstrate that the reasons proffered were
merely pretext for discrimination. Id. Importantly, temporal-proximity arguments by
themselves “generally cannot prove that an employer's proffered reasons are pretextual.”

23

Todd, 998 F.3d at 1219 (citing Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Ga., Inc., 967 F.3d 1121, 1137
n.15 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (collecting cases)).
To establish a prima facie case of unlawful termination under the ADA, Hinson
must show that: (1) she is disabled; (2) she was a “qualified individual” at the relevant
time, meaning she could perform the essential functions of the job in question with or
without reasonable accommodations; and (3) she was discriminated against because of her
disability, which resulted in her termination. See Holly v. Clairson Indus., L.L.C., 492 F.3d
1247, 1255–56 (11th Cir. 2007).
Once more, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Hinson as the
non-movant, the restrictions associated with the June 8, 2021 physician’s note expired on
July 14, 2021. (See doc. 29-19; doc. 40 at 38). Accordingly, a jury could conclude that
Hinson was free of restrictions upon that expiration and, as a result, able to perform the
essential functions of her job without an accommodation. Thus, Hinson would be a
“qualified individual” from July 15, 2021 until her termination.
By the same token, Hinson provides insufficient evidence to demonstrate that she
provided Hyundai with documentation of an actual disability from July 15, 2021 until her
termination. However, Hinson also alleges that Hyundai terminated her because of a
“perceived” limitation (doc. 40 at 55), which would fall into a “regarded as” claim under
the ADA. To that end, it is worth examining the evidence regarding Hinson’s last in-person
meeting with Hyundai representatives prior to her termination.
Hinson stated that she met with Hyundai representatives Keith Boling and Will
Ware on July 22, 2021. (Doc. 28-1 at 8). Counsel for Hyundai strongly contested the
24

contents of this meeting at oral argument, but the evidence in the record tells a different
story, and counsel’s arguments are not evidence. See United States v. Lopez, 590 F.3d 1238,
1256 (11th Cir. 2009) (“statements and arguments of counsel are not evidence”) (quoting
United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1551, 1562 (11th Cir. 1990)). For instance, Boling does
not recall the details of the meeting (doc. 28-2 at 11), but Hinson said in her deposition that
Boling told her that according to her restrictions, he believed her condition had “worsened”
and that there were no jobs for her at Hyundai (doc. 25-1 at 33). Since Hinson is providing
specific testimony regarding the meeting and Boling cannot recall any details, their
testimony does not conflict and as the non-movant these facts must be construed in the
light most favorable to Hinson. With Hinson’s account of the July 22, 2021 meeting
essentially uncontested, a jury is entitled to resolve the factual question of whether Hyundai
perceived Hinson as having a physical impairment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A).
In sum, a reasonable juror could conclude that Hinson was “disabled” as defined by
the ADA 8 and a “qualified individual” from July 15, 2021 until her termination. Now, the
Court turns to the final element of the prima facie case: whether Hinson was discriminated
against because of her disability, which resulted in her termination. And it is here that
Hinson must demonstrate through a comparator analysis that “she was treated differently
from other individuals with whom she was similarly situated in all material respects.”
Lewis v. City of Union City, Georgia, 918 F.3d 1213, 1217–18 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc)
(Lewis I).

8

The ADA’s definition of “disabled” includes being regarded as having a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).

25

The parties acknowledge that Hinson has no comparators. (Doc. 40 at 51; doc. 26
at 20). As such, Hinson’s unlawful termination count fails under the McDonnell Douglas
framework at step one since Hinson cannot establish a prima facie case. See Lewis I, 918
F.3d at 1218 (“[W]e hold, as an initial matter, that a meaningful comparator analysis must
be conducted at the prima facie stage of McDonnell Douglas’[] burden-shifting
framework . . .”).
2.

Convincing Mosaic Analysis

Alternatively, Hinson may also establish a case of unlawful termination under the
ADA by presenting a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence which would allow
a jury to infer intentional discrimination. Change v. Midtown Neurology, P.C., 2021 WL
2483368, at *21–22 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 3, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021
WL 2492470 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 26, 2021), aff’d, 2022 WL 2352339 (11th Cir. June 29, 2022)
(discussing various district court cases utilizing the convincing mosaic paradigm in ADA
cases).

“A convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence allowing the inference of

discrimination may be shown by suspicious timing, ambiguous statements, and other bits
and pieces from which an inference of discriminatory intent may be drawn; systemically
better treatment of similarly situated employees; and that an employer's justification is
pretextual.” Id. at *21. However, the Eleventh Circuit has cautioned that even under the
convincing mosaic framework, an inference of intentional discrimination is not allowed
unless “something links the action to the employee’s” protected class. Turner v. Florida
Prepaid Coll. Bd., 522 Fed. App’x. 829, 833 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). Moreover, the

26

convincing mosaic paradigm does not negate the requirement that a Plaintiff demonstrate
that she is a “qualified individual” under the ADA. Change, 2021 WL 2492470, at *22.
Here, a reasonable juror, through a variety of evidence and facts, could find a
“convincing mosaic” from which to find intentional discrimination against Hinson on the
part of Hyundai. As previously described, Hinson has a history of shoulder injuries which
precluded her attendance from the workplace and required further accommodations upon
her return. These shoulder issues flared up again during the relevant time period in 2021.
And, as described by Hyundai’s counsel at oral argument, attendance is very important to
Hyundai and its operations in the facility where it employed Hinson. Following the June
8, 2021 physician’s note, Hyundai determined it could not accommodate overhead
restrictions associated with Hinson’s shoulder issues. Then, with Hinson potentially facing
an additional surgery on her shoulders, which likely would have required further absences
from work and a gradual return to work, Hyundai sent Hinson an “off-base” letter on July
15, 2021. This letter came just one day after the specified expiration date of Hinson’s June
8, 2021 restrictions. And, as discussed already, Hyundai representatives met with Hinson
seven days later on July 22, 2021, where one representative stated that he believed Hinson’s
condition had “worsened.”

Though Brown disclaims any knowledge of Hinson’s

conditions playing a role in the discharge decision or discussing the July 22, 2021 meeting
with Boling or Ware (doc. 25-26 at 4), Brown simply funneled information gathered from
around the organization into a summary report for McIntyre and the ERC (see id. at 2–4).
This does not preclude the finding that information was provided to Brown regarding

27

Hinson’s absences in an effort to terminate her employment on the basis of her “regarded
as” disability.
Strung together, these elements paint a mosaic from which a reasonable juror could
find that Hyundai regarded Hinson as disabled and terminated her on that basis in violation
of the ADA.
For the foregoing reasons, Hyundai’s motion for summary judgment is due to be
DENIED in part to the extent that Hinson’s claim of unlawful termination (Count II) will
proceed to trial for a jury to determine whether Hyundai regarded Hinson as disabled and
undertook adverse action on that basis which resulted in Hinson’s termination from
Hyundai.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
1.

Hyundai’s motion for summary judgment (doc. 24) is GRANTED in part to

the extent that Hinson’s failure to accommodate claim (Count I) is DISMISSED.
2.

Hyundai’s motion for summary judgement (doc. 24) is GRANTED in part to

the extent Hinson claims she was terminated because of an actual disability and that claim
is DISMISSED.
3.

Hyundai’s motion for summary judgment (doc. 24) is DENIED in part to the

extent that Hinson’s claim of unlawful termination based on a perceived disability (Count
II) will proceed to trial for a jury to determine whether Hyundai regarded Hinson as
disabled and undertook adverse action on that basis which resulted in Hinson’s termination.
4.

Hinson’s motion to exclude (doc. 41) is DENIED as moot.
28

5.

Hyundai’s motion to strike (doc. 43) is DENIED.

Done this 7th day of February, 2024.
/s/ Emily C. Marks
EMILY C. MARKS
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

29