McBride v. Watkins et al (MAG+)
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: it is ORDERED as follows: 1. McBride's Objections (doc. 34 ) are OVERRULED; 2. The Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (doc. 33 ) is ADOPTED; 3. To the extent the Defendants seek to strike portio ns of the Amended Complaint (doc. 21 ), the Motion (doc. 23 ) is GRANTED; 4. The Motion to Dismiss (doc. 23 ) is GRANTED in part as follows: a. Autauga County is DISMISSED as a defendant on all claim; b. Watkin is DISMISSED entirely on all state l aw claims (Claims Two, Nine, Ten, Twelve, and Thirteen) due to the immunity afforded him under Article I, 14 of the Alabama Constitution; c. Watkins is DISMISSED in his official capacity on all of the survive federal law claims for monetary damages (Claims One, Three, and Four); d. McGowin is DISMISSED entirely on Claims One, Two, Nine, Ten, Twelve, and Thirteen due to McBrides failure to state a claim; 5. In all other aspects, the Motion (doc. 23 ) is DENIED; and 6. This action will proceed against Watkins in his individual capacity on Claims One, Three, and Four, and against McGowin on Claim Five. Signed by Honorable Judge R. Austin Huffaker, Jr on 3/28/2024. (CWL)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION
RANDY CURTIS MCBRIDE,
v.
Plaintiff,
BART SHANNON WATKINS,
et al.,
Defendants
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Case No. 2:22-cv-689-RAH
[WO]
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Randy Curtis McBride filed this action on December 6, 2022
asserting claims against Autauga County, Deputy Sheriff Bart Watkins, and
Dispatcher Scarlet McGowin. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on
June 6, 2023 that is now the operative pleading. (Doc. 21.) The amended complaint
asserts fourteen claims involving multiple constitutional violations and multiple
state law torts—all arising from Plaintiff’s detention, arrest, and bond on December
18–19, 2020 by two officers of the Autauga County Sheriff’s Office (“ACSO”). (Id.)
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s
Complaint seeking dismissal of all claims except those brought against Watkins
pursuant to First and Fourth Amendment for false arrest and the claim against
McGowin for unlawful seizure/false imprisonment. (Doc. 23.)
Additionally,
Defendants also move to strike paragraphs 37, 38, 131, and the entirety of Claim
Seven pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Defendants also ask the Court to dismiss
any relief regarding a declaratory judgment against “the prosecuting attorney,” any
injunctive relief, attorney fees, and the various special conditions McBride requested
for a future hypothetical judgment beyond the confines of federal law.
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Thereafter, the Magistrate Judge recommended partially granting the motion
to dismiss and strike. On March 18, 2024, McBride filed Objections (doc. 34) to the
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (doc. 33). McBride objects to (1)
Autauga County being dismissed as a defendant entirely; (2) Watkins’s dismissal
pursuant to Article I, Section 14 of the Alabama Constitution; (3) McGowin’s
dismissal in Claim One; (4) and striking paragraphs 37, 38, and 131 from the
amended complaint. McBride does not object to McGowin’s dismissal from all state
law claims or the dismissal of all claims based on due process, except Claim Eleven.
Upon an independent and de novo review of the record, including a review of the
amended complaint, and for the reasons that follow, the Court overrules McBride’s
Objections.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a party objects to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the
district court must review the disputed portions of the recommendation de novo. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The district court “may accept, reject, or modify the
recommendation; receive further evidence; or resubmit the matter to the magistrate
judge with instructions. Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3).
De novo review requests the district court to independently consider factual
issues based on the record. Jeffrey S. ex rel. Ernest S. v. State Bd. of Educ. of Ga.,
896 F.2d 507, 513 (11th Cir. 1990). “Although de novo review does not require a
new hearing of witness testimony, it does require independent consideration of
factual issues based on the record.” Id. (citation omitted). If the magistrate judge
made findings based on witness testimony, the district court must review the
transcript or listen to a recording of the proceeding. Id. This Court has reviewed the
briefings of the parties and the record in this case.
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II.
DISCUSSION
The Magistrate Judge provided a thorough recitation of the allegations in his
Recommendation. Consequently, a summary of the allegations related to the motion
to dismiss is not necessary.
McBride objects to Autauga County being dismissed as a defendant in its
entirety. In his amended complaint, McBride alleges that Autauga County “is a
municipal corporation within the purview of the Middle District of Alabama and acts
as employer for Watkins and McGowin. (Doc. 21 at 3.) McBride alleges further
that Autauga County is liable for his alleged injuries because it “was complicity with
multiple arresting agencies within the purview of Autauga County and their use of
an unconstitutional 24-hour mandatory hold . . . as a form of pretrial punishment
and/or the presumption of pretrial guilt.” (Doc. 21 at 2–3.) Autauga County argues
that it “cannot be held liable as a matter of law for any alleged violations of the
Sheriff or his employees.” (Doc. 23 at 1.)
The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge in his dismissal of Autauga
County. In McMillan v. Monroe Cnty., the Supreme Court agreed with the Eleventh
Circuit that “Alabama sheriffs, when executing their law enforcement duties,
represent the State of Alabama, not their counties.” 520 U.S. 781, 793 (1997)
(emphasis added). See also Ex parte Sumter Cnty., 953 So. 2d 1235, 1239 (Ala.
2006) (“Sheriffs are not county employees . . . particularly for purposes of imposing
respondeat superior liability upon the county. . . . Moreover, deputies . . . are likewise
not county employees.”). McBride has provided no facts or legal authorities that
support the proposition that the acts of ACSO employees are attributable to Autauga
County or that a sheriff is a policy maker for the county. Nor did McBride provide
any facts or legal authority showing that Autauga County is liable for allegedly
discriminatory bond amounts. Therefore, McBride’s objection is overruled, and
Autauga County is due to be dismissed in its entirety.
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McBride also objects to the dismissal of Deputy Watkins on all state law
claims and federal law claims in his official capacity where the relief sought is
monetary damages pursuant to State immunity afforded to him by Ala. Const. Art.
I, §14. In his objection, he argues that Article I, Section 14 of the Alabama
Constitution is unconstitutional because it “limits the authority of the judiciary to
provide redress for individuals and groups who have been subjected to constitutional
violations by governmental officials.” (Doc. 34 at 9.) While he is correct about the
effect of Ala. Const. Art. I, § 14, he offers no legal authority as to why this provision
violates the federal Constitution. Much of McBride’s arguments for why this state
constitutional provision should be declared federally unconstitutional are really
policy arguments for repealing the provision, which he advocates for in his closing
paragraph on this particular objection. (Doc. 34 at 10.)
But none of his rationales
are supported by legal authorities that show the constitutional provision is violative
of the federal constitution. And this is because the provision is constitutional and
has been consistently enforced by courts since its inclusion in the Alabama
Constitution of 1875. See Ex parte Donaldson, 80 So. 3d 895, 898–99 (Ala. 2011)
(discussing § 14 State immunity as it relates to sheriffs and deputy sheriffs); M.D.
ex rel Daniels v. Smith, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1253 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (discussing
that § 14 prohibits plaintiffs from seeking monetary damages against deputy
sheriffs). Therefore, his objection based on the constitutionality of Ala. Const. Art.
I, § 14 is overruled and Watkins is due to be dismissed on all claims where the relief
sought is monetary damages.
Next, McBride objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation of
dismissing McGowin from Claim One. Claim One is styled “Acts in excess of
Amendment I: Retaliation for speech” and appears to be asserted pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 21 at 11.) “To state a retaliation claim, the commonly accepted
formulation requires that a plaintiff must establish first, that his speech or act was
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constitutionally protected; second, that the defendant’s retaliatory conduct adversely
affected the protected speech; and third, that there is a causal connection between
the retaliatory actions and the adverse effect on speech.” Bennett v. Hendrix, 423
F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 2005).
According to the amended complaint, McGowin falsely informed Watkins
that McBride and his partner Galloway were “arguing” inside the ACSO and
instructed them to be quiet. (Doc. 21 at 5, 11.) McBride denies arguing with
Galloway and contends that he was merely asking McGowin why he was being
locked inside the sheriff’s office. (Doc. 29 at 3.) Prior to the arrest, McGowin
allegedly told Watkins that McBride and Galloway were arguing in front of her.
Watkins then talked with both McBride and Galloway and Watkins became angry
and arrested McBride “for domestic violence, harassment.” (Doc. 21 at ¶¶ 27–30.)
The degree of protection owed to speech depends on the type of public
premise at issue:
The ability of the government to constrain the First
Amendment activity on public property depends on the
type of forum involved; thus we analyze restrictions of
expressive activity on government property using the
public forum doctrine, under which government property
is categorized as a traditional public forum, a designated
public forum, or a nonpublic forum. Each type of forum is
governed by a different set of standards. In a nonpublic
forum—public property that is not by tradition or
designation a forum for public communication—the
government may reserve the forum for its intended
purposes and impose time, place, and manner regulations.
If these regulations on speech are reasonable and
viewpoint neutral, there is no First Amendment violation.
Watkins v. U.S. Postal Emp., 611 F. App’x 549, 551 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). The Magistrate Judge found that the ACSO
is a nonpublic forum and therefore any restriction on McBride’s speech must be
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reasonable and viewpoint neutral. (Doc. 33 at 11, citing Watkins, 611 F. App’x at
551.) The Court agrees that the ACSO is a nonpublic forum. A law enforcement
office is not a traditional public forum, such as a park, nor is it a designated public
forum, such as a government-run auditorium where public meetings take place.
After a review of the amended omplaint, it is clear that McBride provided no
detail as to what he said to McGowin (his allegedly protected speech) or what
McGowin did to restrict his speech other than tell him to be quiet. That is the
“restriction” on his speech. And nothing in the alleged facts makes McGowin’s
order to “be quiet” appear unreasonable or viewpoint biased. See United States v.
Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990) (plurality opinion) (“[R]egulation of speech
activity where the Government has not dedicated its property to First Amendment
activity is examined only for reasonableness.”) And because McBride cannot
establish that McGowin’s actions were unreasonable or viewpoint biased, his claim
against McGowin fails.
Additionally, the Magistrate Judge found that even if McBride had established
a First Amendment claim, such a claim would be subject to dismissal on the basis of
qualified immunity. To qualify for qualified immunity, a state actor must be
engaged in a discretionary function of their position and her conduct must not violate
a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person
would have known. Watkins, 611 F. App’x at 551 (citing to Randall v. Scott, 610
F.3d 701, 714 (11th Cir. 2010)). It is obvious that McGowin was engaging in a
discretionary function of her job when she told McBride to be quiet. And the Court
is unable to locate, nor did McBride provide, any case law that would support that
McGowin was on notice that such conduct was violative of the First Amendment.
As a result, McBride’s objections are due to be overruled and McGowin should be
dismissed from Claim One.
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McBride further objects to the dismissal of Claim Eleven. Claim Eleven is
titled “Acts in Excess of Amendment XIV; Due Process Violation; Brady
Violation.” (Doc. 21 at 23.) After reviewing the amended complaint, it is apparent
that despite the styling of the Claim, McBride is really trying to litigate a purported
Brady violation. To prove a Brady violation, “a defendant must establish three
elements: (1) the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused, either because it is
exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; (2) this favorable evidence was suppressed
by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) the defendant suffered
prejudice as a result.” Downs v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corrs., 738 F.3d 240, 258 (11th
Cir. 2013). To prove prejudice, the Eleventh Circuit requires a defendant to
demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (quotation
marks omitted). However, this claim fails because McBride admits that his criminal
case terminated with an acquittal. (Doc. 21 at 10.) In other words, McBride suffered
no prejudice because he was not convicted of the underlying offense, nor has he
shown that he can maintain a private right of action for monetary damages under a
theory of a Brady violation.
III.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:
1. McBride’s Objections (doc. 34) are OVERRULED;
2. The Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (doc. 33) is
ADOPTED;
3. To the extent the Defendants seek to strike portions of the Amended
Complaint (doc. 21), the Motion (doc. 23) is GRANTED 1;
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f), the court “may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” And motions to strike are disfavored
and “will usually be denied unless the allegations have no possible relation to the controversy and
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4. The Motion to Dismiss (doc. 23) is GRANTED in part as follows:
a. Autauga County is DISMISSED as a defendant on all claim;
b. Watkin is DISMISSED entirely on all state law claims (Claims Two,
Nine, Ten, Twelve, and Thirteen) due to the immunity afforded him
under Article I, § 14 of the Alabama Constitution;
c. Watkins is DISMISSED in his official capacity on all of the survive
federal law claims for monetary damages (Claims One, Three, and
Four);
d. McGowin is DISMISSED entirely on Claims One, Two, Nine, Ten,
Twelve, and Thirteen due to McBride’s failure to state a claim;
5. In all other aspects, the Motion (doc. 23) is DENIED; and
6. This action will proceed against Watkins in his individual capacity on Claims
One, Three, and Four, and against McGowin on Claim Five.
DONE, on this the 28th day of March 2024.
R. AUSTIN HUFFAKER, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
may cause prejudice to one of the parties.” Contreras v. City of Hanceville, No. 5:18-cv-1748LCB, 2019 WL 1979437 at *2 (N.D. Ala. May 3, 2019). Here, we have allegations that were not
immaterial at the time McBride filed his Amended Complaint. Paragraphs 37 and 38 contain full
names, races, charged crimes, and bond amounts for individuals in Autauga County. It is obvious
to the Court that McBride included these individuals for the purpose of fully litigating Claim Seven
(Excessive Bail/Racial Discrimination) and Claim Fourteen (Failure to Train/Custom of
Discrimination) by showing comparators. However, since the Court has dismissed Claims Seven
and Fourteen, these allegations have now become immaterial and will be struck from the Amended
Complaint. Regarding paragraph 131, this allegation directly alleges that the Autauga County
Sheriff’s Office and an Autauga County magistrate judge have engaged in a pattern of racial
discrimination. Since these are non-parties and the claim has been dismissed in its entirety, these
are immaterial and likewise are struck. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).
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