Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin, Portis and Miles, P.C. V. The Smith Law Firm, PLLC et al

Filing 44

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER that the Motion to Recuse (doc. 38 ) is DENIED. Signed by Honorable Judge R. Austin Huffaker, Jr. on 01/03/2025. (LAB)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION
BEASLEY, ALLEN, CROW,
METHVIN, PORTIS AND
MILES, P.C.,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE SMITH LAW FIRM, PLLC,
et al.,
Defendants.

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) CASE NO. 2:24-cv-00582-RAH
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[WO]
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is the Motion to Recuse (doc. 38) filed by Defendants The
Smith Law Firm, PLLC and Robert Allen Smith, Jr. (“Smith Defendants”). The
motion comes after a status conference where I voluntarily disclosed my previous
representation of Plaintiff Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin, Portis & Miles, P.C.
(“Beasley Allen”) before I was confirmed as a federal judge. I made the disclosure
so that any concern could be resolved sooner rather than later in the case. Beasley
Allen has filed a response.
In their motion, the Smith Defendants cite solely to 28 U.S.C. § 455, which
“places a judge under a self-enforcement obligation to recuse himself where the
proper legal grounds exist.” United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532, 1540 (11th
Cir. 1987) (per curiam), superseded on other grounds by statute, Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28, as recognized in Lussier
v. Dugger, 904 F.2d 661, 664–65 (11th Cir. 1990). Section 455(a) contains a general
catch-all provision requiring a judge to “disqualify himself in any proceeding in

which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
Section 455(b) enumerates several specific, bright-line grounds for disqualification.
See id. § 455(b). This case does not involve any of the specific circumstances
enumerated in Section 455(b), nor do the Smith Defendants say that it does. So, I
must answer the more general question of whether, under Section 455(a), my
previous attorney-client relationship with Beasley Allen, which ended over five
years ago, would cause a fully informed, lay observer to reasonably question my
impartiality in this proceeding. The Smith Defendants say that it does.
Section 455(a) has a broader scope than Section 455(b) and requires a judge
to “disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably
be questioned.” Id. § 455(a). Even the mere appearance of bias is sufficient to
mandate recusal—whether there is actual bias is irrelevant. See Liteky v. United
States, 510 U.S. 540, 567 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Because Section 455(a)’s purpose “is to promote confidence in the judiciary
by avoiding even the appearance of impropriety whenever possible,” Liljeberg v.
Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 865 (1988) (citation omitted), it
requires the application of an objective standard, see Parker v. Connors Steel Co.,
855 F.2d 1510, 1524 (11th Cir. 1988). Specifically, that objective standard asks
“whether an objective, disinterested, lay observer fully informed of the facts
underlying the grounds on which recusal [would be based] would entertain a
significant doubt about the judge’s impartiality.” Id. The purpose of § 455 “is to
foster impartiality by requiring even its appearance.” Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana
v. Harry L. Laws Co., 690 F.2d 1157, 1165 (5th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted).
Importantly, “[a] reasonable observer must assume that judges are ordinarily capable
of setting aside their own interests and adhering to their sworn duties to ‘faithfully
and impartially discharge and perform all the duties’ incumbent upon them.”
Armenian Assembly of Am., Inc. v. Cafesjian, 783 F. Supp. 2d 78, 91 (D.D.C. 2011)
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(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 453). “Thus, under § 455(a), a judge should be disqualified
only if it appears that he or she harbors an aversion, hostility or disposition of a kind
that a fair-minded person could not set aside when judging the dispute.” Liteky, 510
U.S. at 558 (Kennedy, J., concurring). A court considering recusal must bear in
mind that “[t]here is as much obligation for a judge not to recuse when there is no
occasion for him to do so as there is for him to do so when there is.” Hinman v.
Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (citation omitted); see
United States v. Greenough, 782 F.2d 1556, 1558 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (“[A]
judge, having been assigned to a case, should not recuse himself on unsupported,
irrational, or highly tenuous speculation.”).
“A judge’s prior representation of one of the parties in a proceeding . . . does
not automatically warrant disqualification.” See, e.g., United States v. Lovaglia, 954
F.2d 811, 815 (2d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). The Judiciary’s Committee on
Codes of Conduct (“Committee”) offers guidance in its Compendium of Selected
Opinions (“Compendium”), which can be found within the Guide to Judiciary
Policies and Procedures. The Compendium1 contains a summary of selected
published and unpublished opinions issued by the Committee and contains
summaries of the advice given in response to confidential fact-specific inquiries. See
generally Compendium (Aug. 2024). The Compendium provides that “[a] judge
who formerly represented various law firms in defending malpractice suits should
recuse from all cases handled by such firms for a reasonable period (two to five
years), regardless of whether the fees were paid by the firm or its insurance carrier.”
Id. § 3.6-5(c) (Aug. 2024).
To resolve the recusal issue in question (i.e., litigation involving a former
client of a judge in a matter unrelated to the earlier representation), several factors

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The Compendium is a restricted-access internal resource for judges.
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should be considered, including the length of time since the earlier representation
ended; the nature, duration, and intensity of the earlier representation; and the
presence or absence of an ongoing personal relationship. The general recommended
period of recusal is a minimum of two years. See, e.g., Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All
Am. Life Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 617, 621–22 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Nothing in the Code of
Conduct for federal judges makes prior representation of a litigant a disqualifying
event. The norm among new appointees to the bench is that once two years pass,
perhaps even earlier, a judge is free to sit in controversies involving former clients.”
(citing Compendium § 3.6-5)).
Pertinent to the consideration of the Smith Defendants’ motion, I state the
following. I was confirmed to my current judicial position on December 4, 2019,
over five years ago, after practicing law in Montgomery, Alabama for approximately
twenty years with the law firm of Rushton, Stakely, Johnston & Garrett, P.A.
Rushton Stakely is primarily a litigation defense firm, with a focus in professional
liability defense. Over the last fifteen years of my practice, a large percentage of my
practice involved representing attorneys across the State of Alabama in various legal
matters in which they found themselves – legal malpractice, disciplinary matters
before the Alabama State Bar, human resource matters, attorney separation, and
attorney fee disputes. Beasley Allen was just one of numerous other law firms and
attorneys that I represented over the years. That representation was occasional over
the course of the years and constituted a small fraction of my overall client base and
revenue generations on a year-to-year basis.2 But that relationship ended over five
years ago. I have no ongoing attorney-client relationship with the Beasley Allen
firm, nor have I in over five years. And further, that representation never involved
or included any of the matters at issue in this lawsuit, both as it concerns the
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And during that time, I represented clients in matters against parties represented by Beasley
Allen.
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Defendants and the talc litigation against Johnson & Johnson.
I have no close social or personal ties to their attorneys. Any interaction with
the attorneys of that firm over the past five-plus years has been in my role as a
judicial officer before whom they occasionally appear as counsel for litigants, at barrelated functions, and in the Montgomery community in general. That relationship
is no different than that of which I have with any attorney in the Montgomery area,
including current local counsel for the Smith Defendants.
As the Seventh Circuit observed some time ago:
In today’s legal culture friendships among judges and lawyers are
common. They are more than common; they are desirable. A judge
need not cut himself off from the rest of the legal community. . . . Many
courts therefore have held that a judge need not disqualify himself just
because a friend—even a close friend—appears as a lawyer.
United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1537 (7th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).
However, if “the association exceeds what might reasonably be expected in light of
the associational activities of an ordinary judge, the unusual aspects of a social
relation may give rise to a reasonable question about the judge’s impartiality.” Id.
at 1538 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Based on the requirements and considerations of Section 455 and the guidance
interpreting it, including the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, I am
confident that my prior representation of Beasley Allen (or any other attorney or law
firm for that matter) would not lead an objective, disinterested, lay observer to
entertain a significant doubt about my impartiality. See Parker, 855 F.2d at 1524. I
therefore conclude that I am not prohibited by the Code of Conduct for United States
Judges or 28 U.S.C. § 455 from hearing this case and that my recusal is unwarranted.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Motion to Recuse (doc. 38) is
DENIED.

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DONE and ORDERED on this the 3rd day of January 2025.

R. AUSTIN HUFFAKER, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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