Mills v. City of Phenix City, Alabama

Filing 37

OPINION. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/16/12. (scn, ) (Main Document 37 replaced on 7/16/2012 to correct spelling and date errors) (scn, ).

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, EASTERN DIVISION

BEVERLY MILLS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF PHENIX CITY,
ALABAMA,
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.
3:11cv529-MHT
(WO)

OPINION
Plaintiff Beverly Mills brings this lawsuit charging
that defendant City of Phenix City, Alabama terminated
her employment in violation of her due-process rights (as
protected

by

the

Fourteenth

Amendment,

as

enforced

through 42 U.S.C. § 1983) and discriminated against her
on the basis of her gender in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981a, 2000e through 2000e-17.
state-law

defamation

claim.

Mills also asserts a

Jurisdiction

is

proper

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights), 42 U.S.C.

2000e-5(f)(3) (Title VII), and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (state
law).
The city now moves for summary judgment.

For the

reasons that follow, the motion will be granted.

I.

SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

The court must view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that
party.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

Here, Mills is the non-

moving party.

II.

BACKGROUND

After 30 years in the banking industry and a brief
retirement,

Mills

began

working

2

for

Phenix

City

in

January 2003.
city’s

She was hired as an office manager in the

utilities

included

department.

numerous

Her

administrative

responsibilities

tasks,

processing

payroll, and authorizing employee reimbursements.
The city divides its employees into ‘classified’ and
‘unclassified’ positions.

Its merit-system rules “apply

to all positions in the Merit System except those in the
Unclassified Service.”

City Rules (Doc. No. 13-6) at 2.

The rules further state that, “Provisions with respect to
General

Provisions,

Position

Classification

Plan,

Compensation Plan, Attendance and Leave Regulations and
Employee Relations apply to full-time employees in the
Unclassified Service except elected officials, members of
the advisory boards, commissions and committees.”
2-3.

Per

the

rules,

only

classified

Id. at

employees

are

entitled to a hearing.
It is undisputed that, at the time of hiring, Mills’s
office-manager position was ‘classified’ under the city’s
merit-system rules. At that time, unclassified employees

3

included, amongst others, the city manager, aides to the
city

manager,

the

city

clerk,

the

city

department directors, and temporary employees.

attorney,
But, on

February, 15, 2005, the city council passed ordinance
number 2005-02, which added office managers to the list
of unclassified positions.

According to the city, this

ordinance transferred Mills to the unclassified service,
notwithstanding the fact that she had been hired as a
classified employee.
Mills’s disciplinary troubles began in October 2007
when she was given a verbal warning and counseling for
permitting a subordinate employee to handle payroll.
Verbal Warning Form (Doc. No. 13-1) at 1.

The city

states that only Mills and Utilities Director Greg Glass
were authorized to process payroll.

Mills responds that

Glass had directed her to let the subordinate employee
handle the payroll.

It is undisputed that only Mills was

written up for insubordination for this incident.

4

In August 2009, Mills received two disciplinaries.
In one incident, she altered the time cards of Trevor
Truitt in violation of city policy.1

She contends that

Truitt had been taking only 20 minutes of his allotted
30-minute lunch break and that she altered the time cards
to prevent him from making a claim for unpaid overtime.
According to Mills, the alteration of time cards was a
common occurrence in the city’s utilities department.
Mills received an eight-hour suspension for the time-card
alterations.

Written Warning Form (Doc. No. 13-2) at 1.

Around the same time, Mills was again written up,
this time for insubordination for a separate incident.
She had been advised by City Manager Wallace Hunter that,
if

any

issue

arose

during

Utilities

Director

Steve

Smith’s extended absence, she should contact Hunter.
When

employee

Charles

Woody

approached

Mills

about

1. The record and briefing contain three different
first names for Truitt: Trevor, Travor, and Travis. The
court uses the first name ‘Trevor’ because it is the most
frequently used name and appears on the city’s official
documents.
5

another employee’s absence from a training program, Mills
and Woody called Smith on his cell phone to ask for help.
Mills states that Smith had instructed her to call him if
a problem arose.

Nonetheless, Mills was disciplined for

ignoring Hunter’s command and received an eight-hour
suspension.

Written Warning Form (Doc. No. 13-3) at 1.2

The city terminated Mills on July 14, 2010, after she
had approved fraudulent purchase orders submitted by
Truitt.
and

A city investigation had revealed that Truitt

finance-department

employee

Sylvia

Suttle

were

romantically involved and had conspired to defraud the
city.

Truitt submitted false reimbursement requests for

expenses such as air fresheners, foot powder, and car
repairs.

Mills approved these requests in her role as

office manager.

According to the city, Mills’s actions

2. Mills received a fourth reprimand in April 2010
for forwarding a chain email about coping with grief
shortly after her husband died. She was suspended for 40
hours for this violation. Written Warning Form (Doc. No.
13-4) at 1. She concedes that she violated the city’s
prohibition against sending chain emails.
Opposition
Brief (Doc. No. 20-1) at 4.
6

were negligent and merited termination in light of her
prior

reprimands.

Mills

responds

that

none

of

the

purchases raised red flags; that she processed 75 to 80
pay requests daily; and that her supervisor (Smith) was
equally responsible for approving Truitt’s requests.
During the course of the fraud investigation, Mills
was interviewed by the police but never charged with a
crime.
Mills

The story also garnered local media attention.
has

community

submitted

affidavits

detailing

the

from

rumors

members

of

surrounding

her
her

termination.
After

Mills

was

utilities-department

fired,
employees

Smith

gathered

all

the

and

informed

them

of

Truitt and Suttle’s affair and fraudulent scheme.

Smith

commented that Mills had been fired for authorizing the
improper
affidavit

reimbursement
submitted

by

charges.

According

utilities-department

to

an

employee

Marcy Williams, Smith’s speech left the impression that

7

Mills had been part of Truitt and Suttle’s conspiracy.
Williams Affidavit (Doc. No. 19-6) at 2.
Mills sought an administrative hearing before the
city’s personnel-review board and appeared at a meeting
of the city council.

The review board and city council

refused to hear Mills’s appeal on the ground that she was
an unclassified employee outside the city’s merit-system
rules.

This lawsuit followed.

III.
A.

DISCUSSION

Due Process

Mills makes two separate claims under the Due Process
Clause as enforced through § 1983.

First, she contends

that her right to ‘procedural’ due process was violated
by the city when it fired her without a hearing.

Second

and relatedly, Mills asserts a ‘stigma-plus’ claim: that
the city defamed her when it terminated her and failed to
provide an avenue to clear her name.

8

1.

Procedural Due Process

Mills claims that she had a property interest in her
job and that the city violated that interest when it
terminated her.
reasons.

The court rejects this claim for two

First, this claim is abandoned or waived, for,

while it was presented in her complaint, it was not
addressed in her summary-judgment brief.

Resolution

Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir.
1995) (“grounds alleged in the complaint but not relied
upon in summary judgment are deemed abandoned”).

Second,

as will now be explained, this claim lacks merits.
A

public

employee

is

entitled

to

procedural due

process if she has a property interest in her position.
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 343-47 (1976).

A property

interest

individual

exists

entitlement

if

grounded

an
in

employee
state

removed except ‘for cause.’”

that

“‘property’

9

law,

“an
which

cannot

be

Logan v. Zimmerman Brush

Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982).
instructed

has

The Supreme Court has
interests

subject

to

procedural due process protection are not limited by a
few rigid, technical forms.

Rather, ‘property’ denotes

a broad range of interests that are secured by ‘existing
rules or understandings.’”

Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.

593,

Board

601

(1972)

(quoting

of

Regents

Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
a

unilateral

expectation

of

continued

of

State

Of course,

employment

is

insufficient to trigger due-process protections. Bishop,
426 U.S. at 345-47.
The parties dispute whether Mills had a property
interest in her employment.

Mills believes that the

city’s classification system is unclear and that the
rules

and

disciplinary

procedures

used

by

the

city

created a property right in her employment.
The

court

notes

at

the

outset

that

Alabama

has

jealously guarded its status as an “at will” employment
state.

See, e.g., Ex parte Amoco Fabrics and Fiber Co.,

729 So. 2d 336, 339 (Ala. 1998) (“The bedrock principle
of Alabama employment law is that, in the absence of a

10

contract providing otherwise, employment in this state is
at-will, terminable at the will of either party.

Under

this doctrine, an employee may be discharged for any
reason, good or bad, or even for no reason at all.”).
Therefore,

governmental

employees

in

Alabama

do

not

acquire a property interest in their employment as long
as they remain in the terminable-at-will realm.
The city’s 2005 ordinance clearly transferred the
office-manager

position

unclassified service.

from

the

classified

to

2005 Ordinance (Doc. No. 13-7) at

1.

As such, there is no ambiguity as to the designation

of

the

office-manager

position

and

Mills

was

not

a

classified employee entitled to a hearing.
To be sure, an employee need not have an explicit
contract to move into the realm of for-cause employment.
Alabama cases establish that, in certain circumstances,
an

employee

employment.

handbook

may

vest

property

rights

in

Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., v. Campbell, 512 So.

2d 725, 735 (Ala. 1987) (holding that “the language

11

contained in a handbook can be sufficient to constitute
an offer to create a binding unilateral contract”).

But

these cases are inapposite when the handbook expressly
avows that it does not create a property interest in
employment.

Id. at 734 (commenting that “if the employer

does not wish the policies contained in an employee
handbook to be construed as an offer for a unilateral
contract, he is free to so state in the handbook”).
Whether

employee

handbooks

or

other

employee

rules

constitute a binding contract is a question of law to be
decided by the court. Campisi v. Scoles Cadillac, Inc.,
611 So.2d 296, 298-99 (Ala. 1992).
Here, the city’s rules unequivocally state that they
do not create a property interest: “The city reserves the
right to change or depart from the Merit System Rules and
Regulations.

Nothing in these Rules and Regulations

shall be construed as an employment contract between any
individual and the city covering any term or condition of
employment.”

Merit System Rules (City’s Exhibit 1) at

12

12.

Courts construing Alabama law have held similar

“language

prevents

contract

of

employment.”

the

handbook

from

supporting

other

than

for

employment
Nicholson

v.

City

of

Daphne,

a

at-will
2009

4667382, *6 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 25, 2009) (Steele, J.).

WL
See

also Hoffman-LaRoche, 512 So. 2d at 734 (providing as an
example of at-will employment: “[t]his Handbook and the
policies contained herein do not in any way constitute,
and should not be construed as a contract of employment
between the employer and the employee, or a promise of
employment”).

Thus, Mills cannot point to the city’s

merit-system rules to establish a property right in her
employment.
Mills refers to language in her termination letter
and three of the disciplinaries as the source of her
right to a hearing.

When she was fired, Mills was asked

to sign beneath the following paragraph:
“I further acknowledge I have been
informed of my right to appeal the
disciplinary action taken against me to
the Appeals Board or the Personnel
13

Review Board.
My request must be
submitted in writing to the Personnel
Director within three (3) working days
for the Appeal Board and within ten (10)
working days for the Personnel Review
Board. Probationary employees are not
entitled to a Personnel Review Board
Hearing as stated in Section 15.011 of
the Merit System Rules and Regulation.”
Termination Letter (Doc. No. 13-5) at 3.
This argument is unavailing for two reasons.

First,

as discussed above, the city’s rules-–which define the
disciplinary procedures–-cannot form the basis for a
property right because the city included a disavowal
clause in its handbook.

Second, it is axiomatic that

“‘property’ cannot be defined by the procedures provided
for

its

deprivation.”

Loudermill,

470

U.S.

Cleveland
532,

541

Bd.

(1985).

of

Educ.
One

v.

cannot

“construct a property interest out of procedural timber
....

‘The

distinct.’”

categories

of

substance

and

procedure

Bunger v. University of Oklahoma Bd. of

Regents, 95 F.3d 987, 990-991 (10th Cir. 1996).
the

city’s

are

“promise

that

14

it

would

follow

Thus,
certain

procedural steps in considering [Mills’s termination] did
not beget a property interest in [it].”
such,

Mills

cannot

rely

on

a

Id. at 991.

boilerplate

As

procedural

instruction in a disciplinary form as the basis for a
property right when none otherwise exists.
Alternatively, Mills contends in both his complaint
and summary-judgment brief that the city violated her
due-process right when it reclassified her position in
2005 and, thus, that the city could not terminate her
without a hearing in 2010.
an

executive

importance.

and

Here, the distinction between

legislative

act

is

of

paramount

As the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has

explained:
“Executive acts characteristically apply
to a limited number of persons (and
often to only one person); executive
acts
typically
arise
from
the
ministerial or administrative activities
of members of the executive branch. The
most common examples are employment
terminations. ...
“Legislative acts, on the other hand,
generally apply to a larger segment
of--if not all of--society; laws and
15

broad-ranging executive regulations are
the most common examples. The analysis,
and
the
substantive/procedural
distinction discussed above, that is
appropriate for executive acts is
inappropriate for legislative acts. For
instance,
only
when
addressing
legislative acts has the Supreme Court
mandated that states must demonstrate
that
they
are
violating
private
interests only as necessary to promote
state interests.”
McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1557 n.9 (11th Cir. 1994)
(en banc) (citations omitted). The 2005 reclassification
was

a

legislative

act:

the

city

council

passed

an

ordinance transferring an entire group of employees from
the classified to unclassified service.

There was no

individualized consideration.

Mills’s argument that the

city

office

could

not

reclassify

managers

cognizable as a procedural due-process claim.

is

not

She may

bring a procedural due process violation for only the
paradigmatic executive act at issue in this case-–her
termination.3

3. Finally, Mills claims that she was ‘grandfathered’
into the classified service.
Mills’s contention
(continued...)

16

2.
Mills

Stigma-Plus
also

raises

a

‘stigma-plus’

claim.

Specifically, she alleges that the city defamed her and
failed to provide a hearing to clear her name.

A public

employee seeking to establish a stigma-plus claim must
prove that: “(1) a false statement (2) of a stigmatizing
nature (3) attending a governmental employee's discharge
(4) was made public (5) by the governmental employer (6)
without

a

meaningful

opportunity

for

employee

name

clearing.”

Cannon v. City of West Palm Beach, 250 F.3d

1299,

(11th

1301

Cir.

2001).

A

stigma-plus

claim

“requires the plaintiff to show both a valid defamation
claim

(the

stigma)

and

the

tangible interest (the plus).”

violation

of

some

more

Rehberg v. Paulk, 611

F.3d 828, 852 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

(...continued)

misinterprets Alabama case law.
She relies on cases
where Alabama law explicitly ‘grandfathered’ in certain
employees. Morrison v. Booth, 763 F.2d 1366, 1368 (11th
Cir. 1985) (discussing the ‘grandfathering’ process). No
such grandfather clause exists in this case.
17

Mills’s

stigma-plus

claim

cannot prove defamation.4

must

fail

because

she

To establish a defamation

claim, Mills must show “‘[1] that the defendant was at
least

negligent

defamatory

[2]

in

publishing

statement

to

another

[3]

[4]

a

false

and

concerning

the

plaintiff, [5] which is either actionable without having
to prove special harm (actionable per se) or actionable
upon allegations and proof of special harm (actionable
per quod).’”

Ex Parte Crawford Broadcasting, 904 So. 2d

221, 225 (Ala. 2004) (quoting Delta Health Group, Inc. v.
Stafford, 887 So. 2d

887, 891 (Ala. 2004)).

4. The court notes that there must be a ‘plus’ in a
stigma-plus case.
See Rehberg, 611 F.3d at 852 (“The
‘stigma-plus’ test requires not only allegations stating
a common-law defamation claim, but also an additional
constitutional injury, tied to a previously recognized
constitutional property or liberty interest, flowing from
the defamation.”). The court has concluded that Mills
lacks a property interest in her employment, see supra
Section III.A.1. As such, Mills can prevail only if she
had a liberty interest in her employment. Because the
court concludes that there is no ‘stigma,’ it declines to
address whether a public employee can have a liberty
interest in continued employment when a property interest
does not exist.
18

“Truth is an absolute defense to a defamation claim.”
S.B. v. Saint James School, 959 So. 2d 72, 100 (Ala.
2006).

The First Amendment compels a defense of truth to

defamation claims, lest state tort law “interfere with
the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas.”
Hustler
(1988).

Magazine,

Inc.

v.

Falwell,

485

U.S.

46,

52

However, “there is no constitutional value in

false statements of fact.”

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,

418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (emphasis added).
The question, then, is whether Smith uttered a false
statement of fact when he announced Mills’s termination.
Mills

provides

the

following

account

of

the

defamatory speech:
“On or about July 14, 2010, Stephen
Smith met with all of the employees of
the utilities department.
He told us
that Beverly Mills and two other
employees (Trevor and Sylvia) had been
fired. He said that Trevor and Sylvia
had been having an affair. He said that
Sylvia had been helping her boyfriend
Trevor to hide improper reimbursement
charges.
Smith said that Beverly was
fired for signing invoices that should
not have been signed. In this meeting,
19

city’s

Mr. Smith lumped Beverly Mills together
with Trevor and Sylvia, giving the false
impression that Beverly was part of
their scheme to steal from the City.”
Williams Affidavit (Doc. No. 19-6) at 2 (emphasis added).
Nothing in Williams’s affidavit evidences that a
false statement was made.

Mills was terminated by the

city for her negligent approval of Truitt and Suttle’s
fraudulent scheme and Smith’s speech reflects that fact.
Williams’s account of Smith’s speech places a far greater
emphasis on the involvement between Truitt and Suttle;
Mills is referenced with regards to only her approval of
the

reimbursements,

not

the

fraud

itself.

Thus,

Williams’s “false impression” of Smith’s speech is not
synonymous with a ‘false fact.’
Additionally,

Mills

cites

to

a

local

newspaper

article--that neither mentions her by name nor contains
any false statement–-and affidavits from friends who have
heard rumors about why she was terminated.

A rumor

mill’s insinuations that Mills was actively and knowingly
involved in the fraudulent scheme does not transform
20

Smith’s statement into a falsehood.

Because the city did

not state a falsehood, Mills’s stigma-plus claim must
fail.5

B.

Gender Discrimination

A gender-discrimination claim brought under Title VII
is governed by the familiar burden-shifting analysis of
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff has
the initial burden of establishing a prima-facie case of
unlawful employment discrimination by a preponderance of
evidence.

Id. at 802.

If the plaintiff establishes a

prima-facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant
to rebut the presumption by articulating a legitimate,

5. Mills also asserted a state-law defamation claim.
She has conceded that summary judgment is due to be
granted on this claim. See infra Section III.C.
It could be argued that, because the stigma-plus test
requires proof of “a common-law defamation claim,”
Rehberg, 611 F.3d at 852, Mills’s concession defeats her
stigma-plus claim as well.
21

non-discriminatory reason for its employment action. The
defendant

has

the

burden

of

production,

not

of

persuasion, and thus need not convince the court that the
reason advanced actually motivated its action.
Once

the

presumption

defendant

of

satisfies

discrimination

plaintiff

has

the

evidence,

including

opportunity
the

is

this

Id.

burden,

eliminated

to

previously

come

and

forward

produced

“the
the
with

evidence

establishing the prima-facie case, sufficient to permit
a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the reasons
given by the [defendant] were not the real reasons for
the

adverse

employment

decision.”

Chapman

v.

AI

Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
plaintiff

must

show

that

a

In other words, a

defendant’s

proffered

explanation is a mere pretext for discriminatory conduct.
To establish a prima-facie case of discriminatory
discipline, Mills must show that: (1) she belongs to a
protected class; (2) she was subjected to adverse job

22

action; and (3) her employer treated similarly situated
employees

outside

favorably.

her

protected

classification

more

Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th

Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
The city contends that the three pre-termination
disciplinaries

are

not

tangible-employment

cognizable under Title VII.

actions

In Burlington Industries v.

Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), the Supreme Court explained
that

a

“tangible

employment

action

constitutes

a

significant change in employment status, such as hiring,
firing,

failing

to

promote,

reassignment

with

significantly different responsibilities, or a decision
causing a significant change in benefits.”

Id. at 761.

Although context specific, a “tangible employment action
in most cases inflicts direct economic harm.”

Id. at

762.
Here, Mills was suspended without pay on two relevant
occasions prior to her termination.6

6.

“While a suspension

Mills does not contend that the chain-letter
(continued...)

23

is not the most severe punishment, it still qualifies as
a tangible-employment action” because there is direct
Adams v. City of Montgomery, 2012 WL

economic harm.

1414979, *6 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 24, 2012) (Thompson, J.).
Moreover, because the city’s progressive disciplinary
policy factored in the three contested disciplinaries
into the termination decision, each of them is actionable
to that extent.

Id.

The city fares better on its next arguments.

The

city argues that Mills has failed to identify a valid
comparator.

“To make a comparison of the plaintiff’s

treatment to that of [male] employees, the plaintiff must
show that [s]he and the employees were similarly situated
in all relevant respects.”
(emphasis added).

Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1562

The Eleventh Circuit requires that

“the quantity and quality of the comparator's misconduct
be

nearly

identical

to

prevent

courts

from

(...continued)

disciplinary was discriminatory.
As such, the court
omits it from the discussion of Mills’s Title VII claim.
24

second-guessing

employers'

reasonable

decisions

and

Maniccia v. Brown, 171

confusing apples with oranges.”

F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added).
For the October 2007 reprimand, the August 2009
insubordination

suspension,

and

the

July

2010

termination, Mills cites her immediate supervisors, Glass
and Smith, as comparators.7

Of course, a supervisor is

not “similarly situated” to a subordinate employee.

As

to the time-card suspension, Mills submits that other
employees

regularly

suspended.

edited

time

cards

and

were

not

Mills, however, has not presented evidence

that another office manager altered time cards and that
the

same

person.

supervisor

knew

and

failed

to

punish

this

As such, Mills cannot establish a prima-facie

case of discriminatory discipline.

Moreover, Mills has

not presented evidence that any male employee had a

7. Mills also claims that Woody was not punished for
his role in the phone call to Smith in contravention of
Hunter’s directive. But Mills clearly states that she
and Mitchell were informed of Hunter’s order, not Woody.
See Mills Deposition (Doc. No. 19-16) at 13.

history of rules violations similar to hers but was not
terminated.
In addition to the lack of a comparator, Mills has
not produced any evidence of pretext.

While Mills may

dispute the fairness and severity of the disciplinaries,
she does not dispute that her behavior occurred.

Rather,

she submits that her actions was excusable because her
immediate supervisor authorized it or engaged in similar
behavior

(in

contradiction

to

his

supervisor’s

pronouncements and/or city rules). Mills listened to her
immediate supervisor, not the chain-of-command. As such,
the

city’s

leadership

discriminatory

reason

had

for

a

legitimate,

disciplining

Mills:

nonshe

violated work rules by ignoring city rules and the direct
orders of her higher-ranking supervisors.

C.

Defamation

In her opposition brief, Mills concedes that summary
judgment

should

be

granted

26

on

her

defamation

claim

because

“she

has

been

unable

produce

sufficient

evidence to show actual malice by the City.”

Opposition

Brief (Doc. No. 20-1) at 20.

to

As such, the court will

grant defendant City of Phenix City’s motion for summary
judgment as to this claim.
*

*

*

An appropriate summary judgment in favor of Phenix
City and against Mills will be entered.
DONE, this the 16th day of July, 2012.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE