Hughley v. United States of America (INMATE3)
OPINION. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/3/11. (djy, )
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Civil Action No. 3:11cv895-MHT
Petitioner Johnny Hughley has filed a motion seeking relief pursuant to
FED.R.CIV.P. 60(b)(6) and purporting to challenge this court’s previous judgment
denying a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion that he filed in April 2000.1 For the reasons that
follow, this court concludes that Hughley is not entitled to any relief.
In his motion, Hughley contends that this court, when denying his § 2255 motion
in September 2002, neglected to address his claim asserting a violation of the antishuttling provision of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”). However, when
ruling on Hughley’s § 2255 motion in 2002, this court found that all substantive claims
asserted in his motion were procedurally barred because they were either raised on
direct appeal and consequently precluded from reconsideration in his § 2255 motion or
were not raised on direct appeal and therefore defaulted. United States v. Hughley,
See United States v. Hughley, Case Nos. 3:98cr43-MHT & 3:98cr97-MHT. In
his original § 2255 motion, Hughley challenged his 1998 conviction and sentence for possession
of counterfeit currency; passing, uttering, and publishing counterfeit currency; and possessing
a firearm after having been convicted of a felony.
Case Nos. 3:98cr43-MHT & 3:98cr97-MHT, Doc. No. 83 at 3 & 5. After noting that
Hughley relied on ineffective assistance of counsel as cause to excuse his procedural
default, id. at 5, this court then fully addressed his claim that his counsel “provided
ineffective assistance in failing to raise the IAD issue on appeal.” Id. at 17. The court
then determined that Hughley’s claim that his counsel was ineffective was meritless
because his underlying substantive claim of an IAD violation was likewise meritless.
Id. at 17-19.
In light of the above, Hughley is incorrect in alleging that this court neglected
to address his IAD claim when denying his § 2255 motion in September 2002.
Accordingly, this court finds that Hughley is not entitled to any relief under
In his self-styled Rule 60 motion, Hughley is in effect
reasserting a claim that he asserted in his original § 2255 motion and that was
determined adversely to him by this court. To the extent that Hughley is reasserting
a claim that has previously been adjudicated by this court, his claim is in substance part
of a successive § 2255 motion.3 See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 532 (2005).
Hughley fails to show that this court incorrectly applied a procedural bar in
addressing his IAD claim or that this court neglected to address his IAD claim when ruling on
his § 2255 motion.
In addition to his original § 2255 motion, Hughley has sought to challenge his
convictions and sentence on at least four other occasions through pleadings that were
ultimately determined to be successive § 2255 motions. In August 2004, Hughley filed a
pleading styled as “Request for a Nunc Pro Tunc Reconsideration and/or in the Alternative
a Correction of Sentence,” challenging his sentence. United States v. Hughley, Case Nos.
3:98cr43-MHT & 3:98cr97-MHT. Because that motion attacked the fundamental validity of
Because Hughley has not received certification from the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals authorizing this court to consider a successive § 2255 motion, this court lacks
the jurisdiction to consider such a motion.4 See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532; Farris v.
United States, 333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003).
An appropriate judgment will be entered denying Hughley’s motion for relief
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6)
Done this 3rd day of November, 2011.
/s/ MYRON H. THOMPSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Hughley’s sentence, this court characterized the motion as a motion to vacate, set aside, or
correct sentence under § 2255. Because Hughley had not received certification from the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals authorizing this court to consider a successive § 2255
motion, this court summarily dismissed his § 2255 motion. Id.. In January 2006, Hughley filed
what he styled as a “Motion for New Trial Under Rule 60(B)(6).” Hughley v. United States,
Case No. 3:06cv28-MHT. This court ultimately determined that motion to be another
successive § 2255 motion, which had been filed without approval from the Eleventh Circuit.
Id. In April 2009, Hughley again filed what he styled as a motion for relief under Rule
60(b)(6). Hughley v. United States, Case No. 3:09cv296-MHT. This court again determined
that Hughley’s motion was another successive § 2255 motion filed without approval from the
Eleventh Circuit. Id. In December 2009, Hughley once more filed a self-styled Rule 60(b)(6)
motion that was determined to be yet another successive § 2255 motion. Hughley v. United
States, Case No. 3:09cv1110-MHT.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) provides that,
to file a second or successive § 2255 motion in the district court, a petitioner must first move
in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the
motion. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). The appellate court, in turn, must certify that the second
or successive § 2255 motion contains “(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed
in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or
(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the
Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).
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