Rundquist v. Mayfield et al (MAG+)

Filing 40

ORDERED as follows: 1) Plf's 38 Objection is OVERRULED; 2) The 36 Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge is ADOPTED; 3) Dfts' 7 , 10 , 12 , 17 , & 19 Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED; 4) Plf's claims are DISMISSED without prejudice as to all Dfts; and 5) Dfts' 10 , 12 , & 20 Motions for Attorney's Fees are DENIED. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 9/17/2012. (wcl, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
EASTERN DIVISION
ERIC P. RUNDQUIST,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
MARGARET MAYFIELD,
)
THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S
)
OFFICE, 37TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT )
OF ALABAMA, NICK ABBETT,
)
THE ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF )
HUMAN RESOURCES, NANCY
)
BUCKNER, CIRCUIT COURT FOR )
LEE COUNTY, ALABAMA,
)
RICHARD D. LANE, BEN HAND,
)
CORINNE T. HURST, ANN B.
)
RUNDQUIST, ROBERT G. POOLE, )
and WHITTELSEY, WHITTELSEY & )
POOLE,
)
)
Defendants.
)

CASE NO. 3:11-CV-1068-WKW
[WO]

ORDER
Before the court is the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge
(“Recommendation,” Doc. # 36) regarding Defendants’ motions to dismiss and
motions for attorney’s fees. Plaintiff filed a timely objection. (Doc. # 38.) For the
reasons that follow, the Recommendation is due to be adopted.

I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s claims arise from proceedings to collect child support in the Circuit
Court of Lee County, Alabama, (“State Court”). (Doc. # 1 at 3.) The State Court
issued an order holding Plaintiff in contempt on December 6, 2010. (Doc. # 20,
Exhibit I.) In January 2011, the State Court entered a second order granting in part
Plaintiff’s motion to amend the contempt order. (Doc. # 20, Exhibit M.) Finally, the
State Court entered a third order in October 2011 confirming its position and restating
that the $5,000 sum paid by Plaintiff pursuant to the December 2010 contempt order
represented owed child support paid to purge Plaintiff’s contempt. (Doc. # 20, Exhibit
O.)
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, then filed the instant action on December 15, 2011.
(Doc. # 1.) Plaintiff raises eight causes of action. Seven are claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 alleging that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights to procedural due process
in the December 2010 proceeding; the eighth is a state law claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress and conspiracy arising from the same events. (Doc.
# 1 at 8–13.) In addition to money damages, Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of a
mandatory injunction. (Doc. # 1 at 14.) He asks this court to appoint “an independent
monitor” to oversee Defendants’ activities for a period of ten years and to require that
the monitor report to this court on compliance annually. (Doc. # 1 at 14.) Plaintiff
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does not ask this court to enjoin any state proceeding against him. (Doc. # 1 at
14–15.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court reviews de novo the portion of the Recommendation to which the
objection applies. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
III. DISCUSSION
In the Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge found that “[t]o the extent
Plaintiff seeks review of the child support orders entered by the Circuit Court of Lee
County,” (Doc. # 36 at 4), the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine deprives this court of
jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claims. See Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413
(1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The
Doctrine prevents federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over “cases brought by
state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered
before the district court proceedings commence and inviting district court review and
rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544
U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
Rooker-Feldman applies where a state court loser appears before a federal
district court seeking review of a judgment in state court. See id. at 293–94 (declaring
Rooker-Feldman abstention inappropriate where federal plaintiff filed action in federal
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court before the state court rendered any judgment). There are four criteria for
Rooker-Feldman abstention. First, the party in federal court must be the same as the
party in state court. Storck v. City of Coral Springs, 354 F.3d 1307, 1310 n.1 (11th
Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Second, the relevant state court ruling must have been
conclusive on the merits. Id. Third, the federal plaintiff must have had a reasonable
opportunity to raise its federal claims in the state proceeding. Id. Fourth, the state
court must either have adjudicated the issue before the federal court or the issue raised
in federal court must be inextricably intertwined with the state court’s judgment. Id.
Because each requirement is met, Rooker-Feldman applies. First, Plaintiff
acknowledges in his objection that the commonality of parties requirement is met.
(Doc. # 38 at 4.) Second, as observed by the Magistrate Judge, the State Court orders
entered are final orders for the purposes of Rooker-Feldman. See McGee v. Kell, 335
Fed. App’x 3, 4–5 (11th Cir. 2009) (affirming district court’s abstention based on
Rooker-Feldman where plaintiff brought suit in federal court seeking relief from
contempt orders entered in state court based on federal plaintiff’s unpaid child support
obligations). Third, Plaintiff not only had a reasonable opportunity to raise his federal
procedural due process claims in the State Court, he apparently did so. Plaintiff
argued in his motion to vacate the December 2010 contempt order that the presiding
Referee failed to receive “any sworn testimony.” (Doc. # 20, Exhibit L.) This
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assertion is among the facts Plaintiff cites as procedural due process violations in his
cause of action before this court. (Doc. # 1 at 9.)
Fourth, Plaintiff’s federal claims are inextricably intertwined with the State
Court orders. Though Plaintiff does not ask this court to enjoin any specific
proceeding against him, the relief he seeks would effectively reverse the State Court
orders. If this court were to find that Plaintiff’s constitutional rights had been
violated, that ruling would render the state court’s orders invalid. See Goodman ex
rel. Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that RookerFeldman applies even where a plaintiff seeks damages in federal court, as the doctrine
is “broad enough to bar all federal claims which were, or should have been, central to
the state court decision, even if those claims seek a form of relief that might not have
been available from the state court”). Although “Rooker-Feldman is a narrow
doctrine,” Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284, it applies here to deprive the court of
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s federal claims. Such claims should therefore be dismissed
without prejudice.
Plaintiff also asserts a cause of action under state law. As Plaintiff correctly
observes in his objections, however, in the absence of jurisdiction over the claims
arising under federal law (Doc. # 38 at 10), there is no basis for jurisdiction over the
state law cause of action because the federal court has no jurisdiction over a
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substantial federal claim arising from the same facts.

L.A. Draper & Son v.

Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 735 F.2d 414, 427 (11th Cir. 1984). In view of this court’s
determination that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s federal claims,
the state law claims are also due to be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:
1.

Plaintiff’s objection (Doc. # 38) is OVERRULED;

2.

The Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (Doc. # 36) is ADOPTED;

3.

Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Docs. # 7, 10, 12, 17 & 19) are

GRANTED;
4.

Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED without prejudice as to all Defendants;

5.

Defendants’ motions for attorney’s fees (Docs. # 10, 12 & 20) are

and

DENIED.
A separate final judgment will be issued.
DONE this 17th day of September, 2012.
/s/ W. Keith Watkins
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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