APR, LLC v. American Aircraft Sales, Inc., et al

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER directing as follows: (1) Plaintiff APR, LLC's 13 motion to remand is denied; (2) Defendants American Aircraft Sales, Inc. and Jet Tolbert's 22 alternative motion to change venue is granted; (3) This lawsuit is transferred in its entirety to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida; (4) All other pending motions are left for resolution after transfer; the clerk of the court is DIRECTED to take appropriate steps to effect the transfer; this case is closed in this court. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/19/13. (scn, )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, EASTERN DIVISION

APR, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
AMERICAN AIRCRAFT SALES,
INC.; and JET TOLBERT,
individually, and as an
agent, servant, and/or
employee of American
Aircraft Sales, Inc.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.
3:12cv1019-MHT
(WO)

OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff

APR,

LLC

brings

this

lawsuit

against

defendants American Aircraft Sales, Inc. and Jet Tolbert
for injuries arising out of the purchase of a Cessna
aircraft facilitated by American Aircraft and Tolbert.
APR asserts a number of state-law claims, including breach
of

fiduciary

fraudulent

duties,

promissory

misrepresentation,

estoppel,

fraudulent

negligence,
suppression,

unjust enrichment, conspiracy, wantonness, conversion,
equitable

estoppel,

and

breach

of

contract.

The

jurisdiction of this court has been invoked pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity of citizenship) and 1441
(removal).
Now before the court are four motions: APR’s motion to
remand; American Aircraft and Tolbert’s two motions to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to
state

a

claim;

and

American

Aircraft

alternative motion for transfer of venue.

and

Tolbert’s

For the reasons

that follow, the remand motion will be denied and the
alternative transfer motion granted.

I. BACKGROUND
This case arises out of the purchase of an aircraft by
APR,

an

Alabama

company

with

its

principal

place

of

business in Opelika.

APR contends that, while it believed

that

shepherded

it

was

being

through

the

purchasing

process by a responsible broker, it was instead being
duped into paying a higher price so that the company it

2

believed was brokering the transaction could profit at
APR’s expense.
In March 2012, while APR was in the midst of its
search for a corporate aircraft, one of its employees
found a 1984 Cessna Citation S/II listed as available for
sale on the website <www.controller.com>.
provided

a

link

to

<www.americanaircraftsales.com>,

another
which

is

The listing
website,
owned

and

maintained by American Aircraft, a corporation organized
and existing under the laws of Florida.

On its website,

American

a

Aircraft

describes

itself

as

“prestigious

aircraft brokerage firm” that uses its expert assistance
to help buyers navigate the negotiation and purchase
process.

The Cessna itself was not owned by American

Aircraft but by a company called Lewis Air Fleet.
An APR employee contacted Jet Tolbert, an American
Aircraft employee, who assured him that he would help APR
get “the best deal.”

Compl. (Doc. No. 18) at 5.

Tolbert

sent APR some of American Airlines’s marketing material.

3

After some discussion between Tolbert and APR, Tolbert
recommended that APR offer Lewis Air Fleet $ 1,050,000 to
purchase the Cessna.
would

suffice,

necessary sum.

Although APR asked if a lower figure

Tolbert

insisted

that

this

was

the

APR agreed to make the offer.

Tolbert began to aid APR in the purchasing process.
He instructed APR to wire a deposit to an escrow company
that he had selected, and he promised to present APR’s
offer to Lewis Air Fleet once the wire transfer was
complete.

Two APR representatives flew to Jacksonville

International Airport in Florida to inspect the Cessna.
On

March

28,

American

Aircraft

made

an

offer to

purchase the Cessna from Lewis Air Fleet for less than APR
had offered to pay; APR was unaware that American Aircraft
had taken this step.

Shortly before closing, APR learned

that American Aircraft would actually become the owner and
the seller of the Cessna, but was informed that title was
merely passing through American Aircraft.

4

APR now alleges that Tolbert and American Aircraft
actually used APR’s financial resources to purchase the
Cessna for a lower price and then sell it to APR for a
profit; APR further alleges that Tolbert used information
that he learned from APR to negotiate a contract between
Lewis Air Fleet and American Aircraft, and he used APR’s
deposit (which Tolbert had APR wire to an escrow account)
to make a deposit on the Cessna for American Aircraft.
In addition to the bad deal APR alleges it received at
the hands of American Aircraft and Tolbert, APR alleges
that the Cessna had defects when it was delivered.

APR

alleges that the Cessna’s systems and avionics were not
“functioning normally to manufacturer’s specifications”
and that it was “not current on its factory-recommended
maintenance program.”

Am. Compl. (Doc. No. 18) at 12.

5

II. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Remand
APR initially filed this lawsuit in an Alabama state
court.

Shortly

after

filing,

American

Aircraft

and

Tolbert removed it to this federal court pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity of citizenship) and 1441
(removal).

APR now moves to remand this case to state

court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447.
Federal district courts have original jurisdiction
over

civil

citizenship

actions
and

where

the

the

parties

amount

in

are

controversy

“$ 75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.”
§ 1332.

diverse

in

exceeds
28 U.S.C.

APR does not contest that the diversity-of-

citizenship requirement is satisfied; instead, it disputes
that

American

established

Aircraft

that

there

and

Tolbert

is

a

have

sufficient

adequately
amount

in

controversy.
Because APR did not specify the amount at issue in its
complaint, American Aircraft and Tolbert bear the burden

6

of

establishing

the

jurisdictional

preponderance of the evidence.

amount

by

a

See Lowery v. Alabama

Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1208 (11th Cir. 2007).

To that

end, a removing defendant “may submit a wide range of
evidence

in

order

to

requirements of removal.”

satisfy

the

jurisdictional

Pretka v. Kolker City Plaza II,

Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 755 (11th Cir. 2010).

This includes

“affidavits, declarations, or other documentation.”

Id.

The evidence presented may be “combined with reasonable
deductions, reasonable inferences, or other reasonable
extrapolations” to meet the defendant’s burden.

Id. at

754.
Here, American Aircraft and Tolbert’s evidence is
fairly

straightforward.

Principally,

they

submit

an

affidavit from Tolbert stating that American Aircraft had
bought the Cessna from its original owner for $ 850,000.
This statement was supported by a purchase agreement and
aircraft acceptance receipt, which were both attached as
exhibits.

Because, as described above, APR purchased the

7

aircraft for $ 1,050,000, American Aircraft’s gross profit
was $ 200,000.
that,

when

aircraft

Tolbert also explained in his affidavit

American

with

a

Aircraft

market

value

brokers

the

between

$

sale

of

an

850,000

and

$ 1,050,000, the normal commission rate is 5-8 %.

An

earlier brokerage agreement that American Aircraft had
with the owner of the Cessna at issue in this case set the
commission rate at 5 %.

Given these rates, even if APR

expected to pay the highest commission rate within the
normal range for an aircraft with this market value, the
potential

damages

in

this

case

would

still

be

approximately $ 132,000, well over the $ 75,000 mark.1
Tolbert’s affidavit and supporting documentation, combined
with the reasonable inference that American Aircraft would

1. The court arrived at this estimate by assuming
that APR would have paid an 8 % commission (because doing
so would yield the lowest amount of damages). At that
rate, the commission paid for an $ 850,000 aircraft would
have been $ 68,000, making the total paid $ 918,000. The
$ 132,000 figure reflects the difference between what APR
would have paid had it been given the deal to which it
alleges it was entitled ($ 918,000. )and what it actually
paid for the aircraft ($ 1,050,000).
8

have charged a commission rate within its normal range,
suffice to establish the requisite jurisdictional amount
by a preponderance of the evidence.

APR contends that

this court should discredit the evidence that American
Aircraft and Tolbert append to their amended removal
notice because it contradicts statements they make in
their motion to dismiss.
instances

in

the

Specifically, APR cites three

dismissal

motion

in

which

American

Aircraft and Tolbert point out that the APR has not
specified what damages it has suffered and that the amount
of damages is therefore unclear; APR argues that these
statements reveal that American Aircraft and Tolbert do
not
$

know

75,000.

whether

the

However,

amount
American

in

controversy

Aircraft

and

exceeds

Tolbert’s

accurate assertions that APR did not specify its damages
in no way preclude American Aircraft and Tolbert from
presenting evidence to establish what those damages might
be.

9

For these reasons, APR’s motion to remand will be
denied.

B. Motion to Transfer Venue
As an alternative to their motion to dismiss, American
Aircraft

and

Tolbert

ask

this

court

to

exercise

its

discretion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to transfer
this action to the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida.

Because a transfer of venue

would render unnecessary a ruling on the merits of the
dismissal motion, the court will address the alternative
transfer motion first.
As an initial matter, APR argues that, pursuant to
Federal

Rule

of

Civil

Procedure

12(g)(2)

and

(h),

American Aircraft and Tolbert have waived their right to
request a change of venue by not arguing that venue was
improper

in

complaint.

their

motion

However,

to

unlike

dismiss
a

motion

APR’s
to

original

dismiss

for

‘improper’ venue made pursuant to Rule 12(b), the waiver

10

provisions
‘transfer’

of

Rule

venue

12(h)

do

pursuant

not

govern

to

the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

a

motion

to

‘discretionary’

See, e.g., Aalberg v.

Plan 4 Coll., Inc., No. 8:09-CV-1393-T-27EAJ, 2009 WL
3698039, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2009) (Porcelli, J.) (a
motion to transfer venue under § 1404(a) “is not a Rule
12(b)(3)

motion

and

is

not

governed

by

the

waiver

provisions of 12(h)”) (quotations and citations omitted)
; Smith v. Kyphon, 578 F. Supp. 2d 954, 957 (M.D. Tenn.
2008) (Wiseman, J.) (“[A] motion to dismiss for improper
venue pursuant to Rule 12(b) is not the same as a motion
to transfer to a more convenient venue under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) and [the latter] is therefore not subject to the
waiver provisions of Rule 12(h)”) (emphasis in original);
Mohamed v. Mazda Motor Corp., 90 F. Supp. 2d 757, 759
(E.D. Tex. 2000)

(Heartfield, J.) (noting that Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(h) “speaking to improper venue–-not transfer of
venue for convenience of the parties and the witnesses
under Title 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)”) (emphasis in original).

11

Therefore, American Aircraft and Tolbert have not waived
their right to make this request.
Section 1404(a) provides that a district court may
transfer a civil action to another district or division in
which it might have been brought, “For the convenience of
the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.”
Federal

courts

grant

considerable

plaintiff’s initial choice of forum.

deference

to

a

See In re Ricoh

Corp., 870 F.2d 570, 573 (11th Cir. 1989).
the burden is on the party requesting a

Accordingly,
§ 1404(a)

transfer to show that the forum it suggests is more
convenient or that litigating the case there would be in
the interest of justice.

See C.M.B. Foods, Inc. v. Corral

of Middle Georgia, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1285 (M.D. Ala.
2005) (Thompson, J.).
Determining the propriety of transfer entails two
steps.

“First, the court must determine whether the

action could originally have been brought in the proposed
transferee district court.” Id. at 1286 (quotations and

12

citations omitted).

Second, the court “must determine

whether

should

be

parties

and

the

convenience
justice.”

action
of

the

transferred
in

the

for

the

interest

of

Id.

Here, the first step is easily accomplished.

The

Middle District of Florida has original subject-matter
jurisdiction over this action based on diversity pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

That court also has personal

jurisdiction over American Aircraft and Tolbert, a Florida
corporation and a Florida resident, respectively.
is

proper

pursuant

to

the

provisions

of

28

Venue
U.S.C.

§ 1391(b)(1) and (2), which state that a civil action may
be brought in “a judicial district in which any defendant
resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in
which the district if located” or “in a judicial district
in which a substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred.”

American Aircraft is

a Florida corporation and has offices only in Florida;
Tolbert is a resident of Florida.

13

Moreover, the aircraft

at issue was located, inspected, and delivered in Florida.
Therefore, the Middle District of Florida is a proper
venue for this action.
The court now turns to the second inquiry: whether
convenience and the interest of justice favor a transfer.
To evaluate this concern, this court may consider a broad
range of factors, including:
“(1) the convenience of the witnesses;
(2) the location of relevant documents
and the relative ease of access to
sources of proof; (3) the convenience of
the parties; (4) the locus of operative
facts; (5) the availability of process
to compel the attendance of unwilling
witnesses; (6) the relative means of the
parties; (7) a forum's familiarity with
the governing law; (8) the weight
accorded a plaintiff's choice of forum;
and (9) trial efficiency and the
interests of justice, based on the
totality of the circumstances.”

Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 F.3d 1132, 1135 (11th Cir.
2005) (quotations and citations omitted).
not

apply

adjudicate

these
motions

factors
to

mechanically,

transfer

14

The court must
but

“according

rather
to

an

‘individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience
and fairness.’” Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.,
487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376
U.S. 612, 622 (1964)).
Here, American Aircraft and Tolbert allege that, aside
from the parties themselves, “there are no non-party
witnesses expected other than the company in Venice[,]
Florida” that inspected the Cessna before it was delivered
to APR,

Defs.’ Mot. (Doc. No. 22) at 28, and APR does not

dispute this.

The parties also agree that the location of

documents is a non-issue given the ease of moving them.
The convenience to the parties, on balance, counsels
in favor of a transfer.

While APR is located in Alabama,

American Aircraft and Tolbert have presented evidence
showing that APR has flown the Cessna at issue to Florida
on

19

different

aircraft in July.

occasions

since

the

closing

on

the

American Aircraft and Tolbert, on the

other hand, are based in Florida and, by their account,
“never travel to Alabama.”

Defs.’ Mot. (Doc. No. 22) at

15

29.

American Aircraft and Tolbert also note that, while

APR is “a large corporate entity[] with its own corporate
jet,” American Aircraft and Tolbert stay in business by
earning commissions, which would be seriously hampered if
key staff had to travel to Alabama for trial.

APR does

not directly dispute any of these arguments, but instead
makes a blanket argument that, “The convenience of the
parties amounts to a wash in this case” because APR would
be

inconvenienced

by

traveling

to

Florida,

just

as

American Aircraft and Tolbert would be inconvenienced by
traveling to Alabama.

However, the court finds that

American Aircraft and Tolbert’s arguments (uncontested by
APR) are persuasive and concludes that, on balance, the
convenience

of

the

transferring

this

parties

action

to

is
the

better
Middle

served

by

District

of

Florida, particularly given the parties’ relative means.
Transfer

is

operative facts.

also

appropriate

given

the

locus

of

The Cessna was located in Florida and

was also delivered in that State; APR visited Florida to

16

inspect the aircraft; and neither Tolbert nor any other
representative

of

American

Aircraft

ever

traveled

to

Alabama to discuss the transaction at issue in this case.
The concentration of the operative facts in Florida is
significant for a second reason: it gives this court
serious
American

doubts

about

Aircraft

its

and

personal

Tolbert.

jurisdiction

As

noted,

over

American

Aircraft and Tolbert have also filed a motion to dismiss,
which

argues

that

they

lack

the

requisite

“minimum

contacts” with Alabama to be subject to suit in this
State.

See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v.

Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984) (“Due process requirements
are satisfied when in personam jurisdiction is asserted
over a nonresident corporate defendant that has ‘certain
minimum contact with [the forum] such that the maintenance
of the suit does not offend ‘traditional nations of fair
play and substantial justice.’’”) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).

17

In order to have minimum contacts with a forum State,
the

defendant

purposefully

must

(among

availed

other

itself

of

benefits” of that forum’s law.
Corp.

v.

emphasizes

Woodson,
American

444

U.S.

requirements)
the

“privileges

have
and

World-Wide Volkswagen
286,

Aircraft’s

use

295
of

(1980).
a

APR

website,

accessible in Alabama, which is the means by which APR
initiated contact.

It is indisputable that “advertising

that is reasonably calculated to reach the forum may
constitute purposeful availment of the privileges of doing
business in the forum.”

U.S. S.E.C. v. Carillo, 115 F.3d

1540, 1545 (11th Cir. 1997).

However, district court

cases in this circuit strongly suggest that the mere
existence of a website that includes contact information
is not the sort of active advertising effort that would
justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Brannon v. Fin. Am., LLC, 483 F. Supp.2d 1136, 1140-41
(M.D. Ala. 2007) (Thompson, J.) (concluding that the
minimum-contacts

requirement

18

was

satisfied

where

defendants actively targeted the plaintiffs’ business, as
opposed to merely making “an unfocused solicitation, such
as an advertisement on a nationally oriented website”)
(emphasis added); Butler v. Beer Across America, 83 F.
Supp.2d 1261, 1268 (N.D. Ala. 2000) (Hancock, J.) (finding
that “the limited degree of interactivity available on the
defendants’ website [was] ... insufficient to satisfy the
minimum contacts requirement of due process” where the
site was “closer to an electronic version of a postal
reply

card.”).

Here,

American

Aircraft

merely

gave

information about its business to Sandhills Publishing
Company for the purpose of advertising on Sandhills’s
website at <www.controller.com> and operated a website of
its own at <www.americanaircraftsales.com>. APR’s use of
these websites as a means of finding and learning about
American Aircraft does not show that American Aircraft
purposefully availed itself of the laws of Alabama by
actively advertising in this forum.

19

Further,

American

Aircraft

and

Tolbert

did

not

initiate contact with APR or visit Alabama, nor did they
have an ongoing business relationship with APR.

The

escrow funds were never held in Alabama, and the aircraft
was never delivered in this State.

Compare Banton Indus.,

Inc. v. Dimatic Die & Tool Co., 801 F.2d 1283, 1284 (11th
Cir. 1986) (finding no personal jurisdiction where the
defendant “[was] not an Alabama corporation and ha[d] no
contacts with that state other than its sale of goods to
an Alabama resident,” nor did it “actively seek business
in Alabama”; instead the “contract and sale upon which
[the

plaintiff]

plaintiff’s]

base[d]

unsolicited

its

claim

order

of

arose
goods

out

of

[the

from

[the

defendant,” which were “tendered to [the plaintiff] in
Omaha, Nebraska”), with Brannon, 483 F. Supp. 2d at

1140-

41 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (Thompson, J.) (finding personal
jurisdiction where the defendant “clearly directed its
activities toward the [plaintiffs], and not the other way
around”; and the defendant’s actions “evince[d] intent to

20

conduct business on an ongoing basis with a particular
consumer in Alabama”).

The court is therefore doubtful

that it has personal jurisdiction over American Aircraft
and Tolbert.
In addition, that the underlying facts transpired
almost exclusively in Florida dilutes the weight of APR’s
initial choice of forum: “[W]hen ‘the operative facts
underlying the cause of action did not occur within the
forum chosen by the Plaintiff, the choice of forum is
entitled to less consideration.’”
Ins.

Co.,

990

F.Supp.

1354,

Gould v. Nat'l Life

1358

(M.D.

Ala.

1998)

(Albritton, J.).
Another factor this court considers is which State’s
law will be applied in this case.

For, “there is an

appropriateness ... in having the trial of a diversity
case in a forum that is at home with the state law that
must govern the case rather than having a court in some
other forum untangle problems in conflicts of laws and in
law foreign to itself.”

Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330

21

U.S. 501, 509 (1947).

In addition, when an action is

transferred upon a request from the defendants, “the
transferee district court must ... apply the state law
that would have been applied if there had been no change
Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639

of venue.”
(1964).

Therefore,

this

court

should

State’s law would govern.
diversity

must

jurisdiction

in

apply
which

the
it

first

decide

which

A federal court sitting in
choice-of-law
sits,

see,

rules
e.g.,

of

the

Boardman

Petroleum, Inc. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F.3d 750,
752 (11th Cir. 1998); thus, this court will apply Alabama
choice-of-law

rules.

Here,

APR

makes

both

tort

and

breach-of-contract claims.
In tort cases, Alabama courts apply the substantive
law of the place of injury.

See Movie Gallery US, LLC v.

Greenshields, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1262 (M.D. Ala. 2009)
(Thompson, J.).

Thus, “it is not the site of the alleged

tortious act that is relevant, but the site of the injury,

22

or the site of the event that created the right to sue.”
Glass v. Southern Wrecker Sales, 990 F. Supp. 1344, 1347
(M.D. Ala. 1998 (Albritton, J.).

“[T]he place of injury

for tort claims involving financial injury is ‘the state
in which the plaintiff suffered the economic impact.’”
Movie Gallery, 648 F. Supp.2d at 1262 (quoting Glass, 990
F. Supp. at 1348).

The parties hotly dispute the site of

injury in this case.
Alabama law demands that, “[i]n breach of contract
actions, the law of the state in which the contract was
executed determines the rights and liabilities of the
parties.”

Brown Mach. Works & Supply, Inc. v. Insurance

Co. of North American, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 988, 992 (M.D.
Ala. 1996) (De Ment, J.) (emphasis in original).

The

parties even more closely dispute where the governing
contract was finalized, for the contract went through a
number of drafts and exchanges between the parties in
Alabama and Florida.

23

Alabama’s choice-of-law rules for torts and breachof-contract claims, therefore, present quite challenging
questions,
resolve.

which,

fortunately,

this

court

need

not

For, assuming that Alabama law governs these

claims (as APR contends), the court still concludes that
this case should be transferred (as American Aircraft and
Tolbert contend).
A court must not mechanically apply the factors it
considers when determining whether a transfer of venue is
appropriate.

In this case, the overall convenience of

transferring this case and this court’s concerns about its
personal jurisdiction over American Aircraft and Tolbert
weigh most heavily.

See, e.g., C.M.B. Foods, 396 F.

Supp.2d at 1287 (“[N]otwithstanding C.M.B.’s preference
and issues of convenience, the court is concerned that a
substantial question remains as to whether the Stephensons
have had ‘minimum contacts’ with the State of Alabama such
that

this

court

can

properly

exercise

jurisdiction over them in this lawsuit.

24

personal

For this reason,

the

court

concludes

transferred.”).

More

that

the

action

specifically,

should

be

convenience

and

concerns about personal jurisdiction strongly outweigh the
issue of which State’s law applies.
Moreover, where it is substantially uncertain as to
which State’s law applies to the claims at issue, it would
seem to follow that the applicable-state-law factor should
weigh less in the court’s determination of whether a
transfer is warranted pursuant to § 1404, for even after
resolution at the trial level the issue would still remain
realistically open for, and have a significant possibility
of, contrary resolution on appeal.

Here, because the law

is so uncertain as to whether Alabama or Florida law
should govern the tort and breach-of-contract claims, the
applicable-state-law factor carries must less, if, in
fact, no weight.2
2. Indeed, it could be argued that it would be
unwise for this court to resolve the applicable-state-law
issue since, regardless as to the resolution of that
issue, transfer is still warranted.
For, it could be
argued, that, should this court resolve the issue one way
(continued...)
25

Therefore,

it

is

in

the

interest

of

justice

to

transfer this action to the Middle District of Florida.
That forum undoubtedly is more convenient and has personal
jurisdiction over the American Aircraft and Tolbert, and
it is an appropriate venue for this action.
* * *
Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:
(1) Plaintiff APR, LLC’s motion to remand (Doc. No.
13) is denied.
(2) Defendants American Aircraft Sales, Inc. and Jet
Tolbert’s alternative motion to change venue (Doc. No. 22)
is granted.
(3) This lawsuit is transferred in its entirety to the
United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida.

2. (...continued)
and the Florida court, after transfer, resolve it another
way, the two courts would have been put, unnecessarily,
in conflict. Or, to put it another way, this court sees
no reason to saddle the transferee court with the
transferor court’s resolution of the issue.
26

(4) All other pending motions are left for resolution
after transfer.
The clerk of the court is DIRECTED to take appropriate
steps to effect the transfer.
This case is closed in this court.
Done this the 19th day of February, 2013.

/s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE