Lewis v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Georgia et al
Filing
14
OPINION AND ORDER it is ORDERED as follows: (1) Plaintiff Jane Lewis's 9 motion to remand is denied. (2) Defendants Blue Cross Blue Shield of Georgia (d/b/a Greater Georgia Life Insurance Company) and ESG Operations, Inc.'s 3 motion to dismiss is granted to the extent that plaintiff Lewis has 14 days from this date to file an amended complaint that sets forth the claim under ERISA. Should plaintiff Lewis fail to amend within the time allotted, the court will dismiss plaintiff Lewis's complaint with prejudice. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/31/2015. (kh, )
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, EASTERN DIVISION
JANE LEWIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD
OF GEORGIA d/b/a Greater
Georgia Life Insurance
Company, and ESG
OPERATIONS, INC.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
CIVIL ACTION NO.
3:14cv316-MHT
(WO)
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff
Alabama
Jane
state
Lewis
court
filed
asserting
this
lawsuit
state-law
in
an
claims
of
negligent, wanton, and fraudulent misrepresentation and
suppression against the following two defendants: Blue
Cross Blue Shield of Georgia d/b/a Greater Georgia Life
Insurance Company and ESG Operations, Inc.
Greater
Georgia Life, with the consent of ESG, removed the case
to this court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, asserting that
Lewis’s
claims
are
‘completely
preempted’
by
the
Employee
Retirement
Income
Security
Act
of
1974
(“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq., and thus the
court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
The
case is currently before the court on Lewis’s motion to
remand and Greater Georgia Life and ESG’s motion to
dismiss.
The remand motion will be denied, and the
dismissal motion will be granted, albeit with leave to
restate a claim under ERISA.
I.
The
party
LEGAL STANDARDS
seeking
removal
has
establishing federal jurisdiction.
the
burden
of
Diaz v. Sheppard,
85 F.3d 1502, 1505 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520
U.S. 1162 (1997).
narrowly,
and
Removal statutes should be construed
all
doubts
resolved in favor of remand.
about
removal
should
be
Allen v. Christenberry,
327 F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th Cir. 2003).
A defendant may
submit affidavits, depositions, or other evidence to
support removal.
Hardy v. Welch, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1171,
1177 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (Thompson, J.).
2
A lawsuit filed in state court may be removed by a
defendant
where
the
district
original jurisdiction.
original
issue
apparent
would
28 U.S.C. § 1441.
federal-question
is
court
on
jurisdiction
the
face
of
have
had
A court has
if
the
a
federal
plaintiff’s
complaint.
Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478
U.S.
808
804,
complaint
(1986).
rule,
“a
Under
defense
this
that
well-pleaded
raises
a
federal
question is inadequate to confer federal jurisdiction.”
Id.
There
pleaded
is,
however,
complaint
rule
an
in
exception
cases
where
to
the
well-
Congress
“so
completely pre-empt[s] a particular area that any civil
complaint
necessarily
raising
federal
this
in
select
group
character.”
of
claims
Metropolitan
is
Life
Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987); Jones v.
LMR
Intern.,
Inc.,
457
F.3d
1174,
1178
(11th
Cir.
2006).
Should the court find Lewis’s claim is completely
preempted
by
inappropriate,
federal
the
court
law
and,
thus,
remand
will
3
also
address
Greater
Georgia Life’s motion to dismiss.
In considering a
defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court accepts the
plaintiff’s
allegations
as
true,
Hishon
v.
King
&
Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), and construes the
complaint in the plaintiff’s favor, Duke v. Cleland, 5
F.3d 1399, 1402 (11th Cir. 1993).
“The issue is not
whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether
the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support
the claims.”
(1974).
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007), but
rather “only enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.”
II.
This
case
arises
Id. at 574.
BACKGROUND
out
of
Greater
Georgia
Life’s
denial of Lewis’s life insurance claim following the
death
of
her
late
husband.
4
ESG,
a
Georgia-based
company, contracts with municipalities to manage their
utility
and
public
works
Lewis for over year.
her
husband
Life,
were
Basic
operations.
ESG
employed
During her employment, Lewis and
covered
Accidental
under
“Basic
Group
Term
&
Death
a
Dismemberment
and
Optional Group Term Life Insurance” policy issued by
Greater Georgia Life.
policy
as
part
of
The insurance company issued the
a
group
plan
with
ESG
as
plan
sponsor.
When Lewis decided to leave her employment with
ESG, she contacted an ESG human resources employee to
discuss
her
policy
with
Greater
Georgia
Life.
The
human resources employee represented to Lewis that she
could take her policy with her and that, by paying the
insurance premiums herself, the policies would stay in
full force and effect.
Lewis then contacted Greater
Georgia Life to confirm that she would be allowed to
pay
her
coverage.
insurance
premiums
personally
and
retain
Based on these conversation, Lewis provided
5
the insurance company with her personal mailing address
and set up payment arrangements.
Lewis paid the policy’s premiums from 2007 through
2012.
In December of 2012, her husband had a stroke.
Following her husband’s hospitalization, Lewis notified
Greater Georgia Life of a possible claim for benefits
under
her
policy.
The
insurance
company,
in
turn,
represented to Lewis that the policy was in full force
and effect and that all necessary premiums had been
paid through February 2013.
However, in January 2013,
the insurance company contacted Lewis and informed her
that her policy had been cancelled and all coverage was
terminated.
Lewis’s husband died on May 18, 2013, and Lewis
made a claim for benefits under her policy.
Greater
Georgia Life denied Lewis’s claim, again informing her
that the policy had been cancelled and all coverage
terminated.
Upon receipt of the insurance company’s
denial, Lewis filed suit in an Alabama state court,
6
initially
asserting
breach
of
contract;
later,
she
amended her complaint to assert negligent, wanton, and
fraudulent
misrepresentation
and
suppression
part of Greater Georgia Life and ESG.
on
the
The insurance
company removed the action to this court on April 30,
2014.
III.
A.
DISCUSSION
Motion to Remand
The resolution of Lewis’s motion to remand turns on
the
timeliness
of
Greater
Georgia
Life’s
notice
of
removal and the proper characterization of Lewis’s life
insurance policy.
Lewis puts forth three arguments in
favor
(1)
of
remand:
the
insurance
policy
is
not
governed by ERISA because it was neither established
nor
maintained
organization
insurance
by
on
policy
Lewis’s
her
is
employer
employer’s
statutorily
or
an
behalf;
exempt
employee
(2)
from
the
ERISA
coverage as ESG exists solely to act as a governmental
7
instrumentality
performing
governmental
functions
for
the City of Opelika; and (3) Greater Georgia Life’s
notice of removal was not timely pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§
1446.
The
insurance
company
disputes
Lewis’s
contentions and maintains that her policy is properly
characterized
accordingly,
as
an
Lewis’s
employee
state-law
benefit
claims
plan,
are
and,
completely
preempted by ERISA and subject to federal jurisdiction.
Congress enacted ERISA to protect “the interests of
participants
in
beneficiaries.”
employee
29
benefit
U.S.C.
§
plans
and
1001(b).
their
Federal
preemption based on ERISA may take one of two forms:
‘defensive’
preemption
and
‘complete
preemption.’
Butero v. Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co., 174 F.3d 1207,
1211 (11th Cir. 1999); Whitt v. Sherman Int’l Corp.,
147 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 1998).
Because Lewis
asserts only state-law claims, Greater Georgia Life is
asserting
‘complete
preemption’
removal.
8
as
the
basis
for
The Eleventh Circuit has adopted a two-part test to
determine whether ERISA completely preempts a state-law
claim: “(1) whether the plaintiff could have brought
its claim under [ERISA] § 502(a); and (2) whether no
other
legal
duty
supports
the
plaintiff’s
claim.”
Connecticut State Dental Ass'n v. Anthem Health Plans,
Inc.,
591
F.3d
1337,
1345
(11th
Cir.
2009)
(citing
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 210 (2004)).
If an ERISA claim is completely preempted, “state law
claims
that
seek
relief
available
under
ERISA
are
recharacterized as ERISA claims” for the purpose of
jurisdiction
and,
thus,
LMR, 457 F.3d at 1178.
“arise
under
federal
law.”
Lewis’s claims meet both prongs
of the test.
1.
Prong One: Whether Lewis Could Have Brought Her
Claims Under § 502(d)
Lewis could have brought her claims under ERISA,
despite
her
arguments
to
the
alternative.
ERISA
§ 502(a) states that a participant or beneficiary of an
employee insurance plan may bring an action to recover
benefits or to enforce her rights under an employee
benefit welfare plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
Lewis
agrees that her policy, when first purchased, was part
of
a
group
employee
benefit
plan.
However,
she
contends that, when she left her employment with ESG,
requested portability of her policy, and began making
premium payments personally, her policy ceased to be
part of ESG’s sponsored group employee benefit plan.
The Eleventh Circuit addressed a situation similar
to Lewis’s in Glass v. United Omaha Life Insurance Co.
33 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 1944).
The Glass court held
that ‘conversion’ of a group plan into an individual
plan did not defeat ERISA coverage.
Id. at 1346-47.
While that holding has been narrowed by this court in
situations
where
relationship
with
an
employer
the
opts
insurer,
to
terminate
its
see
McDonald
v.
Professional Ins. Corp., 946 F. Supp. 943, 945 (M.D.
Ala. 1996) (Thompson, J.), Lewis’s claim follows the
10
basic course of conversion by way of his an employee
portability
under
the
1346-47
request
scope
of
(affirming
and,
as
ERISA.
the
such,
See
remains
Glass,
district
properly
33
F.3d
court’s
at
summary
judgment in favor of defendant insurer in part because
the insured’s ability to convert his life insurance
policy following termination of employment arose from
the
initial
group
plan,
“and
the
converted
policy
itself continued to be integrally linked with the ERISA
plan”); see also Griggers v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc’y of the U.S., 343 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1195 (N.D. Ga.
2004) (Duffy, J.) (denying plaintiff leave to litigate
her
claims
under
state
law
after
holding
that
the
insurance policy at issue originated under a group plan
and
was
a
continuation
of
the
ERISA-covered
plan
despite plaintiff having “resigned her employment and
assumed responsibility for paying the premium”).
Additionally,
despite
Lewis’s
argument
to
the
contrary, ESG’s work with the City of Opelika does not
11
convert its sponsored group plan into a ‘governmental
plan’ exempt from ERISA under 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1).
“Even if a plan qualifies as an employee benefit plan
under ERISA, the plan can nevertheless evade ERISA’s
broad coverage if it is statutorily exempt.”
Dickerson
v. Alexander Hamilton Life Ins. Co. of Am., 130 F.
Supp.
2d
1271,
1274
Five
categories
of
(N.D.
Ala.
employee
2001)
(Nelson,
benefit
J.).
plans
are
statutorily exempt from ERISA’s scope: (1) governmental
plans; (2) church plans; (3) plans maintained solely
for
complying
with
workmen’s
compensation
laws,
unemployment compensation laws, or disability insurance
laws; (4) plans maintained outside of the United States
primarily for the benefit of nonresident aliens; and
(5)
unfunded,
§ 1003(b).
established
excess
benefit
plans.
29
U.S.C.
A ‘governmental plan’ is defined as “a plan
or
maintained
for
its
employees
by
the
Government of the United States, by the government of
any State or political subdivision thereof, or by any
12
agency or instrumentality of the foregoing.”
§ 1002(32).
29 U.S.C.
Lewis maintains that ESG qualifies as an
‘instrumentality’
of
therefore,
plan
her
the
is
City
a
of
Opelika,
statutorily
and,
exempt
governmental plan.
ERISA does not define the term ‘instrumentality.’
As a result, when charged with determining whether an
entity qualifies as an ‘instrumentality’, courts have
commonly turned to provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code.
See
Dickerson,
130
F.
Supp.
2d
at
1274-75;
Culpepper v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 938 F. Supp.
794, 798 (M.D. Ala 1996) (Albritton, J.) (citing Rose
v. Long Island R.R. Pension Plan, 828 F.2d 910, 918
(2nd Cir. 1987)).
The Internal Revenue Code is an apt
source for guidance as its definition of ‘governmental
plan’ is nearly identical to ERISA’s, and the IRS has
issued a Revenue Ruling to accompany the definition
that provides a six-factor analysis for “determining
whether
an
entity
is
a
13
governmental
agency
or
instrumentality.” Brown v. Reliance Standard Life Ins.
Co.,
No.
2:13-CV-00261-RDP,
2014
WL
4681522,
(N.D. Ala. Sept. 16, 2014) (Proctor, J.).
at
*4
The Revenue
Ruling instructs the court to consider:
“whether it is used for a governmental purpose
and performs a governmental function;
(1) whether
performance
of
its
function is on behalf of a state
or political subdivision;
(2) whether
there
are
private
interests involved, or whether the
states or political subdivisions
involved
have
the
powers
and
interests of an owner;
(3) whether control and supervision of
the organization is vested in a
public authority;
(4) if express or implied statutory or
other authority is necessary for
the creation or use of such an
instrumentality, and whether such
authority exists; and
(5) the degree of financial autonomy
and the source of its operating
expenses.”
Rev. Rul. 57—128, 1957-1 C.B.311.
In evaluating ESG in light of these factors, the
court
finds
instrumentality
that
of
ESG
the
does
City
14
of
not
qualify
Opelika.
as
While
an
it
appears at first blush that two of the IRS factors
(governmental purpose and function) appear to weigh in
favor of construing ESG as an instrumentality of the
city, the court finds that ESG, in managing the city’s
water
and
public
works
operations,
functions
independent contractor for the city.
as
an
This is evident
when considering three of the remaining IRS factors.
First, ESG is a private company, headquartered in
Macon, Georgia.
an
ownership
supervised
or
The City of Opelika does not possess
stake
in
ESG.
controlled
by
Second,
the
ESG
City
of
is
not
Opelika.
Rather, it manages the city’s water and public works
operations
in
accordance
agreement--similar
to
the
with
a
agreements
public-private
it
has
entered
into with various municipalities across the southeast.
Third,
ESG
autonomy.
enjoys
a
largely
unfettered
degree
of
Aside from receiving compensation from the
city for services rendered, ESG is not funded by the
city, the city is not responsible for the debts or
15
obligations of ESG, and ESG is not in a position to
directly levy taxes upon the city’s residents.
In applying the IRS factors to determine ultimately
that
an
Alabama
instrumentality
of
healthcare
the
authority
State,
the
was
court
not
in
an
Brown
explained the importance of financial autonomy, noting
the following:
“[The authority’s] lack of outside
funding,
in
combination
with
its
inability to levy taxes, removes from
the
equation one
of the
primary
factors
that
drove
Congress’s
exemption of ‘governmental plans’ from
ERISA.
Indeed,
despite
ERISA’s
regulatory
and
remedial
sweep,
Congress did not include public or
governmental plans within its reach,
believing in part, state and local
governments’ ability to tax would
enable
them
to
operate
employee
welfare benefit systems that would
avoid the pitfalls of underfunding.”
2014 WL 4681522 at *6 (internal quotations and emphasis
omitted).
Based on ESG’s financial autonomy, private
ownership,
and
private
control,
the
court
concludes
that it does not qualify as an ‘instrumentality’ of the
16
City of Opelika under § 1003(b)(1).
Accordingly, Lewis
could have brought an action for denial of benefits
under § 502(a), in lieu of her state-law claims.
2.
Prong Two: Whether No Other Legal Duty Supports
Lewis’s Claims
The
theories
upon
which
Lewis
bases
“d[o] not arise independently” from her
her
claims
ERISA plan.
Connecticut State Dental Ass'n v. Anthem Health Plans,
Inc., 591 F.3d 1337, 1346 (11th Cir. 2009).
There is
no
case
independent
legal
duty
in
an
ERISA
if
“interpretation of the terms of [the] benefit plan[]
forms an essential part” of the legal claim.
Aetna
Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 213 (2004).
Here,
Lewis argues that Greater Georgia Life failed to pay
her
benefits
falsely
under
informing
cancelled.
her
her
life
insurance
that
her
policy
policy
had
after
been
To determine the merits of Lewis’s legal
claims, the court would have to understand the terms of
17
the “Basic Group Term Life, Basic Accidental Death &
Dismemberment and Optional Group Term Life Insurance”
policy, specifically with regards to her coverage under
the policy’s portability provision.
In other words,
the
be
foundation
interpretation
of
of
her
the
claims
plan.
would
As
the
such,
no
court’s
other
independent legal duty supports her claims.
Because Lewis could have brought her legal claims
under § 502(a) and did not have an independent basis
for
the
claims,
they
are
completely
preempted
by
federal law. Therefore, the claims arise under federal
law,
and
the
court
has
proper
federal-question
jurisdiction.
3.
Timeliness of Greater Georgia’s Notice of Removal
Lewis finally argues that her claims are due to be
remanded to state court because Greater Georgia Life’s
notice of removal was not timely pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
18
§ 1446.
A petition for removal must be filed within 30
days after defendant’s receipt of the initial pleading
setting
forth
1446(b)(1).
the
claim
for
relief.
28
U.S.C.
§
However, “if a case stated by the initial
pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be
filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant
... Of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or
other paper from which it may first be ascertained that
the case is one which is or has become removable.”
28
U.S.C. § 1446 (b)(3).
The crucial question is when did Greater Georgia
Life first receive a “paper” from which it could have
“ascertained” that an ERISA-governed plan was at issue,
and thus, that the case was removable.
See Clingan v.
Celtic Life Ins. Co., 244 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1302 (M.D.
Ala. 2003) (Albritton, C.J.); see also Naef v. Masonite
Corp.,
(Howard,
923
J.)
F.
Supp.
(“When
1504,
the
1511
initial
(S.D.
Ala.
pleading
1996)
fails
to
provide at least a clue that the action is removable
19
... The thirty day time limit for notice of removal
begins
at
the
point
when
the
defendant
intelligently
ascertained
that
removable.”).
Removability
can
either
formal
or
informal
could
have
action
was
ascertained
from
the
be
papers.
Clingan,
244
F.
Supp. 2d at 1302 (citing Webster v. Dow United Techs.
Composite Prods., Inc., 925 F. Supp. 727, 729 (M.D.
Ala. 1996) (Albritton, J.)).
It is Greater Georgia
Life’s burden to prove “exactly when the thirty day
time limit of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) began to run.” Id. at
1302.
Greater Georgia Life contends that it was first
intelligently
able
removable
March
second
on
amended
to
ascertain
31,
2014,
complaint
and
that
when
the
Lewis
responses
Georgia Life’s discovery requests.
case
was
filed
her
to
Greater
In those filings,
Lewis identified ESG for the first time as her former
employer
through
which
she
insurance policy at issue.
20
established
the
life
Her initial complaint and
first
amended
purchased
Greater
the
complaint
life
Georgia
represent
insurance
Life
and
policy
did
that
she
had
directly
from
provide
any
not
identifying information regarding the policy.
In response to Lewis’s initial complaint and first
amended complaint, Greater Georgia Life indicated on
three separate occasions that it was unable to respond
substantively
to
her
complaint
due
to
a
lack
of
information “regarding the identity of the plaintiff
and the decedent” in the preceding complaints.
Thus,
for Greater Georgia Life to remove this matter prior to
Lewis’s March 31 state-court filings, it would have had
to guess as to removability, which is something courts
have routinely held litigants should not be required to
do.
See, e.g., Webb v. Home Depot, USA, Inc., No.
Civ.A. 00-A-220-N, 2000 WL 351992, at *3 (M.D. Ala.
Mar. 27, 2000) (Albritton, C.J.).
The first date upon which Greater Georgia Life had
enough information to “ascertain” that this case was
21
removable was March 31, when Lewis filed her second
amended
complaint
and
responses
company’s discovery requests.
to
the
insurance
Thus, removal on April
30, 2014, was within the statutory 30-day period, and
Lewis’s motion to remand should be denied.
B.
The
court
now
motion to dismiss.
that
ERISA
Lewis’s
preemption.
turns
is
her
a
to
Greater
Georgia
life’s
The insurance company first argues
complaint
preempts
preemption
Motion to Dismiss
should
be
state-law
separate
(Although
they
dismissed
claims.
inquiry
are
from
separate
because
Defensive
complete
inquiries,
courts have recognized that “[c]omplete preemption is
narrower than defensive preemption.”
Connecticut State
Dental Ass'n v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., 591 F.3d
1337, 1343 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
In other words, if a state-law claim is
completely preempted under the narrower test, it will
22
likely also be preempted under the broader defensive
preemption test.)
“Unlike
complete
preemption,
which
is
jurisdictional, defensive preemption is a substantive
defense, justifying dismissal of preempted state law
claims.”
Jones v. LMR Intern., Inc., 457 F.3d 1174,
1179 (11th Cir. 2006).
ERISA preempts “any and all
State” law claims if the claim relates to an ERISA
plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
The question of whether a state-law claim relates
to an ERISA plan is one of Congressional intent.
Shaw
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983).
In
enacting
to
ERISA,
Congress
did
not
simply
intend
counteract state laws meant to affect employee benefit
plans, but instead created a broad preemption for any
law that “has connection with or reference to such a
plan.”
Id. at 97; LMR, 457 F.3d at 1179-80.
Under
this broad standard, courts have regularly dismissed
fraudulent
misrepresentation
23
and
suppression
claims
based on an employer’s or provider’s failure to pay a
under a policy.
See, e.g., LMR, 457 F.3d at 1180
(dismissing as preempted under ERISA state-law breach
of
contract,
unjust
enrichment,
and
fraud
claims
against employer who failed to fund the benefits plan);
Kirkland v. SSL Americas, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 1326
(M.D.
Ala.
preempted
2003)
under
(Albritton,
ERISA
state
C.J.)
law
(dismissing
as
breach-of-contract,
fraud-by-suppression, unjust-enrichment, fraud, deceit,
and
conversion
claims
against
employer
that
denied
employees claims under a severance plan).
Lewis alleges that Greater Georgia Life and ESG
negligently,
wantonly,
and
fraudulently
made
misrepresentations and suppressed facts concerning her
life-insurance policy.
These claims not only refer to
the plan previously determined to be an ERISA-covered
employee benefit plan, but are based entirely on the
plan.
They are classic examples of state-law claims
24
that relate to an ERISA plan and are thus preempted
under federal law.
Because Lewis’s only claims are state-law claims,
they
are
both
preempted
under
ERISA.
The
court,
however, declines to dismiss Lewis’s complaint at this
time and will, instead, afford Lewis two weeks to amend
her
complaint
to
plead
her
claims
under
ERISA.
***
For
the
foregoing
reasons,
it
is
ORDERED
as
follows:
(1) Plaintiff Jane Lewis’s motion to remand (doc.
no. 9) is denied.
(2) Defendants Blue Cross Blue Shield of Georgia
(d/b/a Greater Georgia Life Insurance Company) and ESG
Operations, Inc.’s motion to dismiss (doc. no. 3) is
granted to the extent that plaintiff Lewis has 14 days
from this date to file an amended complaint that sets
forth the claim under
ERISA. Should plaintiff
25
Lewis
fail to amend within the time allotted, the court will
dismiss plaintiff Lewis’s complaint with prejudice.
This case is not closed.
DONE, this the 31st day of March, 2015.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
.
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