Burns, et al. v. City of Alexander City, et al. (JOINT ASSIGN)(MAG+)

Filing 102

OPINION AND ORDER: It is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows: (1) The 89 Judgment dismissing the Huddle House defendants is vacated. The Huddle House defendants--D&L Foods, Inc., Daniel Yates, Lynn Patterson, LeGina Watson, and Huddle House, Inc.--are reinstated. (2) The 95 Motion to approve the settlement agreement is granted as further set out in the opinion and order. (3) The Settlement Agreement and Release of All Claims with Alexander City defendants (doc. no. 95 -1) is approved. (4) The Pro Tanto Release and Settlement with the Huddle House defendants (doc. no. 101 ) is approved. (5) The guardian ad litem, Honorable Linda Benson, is entitled to a fee of $4,000.00 to $5,000.00. The guardian ad litem fee is to be paid out of the plaintiffs' counsel fee recovery. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/2/2016. (dmn, )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, EASTERN DIVISION

MS. KOLEA BURNS,
Administrator of the
Estate of Emerson Crayton,
Jr., and G.C., only child
of her father Emerson
Crayton, Jr., by her
mother and next friend
Kolea Burns,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF ALEXANDER CITY, a
Municipal corporation,
et al.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.
3:14cv350-MHT
(WO)

OPINION & ORDER
This lawsuit arises out of a police officer’s fatal
shooting of Emerson Crayton, Jr., outside of a Huddle
House restaurant in Alexander City, Alabama in 2014.
The issue before the court is whether it should approve
two settlements that would benefit decedent Crayton’s
minor child.

The plaintiffs are Kolea Burns (administrator* of
the

decedent

(Burns

and

Emerson

Crayton’s

surviving child).
The

first

Crayton
minor

Jr.’s

child

estate)

and

and

G.C.

Crayton’s

only

There are two groups of defendants.

consists

of

the

so-called

“Huddle

House

defendants”: D&L Foods, Inc., Huddle House, Inc., Lynn
Patterson, LeGina Watson, and Daniel Yates.

The second

consists of the so-called “Alexander City defendants”:
the City of Alexander City and Officer Tommy Maness.
The parties have presented two settlements to the
court:

one

defendants,

between
and

the

Burns

and

other

between

Alexander City defendants.

the

Huddle
Burns

House

and

the

Because both settlements

are for the benefit of the minor, G.C., the parties
have

filed

settlements.

a

motion

for

court

approval

of

the

For the reasons that follow, the motion

will be granted and the settlements approved.
*

In her initial complaint and throughout this
litigation,
Burns
refers
to
herself
as
the
“administratrix” of Crayton’s estate.
Because the
gender of the estate’s representative is irrelevant,
the court refers to her as the “administrator” of the
estate.
2

I.

LEGAL STANDARD

“Alabama law requires that a court hold a fairness
hearing

before

settled.”

a

Adam

minor
v.

plaintiff’s

Criswell,

case

may

be

No. 13cv458,

2014

WL

813142, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 3, 2014) (Thompson, J.)
(citing Large v. Hayes By and Through Nesbitt, 534 So.
2d 1101, 1105 (Ala. 1988)).

This hearing must involve

“an extensive examination of the facts, to determine
whether the settlement is in the best interest of the
minor.”
2d

Large v. Hayes By and Through Nesbitt, 534 So.

1101,

1105

(Ala. 1988);

see

also

Adams,

2014

WL

813142, at *1; William E. Shreve, Jr., Settling the
Claims of a Minor, 72 Ala. Law. 308 (2011).
minor

ordinarily

cannot

be

bound

by

a

Because a
settlement

agreement, Hines v. Seibels, 86 So. 43, 44 (Ala. 1920);
Shreve, Settling the Claims of a Minor, supra, at 309,
a fairness hearing and approval of the settlement are
required in order for a compromise to be “valid and

3

binding”

and

to

“bar[]

a

subsequent

action

minor] to recover for the same injuries.”

[by

the

Id. at 310.

II. BACKGROUND
A.

Factual Background

This suit arises out of events that occurred at the
Huddle House in Alexander City, Alabama in the early
morning hours of March 8, 2014.

Plaintiffs allege that

Crayton was waiting for his meal when he got into a
disagreement

with

a

Huddle

House

accused him of being too loud.

waitress,

who

had

After Crayton exchanged

words with another waitress who had involved herself in
the disagreement, he got up to leave, and witnesses
report that he stated, “Y’all can keep my money, and
keep my food; I’m leaving.”
After being handed his food, Crayton went to his
car in the Huddle House parking lot.
after

a

Huddle

House

employee

had

In the meantime,
contacted

the

Alexander City police department, Officer Maness was
summoned to the restaurant.

The plaintiffs allege that
4

several Huddle House employees falsely stated to Maness
that

Crayton

shoot

was

someone,

restaurant.

carrying

or

had

a

gun,

threatened

had
to

threatened
blow

up

to
the

Maness contends that he did not hear these

allegations.
Crayton was backing out of his parking space at the
Huddle House when Maness attempted to stop him.
then

fired

five

or

six

bullets

into

Maness

Crayton’s

car,

killing him.

B.
The

Litigation Background

plaintiffs

have

pursued

connection with Crayton’s death.

several

claims

in

Against the Alexander

City defendants, they brought a state wrongful-death
claim and two federal claims, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Against the Huddle House defendants, they brought
state

wrongful-death

claims.
claim

and

negligent-failure-to-train

They also brought federal claims, including a

for

race

discrimination
5

in

places

of

public

accommodation under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (42 U.S.C.

§ 2000a), and, pursuant to § 1983, a

claim for race discrimination in contractual dealings
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Some

of

these

claims

and

G.C.

were

dismissed,

leaving only estate-administrator Burns to pursue the
remaining claims against both sets of defendants.
Administrator Burns reached a settlement with the
Huddle

House

defendants

dismissed pro tanto.
of $ 100,000.

and

those

defendants

were

This settlement is in the amount

Out of this amount, Burns must pay her

attorneys $ 28,500 in litigation expenses and 50 % of
the remaining recovery in attorneys’ fees pursuant to a
contingent-fee

contract.

administrator,

will

be

Thus,

entitled

to

Burns,

$ 35,750

as

and

her

attorneys will split the remaining $ 35,750.
Administrator Burns later reached a settlement with
the Alexander City defendants.
the

amount

arrangement

of
is

This settlement is in

$ 500,000.
the

same

as
6

The
in

the

contingent-fee
Huddle

House

settlement; having already paid the $ 28,500 litigation
expenses,

Burns,

as

administrator,

should

receive

$ 250,000 and the attorneys will split the remaining
$ 250,000 as fees.
Because the settlements were, in fact, solely for
the benefit of G.C. as Crayton’s only heir, the court
granted a motion to amend the complaint to reinstate
G.C.

as

a

considering

plaintiff
the

for

proposed

the

limited

settlements.

purpose
At

the

of
same

time, it appointed Linda Benson as C.G.’s guardian ad
litem

and

one

of

the

Hutchins, as conservator.

plaintiffs’

attorneys,

Eric

A pro ami hearing was held

on May 17, 2016.

III. DISCUSSION
The court will first address whether it should even
consider the settlements for approval.

And, if so, it

will then discuss whether it should approve them.

7

A.

Appropriateness of Even Considering
the Settlements

Two aspects of the Huddle House settlement warrant
discussion:

the

nature

of

the

parties’

request

for

approval and the nature of the claim at issue in the
settlement.

As

to

the

nature

of

the

request,

the

parties essentially seek retroactive approval of the
settlement,
already

for

been

the

dismissed

partially disbursed.
this

Huddle

settlement,

and

House
the

defendants

settlement

have

proceeds

At the time of the resolution of

the

plaintiffs’

attorneys

did

not

understand Alabama law to require a pro ami hearing to
settle a minor’s wrongful-death claim.

Not until after

a court-appointed guardian ad litem had later informed
counsel for the Huddle House defendants that she was of
the

opinion

Huddle

House

that

court

counsel

approval
even

was

consider

necessary,
whether

did
such

approval was necessary or prudent.
The timing of the parties’ request does not appear
to be an obstacle to the court’s consideration of the
proposed

settlement.

The
8

parties

have

jointly

expressed an interest in having the court consider the
proposed settlement, and even a retroactive approval by
the court can ensure that the interests of the minor
and the other parties involved are protected.

That the

funds have already been partially distributed does not
counsel

against

consideration

agreement either.

of

the

settlement

The court will therefore reinstate

the Huddle House defendants as parties for the limited
purpose

of

the

court's

consideration

of

their

settlement.
The court now turns to the nature of the claim at
issue in the Huddle House settlement.
for

that

settlement

wrongful-death claim.

was

the

The sole claim

plaintiffs’

state

The guardian ad litem refers to

this court’s opinion in McCall v. Reed, ____ F.Supp.3d
____,

2015

WL

4067032

(M.D. Ala. July 2, 2015)

(Thompson, J.), as justification for consideration of
the

settlement.

encompassing
§ 1983)

and

McCall

both
a

a

federal

state

claim
9

discussed
claim
(for

a

(under

settlement
42

wrongful

U.S.C.
death).

McCall, ____ F.Supp.3d at ____, 2015 WL 4067032, at *1.
Under those facts, this court explained, “it is unclear
whether a minor is a proper party in an action alleging
deliberate

indifference

under

federal

constitutional

law as well as wrongful death under Alabama law.”
at *3.

Id.

This lack of clarity arose out of the fact that

minors are not proper parties to wrongful-death cases
in

Alabama,

they

are

which

proper

permit
parties

only
to

punitive
a

damages,

federal

claim

but

under

§ 1983, which permits compensatory damages for family
members.

Id.

This court found it appropriate to hold

a pro ami hearing in that case due to the ambiguity of
the law on the issue and explained that the minor, as
“the sole beneficiary of a settlement, ... should be
protected through a pro ami hearing.”

Id.

Like the

minor in McCall, G.C. is the sole intended beneficiary
of the Huddle House settlement.

However, unlike the

settlement in McCall, the settlement with the Huddle
House

defendants

encompasses

only

a

state

wrongful-death action, to which G.C. is not a proper
10

party

under

Alabama

law,

despite

beneficiary of the proceeds.

her

all

involved

here,

the

Therefore, McCall does

not resolve the issue presented by G.C.
because

being

Nevertheless,

including

the

minor's

guardian ad litem, agree that the most prudent course
of action is to have the court consider the Huddle
House settlement, the court will do so--albeit out of
prudence and not because the law requires such.
As

to

the

settlement

with

the

Alexander

City

defendants, this court’s decision in McCall is squarely
on point.

Like the settlement at issue in McCall, the

Alexander City settlement encompasses both a federal
§ 1983

and

a

state

wrongful-death

claim.

For

the

reasons the court outlined in McCall, the court will
address the fairness of the Alexander City settlement.
Id. at ____, 2015 WL 4067032 at

11

*3-*4.

B.
The

Approval of the Settlements

court

settlements

now

warrant

turns
its

to

whether

approval.

the

For

proposed

reasons

that

follow, they do.
First, Burns made a logical decision to settle.
This case involved complicated issues that would yield
uncertain results on summary judgment and at trial.
to

the

federal

claim,

there

are

these

As

questions:

whether the plaintiffs could overcome Officer Maness’s
qualified-immunity defense, see Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800 (1982); and whether they could establish
that Crayton's death was caused by a municipal policy
adopted

by

Alexander

City,

see

City

Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1989).
there

is

the

question

whether

of

Canton

v.

As to all claims,

there

is

any

factual

basis to hold the Huddle House defendants liable for
Maness’s

conduct.

And,

as

to

all

claims

and

all

defendants, there is the question whether a jury would
reject as not credible Maness’s contention that he shot

12

Crayton because he believed Crayton was trying to run
over him.
Additionally, the litigation, through trial and a
possible

appeal,

years.

Burns

could
would

have
have

lasted
faced

for

several

considerable

more
legal

obstacles over an extended period of time if she had
chosen to proceed with this litigation.

Thus, given

these realities, her decision to settle was rational.
Second, the settlement amounts are reasonable.
the

pro

pursuing

ami

hearing,

this

Burns

litigation

testified

for

over

two

that,
years

At

after
and

attending numerous depositions, she was satisfied with
the settlement amounts obtained.

The guardian ad litem

agreed that the settlement amounts are fair and that
the settlements are in the best interests of the minor.
After an independent review of the record, the court
concurs with these assessments.
Third,

to

determine

the

reasonableness

of

attorneys’ fees, the court must consider the factors
set

forth

in

Peebles

v.
13

Miley,

439

So.

2d

137

(Ala. 1983).

The proposed fees are reasonable in light

of those factors: the representation involved in this
case required considerable learning, skill, and labor
for its proper discharge; and, for the reasons given
above,

the

claims

were

quite

risky,

such

that

many

attorneys would decline to take the case for a lesser
fee.
the

Additionally, the plaintiffs’ attorneys expended
necessary

collectively

time

on

several

the

litigation,

hundred

spent

meeting

hours

having

with

experts, interviewing witnesses, taking and defending
numerous depositions, and writing briefs; they incurred
nearly $ 30,000 in litigation expenses determined by
the guardian ad litem to be reasonable; and they have
devoted

time

on

this

matter

that

profitably spent on other matters.

could

have

been

Finally, while the

50 % contingency figure is at the high end, it was
reasonable in this case, particularly in light of the
above-described riskiness of the claims.

See Sweeney

v.

1560,

Athens

Reg’l

(11th Cir. 1990)

Med.

Ctr.,

(approving
14

a

917
50 %

F.2d

contingency

1569
fee

given the difficulty of a case); McCall, ____ F.Supp.3d
at ____, 2015 WL 4067032, at *4 (acknowledging that a
50 %

contingency

fee

was

“on

the

high

end,”

but

nonetheless finding it reasonable); Large, 534 So. 2d
at 1106 (noting that a 50 % contingency fee has been
upheld as a matter of law).
In

sum,

the

settlements

are

fair,

just,

and

reasonable and in the best interests of the minor.

C. Personal Representative Fee
The plaintiffs also request that the court order
payment

of

a

5 %

personal-representative

fee--to

be

taken from the settlement funds--to Burns for her work
in

pursuing

this

administrator

of

litigation

Crayton’s

in

her

estate.

At

capacity
the

pro

as
ami

hearing, Burns testified, and her attorneys confirmed,
that

she

resolution

expended
of

considerable

this

case,

effort
including

depositions and locating witnesses.
recognizes

the

amount

of

time
15

and

toward

the

attending

While the court
energy

Burns

has

devoted to pursuing this case, there is no basis for
awarding such a fee under existing law.
In Ex parte Rodgers, 141 So. 3d 1038 (Ala. 2013),
the

Alabama

Supreme

such a fee.

Court

foreclosed

the

payment

of

It held that, “There is no allowance in

the wrongful-death statute for payment of expenses of
the

administration

would

include

of

the

decedent’s

personal-representative

141 So. 3d at 1043.

estate,

which

compensation.”

In a special concurrence cited by

the plaintiffs as justification for payment of a fee,
Justice

Bolin

method

“propose[d]

of

a

providing

compensation

for

wrongful-death

actions

potentially

alternative

personal-representative

successfully
separate

and

prosecuting
apart

from

the

estate duties of the personal representative,” id. at
1044 (Bolin, J. concurring specially).

Specifically,

he suggested that courts might be able to find that a
statutory

trust

exists

in

successful

wrongful-death

actions brought by a personal representative and that
the

finding

of

such

a
16

trust

would

allow

the

representative to collect a trustee’s fee, see id. at
1046 (Bolin, J. concurring specially).
In

proposing

this

alternative,

however,

Justice

Bolin made clear that his proposal was just that:
“proposal,”
expressly

a

“potential

“concur[red]

result

reached

alternative.”

in

the

main

therein.”

under

holding

the

by

the

he

and

at

the
1044

In the face of an

Alabama

circumstances

opinion
Id.

(Bolin, J. concurring specially).
express

Indeed,

a

Supreme

presented

Court

here,

there

that,
is

no

right to a personal-representative fee under state law,
this

court

proposal

by

contrary.
payment

is

unwilling

only

one

Therefore,
of

a

to

rely

justice
the

on

that

an

alternative

might

plaintiffs’

personal-representative

allow

the

request

for

fee

will

be

denied.
Moreover, it cannot be overlooked that, while Burns
is not recovering a “fee" for her work in this case,
she is still being greatly rewarded: All the time and

17

energy she has expended has been for the benefit of her
beloved daughter.
***
Accordingly, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED
as follows:
(1)

The

judgment

dismissing

defendants (doc. no. 89) is vacated.
defendants--D&L

Foods,

Inc.,

the

Huddle

House

The Huddle House

Daniel

Yates,

Lynn

Patterson, LeGina Watson, and Huddle House, Inc.--are
reinstated.
(2) The motion to approve the settlement agreement
(doc. no. 95) is granted.
(3) The “Settlement Agreement and Release of All
Claims” with Alexander City defendants (doc. no. 95-1)
is approved.
(4) The “Pro Tanto Release and Settlement” with the
Huddle House defendants (doc. no. 101) is approved.
(5) The guardian ad litem, Honorable Linda Benson,
is entitled to a fee of $ 4,000.00 to $ 5,000.00.

18

The

guardian

ad

litem

fee

is

to

be

paid

out

of

plaintiffs’ counsel fee recovery.
DONE, this the 2nd day of June, 2016.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

the