Colclough v. Colvin

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 9/23/2015. Copies mailed to SSA Chief Judge and SSA Office of Hearings and Appeals (wcl, )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
EASTERN DIVISION
JEFFREY WADE COLCLOUGH,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15-cv-58-TFM
(WO)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Jeffrey Wade Colclough (“Colclough” or “Plaintiff”) applied for disability
insurance benefits pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq.,
alleging that he is unable to work because of a disability. His application was denied at the
initial administrative level. Plaintiff then requested and received a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Following the hearing, the ALJ found that Colclough
was not under a “disability” as defined in the Social Security Act and denied the plaintiff’s
claim for benefits. The Appeals Council rejected a subsequent request for review.
Consequently, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security (Commissioner).1 See Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have consented to entry of final judgment by the

1

Pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub.L. No.
103-296, 108 Stat. 1464, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services with respect to Social
Security matters were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security.

United States Magistrate Judge. The case is now before the court for review pursuant to 42
U.S.C. §§ 405 (g) and 1631(c)(3). Based on the court's review of the record in this case and
the parties’ briefs, the court concludes that the Commissioner’s decision should be
REVERSED and REMANDED.
II. Standard of Review
Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), a person is entitled to disability benefits when the
person is unable to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result
in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than 12 months . . .
To make this determination,2 the Commissioner employs a five-step, sequential
evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.
(1) Is the person presently unemployed?
(2) Is the person’s impairment severe?
(3) Does the person's impairment meet or equal one of the specific
impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1?
(4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation?
(5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy?
An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next
question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative
answer to any question, other than step three, leads to a determination of “not
disabled.”

2

A “physical or mental impairment” is one resulting from anatomical, physiological, or
psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques.

2

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).3
The standard of review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one. This court
must find the Commissioner’s decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial evidence.
42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997). “Substantial
evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is such relevant evidence
as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A reviewing court may not look only to those parts of
the record which supports the decision of the ALJ but instead must view the record in its
entirety and take account of evidence which detracts from the evidence relied on by the ALJ.
Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir. 1986).
[The court must] . . . scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the
reasonableness of the [Commissioner’s] . . . factual findings . . . No similar
presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner’s] . . . legal
conclusions, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in
evaluating claims.
Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987).
III. The Issues
A. The Commissioner’s Decision
Colclough was 48 years old at the time of the hearing, is a high school graduate, and
holds an Associate Degree in Applied Sciences. R. 50. He has prior work experience as a
manager at a switch manufacturing company and a handyman. R. 53, 281. Colclough
3

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026 (11th Cir. 1986) is a supplemental security income case (SSI).
The same sequence applies to disability insurance benefits. Cases arising under Title II are appropriately
cited as authority in Title XVI cases. See e.g. Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1981) (Unit A).

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alleges that he became disabled on December 5, 2010, due to back and leg pain. R. 54-55.
After the hearing, the ALJ found that Colclough suffers from severe impairments of psoriasis
and degenerative disc disease and non-severe impairments of gastroesophageal disease,
opioid dependence4, and obesity. R. 26. The ALJ found that Colclough retains the residual
functional capacity to perform the full range of light work. R. 27. Relying in part on
testimony from a vocational expert, the ALJ concluded that Colclough is able to return to his
past work as a production manager. R. 30. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Colclough
is not disabled. Id.
B. The Plaintiff’s Claims

Colclough presents the following issues for review:
(1)

The RFC determination is unsupported by substantial evidence
because the ALJ improperly failed to rely on any opinion
evidence in the record, particularly the opinion of Dr. Parent,
and failed to include a limitation for changing positions between
sitting and standing at will.

(2)

The credibility determination is unsupported by substantial
evidence.

(3)

The ALJ erred as a matter of law at Step 5 in finding that
Plaintiff could perform his past work as he actually performed
it, as such finding is contrary to the vocational expert’s
testimony.

(4)

The ALJ erred at Step 4 because he relied on vocational expert
testimony that was elicited in response to an incomplete
hypothetical question.

4

The court notes that nothing in the medical records indicates that Colclough exhibits drug-seeking
behavior or is a malingerer.

4

Doc. No. 11, Pl. Br. 5.
IV. Discussion
Plaintiff raises several issues and arguments related to this court’s ultimate inquiry
of whether the Commissioner’s disability decision is supported by the proper legal standards
and substantial evidence.5 See Bridges v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 622 (11th Cir. 1987). However,
the court pretermits discussion of the plaintiff’s specific arguments, with the exception of his
contention that the ALJ improperly discredited his allegations of pain and discounted the
treating physician’s opinion, because the court concludes that the ALJ erred as a matter of
law, and, thus, this case is due to be remanded for further proceedings.
Colclough testified that his pain was so severe that he was unable to work between
the date of onset, December 5, 2010, and the date he was last insured on June 30, 2011. He
also alleged that his pain and impairments lasted for a continuous period of not less than
twelve months. The ALJ did not credit this testimony. The court cannot conclude that the
ALJ’s discrediting of Colclough’s allegation of severe pain is supported by substantial
evidence.

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The Commissioner’s regulations also require that a written decision contain several specific

elements.
Any such decision by the Commissioner of Social Security which involves a determination
of disability and which is in whole or in part unfavorable to such individual shall contain a
statement of the case, in understandable language, setting forth a discussion of the evidence,
and stating the Commissioner’s determination and the reason or reasons upon which it is
based.
42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) (emphasis added).

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“Subjective pain testimony supported by objective medical evidence of a condition
that can reasonably be expected to produce the symptoms of which the plaintiff complains
is itself sufficient to sustain a finding of disability.” Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007 (11th Cir.
1987). The Eleventh Circuit has established a three-part test that applies when a claimant
attempts to establish disability through his own testimony of pain or other subjective
symptoms. Landry v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1551, 1553 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Holt v.
Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991). This standard requires evidence of an
underlying medical condition and either (1) objective medical evidence that confirms the
severity of the alleged pain arising from that condition or (2) an objectively determined
medical condition of such severity that it can reasonably be expected to give rise to the
alleged pain. Landry, 782 F. 2d at 1553. In this circuit, the law is clear. The Commissioner
must consider a claimant’s subjective testimony of pain if he finds evidence of an underlying
medical condition and the objectively determined medical condition is of a severity that can
reasonably be expected to give rise to the alleged pain. Mason v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 1460,
1462 (11th Cir. 1986); Landry, 782 F.2d at 1553. Thus, if the Commissioner fails to
articulate reasons for refusing to credit a claimant's subjective pain testimony, the
Commissioner has accepted the testimony as true as a matter of law. This standard requires
that the articulated reasons must be supported by substantial reasons. If there is no such
support then the testimony must be accepted as true. Hale, 831 F.2d at 1012.
The medical records indicate that Colclough has received extensive treatment for his
chronic back condition, including four back surgeries and one procedure to remove a

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neurofibroma.
!

In 1998, Colclough underwent a laminectomy and diskectomy for a
right-sided disk herniation. R. 529.

!

In 2001, Colclough underwent an L-5-S1 hemilaminectomy and
diskectomy. R. 529.

!

On July 25, 2011, Colclough underwent a CT-guided fine needle
biopsy to remove a neurofibroma from his chest. R. 399.

!

On September 28, 2011, Dr. Rudolph Buckley, a spine surgeon, noted:
MRI of the lumbar spine shows L4-5 and
L5-S1 herniated disks/stenosis with questionable
congenital stenosis.
X-rays of the lumbar spine (AP, lateral and
spot view in the standing position) shows five
lumbar non-rib vertebrae. The pelvis appears to
be level. Slight leftward tilt to the spine overall.
No acute findings. No significant spina bifida.
The lateral view shows mild loss of lordotic curve
overall. There appears to be narrowing of the L5S1 interspace approximately 70% to 80% when
compared with the levels above. No obvious
spondylosis, pars fracture, or spondviolisthesis at
these levels. There is a suggestion of a possible
wedge compression deformity at T12 anteriorly.
No acute findings otherwise.
R. 531. The surgeon recommended surgery “[s]ince the patient
has failed all conservative treatments including physical therapy,
pain management with injections and pain medications.” Id.
The surgeon performed an L4-S1 posterior decompression;
instrumented fusion with bilateral pedical screw fixation;
interbody fusion with graft on putty and cage from medtronics;
posterior lateral fusion with auto graft. R. 514. Upon discharge,
Dr. Buckley diagnosed L4-S1 spinal stenosis, low back pain,
lumbar radiculopathy, internal disk derangement, status post L5S1 diskectomy and currently with thoracic tumor. Id.

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!

On April 19, 2013, Colclough underwent an L4-L5 anterior lumbar
diskectomy/decompression; L4-L5 anterior fusion; right iliac crest bone
graft; implantation of material fusion implants, single implant at L4-5
interspace; anterior instrumentation/application of the lumbar pate L3
L5; and use of bone morphogenetic protein/BNP. R. 606. The
surgeon’s post-operative diagnosis was pseudoarthrosis, status post
posterior fusion, L4-L5, and degenerative disc disease with disk
protrusion/HNP L4 L5. Id.

At the administrative hearing, Colclough testified that he was unable to pick up his
twenty pound granddaughter and that he suffered severe back pain during the relevant time
period. R. 66-67, 72. He stated that, despite receiving treatments such as nerve block
injections and medication, he “never felt good enough to where [he] could go and do
something for a sustained period of time and not have to sit down, stand up or lay down,
which is how the majority of [his] days were spent” and that “[i]f [he went] for a walk, [he
was] wiped out and laying down for two, three hours to recover from that.” R. 72.
In his analysis, the ALJ acknowledged that Colclough’s “medically determinable
impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the
claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these
symptoms are not entirely credible.” R. 29.
First, the ALJ discredits Colclough’s allegations of pain based on his testimony of
daily activities. Specifically, the ALJ found:
“The claimant testified that he has severe pain that prevents him [from]
performing most activities. However, the claimant has admitted to certain
abilities during the period at issue, i.e. December 5, 2010 to June 30, 2011,
which provides support for the residual functional capacity conclusion in this
decision. During that period the claimant stated he was able to walk two
miles, had no problems attending for personal hygiene, and cared for his pet.

8

During that period, imaging revealed no cord compression or other significant
finding consistent with the level of pain the claimant alleged. His physical
examinations were within normal limits prior to the DLI. Lastly, the record
shows the claimant had a severe back impairment prior to the DLI, but there
is no objective evidence of record revealing his impairment was disabling or
as severe as it appears to be following his surgery in September 2011. To the
contrary, in April 2011, the claimant’s treating source stated he did fairly well
after his last back surgery.”
R. 28.
Where an ALJ decides not to credit a claimant’s testimony, the ALJ must articulate
specific and adequate reasons for doing so, or the record must be obvious as to the credibility
finding. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561-62 (11th Cir. 1995); Jones v. Dept. of Health
& Human Servs., 941 F.2d 1529, 1532 (11th Cir. 1991) (articulated reasons must be based
on substantial evidence). If proof of disability is based on subjective evidence and a
credibility determination is, therefore, critical to the decision, “‘the ALJ must either explicitly
discredit such testimony or the implication must be so clear as to amount to a specific
credibility finding.’” Foote, 67 F.3d at 1562, quoting Tieniber, 720 F.2d at 1255 (although
no explicit finding as to credibility is required, the implication must be obvious to the
reviewing court). The ALJ has discretion to discredit a plaintiff’s subjective complaints as
long as he provides “explicit and adequate reasons for his decision.” Holt, 921 F.2d at 1223.
The ALJ concluded that Colclough’s allegations regarding his back condition were not
credible to the extent alleged and discounted that testimony. After a careful review of the
ALJ’s analysis, the court cannot conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
credibility determination.

9

First, the ALJ discredits Colclough’s allegations of pain because Colclough testified
that “he is able to walk two miles.” R. 28. The ALJ’s finding, however, is based on a
mischaracterization of Colclough’s description of his daily activities.

For example,

Colclough testified that, in October of 2011, he was able to take small walks three to five
times a day until he reached a total of two miles. R. 61. He explained that the “orthopedic
specialist told [him] that walking was good for [his] back” and that “it would take several
trips to get there.” R. 58, 70.
The ALJ also discounts Colclough’s allegations of pain because he had “no problems
attending to personal hygiene.” R. 28. The ALJ, however, ignored Colclough’s testimony
that his wife had to wash his legs and feet and towel dry him after showering and that he had
difficulty putting on his socks and shoes. R. 55. The record indicates that Colclough was
able to dress, bathe, feed himself, and attend to his personal hygiene when he was “heavily
medicated on two different types of Morphine, along with some other medications” and
therefore did not feel “an awful lot of pain” at the time. R. 55-56. This court, therefore,
cannot conclude that the ALJ’s determination that he had “no problems” with personal
hygiene is supported by substantial evidence.
The ALJ also found that Colclough’s allegations of pain should be discounted because
he was able to “care for his pet.” R. 28. The record, however, indicates that Colclough
takes care of his dog by giving it food and water and letting it outside. R. 289. The court
questions whether the ability to perform simple tasks, such as refilling a food bowl or
opening and closing a door, is substantial evidence that Colclough’s allegations are not so

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severe as to give rise to disabling pain.
In addition, the ALJ relies on medical records from prior back surgeries in 1998 and
2001 to discredit Colclough’s allegations of pain. For example, the ALJ found his pain was
not “as severe as it appears to be following his surgery in September 2011" because “in April
2011, the claimant’s treating source stated he did fairly well after his last back surgery.” R.
28. The problem with the ALJ’s finding is that Colclough’s previous back surgery occurred
over nine years before the date of onset. The ALJ also determined Colclough has the residual
functional capacity to perform the full range of light work because he was able to perform
medium to heavy work after undergoing back surgeries in 1998 and 2001. R. 28. This court
cannot conclude that Colclough’s ability to perform work after undergoing back surgeries
over ten years prior to the relevant time period is substantial evidence that his allegations of
pain in 2010 and 2011 are not as severe as alleged.
The ALJ also discounts Colclough’s allegations of pain because “[i]n November 2011,
the notes state ‘he is not having any pain in his back any longer’ and the treating doctor
concluded that the back pain ‘has resolved.’” R. 29. The ALJ, however, fails to consider the
physician’s findings in full. The medical records indicate that, on November 9, 2011,
Colclough presented to his treating physician, Dr. Colleen Parent, at Community Memorial
Hospital Family Health Clinic with complaints of pain in his legs and chest and numbness
in his arms. R. 553. His medications included Neurontin, Morphine Sulfate 15 mg and
Morphine Sulfate ER 15 mg. Id. Dr. Parent found that “his back pain has resolved, his leg
pain is still present, will stop the long acting morphine and just continue with the short acting

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morphine, will being weaning down off of that.” R. 554. Despite being under the influence
of narcotics prescribed to treat moderate to severe pain, Colclough’s back pain did not in fact
resolve. On January 4, 2012, Colclough returned to Dr. Parent with complaints of “pain in
his hips and lower back, the more he drops the morphine, the more he figures it out he is
having pain.” R. 551. The physician noted that he “has been wearing a clamshell brace for
4 months, he has 2 months to go.” Id. Dr. Parent assessed a disc disorder and found “the
pain in his legs is improved after the surgery but he continues to have pain in his back and
hips, has been controlled with morphine to this point. . . .” R. 552.
The ALJ then compounded his errors by failing to consider the side effects of
Colclough’s medications on his ability to work. Colclough testified that he was unable to
have an intelligent conversation and “a lot of the times ... laid around” while under the
influence of narcotic medication. R. 55-56. He testified that he opted for a third surgery in
2011 because “nothing else seemed to be working other than being completely wacked out
of my gourd on medication.” R. 74. The medical record is also replete with references to
the side effects of medication. For example, on May 19, 2011, Dr. Parent found that “pain
medication does seem to make him a little loopy.” R. 368.

The ALJ was required to

consider whether the plaintiff experiences any side effects from his medications, and if so,
whether those side effects impact his ability to work. The side effects of medication may
render a claimant disabled or at least contribute to a disability. Cowart v. Schweiker, 662
F.2d 731, 737 (11th Cir. 1981). The record demonstrates that, during the relevant time
period, Colclough was routinely prescribed the following medications: Lortab

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(acetaminophen/hydrocodone bitartrate)6; MS Contin (morphine sulfate)7; Neurontin
(gabapentin)8; and Flexeril (cyclobenzaprine hydrochloride).9 R. 364, 367-69, 372, 405, 471,
488, 513, 516, 529, 553. However, the ALJ made no findings regarding the effects of these
medications on Colclough’s ability to work, and thus, the court is unable to determine
whether the ALJ’s conclusion that Colclough is not disabled is supported by substantial
evidence.
This court likewise is unable to conclude that the ALJ’s discounting of Dr. Parent’s
opinion that Colclough would miss more than four days of work per month, could never lift
more than twenty pounds, and could stand, walk, or sit for no more than two hours in an
eight-hour day is supported by substantial evidence.
The law is well-settled; the opinion of a claimant’s treating physician must be
accorded substantial weight unless good cause exists for not doing so. Jones v. Bowen, 810
F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986); Broughton v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 960, 961 (11th Cir. 1985).
The Commissioner also demonstrates a similar preference for the opinion of treating
physicians.
6

Lortab is prescribed for management of moderate to moderately severe pain.
Physician.pdr.net/drug-summary/lortab-tablets?druglabelid=3486&id=3567.
7

MS Contin is prescribed for “[m]anagement of pain severe enough to require daily, around-theclock, long-term opioid treatment and for which alternative options are inadequate.” Physician.pdr.net/drugsummary/ms-contin?druglabelid+2068&id=1222.
8

Neurontin is prescribed for the treatment of postherpetic neuralgia. Physician.pdr.et/drugsummary/neurontin?druglabelid=2477.
9

Flexeril is used “[a]djunct to rest and physical therapy for relief of muscle spasm associated [with]
acute, painful musculoskeletal conditions.” Physician.pdr.net/drug-summary/cyclobenzaprinehydrochloride?druglabelid=3089.

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Generally, we give more weight to opinions from your treating sources, since
these sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide
a detailed, longitudinal picture of your medical impairment(s) and may bring
a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the
objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations,
such as consultive examinations or brief hospitalizations.
Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing 20 CFR § 404.1527 (d)(2)).
The ALJ’s failure to give considerable weight to the treating physician’s opinion is reversible
error. Broughton, 776 F.2d at 961-2; Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387 (11th Cir. 1982).
However, there are limited circumstances when the ALJ can disregard the treating
physician’s opinion. The requisite “good cause” for discounting a treating physician’s
opinion may exist where the opinion is not supported by the evidence, or where the evidence
supports a contrary finding. See Schnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 582 (11th Cir. 1987).
Good cause may also exist where a doctor’s opinions are merely conclusory; inconsistent
with the doctor’s medical records; or unsupported by objective medical evidence. See Jones
v. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., 941 F.2d 1529, 1532-33 (11th Cir. 1991); Edwards v.
Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584-85 (11th Cir. 1991); Johns v. Bowen, 821 F.2d 551, 555 (11th
Cir. 1987). The weight afforded to a physician’s conclusory statements depends upon the
extent to which they are supported by clinical or laboratory findings and are consistent with
other evidence of the claimant’s impairment. Wheeler v. Heckler, 784 F.2d 1073, 1075 (11th
Cir. 1986). The ALJ “may reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence supports
a contrary conclusion.” Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1240 (11th Cir. 1983). The
ALJ must articulate the weight given to a treating physician’s opinion and must articulate any

14

reasons for discounting the opinion. Schnorr, 816 F.2d at 581.
After reviewing the medical records, the ALJ assigned little weight to Dr. Parent’s
opinion “as the absence of any significant objective clinical findings cannot be reconciled
with the extreme functional limitation she suggests.” R. 30. The ALJ incorrectly found that
Dr. Parent saw Colclough on no more than two occasions and that she never treated him
before September 2011. The record, however, indicates that Dr. Parent was his treating
physician for over 20 years years and that she provided extensive treatment during the
relevant time period. R. 283, 296, 367, 369, 371, 374, 378, 383, 384, 518. Moreover, as
previously discussed, the record is replete with objective medical evidence, including MRIs
and CT scans, indicating the need for extensive back surgery.
The ALJ also discounts Dr. Parent’s opinion about Colclough’s pain and limitations
based on her finding in September 2011 that Colclough was “healthy, well developed, [and]
in no acute distress.” R. 29.

The ALJ, however, failed to consider the finding in its

complete context and ignored the physician’s additional findings. The medical records
indicate that Dr. Parent conducted a pre-operative consultation for the back surgeon on
September 21, 2011. R. 516-518. The court recognizes that Dr. Parent found that Colclough
appeared healthy and well developed with no signs of acute distress or obvious discomfort
and that he was an acceptable risk for back surgery. R. 517. The treating physician’s notes,
however, also indicate that Colclough was taking “MS Contin and morphine sulfate,”
specifically “3 short-acting morphine tabs per day, occasionally the fourth tab and 2 long
acting medications during the day.” R. 516. In addition, Dr. Parent noted that Colclough

15

“has been feeling more pain in the left side and down his leg,” that he “has a lot of numbness
and tingling in his arms, he gets hot flashes a few times a day, [and] he has body tremors
after standing 15 minutes.” R. 516. The ALJ is not free to simply ignore medical evidence,
nor may he pick and choose between the records selecting those portions which support his
ultimate conclusion without articulating specific, well supported reasons for crediting some
evidence while discrediting other evidence. Marbury v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 837, 839-41 (11th
Cir. 1992)
The ALJ also discounts Dr. Parent’s opinion based on medical records indicating that
Colclough’s back condition improved dramatically after his last back surgery. R. 30. The
problem is that the “last back surgery” occurred after the relevant time period on April 19,
2013. The court, therefore, cannot conclude that the ALJ’s decision to assign little weight
to Dr. Parent’s opinion on this basis is supported by substantial evidence.
For these reasons, the court concludes that the Commissioner erred as a matter of law,
and that the case should be remanded for further proceedings.
V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, this case will be reversed and remanded to the Commissioner for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
A separate order will be entered.
DONE this 23rd day of September, 2015.
/s/ Terry F. Moorer
TERRY F. MOORER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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