McCoy v. McCoy-Alfred et al (JOINT ASSIGN)

Filing 6

ORDERED that Plf's 1 motion for temporary restraining order is DENIED for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; further ORDERED that Plf shall show cause, on or before 5/13/2016, why this action should not be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 4/29/2016. (wcl, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
EASTERN DIVISION
RONNIE E. MCCOY,
Plaintiff,
v.
ROBIN MCCOY-ALFRED, et al.,
Defendants.

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) CASE NO. 3:16-CV-302-WKW
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[WO]
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ORDER

Before the court is Plaintiff’s Complaint for Damages and Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction Against Foreclosure. (Doc. # 1.) The
motion for a temporary restraining order is due to be denied.
Plaintiff contends that this court may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over
his claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. To invoke the court’s diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction under § 1332, the complaint must allege facts that, if true,
show that no plaintiff is a citizen of the same state as any defendant. Travaglio v.
Am. Express Co., 735 F.3d 1266, 1268 (11th Cir. 2013) (applying the complete
diversity rule). If the allegations are insufficient to satisfy the requirement of
complete diversity, the district court is without jurisdiction to take any action in the
case. Id. at 1269.
Plaintiff Ronnie E. McCoy alleges that he is “a citizen domiciled in Georgia.”
(Doc. # 1, at 2.) He further alleges that Defendant Laura Lubin is a “resident of

Muscogee County, Georgia.” (Doc. # 1, at 3.) Because the allegations in the
complaint only support the conclusion that both Plaintiff and Ms. Lubin are citizens
of Georgia, the complaint does not satisfy the complete diversity rule.

See

Travaglio, 735 F.3d at 1268. It also is unclear, in light of Plaintiff’s allegation that
the value of the home does not exceed $25,000, whether the amount in controversy
requirement is satisfied. See § 1332. This court is without sufficient allegations of
subject-matter jurisdiction to take any action with respect to this case.
Even if the court had subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain the motion for a
temporary restraining order, the allegations in the verified complaint are inadequate
to show that such an extraordinary form of relief should issue. Plaintiff seeks to
enjoin a foreclosure, but the motion for temporary injunctive relief fails to identify
the date on which the alleged foreclosure is scheduled to take place.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for temporary restraining
order (Doc. # 1) is DENIED for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. It is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff shall show cause, on or before May 13, 2016, why this
action should not be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
DONE this 29th day of April, 2016.
/s/ W. Keith Watkins
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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