Boyd v. Randolph County Board of Education

Filing 50

ORDER: For the reasons set forth above, the Court adopts the Magistrate's recommendation to grant summary judgment as to all of Boyd's claims except her retaliation claim based on the 2015 removal of her pre-kindergarten director duties. The Court denies summary judgment as to that claim. Signed by Honorable Judge Clay D. Land on 12/20/2017. (kh, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
EASTERN DIVISION
SHAWANNA BOYD,

*

Plaintiff,

*

vs.

*

RANDOLPH COUNTY BOARD OF
EDUCATION,

*

CASE NO. 3:16-CV-546-CDL-TFM

*
Defendant.
*
O R D E R
Plaintiff Shawanna Boyd brought this race discrimination and
retaliation action against her employer, the Randolph County Board
of Education (“School District”), under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
(“Title VII”).

The School District moved for summary judgment on

all of Boyd’s claims, and the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and
Recommendation recommending that the summary judgment motion be
granted.

R. & R., ECF No. 44.

The Court reviewed this matter de

novo and concludes that summary judgment should be granted on all
of Boyd’s claims except her retaliation claim based on the removal
of

her

pre-kindergarten

director

duties.

Accordingly,

the

Magistrate’s recommendation to grant summary judgment is adopted
as modified for the reasons explained below, except as to that one
claim.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The

Court

designated

the

Magistrate

to

submit

proposed

findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition of any
pretrial motions in this case.

The Magistrate recommended that

Defendant Randolph County Board of Education’s summary judgment
motion be granted.

See generally R. & R.

Plaintiff Shawanna Boyd

filed an objection to the Magistrate’s recommendation.
to Recommendation of the Magistrate, ECF No. 45.

Pl.’s Obj.

The Court “shall

make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection
is

made.”

28

U.S.C. §

recommendations

to

district

generally

courts

which

636(b)(1).
objections
conduct

a

For
were
plain

those

findings

and

not

asserted,

the

error

review.

Cf.

United States v. Slay, 714 F.2d 1093, 1095 (11th Cir. 1983) (“The
failure to object to the magistrate’s findings of fact prohibits
an

attack

district

on

court

injustice.”).

appeal
except

of
on

the

factual

grounds

of

findings
plain

adopted

error

or

by

the

manifest

The Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole

or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate
judge.”

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

2

Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a).

In determining whether a genuine dispute of material

fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the evidence
is

viewed

summary

in

the

judgment,

light

drawing

opposing party’s favor.
242,

255

most

(1986).

favorable

all

to

the

justifiable

party

opposing

inferences

in

the

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

A fact

is

material

necessary to the outcome of the suit.

if

it

is

relevant or

Id. at 248.

A factual

dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury
to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.

Id.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Shawanna Boyd does not appear to object to any of
the Magistrate’s factual findings.
based

on

how

the

Magistrate

Rather, her objections are

applied

the

law

to

the

facts.

Therefore, the Court adopts the findings of fact as set forth by
the Magistrate and discusses the relevant facts below.
DISCUSSION
I.

Boyd’s Race Discrimination Claims
Title VII and § 1981 both prohibit employment discrimination

on the basis of race.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (prohibiting

racial discrimination with respect to the terms and conditions of
employment);

42

U.S.C. §

1981(a)

(prohibiting

racial

discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts).
survive

summary

judgment

in

a

race

discrimination

case

To

under

either statute, the plaintiff must produce enough evidence for a

3

reasonable juror to conclude that her employer took an adverse
employment action against her that was motivated by her race.

Cf.

Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir.
1998)

(noting

that

Title

VII

and

§ 1981

“have

the

same

requirements of proof and use the same analytical framework” for
discrimination claims).

Boyd contends that the School District

denied her two promotions because of her race: the promotion to
Special

Education

Coordinator.
A.

Coordinator

and

the

promotion

to

Curriculum

The Court will address each claim in turn.

Promotion to Special Education Coordinator

Boyd,

who

is

black,

claims

that

she

was

not

Special Education Coordinator because of her race.

promoted

to

The Magistrate

concluded that Boyd did not point to enough evidence to create a
genuine

fact

Magistrate

dispute

erred

in

on

this

two

claim.

ways.

Boyd

First,

asserts

Boyd

that

the

argues

that

the

Magistrate erred in finding that she had not presented direct
evidence

of

discrimination.

Magistrate

erred

in

sufficient

evidence

Second,

concluding
to

survive

that

Boyd
she

summary

contends
had

not

judgment

that

the

presented
under

the

framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973), and

Texas Department of Community Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
Direct evidence of discrimination is “evidence from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find, more probably than not, a

4

causal link between an adverse employment action and a protected
personal characteristic.”

Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d

1287, 1298 (11th Cir. 1999).1

In other words, direct evidence is

“evidence which reflects ‘a discriminatory or retaliatory attitude
correlating to the discrimination or retaliation complained of by
the employee.’”

Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079,

1086 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of
Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1358 (11th Cir. 1999)).
Boyd

contends

that

the

following

evidence

is

“direct

evidence” of race discrimination: (1) she was not considered for
the Special Education Coordinator position until she complained;
(2)

the

application

process

was

restarted

after

the

special

education committee determined that the original three finalists
did not have enough experience with the state’s special education
paperwork; and (3) the job description was modified to remove the
certification
the

of

requirement

administration/supervision
that

candidates

to

have

requirement
knowledge

of

and

add

special

education laws, process, and the computer tracking system.

None

of these statements reflects a racially discriminatory attitude
correlating to the Special Education Coordinator decision.

The

Magistrate did not err in concluding that this evidence is not
direct evidence of discrimination.
1

The Wright court provided several examples of direct evidence of race
discrimination, including: (1) an employer’s statement that he needed a
black director and (2) a decisionmaker’s statement that he wanted a
greater white presence in a school. Wright, 187 F.3d at 1295-97.

5

Without direct evidence of discrimination, Boyd must prove
her

discrimination

McDonnell

Douglas

claim
and

using

the

Burdine.

framework

E.g.,

Alvarez

established
v.

Royal

Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010).

in
Atl.

Under

that framework, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of
discrimination.

Id.

If she does that, then the employer may

articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason (or reasons) for
its

employment

legitimate

decision.

Id.

nondiscriminatory

If

reason

the

for

employer

its

proffers

decision,

then

a

the

plaintiff must show that the proffered reason is a pretext for
discrimination.

Id.

Here, the Magistrate found that Boyd did not establish a
prima facie case of discrimination.

In the failure-to-promote

context, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by showing
that (1) she belonged to a protected class, (2) she was qualified
and applied for a position her employer was seeking to fill, (3)
she was rejected, and (4) the position was filled with a person
outside her protected class.

Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys.,

408 F.3d 763, 768 (11th Cir. 2005).
belonged

to

a

protected

class,

that

It is undisputed that Boyd
she

was

not

promoted

to

Special Education Coordinator, and that the position was filled
with a white person named Beth Bailey.

The Magistrate concluded,

however, that Boyd was not qualified for the position because she
did not have a Master’s Degree in Special Education, which was a

6

requirement for the position.

Boyd did not submit evidence to

demonstrate that a Master’s Degree in Special Education was not a
legitimate requirement for the Special Education Coordinator job.
Therefore,

Boyd

was

not

qualified

for

the

Special

Education

Coordinator job, and the School District is entitled to summary
judgment on this claim.
Even if the Court were to conclude that a Master’s Degree in
Special Education was not actually required (as Boyd argues it was
not), her claim still fails because she did not present enough
evidence to show pretext.

Boyd may demonstrate that the School

District’s reasons for hiring Bailey were pretextual by revealing
“such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies
or contradictions in [the School District’s] proffered legitimate
reasons for its actions that a reasonable factfinder could find
them unworthy of credence.”

Springer v. Convergys Customer Mgmt.

Grp. Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1348 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Cooper v.
Southern
context

Co.,
of

a

390

F.3d

promotion,

695,
‘a

725

(11th

plaintiff

Cir.

2004)).

cannot

prove

“In
pretext

the
by

simply arguing or even by showing that he was better qualified
than the [person] who received the position [s]he coveted.’”

Id.

at 1349 (first alteration in original) (quoting Brooks v. Cty.
Comm’n of Jefferson Cty., 446 F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir. 2006)).
And, “[a] plaintiff must show not merely that the defendant’s
employment decisions were mistaken but that they were in fact

7

motivated

by

race.”

Id.

(quoting

Brooks,

446

F.3d

at

1163).

Finally, “a plaintiff must show that the disparities between the
successful applicant’s and [her] own qualifications were ‘of such
weight and significance that no reasonable person, in the exercise
of impartial judgment, could have chosen the candidate selected
over the plaintiff.’” Id. (quoting Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695,
732 (11th Cir. 2004)); see also Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S.
454 (2006) (approving of this language from Cooper).
In this case, the School District presented evidence that the
original top three candidates for Special Education Coordinator
(which did not include Boyd) did not have sufficient knowledge of
special education laws, process, and the computer tracking system
to meet the School District’s needs.2

The School District also

presented evidence that it revised the qualifications to attract
more candidates with expertise in special education.

Boyd did not

present evidence to rebut these proffered reasons for reposting
the Special Education Coordinator position.

She also did not

present evidence to show that the disparities between Bailey’s

2

Boyd argues that because the employment committee’s top candidate
during the first round was black, the School District must have been
engaging in race-based discrimination when it decided to repost the
position rather than hire any of the top three candidates (which did not
include Boyd).
This argument ignores the evidence, which Boyd did not
dispute, that the special education committee recommended that none of
the three finalists (including two white applicants) be hired for the job
because they did not have sufficient familiarity with the state’s special
education paperwork.
So, to the extent Boyd is arguing that the
“qualifications disparity” was not her “sole basis for arguing pretext,”
the Court rejects that argument. Vessels, 408 F.3d at 772.

8

qualifications and her own were “of such weight and significance
that no reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial judgment,
could have chosen [Bailey] over [Boyd].”
1348

(quoting

Cooper,

390

F.3d

at

Springer, 509 F.3d at

732).

The

School

District

presented evidence that Bailey was very familiar with what the
state expected in terms of special education compliance; that she
had experienced five state department special education monitoring
cycles; that she had built a rapport with a many staff members and
parents;

that

disabled

students;

Initiative.

she

helped
and

with

that

she

assessments
served

of

on

the

intellectually
state

Autism

Boyd did not present evidence to suggest that her

experience

teaching

experience

as

an

special

education

elementary

school

for

one

principal

year
so

and

her

outweighed

Bailey’s extensive special education experience that no reasonable
person would have selected Bailey over Boyd.

The Court thus finds

that Boyd failed to create a genuine fact dispute on pretext, and
the School District is entitled to summary judgment on Boyd’s race
discrimination claim based on the Special Education Coordinator
promotion.
B.
Boyd

Promotion to Curriculum Coordinator
claims

that

she

was

Coordinator because of her race.

not

promoted

to

Curriculum

The Magistrate found that Boyd

did not present sufficient evidence of pretext to rebut the School
District’s

legitimate

nondiscriminatory

9

reason:

the

candidate

hired, Jennifer Braden, was better qualified for the position.
The Court agrees.
for

the

job

Master’s

Boyd does not dispute that Braden was qualified

given

degree

in

her

Bachelor

Education,

of

Arts

experience

in

Political

as

a

Science,

principal

and

assistant principal, and extensive experience as a teacher and
media

specialist.

And,

the

employment

committee

found

that

Braden’s interview revealed that she had a broader understanding
of and vision for the job.

Also, the committee believed that

Braden’s writing sample was better than Boyd’s.
finds

that

Boyd

did

not

present

evidence

Thus, the Court

to

show

that

the

disparities between Braden’s qualifications and her own were “of
such weight and significance that no reasonable person, in the
exercise of impartial judgment, could have chosen [Braden] over
[Boyd].”
732).

Springer, 509 F.3d at 1348 (quoting Cooper, 390 F.3d at
For this reason, Boyd failed to create a genuine fact

dispute on pretext, and the School District is entitled to summary
judgment

on

Boyd’s

race

discrimination

claim

based

on

the

Curriculum Coordinator promotion.
II.

Boyd’s Retaliation Claims
Title VII prohibits an employer from retaliating against an

employee because she “has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment

practice”

by

Title

VII

or

because

she

“has

made

a

charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation,

proceeding,

or

10

hearing”

under

Title

VII.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
§ 1981.

Such retaliation is also prohibited under

CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 457 (2008)

(holding that “§ 1981 encompasses claims of retaliation”).
prove

a

retaliation

claim,

the

plaintiff

must

prove

that

To
her

protected activity was the but-for cause of the alleged wrongful
action.
2533

Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517,

(2013)

according

to

(“Title

VII

traditional

retaliation
principles

of

claims

must

but-for

be

proved

causation[.]”);

Jones v. Suburban Propane, Inc., 577 F. App’x 951, 954–55 (11th
Cir.

2014)

(per

curiam)

(applying

Nassar’s

requirement in a § 1981 retaliation case).

but-for

causation

In the absence of

direct evidence of retaliatory intent, the plaintiff may proceed
under the McDonnell Douglas framework.
“A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation by
showing that: (1) she ‘engaged in statutorily protected activity’;
(2) she ‘suffered a materially adverse action’; and (3) ‘there was
a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse
action.’”

Chapter 7 Tr. v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 683 F.3d 1249,

1258 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Howard v. Walgreen Co., 605 F.3d
1239, 1244 (11th Cir. 2010)).

If a plaintiff establishes a prima

facie case of retaliation and the employer offers a legitimate
non-retaliatory reason for its decision, then the plaintiff must
“show that the employer’s proffered reasons for taking the adverse
action

were

actually

a

pretext

11

for

prohibited

retaliatory

conduct.”

McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370, 1375 (11th Cir. 2008)

(quoting Sullivan v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 170 F.3d 1056,
1059 (11th Cir. 1999)).
In
School

July

2015,

District

Boyd

filed

alleging

an

race

internal

grievance

discrimination

Education Coordinator promotion decision.

in

with

the

the

Special

And in September 2015,

she filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity

Commission.

Boyd

claims

that

the

School

District

retaliated against her for making these complaints in a number of
ways.

There is no dispute for summary judgment purposes that

Boyd’s

complaints

were

protected

activity

for

purposes

of

a

retaliation claim under Title VII and § 1981, but Boyd does argue
that the Magistrate incorrectly determined that certain actions
were not materially adverse and others were not causally related
to

the

protected

activity.

The

Court

addresses

each

alleged

instance of retaliation in turn.
A.
In

Letter Regarding Off-Campus Lunches
August

2015,

the

School

District’s

Human

Resources

Coordinator, Sherry Saulsberry, sent Boyd a letter notifying Boyd
that the School District did not condone principals taking offcampus lunches during the school day unless they notified the
Human Resources department in advance.

The Magistrate concluded

that the letter was not a materially adverse action.
agrees.

“An

action

is

materially

12

adverse

if

it

The Court
‘might

have

dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge
of discrimination.’” Gate Gourmet, Inc., 683 F.3d at 1259 (quoting
Burlington
(2006)).

N.

&

Santa

Fe

Ry.

Co.

v.

White,

548

U.S.

53,

68

Given that Boyd herself generally agreed with the School

District’s

policy

requiring

a

senior

administrator

like

the

principal to be at school during school hours, the Court finds
that the letter is not a materially adverse action.3
were,

Boyd

presented

proffered

reason

regarding

no

off-campus

evidence

(explaining

that

the

the
was

lunches)

School

Even if it

School

pretext

District’s

District’s
for

policy

retaliation.

Accordingly, the School District is entitled to summary judgment
on this claim.
B.

August 17, 2015 and August 18, 2015 Counseling Letters

The School District’s then-Superintendent, Rance Kirby, sent
Boyd

a

letter

counseled

dated

Boyd

August

about

her

participating in a meeting.
August

18,

2015.

In

that

17,

2015.

In

professionalism

that
in

letter,

Kirby

requesting

and

Kirby sent Boyd a second letter dated
letter,

Kirby

admonished

Boyd

for

suspending a pre-kindergarten child because the child’s father was
fifteen minutes late for pick-up.

3

According to Kirby, the state’s

Boyd argues that other principals were permitted to leave school
grounds without notifying Human Resources. The present record suggests
that Boyd did not have an assistant principal to take the helm if she
left school grounds, and Boyd did not point to evidence to show that
other principals were similarly situated to her in that respect.

13

pre-kindergarten guidelines did not permit suspension under those
circumstances.
The Magistrate concluded that the letters were not materially
adverse actions, and Boyd did not specifically object to that
finding.
letters

Even if she had, the Court is not convinced that such
are

reasonable

materially

employee

adverse

from

actions

pursuing

a

that

charge

of

might

deter

a

discrimination.

Although the “materially adverse” standard for retaliation claims
is “decidedly more relaxed” than the “serious and material change
in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” standard
applicable to discrimination claims, Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d
961, 970-71, 973 (11th Cir. 2008), the harm must be “significant”
and not “trivial,” Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68.

Boyd did not point

to any evidence that the letters had a meaningful impact on her
employment.

Accordingly,

the

School

District

is

entitled

to

summary judgment on Boyd’s claims based on these two letters.
C.
In

Employee Improvement Plan
August

2015,

Kirby

Employee Improvement Plan.

and

Saulsberry

placed

Boyd

on

an

The Employee Improvement Plan had a

number of requirements, some objective (e.g., obtain supervisor’s
permission
demonstrate

before

leaving

professionalism

campus)
to

and

others).

some

subjective

Boyd

was

(e.g.,

the

only

principal who was placed on an Employee Improvement Plan, which
Kirby considered to be the first step to a formal reprimand.

14

If

Boyd failed to follow the Employee Improvement Plan, that failure
could result in suspension or termination.
The

Eleventh

Circuit

has

concluded

that

an

unfavorable

performance review that affects an employee’s eligibility for a
merit pay increase is a materially adverse action for purposes of
a retaliation claim.
reprimand is not.

Crawford, 529 F.3d at 974.

But a simple

Rayner v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 684 F.

App’x 911, 915 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (finding that an
admonishment and reprimand were not materially adverse because the
plaintiff did “not point to any evidence that her pay or promotion
prospects

were

negatively

affected

by

the

admonishment

or

the

reprimand”); Harris v. Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin., 611 F.
App’x 949, 952 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“A supervisor’s
statement that the plaintiff failed to perform his job duties
sufficiently does not constitute an adverse employment action when
nothing

in

the

disciplined.”).

memorandum
Boyd

did

indicates
not

point

that
to

any

the

plaintiff

evidence

that

was
the

Employee Improvement Plan, which was not even considered to be a
formal reprimand, had a meaningful impact on her employment.

The

Court thus finds that the School District is entitled to summary
judgment on Boyd’s claims based on the Employee Improvement Plan.
D.

New Supervisor Training Requirement

In August 2015, Kirby required Boyd to attend training for
new supervisors.

Boyd was the only principal who was required to

15

attend the training.
was

not

a

new

contributed

to

She found the training insulting because she

supervisor,
a

loss

of

and

she

prestige

believes
because

that
other

principals saw that she was in the training course.
evidence

that

the

other

teachers

and

principals

the

training

teachers

and

There is no
attributed

a

negative meaning to Boyd’s attendance, and the Court, like the
Magistrate, is not convinced that the perceived slight amounts to
a materially adverse action for purposes of a retaliation claim.
Accordingly, the School District is entitled to summary judgment
on Boyd’s claims based on the training requirement.
E.

Removal from Pre-K Director Position

In 2014, Boyd applied for and received a grant to start the
first pre-kindergarten program in Randolph County.

She served as

director of the program, though she did not receive any extra
compensation for performing those duties.

When she wrote the

grant application for the 2015-2016 school year, Boyd did include
in the budget $10,000.00 as compensation for the director of the
program.

It is not clear from the present record whether that

portion of the grant application was approved.
In August 2015, Boyd was removed from the pre-kindergarten
director

position

without

explanation.4

4

Saulsberry,

the

Human

In its reply brief, the School District argued for the first time that
the change was made to centralize the function into the Central Office.
First, the evidence the School District cited in support of this
statement does not actually support the statement. Second, “[a]rguments
raised for the first time in a reply brief are not properly before the

16

Resources

Coordinator,

responsibilities

and

took
did

over

not

the

receive

pre-kindergarten
any

extra

pay

director
for

it.

Braden, the Curriculum Coordinator, currently performs the prekindergarten director responsibilities and does not receive any
extra pay for it.

Although the School District did offer to

reinstate these duties to Boyd in 2017, there is a fact dispute on
why Boyd did not accept the position at that time.
The Magistrate concluded that since Boyd did not lose any pay
in connection with the removal of her pre-kindergarten director
duties,

she

did

not

suffer

a

materially

adverse

action.

The

Magistrate also found that because Boyd finalized her charge of
discrimination with the EEOC after her pre-kindergarten director
duties were removed, the removal of these duties must not have
been materially adverse.
“Whether

a

particular

reassignment

is

materially

adverse

depends upon the circumstances of the particular case, and ‘should
be

judged

plaintiff’s

from

the

perspective

position,

of

considering

a

reasonable

“all

the

person

in

the

circumstances.”’”

Burlington, 548 U.S. at 71 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs.,

Inc.,

523

U.S.

75,

81

(1998)).

The

Supreme

Court

emphasized that it is an objective standard, not a subjective one.
Id. at 68.

Given this objective standard, the Court finds it

reviewing court.”
United States v. Oakley, 744 F.2d 1553, 1556 (11th
Cir. 1984) (per curiam).

17

inappropriate to place any significance on the fact that Boyd
persisted

with

her

EEOC

charge

after

the

removal

of

the

pre-

kindergarten director duties.

To find otherwise would effectively

eliminate

retaliation

in

continued

to

claims

pursue

a

all

charge

of

cases

where

discrimination

an

employee

despite

the

employer’s retaliatory acts.
The

next

question

is

whether

the

removal

of

the

pre-

kindergarten director duties was a materially adverse action that
might

dissuade

discrimination.

a

reasonable

employee

from

complaining

about

In Burlington, for example, the Supreme Court

noted that work reassignments could be materially adverse even if
there was no difference in pay or job title; in that case, the
reassignment from the “better” job of forklift operator to the
“more

arduous

and

dirtier”

job

of

track

laborer

could

be

a

materially adverse employment action—and that question was for the
jury.

Id. at 71.

In this case, the Court finds that a fact

question exists on this issue.

Based on the present record, a

jury

started

could

conclude

that

Boyd

and

nurtured

the

pre-

kindergarten program that was housed in her elementary school.

A

jury could also conclude that shortly after Boyd complained of
discrimination, the director role was taken away from her without
explanation and given to a human resources employee who did not
have an educator role.

And, a jury could conclude that removing

Boyd’s

duties

pre-kindergarten

under

18

these

circumstances

was

a

materially adverse action that might have dissuaded a reasonable
employee from complaining of discrimination.

Summary judgment is

therefore inappropriate on this claim.
F.

Refusal to Offer Five-Year Contract

In July or August of 2016, the School District approved fiveyear contracts for five of its principals.

Boyd and one other

principal did not receive five-year contracts.

The Magistrate

concluded that Boyd did not present enough evidence to create a
genuine fact dispute on causation.

The Court agrees.

Although

“[t]he burden of causation” for a retaliation claim “can be met by
showing close temporal proximity between the statutorily protected
activity and the adverse employment action[,] . . . mere temporal
proximity, without more, must be ‘very close.’”

Thomas v. Cooper

Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal
citation omitted) (quoting Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532
U.S. 268, 273, (2001)).

“A three to four month disparity between

the statutorily protected expression and the adverse employment
action is not enough.”

Id.

So, without “other evidence tending

to show causation, if there is a substantial delay between the
protected

expression

and

the

adverse

retaliation fails as a matter of law.”

action,

the

complaint

of

Id.

In this case, nearly a year elapsed between Boyd’s protected
conduct in July and September 2015 and the contract decision in
the summer of 2016.

Boyd offered no other evidence tending to

19

show causation, although she does argue that there was a pattern
of retaliatory acts leading up to the contract decision and that
this “pattern” establishes causation.
most

of

the

employment

decisions

But, as discussed above,
Boyd

complains

about—which

occurred within a short window that was months before the contract
decision—are
finds

that

not
Boyd

actionable

retaliation.

failed

create

to

a

Therefore,

genuine

causation regarding the contract decision.

fact

the

Court

dispute

on

The School District is

entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
G.

Exclusion from Hiring Decisions

In the summer of 2016, Boyd was excluded from the hiring
process for a physical education teacher who was hired to split
time

between

Boyd’s

school

and

another

school.

Although

the

principal of the other school was involved in the interviews and
the hiring decision, Boyd was not.

And, in the spring of 2017,

John Jacobs, the new Superintendent, and the principal of another
school attempted to recruit one of Boyd’s teachers to the other
school.

Boyd was not involved in that conversation.

The teacher

declined the offer.
The Magistrate found that Boyd did not present sufficient
evidence of causation.

The Court agrees.

Nearly a year elapsed

between Boyd’s protected conduct in July and September 2015 and
her exclusion from hiring decisions in the summer of 2016.

20

Boyd

offered no other evidence tending to show causation, so the School
District is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
H.

Human Resources Coordinator Position

The School District’s Human Resources Coordinator position
became vacant in late 2016, and the vacancy was posted.
several other applicants were selected for interviews.
District’s

employment

committee

recommended

Mary

Boyd and
The School

Kelly,

who

white, for the job because she had performed the job before.

is

Boyd

was the committee’s third choice, but the committee also stated
that

Boyd

was

not

a

fit

for

the

position.

Jacobs,

the

new

Superintendent, followed the employment committee’s suggestion and
recommended Kelly for the position; the school board voted to hire
Kelly.

Boyd does not dispute that Kelly is qualified for the

position.
Boyd argues that the decision to hire Kelly instead of her
for

the

position

was

retaliatory,

although

the

Magistrate’s

recommendation and Boyd’s objections also frame this claim as a
discrimination claim.

Boyd did not point to any evidence that

Jacobs, who was a brand new Superintendent when he followed the
employment

committee’s

suggestion

in

recommending

Kelly,

had

a

retaliatory animus toward Boyd based on her protected activity
that took place more than a year earlier when he was not the
Superintendent.

Boyd’s retaliation claim based on this decision

thus fails.

21

To the extent that Boyd claims that this decision was also
discriminatory, that claim fails too.
Kelly

was

qualified

for

the

Boyd does not dispute that

position

or

that

experience as a human resources coordinator.

Kelly

had

prior

The Court thus finds

that Boyd did not present evidence to show that the disparities
between Kelly’s qualifications and her own were “of such weight
and significance that no reasonable person, in the exercise of
impartial

judgment,

could

have

chosen

[Kelly]

over

[Boyd].”

Springer, 509 F.3d at 1348 (quoting Cooper, 390 F.3d at 732).
this

reason,

Boyd

failed

to

create

a

genuine

fact

For

dispute

on

pretext, and the School District is entitled to summary judgment
on Boyd’s race discrimination claim based on the denial of the
Human Resources Coordinator position.
CONCLUSION
For

the

reasons

set

forth

above,

the

Court

adopts

the

Magistrate’s recommendation to grant summary judgment as to all of
Boyd’s

claims

except

her

retaliation

claim

based

removal of her pre-kindergarten director duties.

on

the

The Court denies

summary judgment as to that claim.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 20th day of December, 2017.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

22

2015