Edwards v. Cofield et al

Filing 119

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows: 1. Plaintiffs Motion for Class Certification (Doc. # 5 ) is GRANTED; 2. The following class is CERTIFIED pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(2): all state-court arrestees who are or who will be jailed in Randolph County who are unable to pay the secured money bail amount required for their release; 3. Attorneys Alex Karakatsanis, Esq., Samuel Brooke, Esp., Randall C. Marshall, Esq., and Brandon Buskey, Esq., are DESIGNATED as class counsel; and 4. Plaintiff Kandace Kay Edwards is DESIGNATED as the representative of the class. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 9/10/2018. (kh, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
EASTERN DIVISION
KANDACE KAY EDWARDS,
Plaintiff.
v.
DAVID COFIELD, et al.,
Defendants.

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CASE NO. 3:17-CV-321-WKW
[WO]

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court is the motion for class certification filed by Plaintiff Kandace
Kay Edwards (Doc. # 5), which has been fully briefed (Docs. # 6, 95, 96, 98).
Plaintiff seeks to certify a class consisting of “[a]ll state-court arrestees who are or
who will be jailed in Randolph County who are unable to pay the secured money
bail amount required for their release.” (Doc. # 98, at 2.) Because she has carried
her burden under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, her motion is due
to be granted.
I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
Subject-matter jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and the parties
do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The class action is ‘an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted
by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.’” Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,
133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–01
(1979)). To avail herself of this exception, a plaintiff seeking class certification
bears the burden of proving that she has satisfied the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a)
— often shorthanded as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy — and
that the class action will meet one of the three requirements of Rule 23(b). Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(a), (b); see Brown v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc., 817 F.3d 1225, 1233
(11th Cir. 2016) (“All else being equal, the presumption is against class certification
because class actions are an exception to our constitutional tradition of individual
litigation.”).
The Named Plaintiff seeks certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(2). As a
result, along with the 23(a) prerequisites, she must also prove that Defendants have
“acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final
injunctive relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(2). All of this proof must be made by a preponderance of the evidence. Smith
v. Triad of Ala., LLC., No. 1:14-CV-324-WKW, 2017 WL 1044692, at *1 & n.1
(M.D. Ala. Mar. 17, 2017).

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III. DISCUSSION
The parties agree that Plaintiff has met the requirements for class certification
under Rule 23(a) and (b)(2), although there is some dispute about the definition and
number of classes. Plaintiff defined her proposed class in her motion for class
certification (Doc. # 5) and supporting memorandum (Doc. # 6) as consisting of “all
arrestees who are or who will be jailed in Randolph County who are unable to pay
the secured monetary bail amount required for their release.” (Doc. # 5, at 1; Doc.
# 6, at 2.) In her reply brief, Plaintiff suggested modifying that definition to include
“[a]ll state-court arrestees who are or who will be jailed in Randolph County who
are unable to pay the secured money bail amount required for their release.” (Doc.
# 98, at 2.) That modification was intended to exclude municipal-court arrestees as
well as individuals “detained solely due to a hold request from another jurisdiction.”
(Doc. # 98, at 2.) But it was meant to include arrestees for whom a hold request is
made when “bail is set by the Randolph County District or Circuit Court, for
purposes of addressing the proprietary bail set by the Randolph County court.”
(Doc. # 98, at 2.) Plaintiff’s proposed modification was apparently the product of
discussions with Defendant David Cofield, the Sheriff of Randolph County.
Defendants suggest that Plaintiff’s proposed class should be broken into two
separate classes. They assert that “the current bail procedures divide class members
into two distinct classes with two distinct constitutional claims and distinct forms of
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potential relief.” (Doc. # 95, at 2; see Doc. # 96, at 1–2 (“Sheriff Cofield hereby
joins into, adopts, and incorporates by reference the Judicial Defendants’ Response,
Document 95, as if fully stated herein.” (Doc. # 96, at 2).).) Those classes are:
Class 1: All state-court arrestees who are or will be in custody in
the Randolph County jail who are otherwise eligible for release but who
cannot afford the secured bond in the bond schedule and who must
remain in custody for a maximum of 72 hours to receive an initial
appearance with a judge.
Class 2: All state-court arrestees who are or will be in custody in
the Randolph County jail because they are required to post a secured
bond they cannot afford after an initial appearance at which they receive
the procedural process contained in Section II of the September 8, 2017
Standing Order.
(Doc. # 95, at 8.) Plaintiff objects to breaking her proposed class into two separate
classes for a variety reasons. (Doc. # 98, at 2–5.)
Upon consideration of the arguments and the law on class certification, the
court finds that Plaintiff’s proposed class meets the requirements of Rule 23(a) and
(b)(2) and that breaking that proposed class into two separate classes is unnecessary
at this time. Plaintiff’s proposed class is sufficiently numerous that joinder of all
members would be impracticable; there are questions of law or fact common to the
proposed class; Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the proposed class; and
Plaintiff and her counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the proposed class, which would make final
declaratory and injunctive relief appropriate respecting the proposed class as a
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whole. Finally, this type of suit is the quintessential stuff of Rule 23(b)(2) class
actions.
To the extent it should become necessary to revise the class definition as a
result of discovery or other events, the court can revisit the issue pursuant to Rule
23(c)(1)(C) (“An order that grants or denies class certification may be altered or
amended before final judgment.”).
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:
1.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification (Doc. # 5) is GRANTED;

2.

The following class is CERTIFIED pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(2):
all state-court arrestees who are or who will be jailed in Randolph
County who are unable to pay the secured money bail amount required
for their release;

3.

Attorneys Alex Karakatsanis, Esq., Samuel Brooke, Esp., Randall C.
Marshall, Esq., and Brandon Buskey, Esq., are DESIGNATED as class
counsel; and

4.

Plaintiff Kandace Kay Edwards is DESIGNATED as the representative
of the class.

DONE this 10th day of September, 2018.
/s/ W. Keith Watkins
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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