Gideon v. Auburn University et al
Filing
57
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: it is ORDERED as follows: 1) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 48 ) as to Count Three is GRANTED. Count One is dismissed by concession of the Plaintiff. 2) As there are no further claims, a separate judgment will issue. Signed by Honorable Judge R. Austin Huffaker, Jr on 4/19/2024. (CWL)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
EASTERN DIVISION
HEATHER GIDEON,
Plaintiff,
v.
MELINDA CAMUS,
Defendant.
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)
)
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) Case. No: 3:22-cv-176-RAH-SMD
)
[WO]
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)
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This is an employment matter. Pending before the Court is the Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 48.) The Motion is fully briefed and thus
ripe for decision. For the reasons set forth more fully below, the motion is due to be
GRANTED. 1
FACTS
Heather Gideon worked at the College of Veterinary Medicine (CVM) at
Auburn University as a Coordinator of Student Services (CSS) until her termination
on March 17, 2021. As a CSS, Gideon’s job responsibilities included proctoring
student exams. Jerri Turnbough, an administrative assistant, sometimes assisted
Gideon with this task. Gideon and Turnbough could remotely proctor exams on their
computers using a live video stream set up from the exam rooms.
On the afternoon of March 4, 2021, Robbi Beauchamp, a Scholarship Advisor
at the CVM and Gideon’s personal friend, met with Melinda Camus, the CVM’s
Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, and Nichole Diehl, a CVM Human Resources
1
Gideon concedes dismissal of Count One for age discrimination. Accordingly, only Count Three
for a procedural due process violation will be addressed.
1
Manager, in one of the exam rooms that could be remotely viewed. The meeting
was of a sensitive nature, as it involved Beauchamp’s possible termination.
According to Gideon, the same afternoon that Beauchamp was meeting with
Camus and Diehl, Gideon visited Turnbough’s desk to take over video proctoring2
and noticed that Turnbough’s computer was streaming the Beauchamp meeting.3
Gideon acknowledges that she was aware that this video was not of a student taking
an exam and that she recognized Beauchamp and Camus, although not Diehl, from
the video. Gideon proceeded to “look more closely” but not “watch” the video for
“10 to 20 seconds” because she wondered if Beauchamp, her friend and colleague,
was “okay.” (Doc. 49-1 at 24.)4 Gideon could see what was happening through the
livestream, although she was unable to hear anything.
Unbeknownst to Gideon, Tajuan Sellars, a co-worker, witnessed Gideon and
Turnbough viewing the meeting. Sellars then notified Camus via text that her
meeting was being watched.
The following day, March 5, 2021, Camus and Diehl met with Gideon to
discuss whether Gideon had watched the Beauchamp meeting. Although this
meeting initially began with the purpose of fact-finding, that changed when Gideon
admitted to “looking” at the video out of concern for Beauchamp. Based on her
admissions, Gideon was told that she had potentially committed a serious offense
and that the meeting was now a pre-termination meeting—meaning that she could
be terminated. Gideon was also told that she could email Camus or Diehl any
2
Although the evidence indicates that when Gideon approached Turnbough’s computer there was
no longer a student testing, it is unclear if Gideon—having just finished a meeting—was aware of
this.
3
It is not clear if Gideon knew that this was a pre-termination meeting, but she indicated that,
based off events that had transpired earlier that week, she had reason to be concerned for
Beauchamp. (Doc. 49-1 at 24.)
4
For the sake of clarity, documents will be referred to by their page numbers based on their
CM/ECF document page numbers.
2
additional statements she wanted to make. She was then put on paid administrative
leave.
On March 7, 2021, Gideon sent a follow-up email to Camus and Diehl that,
according to her, sought to clarify a number of points from their earlier meeting.
(Doc. 51-2 at 2–3.) She did not receive a response to her email.
Approximately twelve days later, Gideon was terminated.
Camus’s
termination letter, (doc. 51-3), to Gideon stated that, at the meeting on March 5,
2021, Gideon had admitted seeing the Beauchamp meeting and that she had done so
out of concern for Beauchamp. It also stated that Camus had determined that
Gideon’s actions constituted a Group I violation of Auburn University’s Policies and
Procedures because her actions imposed on the rights and privileges of other
employees and were highly unprofessional and unbecoming of her position. Lastly,
the memo notified Gideon that she could appeal the termination decision through
Auburn’s grievance process.
Gideon ultimately challenged her termination through Auburn’s grievance
process. A three-person panel was empaneled, and a grievance hearing conducted.
Gideon’s termination was upheld by the panel.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate where the materials in the record show
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c). “[A] party
seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion[.]” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
323 (1986). To meet its responsibility, the moving party must “identify[] those
portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits . . . which it believes demonstrate the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
3
To prevent summary judgment, a factual dispute must be both material and
genuine. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986). A fact is
“material” if it has the potential of “affect[ing] the outcome” of the case. Furcron v.
Mail Ctrs. Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Liberty Lobby,
477 U.S. at 248). And to raise a “genuine” dispute of material fact sufficient to
preclude summary judgment, “the nonmoving party must point to enough evidence
that ‘a reasonable juror could return a verdict’” in his favor. Shaw v. City of Selma,
884 F.3d 1093, 1098 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). The “mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party’s] position” is insufficient
to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252.
DISCUSSION
Gideon argues that Camus violated her procedural due process rights when
Camus terminated Gideon’s employment with the CVM without affording her an
adequate pre-termination hearing.
(Doc. 51 at 12–13.)
Camus disputes this
assertion, stating that Gideon received a constitutionally adequate pre-termination
hearing and that, moreover, even if Gideon did not receive an adequate pretermination hearing, any procedural deprivation was cured when Gideon received
adequate post-termination process.
“In this circuit, a § 1983 claim alleging a denial of procedural due process
requires proof of three elements: (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected
liberty or property interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate
process.” Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003), abrogated on
other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). See also Zipperer v.
City of Fort Myers, 41 F.3d 619, 623 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[T]o determine if a
procedural due process violation occurred . . ., we must resolve: (1) whether
[plaintiff] had a constitutionally protected property interest; (2) whether he was
deprived of that interest; and (3) if he was deprived of a constitutionally protected
4
interest, whether the [defendants] failed to use constitutionally sufficient procedures
before that deprivation occurred.” (citations omitted)).
The parties do not dispute the first or second elements of Gideon’s procedural
due process claim, but they do disagree about the third element. As such, the issue
here is whether Gideon was afforded constitutionally sufficient process before her
employment was terminated.
“An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or
property ‘be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature
of the case.’” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985)
(citation omitted). Indeed, the Supreme Court has “described the root requirement
of the Due Process Clause as being that an individual be given an opportunity for a
hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest.” Id. (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). In the public employment
context, the “principle requires some kind of a hearing prior to the discharge of an
employee who has a constitutionally protected property interest in his employment.”
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Reeves v. Thigpen, 879
F. Supp. 1153, 1171 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (“In Loudermill, the Supreme Court made it
clear that some form of pre-termination hearing is required before a public employee
can be discharged, and consequently, deprived of his or her property interest in
continued employment.”).
The pre-termination hearing, though necessary, need not be elaborate. “[T]he
formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the
importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings.”
Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “In
general, ‘something less’ than a full evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse
administrative action.”
Id. (citation omitted).
Moreover, “the pretermination
hearing need not definitively resolve the propriety of the discharge. It should be an
5
initial check against mistaken decisions—essentially, a determination of whether
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the employee are
true and support the proposed action.” Id. at 545–46.
Accordingly, under Loudermill, “[t]he tenured public employee is entitled to
oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer’s
evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story.” Id. at 546. See also
Reeves, 879 F. Supp. at 1171 (“Following the clear dictates of the Loudermill
decision, . . . ‘it is clear that oral notice and an opportunity to respond orally is
sufficient in the pretermination context.’” (quoting Kelly v. Smith, 764 F.2d 1412,
1414 (11th Cir. 1985))). Moreover, “[t]he opportunity to present reasons, either in
person or in writing, why proposed action should not be taken is a fundamental due
process requirement.” Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546.
If a public employee receives no pre-termination hearing, then a due process
violation is “complete” upon her termination—meaning that no post-deprivation
remedy can cure the violation. See Enter. Fire Fighter’s Ass’n v. Watson, 869 F.
Supp. 1532, 1541 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (“[W]hen the violation of due process is the
failure to provide a pretermination hearing, the violation cannot be cured subsequent
to termination.”). But if an inadequate pre-termination hearing was offered, a due
process violation is not “complete” if a post-termination remedy can cure the
deprivation. See McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1560 (11th Cir. 1994) (“When a
state procedure is inadequate, no procedural due process right has been violated
unless and until the state fails to remedy that inadequacy.” (emphasis added)). See
also Galbreath v. Hale Cnty., Ala. Comm’n, 754 F. App’x 820, 828 (11th Cir. 2018)
(“Properly understood, McKinney’s holding that a state ‘may cure a procedural
deprivation by providing a later procedural remedy’ is true only where postdeprivation procedures satisfy due process. But where a due process violation is
6
already complete because no hearing was held as required by Loudermill, McKinney
has no application.” (citation omitted)).
Gideon argues that her pre-termination hearing was inadequate5 because
before her termination on March 17, 2021, “she was merely asked one simple
question: whether she had seen the monitoring video on Ms. Jerri Turnbough’s
screen.” (Doc. 51 at 15.) This, she posits, fails Loudermill’s pre-deprivation
requirements because it does not constitute 1) oral or written notice of the charges
against her, 2) an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and 3) an opportunity to
present her side of the story.
(Id.) Below, the Court discusses each prong of
Loudermill’s test to determine whether Gideon received an adequate pre-termination
hearing, and then addresses Gideon’s additional claim that Camus’s failure to follow
Auburn University’s termination policies further violated Gideon’s procedural due
process rights.6
A. Pre-Termination Process
1. Notice of Charges and Evidence
Diehl’s meeting notes and Gideon’s own deposition testimony show that (1)
during the meeting on March 5, 2021, Gideon was asked whether she watched the
Beauchamp meeting the day before, (2) Gideon confirmed that she had looked at it,
and (3) Gideon acknowledged that she did so because she was concerned about
Beauchamp. Gideon also confirmed in her deposition testimony that Diehl told her
that “this is a serious matter,” that Gideon was told that the meeting had turned into
5
Confusingly, and as the Defendant points out, (doc. 52 at 9–10), Gideon cites to law applicable
when a public employee receives no pre-termination hearing—seemingly to suggest that an
inadequate pre-termination hearing constitutes a “completed” procedural due process violation,
(see doc. 51 at 12). But Gideon received a pre-termination hearing, so her legal citations have
little relevance. Moreover, that Gideon received a constitutionally sufficient pre-termination
hearing resolves any assertion Gideon makes that she received no pre-termination hearing.
6
Because Gideon received adequate pre-termination process, the Court does not consider the
adequacy of the post-termination process she received.
7
a pre-termination meeting, that Gideon was asked if there was anything else she
wanted to communicate about the events,7 and that Gideon could email Camus or
Diehl if there was any additional information that she wanted them to consider.
(Doc. 49-2 at 13.) There is also no dispute that Gideon did in fact submit additional
information via email to Camus and Diehl in which she further addressed the issue.
(See doc. 51-2 at 2–3.)
These facts show sufficient notice: Gideon was told that the meeting
concerned her actions in viewing a confidential personnel meeting; she was allowed
to explain what happened; she was informed that the alleged offense was a serious
one; and she was notified that she could email more information in her own defense,
which she did.
Gideon also appears to suggest that her due process rights were violated
because she was not informed of the specific Auburn University rule or policy that
she was accused of having violated. (See doc. 51 at 8, 13–14.) But Gideon never
develops this argument and cites no case law supporting this proposition. Bookman
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 490 F. App’x 314, 317 n.2 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam)
(“[T]he failure to make arguments and cite authorities in support of an issue waives
it.” (citation omitted)). And this argument would not be persuasive even if Gideon
had sufficiently developed it: she was notified of (and admitted to) the accusation
against her, was told her behavior constituted a serious offense, was “responsibl[e] .
. . [for] know[ing] University and departmental rules and regulations,” (see doc. 493 at 57; doc. 51-1 at 5), and was informed that her meeting had turned into a pretermination meeting.
Gideon also argues that she was unaware of the evidence against her. But this
argument misses the mark because, as Camus points out, it was Gideon’s own
7
To which she responded that, while she could see the video footage, she had been unable to hear
what had occurred in the meeting. (Doc. 49-3 at 80–81.)
8
statements acknowledging the accusation against her that turned what was originally
a fact-finding meeting into a pre-termination meeting. In other words, the evidence
used to terminate Gideon was Gideon’s own admissions to Camus and Diehl during
their meeting, and it is irrelevant that Gideon was not told that it was Tajuan Sellars
who had initially reported Gideon to Camus: Gideon was terminated due to her
admission, not on the basis of Sellars’ accusation. See Powell v. Mikulecky, 891 F.2d
1454, 1459 (10th Cir. 1989) (noting that “because [the plaintiff] admitted to the
allegations, the basis for [the] questions [preceding the admission] became
irrelevant.”). Accordingly, Gideon had notice of the evidence against her.
2. Opportunity to Respond
Gideon also argues that at no time during her pre-termination meeting did
anyone provide her an opportunity to present her side of the story, or to present
evidence contesting the accusation. Once again, her own deposition testimony
contradicts these assertions.
Gideon confirmed in her deposition that she told Camus and Diehl during the
meeting that she did not “watch” the video although she did “see” it for 10 to 20
seconds. (Doc. 49-1 at 24.) And Gideon further stated that there is a difference
between seeing a video and watching one. She also confirmed that she was asked
during the meeting whether she had anything else to say and that she later sent
Camus an email that provided clarifications from the meeting. Given this testimony,
Gideon had ample opportunity both orally and via email to respond and explain her
position. Accordingly, the third element under Loudermill has been met.
B. Violation of Auburn University Termination Policies
Gideon argues that Camus deviated from Auburn University policy in failing
to conduct a review of the circumstances surrounding the misconduct and then meet
with Gideon to allow Gideon an opportunity to defend herself before her
termination. Even assuming this to be true, “noncompliance with personnel policies
9
is not a per se denial of procedural due process.” Dejarnett v. Willis, 976 F. Supp.
2d 1271, 1295 (M.D. Ala. 2013) (quoting Black v. City of Auburn, 857 F. Supp. 1540,
1547 (M.D. Ala. 1994)). The issue is whether the steps Camus took in terminating
Gideon’s employment were sufficient to satisfy the Constitution’s procedural due
process requirements, not whether those steps adhered to Auburn University policy.
See Cochran v. Collins, 253 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1304 n.1 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (“The
Plaintiff’s procedural due process rights are determined by federal law. Thus, even
if the defendants failed to comply with all of the handbook provisions, that failure is
in itself insufficient to establish a violation of procedural due process.” (citation
omitted)). Given that the pre-deprivation process Gideon did receive satisfied
Loudermill, “any . . . noncompliance [with Auburn policy] did not prejudice
[Gideon] to the point that she was deprived of her procedural due process rights[.]”
Dejarnett, 976 F. Supp. 2d at 1295.
CONCLUSION
Gideon received all the process that she was due under the Constitution prior
to her termination because she was aware of the charge and evidence against her and
because she received an opportunity to respond.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:
1. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 48) as to Count Three
is GRANTED. Count One is dismissed by concession of the Plaintiff.
2. As there are no further claims, a separate judgment will issue.
DONE this the 19th day of April, 2024.
R. AUSTIN HUFFAKER, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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