Watts v. Talladega County Jail et al

Filing 41

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER the court is of the opinion that the magistrate judge's report is due to be and hereby is ADOPTED and his recommendation is ACCEPTED. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the defendants' motion for summary judgment is DENIED. This matter is REFERRED to the magistrate judge for further proceedings. Signed by Judge Abdul K Kallon on 07/22/2013. (PSM)

FILED
2013 Jul-22 AM 09:34
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
EASTERN DIVISION
ANTOINE RAY WATTS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAPTAIN KEN FLOWERS,
et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 1:10-cv-03107-AKK-TMP

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER
The magistrate judge filed a report May 24, 2013, recommending that the court
treat defendants’ special report as a motion for summary judgment and that the court
deny the motion. Doc. 36. The defendants – specifically Captain Ken Flowers and
Nurse Stephanie Murphree – have submitted objections to the report and
recommendation,1 docs. 37 - 39, which the court addresses separately.

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In conjunction with her objections, defendant Stephanie Vincent submits a motion for leave to
supplement her previously filed affidavit. Doc. 38. The motion is GRANTED to the extent that she may
supplement her original affidavit with the materials attached to the motion. However, no ruling is made
as to the relevancy or admissibility of the particular statements therein.

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A.

Captain Flowers – Alleged failure to establish knowledge of a need for
treatment

Captain Ken Flowers raises two key contentions in his objections. Doc. 37.
First, Captain Flowers asserts that no evidence exists that supports the subjective
element of the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim. Id. at 1-2. Specifically, citing
language in the three grievances plaintiff submitted to him, Captain Flowers asserts
that there is no evidence showing that he “ever became aware that oral surgery had
ever been recommended for the plaintiff by the jail medical staff or that such surgery
had been delayed.” Id. at 1-2. As it relates to the first grievance the plaintiff filed
on July 20, 2010, Captain Flowers contends the grievance “recites plaintiff Watts’
desire to have a wisdom tooth pulled,” and that the plaintiff never indicated that the
tooth is decayed, broken, or diseased or “any [other] indicia of emergent
circumstances.” Id. at 2. Unfortunately for Captain Flowers, his summary of the
grievance is incomplete and overlooks that the plaintiff plainly stated he suffered
from “serious pain” and had needed his tooth pulled for “9 months.” Doc. 14 at 3.
Moreover, the grievance notified Captain Flowers that the medical staff’s delay in
providing the necessary treatment rested solely upon the plaintiff’s inability to raise
$950, and that medical personnel had allegedly informed the plaintiff that he would

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“just be in pain” until he paid the fee.2 Id. In other words, the express terms of the
first grievance belie Captain Flowers’ contentions that the plaintiff never apprised
him of his need for treatment for his tooth and the subsequent indefinite delay in
receiving treatment.
Likewise, the other two grievances also undermine Captain Flowers’
contention that he had no notice that the plaintiff needed oral surgery. As Captain
Flowers acknowledges, the plaintiff submitted a second grievance in November 2010
that related to “a complaint . . . regarding his teeth.” Doc. 37 at 2. While Captain
Flowers maintains that he cannot locate this grievance, his own description of the
grievance, when coupled with the first and – as shown below – the third grievances,
is sufficient to establish that he had notice of the need to intervene to secure the
plaintiff’s medical treatment. Indeed, a cursory review of the plaintiff’s third
grievance on December 1, 2010, which Captain Flowers characterizes as a grievance
“simply” indicating the plaintiff’s desire to have a tooth pulled, id., easily shows that
the plaintiff stated plainly that he was in “serious pain” and had suffered for “over a
year.” Doc. 21-1 at 79. Moreover, the plaintiff notified Captain Flowers of the

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The plaintiff’s contentions in this regard are supported by the affidavit of Dr. Jerry N. Gurley.
Doc. 30-1. Although Dr. Gurley’s examination of the plaintiff revealed a broken tooth and a “left upper
molar abscess,” he acknowledged informing the plaintiff that “neither the jail nor QCHC would pay for
an oral surgeon.” Id. at 2. It therefore seems clear that absent the plaintiff’s ability to pay, the jail staff
was willing to allow the plaintiff to continue to suffer pain.

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medical staff’s failure to act: “I have went (sic) through every step that I can do
beside (sic) civil action for refusing medical treatment.” Id. Despite clearly indicating
that he needed Captain Flowers’ intervention to induce the medical staff to treat his
problem, Captain Flowers simply referred the plaintiff back to the medical staff even
though Captain Flowers had known of the plaintiff’s complaints of “serious pain” for
at least four months, and had not taken any steps to investigate or remedy the
problem. To make matters worse, Captain Flowers further evidenced deliberate
indifference by responding mockingly to the plaintiff’s plight by stating: “I am in
serious pain over you receiving contraband from one of my officers.” Doc. 21-1 at
79.
Although jail administrative personnel are generally permitted to rely on the
expertise of the medical staff in making determinations regarding the health care of
inmates, they do, however, “have a duty to look into the matter” when they are placed
on notice about the denial of adequate treatment. Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d
1312, 1328 (11th Cir. 2007). In such a context, “[c]hoosing to deliberately disregard,
without any investigation or inquiry, . . . amounts to willful blindness.” Id. In this
instance, nothing in the record refutes the plaintiff’s contention that he suffered from
“significant and recurrent pain” for many months and that the defendants refused to
allow him access to a free world oral surgeon “unless it were (sic) agreed that his
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family members produce the financial funds.” Doc. 34 at 3 - 5. Moreover, the
plaintiff notified Captain Flowers as early as July 2010 that he suffered from serious
pain and that he was denied treatment based solely on his inability to pay for the
required procedure. As the magistrate judge correctly pointed out, based on these
facts, a reasonable jury could find that Captain Flowers possessed sufficient
knowledge of alleged deliberate indifference on the part of the jail medical staff to
create a duty on him to take corrective action.

Therefore, Captain Flowers’

contentions are unavailing.
B.

Captain Flowers – Alleged failure to address qualified immunity

Captain Flowers also contends that the magistrate judge failed to address his
qualified immunity defense. Doc. 37 at 5. Unfortunately for Captain Flowers, the
Eleventh Circuit has held that “the need for dental care combined with the effects of
not receiving it may give rise to a sufficiently serious medical need to show
objectively a substantial risk of harm.” Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1244 (11th
Cir. 2003). In fact, other courts have also recognized that “[d]ental care is one of the
most important medical needs of inmates.” Hunt v. Dental Dept., 865 F.2d 198, 200
(9th Cir. 1989); see also Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 2005). Indeed,
it is well established that “[w]here a prison official or medical provider has
knowledge of the prisoner’s serious medical condition and arbitrarily refuses any
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medical care, that constitutes deliberate indifference.” Newsome v. Chatham County
Detention Center, 256 F. App’x. 342, 346 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing McElligott v.
Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999); Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783, 788 (11th
Cir. 1989)).3 Moreover, it is axiomatic that prison officials cannot deny a prisoner
care for a serious medical need solely on the prisoner’s ability to pay for that care.
Ancata v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985); City of
Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 463 U.S. 239 (1983). Here, the plaintiff
has submitted factual claims which allege violations of clearly established
constitutional parameters regarding the duty of jail personnel to respond reasonably
to the medical needs of inmates. Therefore, based on these alleged facts, Captain
Flowers has failed to establish that he is entitled to qualified immunity at this
juncture.
C.

Defendant Murphree – Alleged failure to have authority to act

Defendant Stephanie Vincent Murphree also objected to the magistrate judge’s
report. Doc. 39. In a supplemental affidavit she filed with her objections, she states
that during her employment at QCHC, she occupied an administrative position as
Health Services Administrator primarily and that she would “sometimes help out in
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The facts in Newsome – where the plaintiff complained to the jail nursing staff of ongoing
dental pain but was told he would have to wait thirty days for pain medication – are similar to those here.
The Eleventh Circuit found that those allegations created a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to
defeat summary judgment.

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the clinic.” Doc. 38 at 3. According to Nurse Murphree, although she spoke with the
plaintiff on occasion in order to “answer questions for him of an administrative
nature,” she never saw the plaintiff “directly in a nurse/patient relationship” and never
examined his tooth personally to determine whether the plaintiff required medical
care. Id. at 4. Moreover, she contends that only the physicians had the authority to
issue orders for teeth extraction. Id. Furthermore, although she has “no independent
recollection” of telling the plaintiff he would have to wait until his transfer to the
state penitentiary to have his tooth extracted, she acknowledges that she “could have
made a statement to the effect that if his teeth were not extracted while at Talladega
Jail it would probably be done when he got to the state.” Id. Based on these
contentions, including her denial that she told the plaintiff that he would “be in pain”
until his transfer to a state prison, id, Nurse Murphree contends that “deliberate
indifference by one who has no authority is not actionable.” Doc. 39 at 2.
Nurse Murphree’s contentions are unavailing for two reasons. First, the
plaintiff is not alleging defendants delayed issuing him a medical referral; rather, he
contends that defendants denied him access to an oral surgeon despite referring him
for oral surgery as early as March 18, 2010.4 See doc. 30-3 at 4. Examining the
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On this point, there is no dispute. In her initial affidavit, Nurse Murphree acknowledges that “it
had been determined that the teeth would have to be removed by an oral surgeon.” Doc. 30-2 at 1. More
importantly, she admits that the plaintiff was told that he could only undergo the procedure while housed
at the Talladega Jail if he “pa[id] for it to be done himself.” Id. at 2.

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record in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, as the court must do for purposes of
summary judgment, by the time Nurse Murphree examined or spoke with the plaintiff,
the record was replete with sick call requests and other medical forms documenting
the plaintiff’s severe pain and referenced a referral for oral surgery. Based on these
facts, it is clear that by that point, it was simply an administrative decision to act on
or delay the referral. Therefore, at this juncture of the case, it is reasonable to infer
that the Health Care Administrator, i.e. Nurse Murphree, had the authority to enact
an administrative decision scheduling a free world appointment for the plaintiff.
Secondly, although Nurse Murphree denies examining the plaintiff’s tooth, the
plaintiff actually contends unequivocally that Nurse Murphree examined his tooth
and determined that further care was necessary. Doc. 34 at 3. This is a quintessential
factual dispute for a jury to resolve at trial. At the very least, a genuine issue of fact
exists with respect to Nurse Murphree’s interaction with the plaintiff and whether she
exhibited deliberate indifference to his serious dental problem. In short, based upon
the evidence before the court, it is clear that a reasonable jury could find deliberate
indifference in Nurse Murphree’s assessment that the plaintiff, absent financial ability
to pay, had no choice but to remain in pain pending his transfer to state custody.5
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Defendant Murphree makes the additional arguments that she cannot be held liable on the basis
of supervisory or vicarious liability, and that deliberate indifference requires more than mere negligence
or medical malpractice. Doc. 39 at 2. In light of the foregoing, these arguments are without merit and do
not warrant discussion.

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Based upon the foregoing, and having carefully reviewed and considered de
novo all the materials in the court file, including the report and recommendation and
the objections thereto, the court is of the opinion that the magistrate judge’s report is
due to be and hereby is ADOPTED and his recommendation is ACCEPTED.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is
DENIED.

This matter is REFERRED to the magistrate judge for further

proceedings.

Done this the 22nd day of July, 2013.

________________________________
ABDUL K. KALLON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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