Abernathy v. Science Applications International Corporation

Filing 39

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Abdul K Kallon on 12/31/2013. (PSM)

FILED
2013 Dec-31 PM 04:12
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
EASTERN DIVISION
AMANDA ABERNATHY,
Plaintiff
vs.
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION,
Defendant

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) Case No. 1:11-cv-03805-AKK
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
On September 30, 2013, the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation was
entered and the parties were allowed therein fourteen days in which to file objections
to the recommendations made by the magistrate judge. On October 14, 2013,
Defendant filed limited objections to the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation. Specifically, Defendant challenges the magistrate judge’s
recommendation regarding Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.
Defendant contends that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in University of
Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013), compels the
court to dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claims. In Nassar, the Supreme Court
determined that the “but-for” causation test set out for age discrimination claims in
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009), applies equally to Title
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VII retaliation claims. 133 S. Ct. at 2528. Relying on Nassar, Defendant argues that
“Plaintiff does not have ‘proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred
in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer’” because Dr.
Caroline Robinson’s animosity toward Plaintiff pre-dated Plaintiff’s complaints. Doc.
34 at 3 (quoting Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2533). Consequently, Defendant maintains it
is due summary judgment on the retaliation claim.
The evidence belies Defendant’s contentions. Specifically, based on the record
before the court, close temporal proximity exists between Plaintiff’s complaints and
the adverse action. Such evidence is generally sufficient for a plaintiff to establish
but-for causation. See Raspanti v. Four Amigos Travel, Inc., 266 Fed. Appx. 820, 823
(11th Cir. Jan. 29 2008) (noting that a “close temporal proximity” between the time
a plaintiff’s protected activity and an adverse employment action would be sufficient
to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of proving but-for causation at summary judgment for
an FLSA retaliation claim). Further, while Defendant is correct that Dr. Robinson
showed hostility towards Plaintiff prior to Plaintiff’s December 4, 2009 complaint,
Plaintiff has presented evidence that Dr. Robinson’s alleged hostility following the
complaint significantly increased.1 Based on these allegations, sufficient evidence

1

According to Defendant, Dr. Robinson was dissatisfied with Plaintiff’s performance prior
to the complaint, and would have given Plaintiff a poor performance evaluation in the absence of the
complaint. Doc. 34 at 4–5. This contention overlooks Plaintiff’s assertion that Dr. Robinson never
attempted to hide her involvement in any prior adverse employment actions like she did with
Plaintiff’s performance evaluation. Doc. 37 at 9.
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exists for a jury to find, if it is so inclined, that but-for Plaintiff’s complaint, Dr.
Robinson would have informed Plaintiff that her Performance Improvement Plan was
complete and kept Plaintiff’s performance evaluation unchanged. Likewise, while the
cantankerous history between Plaintiff and Dr. Robinson may be evidence that
retaliatory animus was not the but-for cause of the adverse employment actions, this
evidence must be weighed against plaintiff's evidence to the contrary. The weighing
of evidence, which includes credibility determinations, is a quintessential task
reserved for a jury, rendering this matter inappropriate for summary judgment.
Next, as to Defendant’s contention that the temporal proximity between
Plaintiff's complaint and the adverse action is too attenuated to establish but-for
causation, this assertion is based on a mistaken assumption that “[a]t least two to
three months elapsed between Plaintiff’s complaint and Dr. Robinson’s decision to
change [Plaintiff’s] evaluation score.” Doc. 38 at 4. In fact, the evidence shows that
Plaintiff’s performance evaluation was prepared as early as January, 2010. Doc. 19-12
at 17. In other words, as little as one month could have separated Plaintiff’s
complaints and Dr. Robinson’s decision to change Plaintiff’s evaluation score.
Accordingly, the magistrate judge correctly found that Dr. Robinson’s actions were
“not too remote in time to be considered causally connected to [Plaintiff’s] protected
speech.” Doc. 33 at 32.
Finally, Defendant argues incorrectly that Plaintiff did not offer sufficient
evidence to rebut Dr. Robinson’s articulated reasons for her actions. Doc. 34 at 5–7.
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To the contrary, Plaintiff has offered evidence that Dr. Robinson gave Plaintiff a poor
evaluation score, and that Dr. Robinson then attempted to hide her involvement in the
evaluation process. Doc. 19-12 at 17–19. This evidence alone may be sufficient for
a jury to discredit Dr. Robinson’s proffered explanation and to find that a retaliatory
reason motivated Dr. Robinson’s actions. Such a determination, if any, is for a jury,
rather than a court, to make.
After careful consideration of the record in this case and the magistrate judge’s
report and recommendation and Defendant’s objections thereto, the court hereby
ADOPTS the report of the magistrate judge. The court further ACCEPTS the
recommendations of the magistrate judge that the motion for summary judgment filed
by Defendant be granted as to Plaintiff’s claims of gender and pregnancy
discrimination and interference with her rights under the Family Medical Leave Act
and that such claims be dismissed with prejudice. The court further ACCEPTS the
recommendations of the magistrate judge that the motion for summary judgment filed
by Defendant be denied as to Plaintiff’s claim of retaliation under Title VII.
A separate order in conformity with this Memorandum Opinion will be entered
contemporaneously herewith.
DONE this 31st day of December, 2013.

________________________________
ABDUL K. KALLON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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