Baker v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Abdul K Kallon on 6/22/2015. (YMB)

FILED
2015 Jun-22 PM 03:24
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
EASTERN DIVISION

VALERIE JOYCE DAVIS-BAKER,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner, Social Security
Administration,

Defendant.

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Civil Action Number
1:14-cv-1854-AKK

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Valerie Joyce Davis-Baker (“Davis-Baker”) brings this action
pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. §
205(g), seeking review of the final adverse decision of the Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration (“SSA”). This court finds that the Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”) applied the correct legal standard and that his decision—which
has become the decision of the Commissioner—is supported by substantial
evidence. Therefore, the court AFFIRMS the decision denying benefits.
I. Procedural History
Davis-Baker filed her application for Title II disability insurance benefits on
June 29, 2011 alleging a disability onset date of May 7, 2010 due to chronic
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obstructive pulmonary disease, bi-polar disorder, sleep apnea, Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder, and Morton’s Neuroma. (R. 69, 133, 155). After the SSA
denied her application, Davis-Baker requested a hearing before an ALJ. (R. 71,
80). The ALJ subsequently denied Davis-Baker’s claim, (R. 21), which became the
final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council refused to grant
review, (R. 1-3). Davis-Baker then filed this action pursuant to § 205(g) of the Act
on September 30, 2014. Doc. 1.
II. Standard of Review
The only issues before this court are whether the record contains substantial
evidence to sustain the ALJ’s decision, see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Walden v.
Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982), and whether the ALJ applied the
correct legal standards, see Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988);
Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g)
and 1383(c) mandate that the Commissioner’s “factual findings are conclusive if
supported by ‘substantial evidence.’” Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529
(11th Cir. 1990). The district court may not reconsider the facts, reevaluate the
evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner; instead, it must
review the final decision as a whole and determine if the decision is “reasonable
and supported by substantial evidence.” See id. (citing Bloodsworth v. Heckler,
703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)).

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Substantial evidence falls somewhere between a scintilla and a
preponderance of evidence; “[i]t is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person
would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Martin, 849 F.2d at 1529
(quoting Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239) (other citations omitted). If supported by
substantial evidence, the court must affirm the Commissioner’s factual findings
even if the preponderance of the evidence is against the Commissioner’s findings.
See Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529. While the court acknowledges that judicial review
of the ALJ’s findings is limited in scope, it notes that the review “does not yield
automatic affirmance.” Lamb, 847 F.2d at 701.
III. Statutory and Regulatory Framework
To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must show “the inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(I)(A). A physical or
mental impairment is “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological,
or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrated by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).

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Determination of disability under the Act requires a five step analysis. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f). Specifically, the Commissioner must determine in
sequence:
(1)

whether the claimant is currently unemployed;

(2)

whether the claimant has a severe impairment;

(3)

whether the impairment meets or equals one listed by the Secretary;

(4)

whether the claimant is unable to perform his or her past work; and

(5)

whether the claimant is unable to perform any work in the national
economy.

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986). “An affirmative
answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next question, or, on steps
three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative answer to any question, other
than step three, leads to a determination of ‘not disabled.’” Id. at 1030 (citing 20
C.F.R. § 416.920(a)-(f)). “Once a finding is made that a claimant cannot return to
prior work the burden shifts to the Secretary to show other work the claimant can
do.” Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
Lastly, where, as here, a plaintiff alleges disability because of pain, she must
meet additional criteria. In this circuit, “a three part ‘pain standard’ [is applied]
when a claimant seeks to establish disability through his or her own testimony of
pain or other subjective symptoms.” Holt v. Barnhart, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th
Cir. 1991). Specifically,
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The pain standard requires (1) evidence of an underlying medical
condition and either (2) objective medical evidence that confirms the
severity of the alleged pain arising from that condition or (3) that the
objectively determined medical condition is of such a severity that it
can be reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged pain.1
Id. However, medical evidence of pain itself, or of its intensity, is not required:
While both the regulations and the Hand standard require objective
medical evidence of a condition that could reasonably be expected to
cause the pain alleged, neither requires objective proof of the pain
itself. Thus under both the regulations and the first (objectively
identifiable condition) and third (reasonably expected to cause pain
alleged) parts of the Hand standard a claimant who can show that his
condition could reasonably be expected to give rise to the pain he
alleges has established a claim of disability and is not required to
produce additional, objective proof of the pain itself. See 20 CFR §§
404.1529 and 416.929; Hale [v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th
Cir. 1987)].
Elam v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 921 F.2d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 1991) (parenthetical
information omitted) (emphasis added). Moreover, “[a] claimant’s subjective
testimony supported by medical evidence that satisfies the pain standard is itself
sufficient to support a finding of disability.” Holt, 921 F.2d at 1223. Therefore, if
a claimant testifies to disabling pain and satisfies the three part pain standard, the
ALJ must find a disability unless the ALJ properly discredits the claimant’s
testimony.
Furthermore, when the ALJ fails to credit a claimant’s pain testimony, the
ALJ must articulate reasons for that decision:

1

This standard is referred to as the Hand standard, named after Hand v. Heckler, 761 F.2d 1545, 1548 (11th Cir.
1985).

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It is established in this circuit that if the [ALJ] fails to articulate reasons for
refusing to credit a claimant’s subjective pain testimony, then the [ALJ], as a
matter of law, has accepted that testimony as true. Implicit in this rule is the
requirement that such articulation of reasons by the [ALJ] be supported by
substantial evidence
Hale, 831 F.2d at 1012. Therefore, if the ALJ either fails to articulate reasons for
refusing to credit the plaintiff’s pain testimony, or if the ALJ’s reasons are not
supported by substantial evidence, the court must accept as true the pain testimony
of the plaintiff and render a finding of disability. Id.
IV. The ALJ’s Decision
In performing the five step analysis, the ALJ found that Davis-Baker had not
engaged in substantial gainful activity from May 7, 2010 through her date last
insured of December 31, 2010, and therefore met Step One. (R. 13). Next, the ALJ
found that Davis-Baker satisfied Step Two because she suffered from the severe
impairments of COPD, essential hypertension, bipolar disorder, and stable
coronary artery disease. Id. The ALJ then proceeded to the next step and found that
Davis-Baker did not satisfy Step Three since she “[did] not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of
the listed impairments.” Id. Although the ALJ answered Step Three in the negative,
consistent with the law, see McDaniel, 800 F.2d at 1030, he proceeded to Step
Four, where he determined that Davis-Baker has the residual functional capacity
(RFC) to “perform medium work that allowed for occasional bending and no

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climbing. She could work in a temperature-controlled environment.” (R. 17). In
light of Davis-Baker’s RFC, the ALJ determined that Davis-Baker “was capable of
performing past relevant work as a contract administrator, administrative assistant,
and secretary.” (R. 20). Therefore, the ALJ found that Davis-Baker has not been
“under a disability, as defined in the Social Security act, at any time from May 7,
2010, the alleged onset date, through December 31, 2010, the date last insured.” Id.
V. Analysis
Davis-Baker challenges the ALJ’s decision on the grounds that he “failed to
properly evaluate the credibility of [Davis-Baker’s] complaints of pain consistent
with the Eleventh Circuit Pain Standard.” Doc. 11 at 5. More specifically, DavisBaker maintains that the ALJ (1) erred in relying on Davis-Baker’s reported daily
activities to discredit her pain testimony, id at 6-8, and (2) improperly applied the
second-prong of the Hand standard as to Davis-Baker’s subjective testimony
regarding her breathing problems, lower back pain, and mental health conditions,
id. at 8-11. The court addresses each issue in turn.
1. Davis-Baker’s daily activities
As an initial matter, the court finds no support for Davis-Baker’s contention
that the ALJ “mischaracterized the record” as it relates to Davis-Baker’s daily
activities. To the contrary, the ALJ thoroughly and accurately summarized DavisBaker’s testimony during the hearing, noting that Davis-Baker completes “minor
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household chores and clean[s] out her cars’ litter boxes.” (R. 18). The ALJ added
that Davis-Baker’s breathing difficulties caused her to complete chores for “about
ten minutes” at a time, that she then must rest for approximately one hour, and that
as a result, she spends “about [seven] hours lying down” in an 8-hour period. (R.
19). Furthermore, the ALJ noted that Davis-Baker experiences breathing attacks,
lasting “about five minutes,” at least twenty times a day, and she can generally
only walk for five minutes before losing her breath. (R. 18, 19). Finally, the ALJ
added that Davis-Baker also experiences occasional lower back pain that makes it
difficult to stand for longer than ten minutes or sit for more than ten to fifteen
minutes. (R. 19). In light of these findings by the ALJ, the court rejects DavisBaker’s contention that the ALJ “ignored the limits . . . [Davis-Baker] described as
to” her daily activities. See doc. 11 at 7-8.
The court also rejects Davis-Baker’s contention that the ALJ improperly
relied on her reported daily activities “to show her activities are contrary to her
testimony.” Doc. 11 at 7. While Davis-Baker is generally correct that “activities of
daily living . . . do not rule out the presence of disabling pain,” Horton v. Barnhart,
469 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1046 (N.D. Ala. 2006), she overlooks that in this case, the
ALJ did not rely solely on Davis-Baker’s reported daily activities to discredit her
testimony. Rather, the ALJ relied on Davis-Baker’s medical records “including
reports from examining and treating physicians” and concluded that the testimony
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is “not corroborated by substantial evidence considered on the record as a whole.”
(R. 19). Therefore, the court rejects Davis-Baker’s arguments related to her
reported daily activities, and as the court will explain further below, finds no error
in the ALJ’s conclusion with respect to the objective medical evidence.
2. The objective medical evidence of physical and mental impairments
The court concludes that the ALJ properly “systematically articulated his
reasons for rejecting [the] subjective complaints” regarding Davis-Baker’s
breathing problems, back pain, and mental health conditions. Dyer v. Barnhart,
395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). Specifically, with respect to Davis-Baker’s
breathing problems, the ALJ properly pointed to notes from Davis-Baker’s
physicians through December 31, 20102 that consistently show that Davis-Baker’s
“coronary artery disease and hypertension [were] . . . stable without any occurrence
of cardiac-related symptoms.” (R. 19). In particular, Davis-Baker’s physician noted
in June 2010, August 2010, October 2010, and December 2010 that her heart
sound and rhythm were normal with no murmurs, and that her respiratory system
was “clear to auscultation.” (R. 263, 265, 267, 269). Next, with respect to DavisBaker’s lower back pain, the ALJ noted that Davis-Baker “received intermittent
treatment for complaints of back pain” prior to December 31, 2010. (R. 19).
2

Because “a claimant is eligible for benefits where she demonstrates disability on or before the last date for which
she were insured,” Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005), and because Davis-Baker’s date last
insured was December 31, 2010, the relevant time period for assessing Davis-Baker’s impairments is May 7, 2010
to December 31, 2010.

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Indeed, Davis-Baker only sought treatment for her back pain once on June 15,
2010, received medication from her physician on that day, and never sought
treatment again. (R. 262-69). Such non-routine or inconsistent treatment history is
sufficient to support the ALJ’s decision to discredit Davis-Baker’s testimony
regarding back pain. See Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1211 (affirming ALJ’s decision where
the ALJ discredited pain testimony by “explaining that [the] pain had not required
routine or consistent treatment.”). Finally, as to Davis-Baker’s mental impairments,
while Davis-Baker testified that she experiences “panic attacks associated with
upset stomach, hives, nervousness, shakiness, and fatigue” and that she tends “to
yell and scream at everyone” because of her condition, (R. 18), the ALJ properly
noted the absence of any medical evidence during the relevant time period to
support the testimony. In fact, a consultative mental examination by Dr. Robert
Kline on April 2010 established that Davis-Baker “did not actually show external
signs of anxiety,” such as “restlessness or tremors,” her mood was “euthymic”
overall, and that “she hasn’t gotten in any fights with anyone recently.” (R. 191192).3 The court finds that Dr. Kline’s observations, and the absence of any
3

Along the same lines, while Dr. Kline ultimately concluded that Davis-Baker experienced “marked restriction of
activities . . . and a moderate to marked restriction in her ability to relate to others,”(R. 192), the ALJ afforded little
weight to Dr. Kline’s opinion after noting that his “conclusions appear inconsistent with the objective, clinical
findings in his own narrative report,” (R. 19). Davis-Baker believes that Dr. Kline’s evaluation “taken in
combination with her longitudinal medical record” supports her testimony, doc. 11 at 11, but the court rejects this
argument because, with respect to the relevant time period, the court finds no medical records supporting DavisBaker’s testimony or Dr. Kline’s opinion. Furthermore, the ALJ was under no duty to defer to Dr. Kline’s opinion in
light of Dr. Kline’s status as a non-treating one-time examining source. See McSwain v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 617, 619
(11th Cir. 1987) (opinions of “one-time examiners” are not entitled to deference).

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treatment history during the relevant time period, provide support for the ALJ’s
decision to discredit Davis-Baker’s testimony. See Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1211. For
these reasons, the court concludes that the ALJ adequately explained his reasons
for discrediting Davis-Baker’s pain testimony.
VI. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the ALJ’s determination
that Davis-Baker is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence, and that the
ALJ applied proper legal standards in reaching this determination. Therefore, the
Commissioner’s final decision is AFFIRMED. A separate order in accordance
with the memorandum of decision will be entered.
DONE the 22nd day of June, 2015.

_________________________________
ABDUL K. KALLON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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