Estate of Jeffery K Russell v. Anniston, City of et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING 35 MOTION to Dismiss as set out herein. Signed by Judge Virginia Emerson Hopkins on 8/23/2017. (JLC)
FILED
2017 Aug-23 AM 09:06
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
EASTERN DIVISION
ESTATE OF JEFFREY K.
RUSSELL, by and through personal
representative Kenley R. Gardner,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF ANNISTON, SHANE
DENHAM, GREG FEAZELL,
WILLIAM WORTHAM, RANDY
GARNER, and JAMES
CAMPBELL,
Defendants.
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) Case No.: 1:15-CV-1080-VEH
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.
Introduction and Procedural Background.
This case stems from the tragic death of Jeffery K. Russell (“Mr. Russell”),
who committed suicide in a jail cell at the City of Anniston jail after being arrested
on February 20, 2014.
On June 26, 2015, the Estate of Jeffery K. Russell, by and through personal
representative Kenley R. Gardner (“Plaintiff”), filed a complaint (the “Initial
Complaint”) against the City of Anniston, Shane Denham (“Mr. Denham”), Greg
Feazell (“Mr. Feazell”), Nick Bowles (“Mr. Bowles”), and Fictitious Defendants
A, B, and C. On July 21, 2015, the Named Defendants1 filed their answer, and on
August 4, 2015, this action was reassigned to the undersigned. (Docs. 6, 9). On
February 25, 2016, the Named Defendants filed an Amended Answer in order to
assert new affirmative defenses. (Doc. 13).
On February 29, 2016, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint (the “Amended
Complaint”), which identified Fictitious Defendants A, B, and C for the first time
as Defendants James Campbell (“Defendant Campbell”), Randy Garner
(“Defendant Garner”), and William Wortham (“Defendant Wortham”) (together,
the “Added Defendants”), respectively. (Doc. 14). Defendant Campbell was
served on November 3, 2016, and Defendants Wortham and Garner were served
on November 10, 2016. (Docs. 30, 33, 34).
On November 18, 2016, the three Added Defendants filed a Motion To
Dismiss the claims filed against them as time-barred by the applicable statute of
limitations. (Doc. 35). Plaintiff responded on November 25, 2016, and the Added
Defendants replied on December 9, 2016. (Docs. 37, 40). The Motion To Dismiss
is ripe for this Court’s disposition.
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The City of Anniston, Mr. Denham, Mr. Feazell, and Mr. Bowles answered the
complaint jointly. However, Mr. Bowles was dismissed from this action pro tanto on October 7,
2016. (Doc. 21). Accordingly, the “Named Defendants” hereinafter refers to the City of
Anniston, Mr. Denham, and Mr. Feazell.
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II.
Legal Standard.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion attacks the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (“[A] party may assert the following defenses by motion:
(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]”). The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure require only that the complaint provide “‘a short and plain
statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 103, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957) (footnote omitted) (quoting
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)), abrogated by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007); see also FED. R. CIV.
P. 8(a) (setting forth general pleading requirements for a complaint including
providing “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief”).
While a plaintiff must provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief, Rule
8 does not mandate the inclusion of “detailed factual allegations” within a
complaint. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1964 (quoting Conley, 355
U.S. at 47, 78 S. Ct. at 103). However, at the same time, “it demands more than an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). “[O]nce a
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claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts
consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563, 127
S. Ct. at 1969.
“‘[A] Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is
appropriate only if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that the claim is
time-barred’ because ‘[a] statute of limitations bar is an affirmative defense, and . .
. plaintiff[s] [are] not required to negate an affirmative defense in [their]
complaint.’ Lindley v. City of Birmingham, 515 F. App’x 813, 815 (11th Cir.
2013) (quoting La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir.
2004)). At the motion to dismiss stage, “a complaint may be dismissed on the basis
of a statute-of-limitations defense only if it appears beyond a doubt that Plaintiffs
can prove no set of facts that toll the statute.” Id. (citing Tello v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 410 F.3d 1275, 1288 n.13 (11th Cir. 2005)).
III.
Factual Allegations.
The decedent, Mr. Russell, was arrested on February 20, 2014, in Anniston,
Alabama. (Doc. 14 at 6). Upon his arrest, he was booked into the City of Anniston
municipal jail. Id. Prior to being placed in a jail cell, Mr. Russell’s personal
clothing, which included two shoes, shoestring, socks, pants, underwear, dress
shirt, and a necktie, was not removed. Id.
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At approximately 9:00 a.m. on February 21, 2014, Mr. Russell was found
unresponsive in his jail cell and was subsequently pronounced deceased by the
Calhoun County coroner’s office. Id. Plaintiff alleges, upon information and
belief, that Mr. Russell’s cause of death was strangulation via a noose fashioned
from his necktie. Id. at 7. Plaintiff also alleges that, at the time relevant to this
action, nine civilian correctional officers were employed at the City of Anniston
municipal jail along with two civilian inmate supervisors. Id.
IV.
Analysis
A.
Applicable Statute of Limitations
In Counts I and II, Plaintiff alleges Section 1983 constitutional violations.
In Count III, Plaintiff alleges violations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 (the “RA”) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”).
All constitutional claims brought pursuant to Section 1983 are “tort actions,
subject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state
where the § 1983 action has been brought.” Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300,
1303 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal citation omitted). In Alabama, that limitations
period is two years. Id. (citing Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 876 F.2d 1480, 1483
(11th Cir. 1989)) (“[T]he two year limitations period . . . applies to section 1983
actions in Alabama.”). Similarly, for discrimination claims under the ADA and the
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RA, “the applicable limitations period is governed by the most analogous state
statute of limitations . . . in Alabama, where this action was brought, the applicable
limitations period is two years.” Horsley v. University of Alabama, 564 F. App’x
1006, 1008, 306 Ed. Law. Rep. 687 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Everett v. Cobb Cnty.
Sch. Dist., 138 F.3d 1407, 1409-10 (11th Cir. 1998)).
The decedent died on February 21, 2014, so any Section 1983, ADA, or RA
claims needed to have been brought by February 21, 2016. The claims against the
Named Defendants are timely, as Plaintiff filed the Initial Complaint on June 26,
2015 (doc. 1). The claims against the Added Defendants, however, are untimely,
as Plaintiff did not filed the Amended Complaint until February 29, 2016 (doc.
14). Accordingly, the claims against the Added Defendants are time-barred unless
the Amended Complaint, particularly the claims against the Added Defendants,
relate back to the timely-filed claims.
B.
Relation Back of Claims Under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)
Rule 15(c)(1) governs the relation back of amended pleadings and states as
follows:
(1)
When an Amendment Relates Back. An amendment to a
pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when:
(A)
the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations
allows relation back;
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(B)
the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of
the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out–or
attempted to be set out–in the original pleading; or
(C)
the amendment changes the party or the naming of the
party against whom a claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1)(B)
is satisfied and if, within the period provided by Rule 4(m)
for serving the summons and complaint, the party to be
brought in by amendment:
(i)
received such notice of the action that it will not be
prejudiced in defending on the merits; and
(ii)
knew or should have known that the action would
have been brought against it, but for a mistake
concerning the property party’s identity.
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1). As the Supreme Court has explained, all three
requirements under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) must be met before an amended complaint
against a newly-named defendant can relate back:
First, the claim against the newly named defendant must have arisen
“out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to
be set out—in the original pleading.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(B), (C).
Second, “within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the
summons and complaint” (which is ordinarily 120 days from when the
complaint is filed, see Rule 4(m)), the newly named defendant must
have “received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in
defending on the merits.” Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(i). Finally, the plaintiff must
show that, within the Rule 4(m) period, the newly named defendant
“knew or should have known that the action would have been brought
against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity.” Rule
15(c)(1)(C)(ii).
Krupski v. Costa Crociere, 560 U.S. 538, 545, 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2491-92, 177 L.
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Ed. 2d 48 (2010).
No party disputes that the claims asserted in the Amended Complaint arise
from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as set out in the Initial
Complaint. (See Doc. 37 at 4; Doc. 40 at 1). However, the parties vigorously
dispute whether the other two requirements of Rule 15(c)(1)(C) have been
satisfied.
Relation back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) “depends on what the party to be
added knew or should have known, not on the amending party’s knowledge or its
timeliness in seeking to amend the pleading.” Krupski, 560 U.S. at 541, 130 S. Ct.
at 2490. The Rule asks “what the prospective defendant knew or should have
known during the Rule 4(m) period, not what the plaintiff knew or should have
known at the time of filing [his or] her original complaint.” Id. (emphases in
original).
Therefore, the operative issue is not whether Plaintiff knew or should have
known the identities of Mr. Campbell, Mr. Garner, and Mr. Wortham, but rather
whether the Added Defendants themselves knew or should have known that they
would be named as defendants “but for an error.” Id. at 548; see also Lindley, 515
F. App’x at 815 (internal citation omitted) (affirming that “the pertinent question
is whether within the Rule 4(m) period the defendant knew or should have known
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that it would have been named as a defendant but for an error”).
Though neither party cites to Lindley, the Court finds that case analogous.
In Lindley, the original complaint was timely filed and listed “Defendant Nurse
Frida (last name unknown)” and “Defendant Correctional Officer John Doe
(identity unknown), whether singular or plural,” as parties. 515 F. App’x at 816.
The district court held, in part, that the amended complaint, which properly
identified the five additional defendants in question but which was filed outside of
the applicable statute of limitations, did not relate back because the plaintiff failed
to demonstrate that the five additional defendants knew or should have known that
they would be sued by the plaintiff. Id. at 815.
The Eleventh Circuit reversed, concluding that even if the district court was
correct that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the plaintiff “had
or should have had the requisite notice, this fact is not apparent from the face of
the complaint.” Id. at 816. Furthermore, “[w]hile the parallelism between the
Initial Complaint and the Amended Complaint does not prove notice sufficient to
satisfy Rule15(c)(1)(C), neither does it disprove such notice.” Id. Accordingly, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that, at the motion to dismiss stage, “nothing on the
face of the complaint establishes that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts to toll
the statute of limitations.” Id. at 16017.
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Like in Lindley, the Added Defendants in this action were identified as
correctional officers in the Initial Complaint:
9.
Fictitious Defendant A (“FDA”) is identified as an employee of
ANNISTON who, at the relevant time he was acting under the
color of state law and was working at the Municipal Jail operated
by ANNISTON. FDA shared in the responsibility to ensure the
safety of Russell, while Russell was confined in ANNISTON’s
Municipal Jail and on or about February 20-21, 2014, FDA
breached that duty. FDA was employed by the APD as
correctional officers assigned to the location where Russell died.
They were responsible for communicating serious medical
conditions of detainees like Russell’s to medical staff. On
information and belief, they were also responsible for monitoring
Russell when he was in custody or for insuring that other APD
employees did the required checks. FDA’s true identity will be
substituted upon being learned.
10.
Fictitious Defendant B (“FDB”) is identified as an employee of
ANNISTON who, at the relevant time he was acting under the
color of state law and was working at the Municipal Jail operated
by ANNISTON. FDB shared in the responsibility to ensure
Russell’s safety while Russell was confined in ANNISTON’s
Municipal Jail and on or about February 20-21, 2014, FDB
breached that duty. FDB was employed by the APD as
correctional officers assigned to the location where Russell died.
They were responsible for communicating serious medical
conditions of detainees like Russell’s to medical staff. On
information and belief, they were also responsible for monitoring
Russell when he was in custody or for insuring that other APD
employees did the required checks. FDB’s true identity will be
substituted upon being learned.
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Fictitious Defendant C (“FDC”) is identified as an employee of
ANNISTON who, at the relevant time he was acting under the
color of state law and was working at the Municipal Jail operated
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by ANNISTON. FDC shared in the responsibility to ensure
Russell’s safety while Russell was confined in ANNISTON’s
Municipal Jail and on or about February 20-21, 2014, FDC
breached that duty. FDC was employed by the APD as
correctional officers assigned to the location where Russell died.
They were responsible for communicating serious medical
conditions of detainees like Russell’s to medical staff. On
information and belief, they were also responsible for checking on
Russell when he was in isolation or for insuring that other APD
employees did the required checks. FDC’s true identity will be
substituted upon being learned.
(Doc. 1 at 4-5). Plaintiff further alleged in the Initial Complaint that, at the time
relevant to this action, there were nine correctional officers employed by the City
of Anniston’s municipal jail, as well as two civilian inmate supervisors. Id. at 7.
Other than identifying Fictitious Defendants A, B, and C as Mr. Campbell, Mr.
Garner, and Mr. Wortham, respectively, the Amended Complaint parallels the
Initial Complaint and asserts no new claims for relief. (See Docs. 1, 14).
The Added Defendants cite to Bloom v. Alvareze, 498 F. App’x 867 (11th
Cir. 2012) to support their contention that pleadings where parties are
subsequently identified by amendment are not “mistakes in the identity of a party”
sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 15(c)(1)(C). In Bloom, the Eleventh
Circuit stated that Rule 15 does not support relation back “where the potential
defendants should not necessarily have known that, absent a mistake by the
plaintiff, they would have sued” and concluded that the plaintiffs did not
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sufficiently identify how the added defendants were put on notice of the filing of
the original complaint Id. at 873.
The Court agrees that, like in Bloom and in Lindley, “[t]his is not the case of
mistaken identity of a party” in the sense that Plaintiff did not misidentify certain
correctional officers. Id. at 873. However, unlike in Bloom, the Court cannot
unequivocally determine from the face of the Initial Complaint that the Added
Defendants were not on notice that Plaintiff intended to name them as Defendants.
Whether the Added Defendants knew or should have known within 120 days of
the filing of the Initial Complaint that Plaintiff intended to sue them is an
inherently factual question that is underdeveloped at this early stage in the
litigation. Furthermore, Bloom, which preceded the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in
Lindley, did not address a situation where a “John Doe” party was later identified
via an amended pleading. Lindley is therefore more factually applicable to this
action.
In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Krupski and the Eleventh
Circuit’s willingness in Lindley to allow “John Doe” parties to be subsequently
identified via amendment so as to avoid a limitations period, this Court is unable
to say beyond a doubt that Plaintiff could prove no set of facts that toll the statute
of limitations.
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V.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court finds that the claims against the Added
Defendants relate back to the original Complaint so as to avoid the bar imposed by
the applicable statute of limitations. Accordingly, the Motion To Dismiss (doc. 35)
is hereby DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED this the 23rd of August, 2017.
VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS
United States District Judge
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