Langley v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge John E Ott on 3/16/2018. (KAM)

FILED
2018 Mar-16 AM 10:34
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
EASTERN DIVISION
GLENN KEVIN LANGLEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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Case No. 1:16-cv-02037-JEO

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Glenn Kevin Langley brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
405(g), seeking review of the final decision of the Acting Commissioner of Social
Security (“Commissioner”) denying his application supplemental security income
(“SSI”). (Doc. 1).1 The case has been assigned to the undersigned United States
Magistrate Judge pursuant to this court’s general order of reference. The parties
have consented to the jurisdiction of this court for disposition of the matter. (See
Doc. 8). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), FED. R. CIV. P. 73(a). Upon review of the record
and the relevant law, the undersigned finds that the Commissioner’s decision is
due to be affirmed.

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References herein to “Doc(s). __” are to the document numbers assigned by the Clerk of
the Court to the pleadings, motions, and other materials in the court file, as reflected on the
docket sheet in the court’s Case Management/Electronic Case Files (CM/ECF) system.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff protectively filed his current SSI application alleging he became
disabled on April 22, 2014. (R. 44, 164). It was initially denied. An
administrative law judge (“ALJ”) held a video hearing on December 8, 2015 (Id.)
and issued an unfavorable decision on May 11, 2016 (R. 44-53). Plaintiff
submitted his appeal to the Appeals Council. Upon consideration, the Appeals
Council found no reason to review the ALJ’s decision. (R. 57). Plaintiff’s request
for review was denied on October 19, 2016. (Id.)
II. FACTS
Plaintiff was 47 years old at the time of the ALJ’s decision. He has a
seventh grade education and intermittently has worked in the past as a buffer
installation person for a marble company and as a self-employed house painter.
(R. 7-9). Plaintiff alleges onset of disability due to back and neck pain and
depression. (R. 184).
Following a hearing, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following
medically determinable impairments: cervical degenerative joint disease,
peripheral neuropathy, sciatica, hypertension, and major depressive disorder. (R.
46). She also found Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed
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impairments in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1. (R. 46). She further found
Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work as
defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b) and that he could (1) occasionally operate hand
controls and reach overhead bilaterally; (2) occasionally climb ladders or scaffolds
and frequently stoop; (3) have no exposure to unprotected heights or hazardous,
moving mechanical parts; (4) perform simple tasks with occasional changes to
routine; and (5) have frequent contact with supervisors, coworkers, and the public.
(R. 48-49). Based on the RFC finding and testimony from a vocational expert
(“VE”), the ALJ concluded Plaintiff had no relevant past work history. (R. 52).
However, based on his age, limited education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ
found that jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy that
Plaintiff could perform, such as an assembler, wire worker, and hand packer. (Id.)
Accordingly, the ALJ determined Plaintiff was not under a disability, as defined in
the Social Security Act, since April 22, 2014, through the date of her decision. (R.
53).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is narrowly
circumscribed. The function of the court is to determine whether the
Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether proper
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legal standards were applied. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 91 S. Ct.
1420, 1422 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002).
The court must “scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision
reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.” Bloodsworth v.
Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). Substantial evidence is “such
relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Id. It is “more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Id.
The court must uphold factual findings that are supported by substantial
evidence. However, it reviews the ALJ’s legal conclusions de novo because no
presumption of validity attaches to the ALJ’s determination of the proper legal
standards to be applied. Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 1993). If
the court finds an error in the ALJ’s application of the law, or if the ALJ fails to
provide the court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal
analysis has been conducted, it must reverse the ALJ’s decision. See Cornelius v.
Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991).
IV. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
To qualify for SSI under the Social Security Act, a claimant must show the
inability to engage in “any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
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death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). A physical or mental
impairment is “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or
psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(D).
Determination of disability under the Social Security Act requires a five
step analysis. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4). Specifically, the Commissioner must
determine in sequence:
whether the claimant: (1) is unable to engage in substantial gainful
activity; (2) has a severe medically determinable physical or mental
impairment; (3) has such an impairment that meets or equals a Listing
and meets the duration requirements; (4) can perform his past relevant
work, in light of his residual functional capacity; and (5) can make an
adjustment to other work, in light of his residual functional capacity,
age, education, and work experience.
Evans v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 551 F. App’x 521, 524 (11th Cir. 2014)2 (citing 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that he was
disabled within the meaning of the Act. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211
(11th Cir. 2005). The applicable “regulations place a very heavy burden on the
claimant to demonstrate both a qualifying disability and an inability to perform

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Unpublished opinions of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals are not considered
binding precedent; however, they may be cited as persuasive authority. 11th Cir. R. 36-2.
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past relevant work.” Id.
V. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues two grounds of error: (1) the ALJ’s decision is not
supported by substantial evidence and (2) the ALJ failed to develop a full and fair
record. Each argument will be addressed below.
A.

Substantial Evidence
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ incorrectly found that his radiographic

evidence fails to show abnormalities consistent with his allegations. (Doc. 12 at
8). The Commissioner responds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
decision. (Doc. 13 at 7-12). The court agrees with the Commissioner.
As noted previously, Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that he is disabled
within the meaning of the Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a) & (c); Moore, 405 F.3d
at 1211; Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274,1278 (11th Cir. 2001). Specifically,
Plaintiff is required to produce relevant medical and other evidence he believes
will prove his alleged disability resulting from his physical or mental impairments.
20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a)-(b). In analyzing the evidence, the focus is on how an
impairment affects Plaintiff’s ability to work, and not on the impairment itself.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a), 416.945(a); McCruter v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 1544,
1547 (11th Cir. 1986) (severity of impairments must be measured in terms of their
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effect on the ability to work, not from purely medical standards of bodily
perfection or normality). “[T]he final responsibility” for determining Plaintiff’s
RFC is reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(e)(2); see also 20
C.F.R. § 416.946(c) (at the hearing level, the ALJ is responsible for determining a
claimant’s RFC).
Plaintiff cites two x-rays in support of his contention that the evidence does
show that he had significant abnormalities that support his claim. (Doc. 12 at 8).
First, he cites to a June 23, 2014 x-ray of his cervical spine which shows
“increased cervical lordosis” and “calcification anteriorly between C5-C6.” (Doc.
12 at 8 (citing R. 247)). Second, he cites to a September 2014 report that shows
arthritic changes in his cervical spine. (Id. (citing R. 258)). To evaluate this
evidence it is necessary to place it in context.
Plaintiff testified at the administrative hearing that he has rheumatoid
arthritis, peripheral neuropathy, high blood pressure, insomnia, and depression.
He reports having constant pain in his back, neck, and shoulders. (R. 11). He
further states that his peripheral neuropathy affects all of his extremities.
According to Plaintiff, he cannot get down on his knees and get back up; he has
poor grip strength; he can only stand for a few minutes before needing to sit down;
and he experiences swelling. (R. 11-16). He also states that the pain limits his
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ability to lift things in front of or above him. (R. 12-15). He also states that he
frequently needs to lie down to alleviate his pain. (R. 14). Lastly, Plaintiff states
that he spends about five or six days a month in bed because of the pain he
experiences. (R. 17).
Plaintiff takes Meloxican for arthritis and Gabapentin for peripheral
neuropathy. He takes Flexeril for his back, Trazodone to help him sleep, and Paxil
for his depression. (R. 18). He has had suicidal thoughts in the past.3 Plaintiff
also states that he does not have a lot of medical records because he does not have
healthcare insurance and has only limited resources. (R. 21).
Other medical evidence of record includes examination notes from Dr.
Sathyan V. Iyer, a physical consultative examiner, showing that Plaintiff had
normal gait, negative straight leg raise testing bilaterally, a full range of motion
with the exception of his neck, normal grip strength, and no neurological deficits
during a June 2014 examination. (R. 242-43). Dr. Iyer opined that Plaintiff
“could” have some impairment in his ability to push, pull, perform overhead
activities, and bend, but that he was not limited in his ability to sit, stand, walk,
handle, hear, or speak. (R. 243).
Examination notes from Dr. Dallas Wilcox, Jr., in September 2014 show

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Plaintiff did not specify the frequency or the recency of the thoughts. (See R. 21).
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that Plaintiff had an “accident in 1991” and his pain has worsened in the last two
years. (R. 257). Plaintiff exhibited a “slightly decreased” range of motion in his
neck and “paraspinal muscular tenderness and spasm of the cervical region and
into BL trapezius.” He displayed no other abnormalities. (R. 257-58). Dr.
Wilcox also noted x-ray results showing osteoarthritis changes. (R. 258). Dr.
Wilcox saw Plaintiff again in February 2015 when he complained of lower back
pain. Dr. Wilcox noted that Plaintiff’s pain radiated down his legs at times and his
feet hurt “on and off.” (R. 261). No other abnormalities were noted. Plaintiff was
continued on his medications.4
Plaintiff also reported he could perform personal care independently,
including that he could cook simple meals, perform light household chores, drive,
shop, manage funds, read, and socialize with friends. (R. 50, 197-204,252).
To the extent Plaintiff appears to be arguing that the ALJ did not consider
his x-ray results, the record demonstrates otherwise. The ALJ specifically
discussed both x-rays in her decision. (See R. 50; see also R. 247, 258, 262). The
ALJ noted that the June 23, 2014 x-ray revealed only cervical lordosis and
calcification between C5-C6. (R. 50). She also noted that the September 2014 x-

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Examination notes from Dr. Ashley B. Hampton, a psychological consultant examiner,
reveal Plaintiff had intact thought processes, judgment, insight, and memory; displayed normal
thought content; and denied homicidal or suicidal ideation. (R. 251-52).
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ray showed “[n]o fracture [or] dislocation” and only “mild” osteoarthritic changes.
(R. 54; see also R.258, 262). Thus, the court finds this claim to be without merit.
To the extent Plaintiff asserts the ALJ’s decision is not supported by
substantial evidence, the court disagrees. Nothing in the record demonstrates that
the x-ray reports are inconsistent with the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff could
perform light work with the specified limitations. Overall, the record reveals only
conservative treatment, including medication. Plaintiff was never referred to a
specialist, indicating his impairments were not as severe as alleged. (R. 50, 250).
There is no opinion from a treating or examining source that Plaintiff is disabled
or has greater limitations than those included in the RFC finding. (R. 48-51). See
Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1324 (11th Cir. 1998) (in concluding that
substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision, the court noted the absence of
opined activity restrictions inconsistent with the ALJ’s RFC determination).
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in giving Dr. Iyer’s report great
weight because it is based on incomplete information due to the fact that the x-ray
reports were dated after he examined Plaintiff. (Doc. 12 at 9-10). The
Commissioner responds that Plaintiff has offered no evidence explaining how the
x-ray findings undermine Dr. Iyer’s report. (Doc. 13 at 10, n.8).
As noted above, Dr. Iyer’s examination notes reveal Plaintiff had normal
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gait, negative straight leg raise testing bilaterally, full range of motion with the
exception of his neck, normal grip strength, and no neurological defects. (R. 4950, 242-43). Dr. Iyer opined that Plaintiff was not limited in his ability to sit,
stand, walk, handle items, hear, or speak, but could have an impaired ability to
push, pull, perform overhead activities, and bend. (R. 243). The ALJ stated she
gave great weight to Dr. Iyer’s opinion because it was consistent with the record
evidence. (R. 51). Additionally, this opinion is consistent with Dr. Iyer’s
examination notes, as well as the remainder of the record. It is not undermined by
the later x-ray findings.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ did not properly consider his impairments
in combination. (Doc. 12 at 10). The court disagrees. The ALJ made specific and
well-articulated findings as to the effect of the combination of impairments in
concluding Plaintiff was not disabled. (See R. 46-53 (stating that the ALJ
considered Plaintiff’s impairments “individually and in combination...”)). See
Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 1001 (11th Cir. 1987) (stating, “It is established
that the ALJ must consider the combined effects of a claimant’s impairments in
determining whether she is disabled.”). In so finding, the court notes that “ there
is no rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in
his decision, so long as the ALJ’s decision” enables the court “to conclude that the
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ALJ considered [Plaintiff’s] medical condition as a whole.” See Dyer v. Barnhart,
395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). The court finds that the ALJ considered the
record as a whole in this case. Accordingly, this claim is without merit.
B.

Full and Fair Record
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed in her duty to develop a full and fair

record when she did not order a comprehensive neurological examination, an
MRI, or an EMG to more fully evaluate Plaintiff’s conditions. (Doc. 12 at 10-11).
The Commissioner responds that the ALJ developed a full and fair record and
Plaintiff has not shown any deficiency demonstrating unfairness or “clear
prejudice.” (Doc. 13 at 5-7). For the reasons stated below, the court agrees with
the Commissioner.
An ALJ has the responsibility for developing a full and fair record. Kelley
v. Heckler, 761 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1985). A plaintiff has the burden of
establishing that he is disabled and to produce evidence in support of his claim.
Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003). Before a matter can be
remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings, a plaintiff must
demonstrate prejudice. Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1423 (11th Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s failure to develop the record concerning his

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rheumatoid arthritis and peripheral neuropathy.5 (Doc.12 at 10-11). This claim is
without merit for a number of reasons. First, the record does not demonstrate that
Plaintiff has a diagnosis of rheumatoid arthritis. To the contrary, as mentioned
previously, the medical notes show that he has relatively mild physical findings,
including normal gait, negative straight leg raise testing bilaterally, full range of
motion with the exception of his neck, normal grip strength, and no neurological
deficits. (R. 49-50, 242-43, 257-58). Second, with respect to his peripheral
neuropathy, the ALJ discussed the impairment, concluded it was severe, and
incorporated postural and environmental limitations in the RFC finding to account
for the condition. (R. 46, 48-49). Third, Plaintiff has failed to show why
additional evidence was necessary for the ALJ to make an informed decision. (See
Doc. 12 at 10-11). Consultative examinations may be used to resolve a conflict or
ambiguity in the record, if one exists, or to obtain any clinical findings, laboratory
tests, diagnoses or prognoses necessary for a decision. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.917,
416.919a. An ALJ “is not required to order a consultative examination unless the
record establishes that such an examination is necessary to enable the [ALJ] to
render a decision.” Holladay v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 1988)

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Plaintiff appears to attribute the failure of proof in this case to his “inability to afford
these tests or treatment.” (Doc. 12 at 11)
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(quoting Ford v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 659 F.2d 66, 69 (5th
Cir. Unit B Oct. 15, 1981)). Here, the record contains sufficient evidence,
including two independent consultative examinations, for the ALJ to have made
her decision. Fourth, Plaintiff has not shown that any purported evidentiary gaps
resulted in unfairness or “clear prejudice” to him, warranting a remand. Graham,
129 F.3d at 1423. The ALJ thoroughly evaluated Plaintiff’s medical history and
daily activities, and determined that he met the functional requirements for light
work with limitations. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate evidentiary gaps
sufficient to warrant a remand. Id., 129 F.3d at 1423.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned concludes that the decision
of the Commissioner is due to be affirmed. An appropriate order will be entered
separately.
DONE, this the 16th day of March, 2018.

______________________________
JOHN E. OTT
Chief United States Magistrate Judge

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