Jackson v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge John H England, III on 9/17/2018. (AFS)
FILED
2018 Sep-17 PM 03:25
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
EASTERN DIVISION
SANFORD JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.
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Case Number: 1:17-cv-01271-JHE
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Plaintiff Sanford Jackson (“Jackson”) seeks review, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), §
205(g) of the Social Security Act, of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (“Commissioner”), denying his application for a period of disability, disability
insurance benefits (“DIB”), and supplemental security income (“SSI”). (Doc. 1). Jackson timely
pursued and exhausted his administrative remedies. This case is therefore ripe for review under 42
U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). The undersigned has carefully considered the record and, for the
reasons stated below, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.
I. Factual and Procedural History
Jackson filed his application for a period of disability, DIB, and SSI on October 27, 2014,
alleging he became unable to work beginning August 29, 2014. (Tr. 125-37). The claims were
initially denied on February 5, 2015. (Tr. 74-78). Jackson requested a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 81-82). Jackson appeared and testified at a hearing held
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In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 73, the parties have voluntarily consented to have a United States Magistrate Judge
conduct any and all proceedings, including trial and the entry of final judgment. (Doc. 12).
on July 11, 2016, in Anniston, Alabama. (Tr. 33-53). After the hearing, the ALJ denied Jackson’s
claim by decision issued on August 26, 2016. (Tr. 21-29). Jackson sought review by the Appeals
Council, but it declined his request on June 1, 2017. (Tr. 1-6). On that date, the ALJ’s decision
became the final decision of the Commissioner. On July 28, 2017, Jackson initiated this action.
(See doc. 1).
Jackson was fifty-eight-years-old at the time of the ALJ’s decision. (Tr. 148). Jackson has
a high school education and past relevant work as a groundskeeper, conveyor off-bearer, pourer of
metal, grinder, and hand painter. (Tr. 28, 48-49). Jackson has alleged he is disabled based on
“slipped disc in lower back” and “pain in hips, knees, and chest.” (Tr. 152).
II. Standard of Review2
The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is narrowly circumscribed. The
function of this Court is to determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by
substantial evidence and whether proper legal standards were applied. Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 390 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). This Court must
“scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported
by substantial evidence.” Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983).
Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.” Id. It is “more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Id.
This Court must uphold factual findings supported by substantial evidence. “Substantial
evidence may even exist contrary to the findings of the ALJ, and [the reviewing court] may have
2
In general, the legal standards applied are the same whether a claimant seeks DIB or SSI.
However, separate, parallel statutes and regulations exist for DIB and SSI claims. Therefore,
citations in this opinion should be considered to refer to the appropriate parallel provision as
context dictates. The same applies to citations for statutes or regulations found in quoted court
decisions.
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taken a different view of it as a factfinder. Yet, if there is substantially supportive evidence, the
findings cannot be overturned.” Barron v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 227, 230 (11th Cir. 1991). However,
the Court reviews the ALJ’s legal conclusions de novo because no presumption of validity attaches
to the ALJ’s determination of the proper legal standards to be applied. Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d
528, 531 (11th Cir. 1993). If the court finds an error in the ALJ’s application of the law, or if the
ALJ fails to provide the court with sufficient reasoning for determining the proper legal analysis
has been conducted, it must reverse the ALJ’s decision. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143,
1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991).
III. Statutory and Regulatory Framework
To qualify for disability benefits and establish his or her entitlement for a period of
disability, a claimant must be disabled as defined by the Social Security Act and the Regulations
promulgated thereunder.3 The Regulations define “disabled” as “the inability to do any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can
be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than twelve (12) months.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). To establish entitlement to disability
benefits, a claimant must provide evidence of a “physical or mental impairment” which “must
result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which can be shown by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508.
The Regulations provide a five-step process for determining whether a claimant is
disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v). The Commissioner must determine in sequence:
(1)
(2)
(3)
whether the claimant is currently employed;
whether the claimant has a severe impairment;
whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals an impairment listed
The “Regulations” promulgated under the Social Security Act are listed in 20 C.F.R. Parts
400 to 499.
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(4)
(5)
by the [Commissioner];
whether the claimant can perform his or her past work; and
whether the claimant is capable of performing any work in the national
economy.
Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing to the formerly applicable C.F.R.
section), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561, 562-63 (7th Cir. 1999);
accord McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986). “Once the claimant has satisfied
steps One and Two, she will automatically be found disabled if she suffers from a listed
impairment. If the claimant does not have a listed impairment but cannot perform her work, the
burden shifts to the [Commissioner] to show that the claimant can perform some other job.” Pope,
998 F.2d at 477; accord Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995). The Commissioner
must further show such work exists in the national economy in significant numbers. Id.
IV. Findings of the Administrative Law Judge
After consideration of the entire record and application of the sequential evaluation
process, the ALJ made the following findings:
At Step One, the ALJ found Jackson meets the insured status requirements of the Social
Security Act through December 31, 2018, and that Jackson had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity from his alleged onset date of August 29, 2014. (Tr. 24). At Step Two, the ALJ found
Jackson has the following severe impairments: disc degeneration of the lumbar spine and leg
spasms. (Tr. 24-25). At Step Three, the ALJ found Jackson did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 25).
Before proceeding to Step Four, the ALJ determined Jackson’s residual functioning
capacity (“RFC”), which is the most a claimant can do despite his impairments. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545(a)(1). The ALJ determined that Jackson had the RFC to perform medium work as
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defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(c) and 416.967(c), which allows for occasional stooping and
crouching and no work around unprotected heights. (Tr. 26-28).
At Step Four, the ALJ determined, Jackson is capable of performing past relevant work as
a conveyer-off bearer, grinder, and hand painter. (Tr. 28). Therefore, there was no need to proceed
to the remaining steps of the sequential evaluation process, and the ALJ concluded Jackson had
not been under a disability as defined in the Social Security Act. (Tr. 28-29).
V. Analysis
Although the court may only reverse a finding of the Commissioner if it is not supported
by substantial evidence or because improper legal standards were applied, “[t]his does not relieve
the court of its responsibility to scrutinize the record in its entirety to ascertain whether substantial
evidence supports each essential administrative finding.” Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838
(11th Cir. 1982) (citing Strickland v. Harris, 615 F.2d 1103, 1106 (5th Cir. 1980)). The court,
however, “abstains from reweighing the evidence or substituting its own judgment for that of the
[Commissioner].” Id. (citation omitted).
Jackson contends the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the “credibility” of his complaints of
pain consistent with the Eleventh Circuit Pain Standard. (Doc. 10 at 4-10). However, substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s determination Jackson failed to demonstrate a disability, and the ALJ
applied the proper standards to reach this conclusion.
A. The ALJ’s Evaluation of Jackson’s Subjective Complaints and the Eleventh Circuit
Pain Standard
When a claimant alleges disability based on complaints of pain or other symptoms, he must
provide evidence of an underlying medical condition and either objective medical evidence
confirming the severity of his alleged symptoms or evidence establishing that his medical
condition could be reasonably expected to give rise to his alleged symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. §§
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404.1529, 416.929; Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). If the objective
medical evidence does not confirm the severity of the claimant’s alleged symptoms but the
claimant establishes he has an impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce his alleged
symptoms, the ALJ must evaluate the intensity and persistence of the claimant’s alleged symptoms
and their effects on the claimant’s ability to work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c), 416.929(c);
Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225-26 (11th Cir. 2002). If he or she does not fully credit
the claimant’s subjective pain testimony, the ALJ’s decision must articulate his or her reasons and
those reasons must be supported by substantial evidence. Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1012
(11th Cir. 1987).
Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 16-3p, effective March 28, 2016, eliminates the use of
the term “credibility” as it relates to assessing the claimant’s complaints of pain and clarifies that
the ALJ “will consider any personal observations of the individual in terms of how consistent those
observations are with the individual's statements about his or her symptoms as well as with all of
the evidence in the file.” SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, *7 (March 16, 2016). SSR 16-3p further
explains that the ALJ’s “decision must contain specific reasons for the weight given to the
individual’s symptoms, be consistent with and supported by the evidence, and be clearly
articulated so the individual and any subsequent review can assess how the adjudicator evaluated
the individual’s symptoms.” SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, *9.
Jackson points to several specific alleged errors in the ALJ’s decision, contending the ALJ
“mischaracterized” the record evidence upon which he relied, relied on “isolated notations in the
record” instead of considering the medical record as a whole, did not properly consider that
Jackson needed rest to relieve his pain, and insufficiently articulated his reasons for according Dr.
Ammar S. Aldaher’s opinion significant weight. (Doc. 10 at 6-10). Each will be addressed in
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turn.
1. The ALJ Did Not Mischaracterize the Evidence and Properly Relied on the
Record as a Whole
As to Jackson’s arguments that the ALJ “mischaracterized” evidence and relied on
“isolated notations,” the ALJ’s decision shows that the ALJ discussed nearly all of the evidence
Jackson cites. See Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (“there is no rigid
requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his decision”). Jackson
points to the record evidencing his complaints of pain, physical examination findings showing
musculoskeletal tenderness, spasms, and moderate lumbar pain with range of motion; prescriptions
for medications (including an increase in Jackson’s Neurontin dosage), diagnosis of recurrent back
pain with radiation and lumbago with sciatica, a lumbar x-ray, and a referral for an orthopedic
consultation. (Doc. 10 at 6-7). Notwithstanding Jackson’s contentions, the ALJ cited and
considered this evidence. Specifically, the ALJ noted complaints of pain in January 2014 and
January 2015; complaints of tenderness and spasm in the lower back with radiation into his legs
and feet at a February 18, 2015 appointment, which were confirmed upon examination; treatment
with Mobic, Baclofen, and Neurotin; an x-ray that revealed straightening of the lumbar lordosis
and posterior arthopathy at L3 and L5, with disc disease at L5; as well as an assessment of lumbago
with sciatic. (Tr. 24-25). There is no mischaracterization in the ALJ’s presentation of this
evidence.
As to Jackson’s assertion that the ALJ relied on “isolated notations,” a review of the record
demonstrates the ALJ relied on the record as a whole. The ALJ considered the March 2015 lumbar
x-ray, which showed straightening of the lumbar lordosis and posterior arthopathy at L3 and L5,
with disc disease at L5, along with Dr. Aldaher’s January 2015 findings Jackson’s back was
without spasm or deformity along with having normal range of motion; that his gait was normal
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with no ataxia or spasticity. (Tr. 25, 27). Treatment notes consistently show Jackson’s extremities
were without abnormalities, he had no difficultly with ambulation and normal gait, and he only
required conservative treatment with prescription medication.
(Tr. 214-15, 220-21, 229).
Treatment notes further show that in October 2015, Jackson reported that his pain was relieved by
medication and rest (tr. 217), and that in March 2016, Jackson reported his pain was “intermittent”
and “better” (tr. 228).
2. There is No Error in the ALJ’s Consideration of the fact Jackson’s Pain was
Relieved by “Medication and Rest” and that His Neurontin Dosage was
Increased Once.
Jackson further argues the ALJ did not properly consider that he reported both medication
and rest relieved his pain. (Doc. 10 at 8). The treatment note at issue states that “[s]ymptoms are
relieved by pain meds/drugs and rest” (tr. 217), and the ALJ stated “[Jackson] also reported that
pain medications and rest relieved his symptoms.” (Tr. 25). It is unclear how Jackson contends
the ALJ did not properly account for the rest aspect of this evidence, other than his argument that
the ALJ should have concluded that he needed rest along with pain medicine. However, as an
initial matter, the treatment note can be read in more than one way. Is Jackson’s pain relieved by
the combination of medication and rest? Or, should it be read in the disjunctive, that either
medication or rest relieves his pain? Is it some combination thereof? It is not clear from the note
itself, and the ALJ’s reading and application is reasonable. Notably, although Jackson’s doctors
prescribed medications for pain relief (tr. 215, 220-21, 229), there is nothing in the record to show
that any of his doctors prescribed rest to relieve his pain. To the contrary, as the Commissioner
points out, one of Jackson’s treating physicians, Dr. Stacy Towles-Moore, advised Jackson to walk
daily as treatment for his back condition. (Tr. 229). Furthermore, Jackson fails to articulate the
amount of rest he would need to relieve his pain and how that would prevent him from being able
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to work.
Jackson also points to the increase in dosage of his Neurontin prescription from 100 mg
three times a day to 300 mg twice a day at his March 2016 appointment as evidence that his pain
must not have been controlled. (Doc. 10 at 8). This is not the only conclusion that can reasonably
be drawn from the evidence, and it was proper for the ALJ not to draw this conclusion. At the
same appointment that Jackson’s Neurontin dosage was increased, Dr. Towles-Moore noted that
rest, prescription medication, and heat are relieving factors and that his pain “comes and goes,” is
“not any worse,” and that “it is better.” (Tr. 228). Additionally, Dr. Towles-Moore prescribed
daily walking. (Id.). This adjustment in one of Jackson’s medications does not necessitate the
conclusion that Jackson’s pain was not controlled as he now argues.
3. The ALJ Properly Accorded Dr. Aldaher’s Opinion Significant Weight
Finally, Jackson’s contention that the ALJ did not properly explain why he accorded
significant weight to Dr. Aldaher’s February 2015 examination findings/opinion and that Dr.
Aldaher’s opinion is “vague” (doc. 10 at 10) is belied by the record. Dr. Aldaher performed a
physical consultative examination on January 28, 2015.4 (Tr. 24, 208-09). As the ALJ reported,
Dr. Aldaher’s notes reveal that Jackson denied radiation, paresthesias, numbness, and muscle
weakness. (Tr. 208). Dr. Aldaher’s examination revealed Jackson’s back had no spasm or
deformity; his lumbosacral area and upper and lower extremities had normal range of motion with
no abnormalities; his gait was normal; and he had no ataxia, muscle weakness, atrophy, or
spasticity. (Id.). Based on these findings, Dr. Aldaher opined that he believed Jackson was able
to do work related activities such as sitting, standing, walking, lifting, carrying, and handling
Notably, Jackson does not allege the ALJ relied on Dr. Aldaher’s opinion over a
treating physician’s opinion (and the ALJ did not). Therefore, no particular significance should
be placed on the fact Dr. Aldaher is a non-treating physician.
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objects and that his hearing and speaking were intact. (Tr. 209). Dr. Aldher’s assessment and
opinion are certainly not vague. Furthermore, the ALJ’s explains why he accords them significant
weight. (Tr. 24, 28). Specifically, after outlining Dr. Aldaher’s findings (tr. 24), the ALJ explains
that he is according those findings and opinions significant weight because they are consistent with
the medical evidence as a whole and with Jackson’s RFC. (Tr. 28).
VI. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, and upon careful consideration of the administrative record
and memoranda of the parties, the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying
Jackson’s claim for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security
income is AFFIRMED, and this action DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
DONE this 17th day of September, 2018.
_______________________________
JOHN H. ENGLAND, III
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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