Nooney v. Taylor Pallets and Recycling et al

Filing 38

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER- For the reasons stated within, there are no genuine issues of material fact, and the defts are entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to claims for wantonness and negligent and/or wanton hiring, supervision, and entrustment; Accordingly, the defts' partial motion for summary judgment is GRANTED (Doc 30 ). Signed by Magistrate Judge Staci G Cornelius on 3/4/20. (MRR, )

FILED
2020 Mar-04 PM 01:51
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
EASTERN DIVISION
PATRICK NOONEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
TAYLOR PALLETS AND
RECYCLING, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:17-cv-01519-SGC

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 1
This matter arises out of a January 7, 2016 traffic accident in Talladega
County, Alabama. (Doc. 1). Presently pending is the motion for partial summary
judgment filed by the defendants, Taylor Pallets and Recycling, Inc., and Martin
Paz-Plata. (Doc. 30). The motion is fully briefed and ripe for adjudication. (Docs.
31-33, 35, 37). As explained below, the motion is due to be granted.
I.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary

judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
1

The parties have consented to dispositive magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(c). (Doc. 10).

The party asking for summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of
informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the
pleadings or filings which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Id. at 323. Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e)
requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and by his own
affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. See id. at 324.
The substantive law identifies which facts are material and which are
irrelevant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). All
reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor
of the non-movant. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir.
1993). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If the
evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment
may be granted. See id. at 249.
II.

MOTION TO STRIKE CONSTRUED AS OBJECTIONS
Following the plaintiff’s opposition to the motion for summary judgment,

the defendants filed a motion to strike. (Doc. 34). The plaintiff did not file any
opposition to the motion to strike, and the time to do so has expired. (See Doc. 11
at 5). On January 13, 2020, the court entered an order terminating the motion to
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strike and noting the grounds asserted in the motion would be treated as objections
to the admissibility of evidence attached to the plaintiff’s opposition. (Doc. 36).
Thus construed, the defendants object to two exhibits attached to the plaintiff’s
opposition: (1) the Alabama Uniform Traffic Crash Report (“Accident Report”)
concerning the accident (Doc. 32-1; Doc. 37-1); and (2) a report compiled by a
third party, HireRight, showing six traffic violations issued to Paz-Plata (the
“HireRight Report”).

(Doc. 32-5; Doc. 37-5).

As explained below, the

defendants’ objections are SUSTAINED, and this memorandum opinion does not
consider these exhibits.
A.

Accident Report

The defendants object to the admissibility of the Accident Report as hearsay.
(Doc. 34 at 2-5). Under Alabama law, accident reports may not be used as
evidence “in any trial, civil or criminal, arising out of an accident.” ALA. CODE §
32-10-11; see Mainor v. Hayneville Tel. Co., 715 So. 2d 800, 802 (Ala. Civ. App.
1997) (“Section 32-10-11 provides that no Alabama Uniform Accident Report
shall be used as evidence in any civil or criminal trial arising out of an accident.”).
The Alabama rule applies in this case, which is premised on diversity jurisdiction.
FED. R. EVID. 501; see Cardona v. Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc., 737 F. App'x 978,
981-82 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).

Accordingly, the Accident Report is

inadmissible here. Quarles v. Tenn. Steel Haulers, Inc., No. 17-0308, 2019 WL
3

758616, at *7 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 20, 2019) (finding accident report inadmissible at
summary judgment stage).
B.

HireRight Report

Next, the defendants object to the admissibility of the HireRight Report,
purporting to show traffic citations Paz-Plata received during the seven years
preceding the accident at issue here. (Doc. 34 at 5-11). The document was
prepared by HireRight—a company which runs background checks on drivers—for
another trucking company at which Paz-Plata had applied. (Doc. 32-5; Doc. 37-5;
see Doc. 32 at 7, n.1). Defendants object to the HireRight Report as inadmissible
hearsay. 2 (Doc. 34 at 5-11). The HireRight Report shows six moving violations:
four issued in California from 2010 through 2013, and two issued in Georgia in
2013. Defendants take particular issue with the four California citations. PazPlata admitted to receiving the two traffic citations in Georgia but testified he only
received two tickets in California—one for speeding and one failing to stop at
scales. (Id. at 8; Doc. 32-2 at 14; Doc. 37-2 at 14).
The plaintiff offers the HireRight Report to show Paz-Plata received the
traffic tickets reflected therein. Accordingly, the HireRight Report is inadmissible
hearsay unless it falls under an exception. The defendants contend the HireRight

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Defendants also contend the HireRight Report is unreliable, pointing to a stipulated final
judgment in a Federal Trade Commission enforcement action for failure to provide accurate
reports. (Doc. 34 at 5-6; see Doc. 34-1).

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Report does not qualify as a business record. (Doc. 34 at 9-11). Although the
plaintiff has not responded to the defendants’ arguments, the undersigned
concludes the business record exception is the only potentially applicable
exception. Because the HireRight Report is not authenticated, it does not qualify
as a business record. FED. R. EVID. 803(6)(D); Saunders v. Emory Healthcare,
Inc., 360 F. App’x 110, 113 (11th Cir. 2010) (court properly struck unauthenticated
exhibits at summary judgment). Accordingly, the HireRight Report constitutes
inadmissible hearsay.
III.

FACTS
Paz-Plata obtained his commercial driver’s license (“CDL”) in California

while living there in 2002 or 2003. (Doc. 31 at 2). Paz-Plata took the California
CDL test twice in Spanish; he passed on his second attempt. (Doc. 32 at 6; Doc.
35 at 2). Prior to obtaining his CDL, Paz-Plata attended a truck driving school.
(Doc. 31 at 2). Paz-Plata’s CDL has never been revoked or suspended, and he has
never failed a DOT inspection. (Id. at 2, 3). While living in California, Paz-Plata
received two traffic tickets—one for speeding and one for failing to stop at scales.
(Id. at 3). In 2011 or 2012, Paz-Plata moved to Georgia and obtained a Georgia
CDL. (Id.). In Georgia, Paz-Plata worked for five or six months driving a box
truck for a secondhand store. (Id.). Paz-Plata left that job to drive tractor-trailers
for a company named CEI; he worked at CEI for two years. (Id.). While working
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at CEI, Paz-Plata received two citations. The first citation was the result of an
accident in which Paz-Plata backed a commercial vehicle into another vehicle,
causing property damage but no injuries. (Id.). This was the only accident in
which Paz-Plata had ever been involved—whether professionally or personally—
prior to the accident giving rise to the instant lawsuit. (Id. at 4). The second
citation was issued when trash escaped from the covered trailer of a CEI truck PazPlata was driving. (Id. at 3). These two citations were the only ones Paz-Plata
received after moving to Georgia. (Id.).
Less than a month after losing his job at CEI—due to the backing accident—
Paz-Plata submitted an application with Taylor Pallets, together with his Georgia
CDL and a current medical examiner’s certificate. (Doc. 31 at 4; Doc. 32 at 7, 25).
Paz-Plata did not fill-out the application himself; he had an English-speaking
friend complete the form. (Doc. 32 at 7). After an interview, Taylor Pallets hired
Paz-Plata on October 8, 2013. (Doc. 31 at 4). It was Taylor Pallets’ practice to
obtain an applicant’s Motor Vehicle Report (“MVR”), showing their driving
history. (Doc. 32 at 7; Doc. 35 at 5).

However, the decision-makers who hired

and supervised Paz-Plata are no longer employed by Taylor Pallets. (Doc. 35 at 5).
Accordingly, Taylor Pallets does not know what was done to check Paz-Plata’s
driving history at the time he was hired. (Id.). Paz-Plata did not provide Taylor
Pallets an MVR or a list of prior employers. (Doc. 32 at 7-8). Likewise, Taylor
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Pallets did not perform a criminal background check or subject Paz-Plata to drug
screening prior to hiring him. (Id. at 8). Between his October 8, 2013 hiring at
Taylor Pallets and the January 7, 2016 accident underlying this lawsuit, Paz-Plata
was not involved in any traffic accidents and did not receive any traffic citations.
(Doc. 31 at 5).
After hiring Paz-Plata, Taylor Pallets assigned another employee to ride
along for one day to assess Paz-Plata’s driving skills. (Doc. 31 at 4; Doc. 32 at 8).
This was the only driving-related training Paz-Plata received. (Doc. 32 at 8).
Taylor Pallets did not have a driver safety manual but occasionally held safety
meetings for its drivers; Paz-Plata testified safety meetings were infrequent. (Id.;
Doc. 31 at 4). While the owner of Taylor Pallets testified the company had a
safety policy, no one at the company assured compliance with the policy. (Doc. 32
at 8). No one at Taylor Pallets told Paz-Plata he was subject to Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Regulations; neither was he provided with a copy of applicable
regulations. (Id. at 8-9). Paz-Plata testified he has never reviewed the Georgia
CDL manual. (Id. at 9). Taylor Pallets did not provide drivers with CB Radios or
cell phones, and Paz-Plata used his personal cell phone to keep in touch with the
main office. (Id. at 9). If issues arose, Taylor Pallets did not provide a dedicated
hotline; instead, drivers would call the main office number. (Id.). Taylor Pallets
does not conduct internal investigations following accidents to determine if they
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were preventable. (Id.).
On January 7, 2016, Paz-Plata drove a bobtail tractor3 from Georgia to meet
a Taylor Pallets tractor-trailer which was broken-down on the right shoulder of
westbound I-20 near Talladega. (Doc. 31 at 5; Doc. 32 at 3). Paz-Plata intended to
hitch the trailer to his tractor and haul it to its intended destination. (See Doc. 31 at
5). The bobtail tractor Paz-Plata drove that day was the same one he had been
driving for the previous year; he performed a pre-trip inspection of the tractor
before departing Georgia that morning. (Id.; see Doc. 32 at 4).
When Paz-Plata reached the disabled tractor-trailer, he pulled over in the
right-hand emergency lane in front of the disabled tractor. (Doc. 31 at 5). The
driver of the disabled tractor had already disconnected it from the trailer, but there
was not enough space for Paz-Plata to pull between it and the trailer. (Id.).
Accordingly, Paz-Plata instructed the other driver to move the disabled tractor
forward to create more space between it and the trailer. (Id.). After the driver of
the disabled tractor pulled forward, Paz-Plata walked behind the disabled tractor
and determined there was enough space to pull his tractor in front of the trailer.
(Id. 5-6). Paz-Plata testified he knew the maneuver would require him to slow
below 40 miles per hour on the interstate, would impede the flow of traffic, was
dangerous, and would require special precautions. (Doc. 32 at 4). Paz-Plata
3

A tractor is “bobtailed” when it is driven without the trailer attached. (See Doc. 31 at 2, n.2).

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testified the rear of the disabled tractor was eighty feet ahead of the front of the
trailer. (Doc. 31 at 5-6). The plaintiff testified the disabled tractor and trailer were
separated by less than the length of a bobtail tractor, although he could not say how
long a bobtail tractor is. (See id. at 7).
Paz-Plata planned to circle back to pull between the trailer and the disabled
tractor. (Doc. 31 at 6). To accomplish this, Paz-Plata drove his bobtail tractor
west to the next exit, crossed over to eastbound I-20, and drove east to an exit
where he could double-back. (Id.). Before re-entering westbound I-20, Paz-Plata
turned on his hazard lights; he testified he engaged the hazard lights to signal that
he was driving slowly and would be turning off the roadway. (Id.; see Doc. 32 at
4-5). Paz-Plata mistakenly thought engaging the hazard lights disabled the turn
indicator lights but that the brake lights would still function. (Doc. 32 at 4). PazPlata had it backward; the turn indicators still function, but the hazard lights use
the same bulbs as the brake lights, meaning the brake lights do not function when
the hazard lights are on. (Id.). At the point where Paz-Plata re-entered I-20, there
are three westbound lanes; the interstate narrowed to two lanes at some point
before reaching the disabled tractor-trailer. (See Doc. 31 at 7).
It appears Paz-Plata entered westbound I-20 just ahead of the plaintiff, who
was also traveling west; the plaintiff saw Paz-Plata enter the interstate with his
hazard lights engaged, three miles or more before the accident site. (See Doc. 32 at
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5; Doc. 31 at 7). The plaintiff testified he believed the hazard lights indicated PazPlata was “in a hurry.” (Doc. 32 at 5). At some point prior to the accident, PazPlata was traveling in the middle westbound lane; once the interstate narrowed to
two lanes, Paz-Plata was traveling in the righthand lane. (Doc. 31 at 7). The
plaintiff testified traffic became congested where the interstate narrowed. (Doc. 32
at 5). As Paz-Plata approached the stranded trailer, the only vehicle he noticed
behind him was the plaintiff’s; he did not see any vehicles in the left lane and
assumed the plaintiff would pass him on the left. (Doc. 31 at 6). As Paz-Plata
began braking to pull into the emergency lane between the disabled tractor and
trailer, he looked into his rearview mirror and did not see the plaintiff behind him.
(Id.).

Additionally, because Paz-Plata mistakenly believed the hazard lights

disabled his turn signals, he did not turn on his right blinker to signal his
impending turn. (Doc. 32 at 5). This, combined with the brake lights being
overridden by the hazard lights, meant that Paz-Plata signaled neither his right turn
nor his braking. (Id.). The only indicator lights engaged just prior to the accident
were Paz-Plata’s hazard lights, which had been on since he entered westbound I20, miles earlier. (Id.).
The plaintiff could not estimate how fast Paz-Plata was traveling prior to the
accident, although he did state both vehicles were going a “good bit” under the
speed limit. (Doc. 31-5 at 7; see Doc. 31 at 7-8; Doc. 35 at 2). Paz-Plata estimated
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he was going approximately 50 miles per hour before he started braking to enter
the righthand emergency lane. (See Doc. 32 at 5). When Paz-Plata reached the
trailer, he turned into the emergency lane between it and the disabled tractor; he
estimated he was traveling about 40 miles per hour when he began pulling into the
emergency lane. (Id.; see Doc. 31 at 8). However, Paz-Plata did not have enough
space to complete the maneuver, leaving the bobtail tractor’s rear wheels
protruding into the righthand travel lane. (Doc. 31 at 8). The plaintiff testified the
left lane was occupied by other vehicles so he could not swerve to avoid the
collision. (Doc. 31-5 at 8). Instead, the plaintiff braked hard and skidded in an
attempt to avoid colliding with the bobtail tractor. (Doc. 32 at 6). Paz-Plata was
stopped when the front, passenger-side of the plaintiff’s vehicle struck the rear
wheels of the bob-tail tractor; the plaintiff could not estimate how fast he was
traveling when the accident occurred. (Doc. 31 at 8). Contemporaneously with the
initial collision, another vehicle, driven by a non-party, struck the plaintiff’s
vehicle from behind. (Id.). The plaintiff injured his neck and left shoulder and has
undergone four surgeries as a result of the accident. (Doc. 32 at 6).
Following the accident, Paz-Plata continued to work for Taylor Pallets as
normal; he did not meet with anybody from Taylor Pallets, receive any training, or
fill out any reports based on the accident. (Doc. 31-1 at 29; Doc. 33-1 at 30). PazPlata continued working for Taylor Pallets until September 2016, when he quit to
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buy his own truck. (Doc. 31-1 at 16; Doc. 33-1 at 17). In October 2016, Paz-Plata
returned as a driver for CEI, although he now drives his own truck. (Doc. 31-1 at
16; Doc. 33-1 at 17).
IV.

DISCUSSION
The defendant moves for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claims for

wantonness and negligent training and supervision. (Doc. 31 at 1-2). Substantive
Alabama law governs these claims, which are addressed in turn.
A.

Wantonness

Alabama law defines wantonness as “[c]onduct which is carried on with a
reckless or conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others.” ALA. CODE § 6–
11–20(b)(3). As explained by the Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions, a defendant’s
conduct is wanton if he “consciously acts or fails to act with a reckless or
conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others, and [] is aware that harm will
likely or probably result.” 2 Ala. Pattern Jury Instr. Civ. § 29.00 (3d ed.). As
explained by the Alabama Supreme Court:
Wantonness is not merely a higher degree of culpability than
negligence. Negligence and wantonness, plainly and simply, are
qualitatively different tort concepts of actionable culpability. Implicit
in wanton, willful, or reckless misconduct is an acting, with
knowledge of danger, or with consciousness, that the doing or not
doing of some act will likely result in injury.
Carter v. Treadway Trucking, Inc., 611 So. 2d 1034, 1035 (Ala. 1992) (quotation

12

marks omitted) (overruled on other grounds by Robertson v. Gaddy Electrical and
Plumbing, LLC, 53 So. 3d 75 (Ala. 2010)).

Of course, a plaintiff claiming

wantonness need not prove the defendant had a “specific design or intent to injure”
him. Joseph v. Staggs, 519 So. 2d 952 (Ala. 1988). As this court has noted, in the
context of a traffic accident, a plaintiff must show the defendant was driving “in a
manner likely to result in injury. . . . However, an error in judgment is insufficient
to demonstrate that an alleged tortfeasor has acted in a manner likely to result in
injury.” Stephens v. Snow, No. 16-442-SGC, Doc. 24 at 1 (N.D. Ala. entered Sept.
25, 2017).
“Wantonness is a question of fact for the jury, unless there is a total lack of

substantial evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer wantonness.” Cash
v. Caldwell, 603 So. 2d 1001, 1003 (Ala. 1992). “The most crucial element of
wantonness is knowledge, and while that element need not be shown by direct
evidence it may be made to appear by showing circumstances from which the fact
of knowledge is a legitimate inference . . . it may not be left to the conjecture or
speculation of the jury.” Roberts v. Brown, 384 So. 2d 1047, 1048 (Ala. 1980).
Considering the facts of this case under the summary judgment standard, the
plaintiff has not presented substantial evidence from which a jury could infer PazPlata was anything more than negligent. The plaintiff relies on Paz-Plata’s failure
to use his turn signal to indicate he was entering the exit lane, coupled with his
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superior knowledge of his planned maneuver. (Doc. 32 at 15-16). However, the
plaintiff has submitted no evidence to show Paz-Plata consciously chose not to
signal his intentions to slow down and turn.

Indeed, Paz-Plata engaged his

emergency lights with the intention of warning other drivers that he would be
slowing and pulling into the emergency lane. Paz-Plata mistakenly believed: (1)
activating his emergency lights disabled his turn indicator lights; and (2) his brake
lights were functioning. Accordingly, the plaintiff has not shown that Paz-Plata
consciously chose not to signal his intentions. Cf. Vines v. Cook, No. 15-0111,
2015 WL 8328675, at *4 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 8, 2015) (granting summary judgment on
wantonness claim where plaintiffs failed to submit evidence semi driver
consciously ignored warning signal, knew traffic light was turning red, and chose
to run the red light).

Instead, the plaintiff’s evidence—under the summary

judgment standard—shows a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Paz-Plata
acted negligently in: failing to understand which indicator lights were affected by
the emergency lights; choosing to engage his hazard lights as early as he did;
failing to use his turn indicator; and failing to ensure he had enough space between
the disabled tractor and trailer to completely remove his bobtail tractor from the
travel lane to the emergency lane. Even assuming—as plaintiff testified—less than
a bobtail tractor-length separated the back of the disabled tractor and the front of
the trailer, this constitutes no more than an error in Paz-Plata’s judgment.
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These summary judgment facts do not constitute substantial evidence of
wantonness. See Vines, 2015 WL 8328675 at *5 (“A jury would need a factual
basis that [the defendant] saw on-coming traffic and still tried to beat the red light.
. . . Simply put, the fact that [the defendant] saw the green light, then moved
around the truck and proceeded through the intersection without realizing that the
light had turned red does not prove that he knew, or recklessly disregarded, that he
would likely harm others on the road.”).
Additionally, merely violating another driver’s right-of-way is insufficient to
show wantonness. See, e.g., Thedford v. Payne, 813 So. 2d 905, 911 (Ala. 2001)
(rear-end collision caused by failure to look ahead not wanton); Ex parte Anderson,
682 So. 2d 467, 470 (Ala. 1996) (accident caused when driver entered intersection
despite having obstructed view of oncoming traffic not wanton); George v.
Champion Ins. Co., 591 So. 2d 852, 853 (Ala. 1991) (affirming summary judgment
on wantonness claim where defendant was not watching the road because she was
talking with backseat passengers, causing her to run a red light); Partridge v.
Miller, 553 So. 2d 585, 587 (Ala. 1989) (affirming directed verdict on wantonness
where defendant turned in front of plaintiff, who had the right-of-way).
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff has not submitted substantial
evidence of wantonness.

Because the defendants are entitled to summary

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judgment on the wantonness claim, it is not necessary to address the parties’
arguments regarding whether the self-destructive behavior presumption applies.
B.

Negligent/Wanton Hiring, Entrustment, Retention, Supervision

In Alabama, claims for negligent hiring, supervision, retention, and
entrustment all share a common element: the plaintiff must show the tortfeasor
employee was incompetent. Halford v. Alamo Rent–A–Car, LLC, 921 So. 2d 409,
412 (Ala. 2005); Johnson v. Brunswick Riverview Club, Inc., 39 So. 3d 132, 140
(Ala. 2009). The same is true regarding similar claims premised on wantonness.
See Vines, 2015 WL 8328675, at *6; Bruck v. Jim Walter Corp., 470 So. 2d 1141,
1144 (Ala. 1985). In Alabama, incompetence is the “state or fact of being unable
or unqualified to do something.” Halford, 921 So. 2d at 415. Alabama courts
measure a driver’s competence “by the driver's demonstrated ability (or inability)
to properly drive a vehicle.” Id. at 414-15. Additionally, “[n]egligence is not
synonymous with incompetency. The most competent may be negligent. . . . But
one who is habitually negligent may on that account be incompetent.” Pritchett v.
ICN Medical Alliance, Inc., 938 So. 2d 933, 941 (Ala. 2006) (alteration
incorporated).
Paz-Plata’s driving history does not demonstrate that he was incompetent.
For summary judgment purposes, he received four traffic tickets and was involved
in one traffic accident in the seven years prior to the January 2016 accident made
16

the basis of this lawsuit; all of these occurred prior to being hired by Taylor Pallets,
more than two years earlier. However, a driver need not have a pristine driving
record to be found competent. Indeed, courts applying Alabama law have granted
summary judgment—on the basis of plaintiffs’ failure to show incompetence—
where tortfeasors had driving records similar to Paz-Plata’s.

Askew v. R&L

Transfer, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303 (M.D. Ala. 2009) (two moving
violations and four minor accidents over previous nine years); Vines, 2015 WL
8328675, at *6 (one speeding ticket and one accident over previous four years);
Lanham v. Gnewuch, No. 13-1358-VEH, 2015 WL 3966480, *8-9 (N.D. Ala. Jun.
30, 2015) (two preventable accidents in previous two years); Thedford, 813 So. 2d
at 912 (one similar accident three months prior); Pryor v. Brown & Root USA, Inc.,
674 So. 2d 45, 52 (Ala. 1995) (two speeding tickets and a suspended DUI charge
over ten years).
Moreover, by the time of the accident at issue, Paz-Plata had demonstrated
his competence by driving a Taylor Pallets truck without incident for more than
two years. Likewise, Paz-Plata had a valid Georgia CDL which had never been
suspended or revoked. All of these facts militate against finding Paz-Plata was an
incompetent driver. See Vines, 2015 WL 8328675 at *5 (noting defendant had
several years of experience driving log trucks and had a valid, never-revoked
CDL). Finally, to the extent the plaintiff suggests Paz-Plata’s inability to speak
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English yields him incompetent, this argument fails. There is simply no evidence,
even under the summary judgment standard, to suggest that Paz-Plata’s inability to
speak English contributed to the accident in this case.

See id. (rejecting as

irrelevant argument that logging truck was overweight where there was no
indication that the vehicle’s weight contributed to the accident).
For the foregoing reasons, there are no genuine issues of material fact, and
the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiff’s claims
for negligent and/or wanton hiring, supervision, and entrustment.
V.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, there are no genuine issues of material fact, and

the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to claims for
wantonness and negligent and/or wanton hiring, supervision, and entrustment.
Accordingly, the defendants’ partial motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
(Doc. 30).
DONE this 4th day of March, 2020.

______________________________
STACI G. CORNELIUS
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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