Raulerson v. New South Express LLC
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 26 Joint MOTION to Dismiss filed by Elwood Staffing Services, Inc., New South Express LLC. All claims in theSecond Amended Complaint, except the ADA retaliation claims based upon the factsspecifically set out in the Plaintiffs EEOC charges, are DISMISSED withprejudice. Signed by Judge Virginia Emerson Hopkins on 7/24/2018. (KWC)
FILED
2018 Jul-24 PM 12:47
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
EASTERN DIVISION
DEREK RAULERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
NEW SOUTH EXPRESS, LLC, et
al.,
Defendants.
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) Case No.: 1:17-CV-1966-VEH
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This is a civil action filed by the Plaintiff, Derek Raulerson, against Elwood
Staffing Services, Inc. (“Elwood”) and New South Express, LLC. (“NSE”), his former
joint employers. (Doc. 25). The Second Amended Complaint alleges that, after the
Plaintiff complained about the Defendants’ alleged discrimination against his coemployees, the Defendants retaliated against him in violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§12101-12213 (the “ADA”). The case comes before the
Court on the Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss, filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted (the “Motion”). (Doc. 26). For the reasons stated herein, the Motion will
be GRANTED.
I.
STANDARD
Generally, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that the complaint
provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). However, to survive a motion to dismiss brought under
Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (“Twombly”).
A claim has facial plausibility “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556) (“Iqbal”). That is, the complaint must include enough facts “to raise
a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation and
footnote omitted). Pleadings that contain nothing more than “a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action” do not meet Rule 8 standards, nor do pleadings
suffice that are based merely upon “labels or conclusions” or “naked assertion[s]”
without supporting factual allegations. Id. at 555, 557 (citation omitted).
Once a claim has been stated adequately, however, “it may be supported by
showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Id. at 563
(citation omitted). Further, when ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court must “take the
factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most
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favorable to the plaintiff.” Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir.
2008) (citing Glover v. Liggett Group, Inc., 459 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006)).
II.
ANALYSIS
In the previous Complaint (the Amended Complaint), the Plaintiff alleged that
the Defendants discriminated against employees based on pregnancy and disability
and that he was retaliated against by the Defendants after he “complained repeatedly
of these discriminatory practices.” (Doc. 6 at 3). The Plaintiff’s discrimination claim
was brought only pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e through 2000e-17 (“Title VII”).
In its previous opinion, this Court wrote:
Title VII, as amended by the [the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (the
“PDA”)], provides a cause of action for retaliation in response to the
Plaintiff’s complaints of discrimination based upon pregnancy. There is,
however, no Title VII claim for the Defendant’s alleged retaliation
against the Plaintiff for his complaints of disability discrimination. Any
such claim should have been made under the [ADA]. Therefore, as
currently pleaded, the Amended Complaint does not set out a claim for
retaliation in response to the Plaintiff’s complaints of disability
discrimination.
(Doc. 24 at 9-10). Furthermore, the Court wrote:
The EEOC charges filed by the Plaintiff allege only one instance of
protected activity–the Plaintiff’s complaint regarding “a disabled
candidate for employment [who] was discriminated against by the Sr.
Human Resource Representative on February 11, 2016.” (Doc. 11-1 at
2; doc. 11-2 at 2) (emphasis added). The Defendants argue that the
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pregnancy discrimination claim must be dismissed because neither
EEOC charge filed by the Plaintiff in this case mentions complaints
regarding pregnancy, or retaliation against the Plaintiff for making such
complaints.
(Doc. 24 at 11) (emphasis in original). The Court agreed with the Defendants and
held that any claims of retaliation based upon the Plaintiff’s alleged reporting of
pregnancy discrimination were barred. (Doc. 24 at 10). The Court granted the
motion to dismiss, but wrote:
However, the Court holds that the EEOC’s investigation of the
allegations in the charges would have covered a claim under the ADA
for retaliation. Accordingly, the Plaintiff will be given one additional
opportunity, consistent with the holdings in this opinion, to amend his
Complaint to add an ADA claim.
(Doc. 24 at 20-21) (emphasis in original).
The Second Amended Complaint, filed on May 11, 2018, contains factual
allegations regarding the Defendants’ alleged discrimination against pregnant
employees, and the Plaintiff’s complaints regarding same. (See doc. 25 at 7-8, ¶¶3538). The Defendants argue that any claims based on these allegations should be
dismissed. For the reasons stated in this Court’s previous opinion, the Motion will
be granted to that extent.1
1
Furthermore, the Second Amended Complaint alleges only a violation of the ADA. As
discussed in the Court’s previous opinion, retaliation based on complaints of pregnancy
discrimination is actionable under Title VII.
4
The Defendants move to dismiss any retaliation claims based upon facts other
than the one allegation of disability discrimination set out in the Plaintiff’s EEOC
charges. In response, the Plaintiff argues only that
a reasonable inquiry into the circumstances and claims asserted in
Plaintiff’s EEOC Intake Questionnaire would have included, and did
include, an investigation regarding Plaintiff’s claims related to his
complaints about the treatment of pregnant employees. These claims
were part of the EEOC’s investigative process, and therefore,
administrative remedies have been exhausted as it relates to the claims.
(Doc. 27 at 4). For the reasons stated in this Court’s previous opinion (see doc, 24
at 13-16), the Plaintiff cannot rely on the Intake Questionnaire.2 All retaliation claims
based on the Plaintiff’s complaints of discrimination, except those specifically set out
in his EEOC charges, will be dismissed.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Motion is GRANTED. All claims in the
Second Amended Complaint, except the ADA retaliation claims based upon the facts
specifically set out in the Plaintiff’s EEOC charges, are DISMISSED with
prejudice.
2
The Plaintiff makes this same argument as to the pregnancy discrimination claims. It
fails for this same reason.
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DONE and ORDERED this 24th day of July, 2018.
VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS
United States District Judge
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