Woods v. United States of America

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 11/6/2017. (KAM, )

FILED
2017 Nov-06 PM 04:13
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
EASTERN DIVISION

REGINALD WOODS,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

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Case No.:

1:17-cv-08029-RDP
1:97-cr-00159-RDP-TMP

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the court is the Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence filed by Petitioner
Reginald Woods (“Petitioner”), a federal prisoner acting pro se, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
(Case No. 1:17-cv-08029-RDP, Doc. # 1). Following the filing of Petitioner’s pending § 2255
Motion, the Government moved to dismiss Petitioner’s Motion for lack of jurisdiction. (Case No.
1:17-cv-08029-RDP, Doc. # 5). For the reasons explained below, the Government’s Motion
(Case No. 1:17-cv-08029-RDP, Doc. # 5) is due to be granted.
I. Background
Petitioner has previously filed both a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and an application for leave to file a second or successive § 2255
motion. (Case No. 1:97-cr-00159-RDP-TMP-1, Docs. # 104, 108). Petitioner filed his first
§ 2255 Motion on August 12, 2014. (Case No. 1:14-cv-08046-JHH, Doc. # 1). On January 23,
2015, the court denied Petitioner’s § 2255 Motion. (Case No. 1:14-cv-08046-JHH, Docs. # 13,
14).

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Petitioner requested leave from the Eleventh Circuit to file a second or successive § 2255
Motion on June 23, 2016.

(Case No. 1:97-cr-00159-RDP-TMP-1, Doc. # 108).

In his

Application for Leave to File a Second or Successive Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct
Sentence, Petitioner alleged that -- based on the new rule of law created in Johnson v. United
States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) -- the definition of “crime of violence” contained in 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) “is unconstitutional and violates due process.” (Case No. 1:17-cv-08029-RDP, Doc.
# 5-1 at p. 5). On July 7, 2016, the Eleventh Circuit denied Petitioner’s application. (Case No.
1:17-cv-08029-RDP, Doc. # 5-2).
Petitioner filed the § 2255 Motion currently pending before the court on June 28, 2017.
(Case No. 1:17-cv-08029-RDP, Doc. # 1). In his § 2255 Motion, Petitioner argues that (1) he is
“actually innocent” of the § 924(c) penalty under Johnson, (2) bank robbery and carjacking are not
“crimes of violence” under Johnson, (3) the court was without jurisdiction to impose the 924(c)
penalty under Johnson, and (4) the court was without jurisdiction to impose the 924(c) penalty “for
the unlawful deference involved.” (Id. at p. 3-4).
After

the

Government

moved

to

dismiss

Petitioner’s

Motion

(Case

No.

1:17-cv-08029-RDP, Doc. # 5), the court ordered Petitioner to “respond with counter-affidavits
and/or documents to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material
fact to be decided.” (Case No. 1:17-cv-08029-RDP, Doc. # 6) (emphasis included). The court
warned Petitioner that (1) he was “not [to] depend upon the mere allegations in his pleadings to
counter [the Government’s motion],” (2) “[t]he granting of summary dismissal is a final
adjudication with prejudice on the merits,” and (3) he “may not add any additional claims and
should not think that new allegations he makes in his response or in any document other than the
Motion presents additional claims to the court.” (Id.) (emphasis included).
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Petitioner responded to the Government’s motion to dismiss on August 16, 2017. (Case
No. 1:17-cv-08029-RDP, Doc. # 7). In his response, Petitioner argues (1) the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984 is unconstitutional, (2) bank robbery and carjacking are not “violent
crimes” in light of Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 2551, and (3) he has made a prima facie showing that his
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is void for vagueness due to Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 2551. On
October 25, 2017, Petitioner moved to supplement his response by including two additional cases.1
(Case No. 1:17-cv-08029-RDP, Doc. # 8).
II. Analysis
A second or successive motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 “must be certified as provided in
section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Section 2244
provides that “before a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the
district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing
the district court to consider the application.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). Absent an order from
the court of appeals authorizing the consideration of the application, “the district court lacks
jurisdiction to consider a second or successive petition.” Farris v. United States, 333 F.3d 1211,
1216 (11th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Holt, 417 F.3d 1172, 1175 (11th Cir. 2005).
A. Petitioner’s Johnson Claims
In Grounds One, Two, and Three of the pending § 2255 Motion, Petitioner alleges that he
should be resentenced based on Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 2551. (Case No. 1:17-cv-08029-RDP, Doc.

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Petitioner asked the court to consider Doriety v. United States, Case No. C16-0924-JCC (W.D. Wash. Nov. 9, 2016)
and Knox v. United States, Case No. C16-5502-BHS (W.D. Wash. Jan. 24, 2017). These cases are not relevant to
Petitioner’s claims because both Doriety and Knox involved convictions related to unarmed bank robberies; whereas,
Petitioner’s conviction involved an armed robbery. Furthermore, as the Eleventh Circuit previously explained to
Petitioner, he “cannot make a prima facie showing that he is entitled to relief under Johnson because his armed bank
robbery convictions under § 2113(a) and (d) are crimes of violence under the use-of-force clause in § 924(c).” (Case
No. 1:17-cv-08029-RDP, Doc. # 5-2 at p. 6).

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# 1 at p. 3-4). The Eleventh Circuit has already considered Petitioner’s conviction in light of
Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 2551, and found that “Woods cannot make a prima facie showing that he is
entitled to relief under Johnson.” (Case No. 1:17-cv-08029-RDP, Doc. # 5-2). Because the
Eleventh Circuit previously denied Petitioner’s application to raise the Johnson claims on which
Petitioner bases Grounds One, Two and Three of his pending § 2255 Motion, the court is without
jurisdiction to consider these claims, and they are due to be dismissed with prejudice for want of
jurisdiction. See In re Bradford, 830 F.3d 1273, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2016) (explaining that § 2244
is a jurisdictional requirement and that federal courts lack jurisdiction over a claim that was
presented in a prior application); In re Anderson, 829 F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[D]enials
of successive applications are with prejudice.”).
B. Petitioner’s Unlawful Deference Claim
Ground Four of Petitioner’s § 2255 Motion appears to allege that the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984 is unconstitutional and, therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction to
impose § 924(c) charges on Petitioner. (See Case No. 1:17-cv-08029-RDP, Docs. # 1 at p. 4; # 8
at p. 5-6).

Although Petitioner has previously filed a § 2255 Motion (Case No.

1:14-cv-08046-JHH, Doc. # 1), Petitioner has not obtained an order from the Eleventh Circuit
authorizing this court to consider Ground Four of this second or successive § 2255 Motion.
Without such an order, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider Ground Four of the instant § 2255
Motion. See Farris, 333 F.3d at 1216 (“Without authorization, the district court lacks jurisdiction
to consider a second or successive petition.”). As such, Ground Four of Petitioner’s § 2255
Motion is due to be dismissed without prejudice for want of jurisdiction.
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, the court concludes that Grounds One, Two, and Three are due to be
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dismissed with prejudice and Ground Four is due to be dismissed without prejudice. The court
will enter a separate order in accordance with this memorandum opinion.
DONE and ORDERED this November 6, 2017.

_________________________________
R. DAVID PROCTOR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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