Lawrence v. Advance Auto Parts Inc
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Staci G Cornelius on 7/22/20. (MRR, )
FILED
2020 Jul-22 PM 02:19
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
EASTERN DIVISION
JEFF LAWRENCE,
Plaintiff,
v.
ADVANCE AUTO PARTS, INC.,
Defendant.
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Case No.: 1:18-cv-00484-SGC
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
This is an employment discrimination case brought by Jeff Lawrence (the
“plaintiff”) against Advance Auto Parts, Inc. (the “defendant”). Pending before the
undersigned is an unopposed motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant.
(Doc. 22). For the reasons discussed below, the motion is due to be granted, and this
action is due to be dismissed with prejudice.
I. Summary Judgment Facts 2
The plaintiff, who is Black, was employed by the defendant as a Retail Parts
Pro. (Doc. 23 at p. 4, ¶¶ 1-2). In or around May 2017, the defendant investigated
an ethics complaint made against the plaintiff. (Id. at p. 5, ¶¶ 7-8). At the conclusion
of the investigation, Rhett Beyer, a Regional Human Resources Manager for the
1
The parties have consented to the exercise of dispositive jurisdiction by a magistrate judge
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. 12).
2
The following facts are undisputed, unless otherwise noted.
defendant, made the decision to terminate the plaintiff’s employment. (Id. at p. 6, ¶
15).
After exhausting his administrative remedies, the plaintiff commenced this
action, alleging he was terminated for opening a commercial account with the
defendant for his automobile repair business and using that account to purchase
automobile parts from the defendant at a discount, while Joey Collins, a similarly
situated employee outside the plaintiff’s protected class, was not terminated for the
same conduct. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 9-11, 16-17, 24).3 Relying on these allegations, the
plaintiff claimed the defendant discriminated against him on the basis of his race in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
(“Title VII”), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. (Id. at ¶¶ 26-27).
Beyer testified he did not make the decision to terminate the plaintiff’s
employment simply because the plaintiff maintained a commercial account with the
defendant but, rather, because the plaintiff violated the defendant’s company policy
prohibiting an employee from processing or ringing up his own transactions. (Doc.
23 at pp. 6-7, ¶¶ 16, 20). According to Beyer, the investigation prompted by the
ethics complaint made against the plaintiff revealed the plaintiff had personally
3
Although the plaintiff also identified Walt Byers in his complaint as a similarly situated employee
outside his protected class who was treated more favorably (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 16-17, 24), he implicitly
concedes in his response to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment that Byers is not a
proper comparator (Doc. 25 at pp. 1-2).
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processed or rung up approximately $55,000 worth of sales made to his automobile
repair business. (Id. at pp. 5-6, ¶¶ 11-16). Moreover, Beyer testified that at the time
he made the decision to terminate the plaintiff’s employment, he was not aware
Collins even had a commercial account with the defendant. (Id. at p. 8, ¶ 26).
Collins himself testified he never personally processed or rung up any sales made to
his business for which he maintained a commercial account with the defendant. (Id.
at p. 8, ¶ 25).
In his response to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff
does not necessarily concede he engaged in conduct materially different from the
conduct in which Collins engaged. (Doc. 25 at p. 2). However, he does concede he
has no evidence Beyer, the sole decisionmaker with respect to his termination, knew
of any misconduct by Collins and that such lack of knowledge is fatal to his case.
(Id.).
II. Standard of Review
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he [district] court
shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986);
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The party seeking
summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the district court of the basis
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for its motion and identifying those portions of the record the party believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute as to a material fact. Celotex Corp.,
477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party carries its initial burden, the non-movant must
go beyond the pleadings and come forward with evidence showing there is a genuine
dispute as to a material fact for trial. Id. at 324.
The substantive law identifies which facts are material and which are
irrelevant. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 248. If the
evidence is merely colorable or not significantly probative, summary judgment is
appropriate. Id. at 249-50 (internal citations omitted). All reasonable doubts about
the facts should be resolved in favor of the non-movant, and all justifiable inferences
should be drawn in the non-movant’s favor. Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d
1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993).
“[T]he district court cannot base the entry of summary judgment on the mere
fact that the motion was unopposed, but, rather, must consider the merits of the
motion.” United States v. One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave.,
Miami, Florida, 363 F.3d at 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004). A district court does this
by ensuring the motion is supported by evidentiary materials and that the standard
for granting summary judgment is otherwise satisfied. Id. at 1101-02.
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III. Discussion
Title VII and § 1981 prohibit race-based employment discrimination. 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 2000e-2(a)(1); Ferrill v. Parker Grp., Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 472 (11th
Cir. 1999) (“Section 1981 prohibits intentional race discrimination in the making
and enforcement of public and private contracts, including employment contracts.”).
Moreover, the elements of race-based employment discrimination claims brought
under Title VII and § 1981 are the same. Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d
1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit “has routinely and
systematically grouped Title VII and § 1981 claims for analytic purposes.” Jimenez
v. Wellstar Health Sys., 596 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Standard,
161 F.3d at 1330-33 (analyzing race discrimination claims brought under Title VII
and § 1981 together); Melton v. Nat’l Dairy LLC, 705 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1315 (M.D.
Ala. 2010) (using Title VII cases and § 1981 cases interchangeably).
The plaintiff’s complaint is properly construed as asserting a claim of racebased disparate treatment involving a tangible employment action. Moreover, the
parties’ briefing of the pending motion makes clear they agree the claim should be
evaluated using the burden-shifting framework established by the Supreme Court in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under this framework, a
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by showing (1) he belongs to a protected
class, (2) he was subjected to an adverse employment action, (3) his employer treated
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a similarly situated employee outside his protected class (a “comparator”) more
favorably, and (4) he was qualified to do the job. Burke-Fowler v. Orange Cty.,
Florida, 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006).4
A comparator must be similarly situated to a plaintiff in “all material
respects.” Lewis v. Union City, Georgia, 918 F.3d 1213, 1218, 1224-29 (11th Cir.
2019). As the word “material” indicates, “a valid comparison [] turn[s] not on formal
labels, but rather on substantive likenesses.” Id. at 1228. Therefore, ordinarily, a
proper comparator “ha[s] engaged in the same basic conduct (or misconduct) as the
plaintiff”; “ha[s] been subject to the same employment policy, guideline, or rule as
the plaintiff”; “ha[s] been under the jurisdiction of the same supervisor as the
plaintiff”; and “share[s] the plaintiff’s employment or disciplinary history.” Id. at
1227-28. Moreover, a plaintiff must show the supervisor or other person who made
the challenged employment decision had actual knowledge of a comparator’s similar
conduct (or misconduct) but did not similarly discipline the comparator. Jones v.
Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534, 1541 (11th Cir. 1989); Summers v. City of Dothan,
Alabama, 444 F. App’x 346, 348 (11th Cir. 2011). Absent such knowledge, the
proffered comparator is not a proper comparator, and the plaintiff cannot establish a
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The burden then shifts to the defendant to show a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its
employment action. Burke-Fowler, 447 F.3d at 1323. If the defendant makes this showing, the
burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove the reason is pretext for unlawful discrimination. Id.
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prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Jones,
874 F.2d at 1542; Summers, 444 F. App’x at 350.
Because the plaintiff in this case concedes he has no evidence the person who
made the decision to terminate his employment (Beyer) knew of any misconduct by
the only proffered comparator (Collins), he cannot support a critical element of his
prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework. 5
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment
(Doc. 22) is due to be granted, and this action is due to be dismissed with prejudice.
A separate final judgment will be entered.
DONE this 22nd day of July, 2020.
______________________________
STACI G. CORNELIUS
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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Given the plaintiff’s concession, the undersigned declines to address the defendant’s alternative
arguments (1) there were material differences between the plaintiff’s conduct and Collins’ conduct,
(2) the plaintiff was not qualified for his position, and (3) there is no evidence of pretext.
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