Finch v. LBF Equity LLC

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: This matter is before the court on Plaintiff Michael Finch's ("Plaintiff") Motion for Default Judgment against Defendant LBF Equity LLC d/b/a Lee Brass Foundry LLC ("Defendant"). (Doc. # [ 12]). For the reasons explained within, Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. # 12 ) is GRANTED as to liability. The Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. # 12 ) is DENIED as to damages pending an evidentiary hearing. This matter will be SET for an evidentiary hearing regarding Plaintiff's damages by separate order. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 10/25/2024. (CLD)

FILED
2024 Oct-25 PM 01:25
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
EASTERN DIVISION

MICHAEL FINCH,
Plaintiff,
v.
LBF EQUITY LLC,
Defendant.

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Case No.: 1:24-cv-00388-RDP

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on Plaintiff Michael Finch’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Default
Judgment against Defendant LBF Equity LLC d/b/a Lee Brass Foundry LLC (“Defendant”). (Doc.
# 12). Plaintiff seeks entry of default judgment against Defendant for what he contends is a sum
certain damages amount. (Doc. # 12). Plaintiff does not expressly seek entry of default as to
liability, although the court construes his motion to include such a request because a finding of
liability is a prerequisite for awarding damages. After careful consideration, the court concludes
that Plaintiff’s Motion is due to be granted in part and denied in part.
I.

Background
On April 11, 2024, Plaintiff served Defendant, through its registered agent CT Corporation,

with a copy of his summons and complaint. (Doc. # 4). The complaint alleges that Defendant
discriminated against him in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”), 29
U.S.C. § 2601. (Doc. # 1). Specifically, Plaintiff’s complaint contains two counts: (1) FMLA
retaliation; and (2) FMLA interference. (Id. at 3-7). In his complaint, Plaintiff seeks declaratory
and injunctive relief, as well as money damages, for violations of the FMLA. (Id. at 7-9).

Despite being properly served, Defendant failed to answer or otherwise respond. (Doc. #
12 ¶ 3). Following the entry of default by the Clerk of Court on June 11, 2024 (Doc. # 11), Plaintiff
filed the instant Motion for Default Judgment seeking a default judgment against Defendant in the
amount of $54,743.86. (Doc. # 12).
I.

Standard of Review
When a defendant has failed to plead or defend, a district court may enter judgment by

default. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). However, entry of default judgment is only appropriate when
there is “a sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment entered.” Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace
Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Under this standard, the
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face, similar to that of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678, (2009)). This plausibility standard is met “when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “[W]hile a
defaulted defendant is deemed to admit the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of fact, he is not
held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law.” Cotton v. Mass Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 402 F.3d 1267, 1278 (11th Cir. 2005) (alteration omitted) (quotation marks omitted).
II.

Analysis
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant violated the FMLA by both retaliating against him and

interfering with the exercise of his FMLA rights. The FMLA applies to employers “who employ
50 or more employees for each working day during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the
current or preceding calendar year.” 29 U.S.C. § 2601(4)(A)(i). Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant
was an employer under the FMLA at all relevant times (Doc. # 1 ¶ 7); therefore, this allegation is

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deemed admitted based on Defendant’s default. An employee is eligible for FMLA protection if
he has been employed for at least twelve months and worked at least 1,250 hours of service with
the employer. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A)(i)-(ii). In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts that he began
working for Defendant on February 21, 2011 as a machine operator. (Doc. # 1 ¶ 8). Therefore, his
allegation that he is eligible for FMLA protection is also deemed admitted.
The FMLA allows “employees to take reasonable leave for medical reasons, for the birth
or adoption of a child, and for the care of a child, spouse, or parent who has a serious health
condition.” 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2). In support of this provision, it prohibits an employer from: (1)
“interfer[ing] with, restrain[ing], or deny[ing] the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right
provided under [the FMLA]” (the interference clause), and (2) “discharg[ing] . . . any individual
for opposing any practice made unlawful by [the FMLA]” (the retaliation clause). 29 U.S.C. §
2615(a). There are “two types of claims for alleged violations of these provisions: interference
claims, in which employers burden or outright deny substantive statutory rights to which their
employees are entitled, and retaliation claims, in which employers discharge employees for
exercising their FMLA right to leave.” O’Connor v. PCA Fam. Health Plan, Inc., 200 F.3d 1349,
1352 (11th Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). In Count I of his complaint, Plaintiff alleges facts in support
of an FMLA retaliation claim. (Doc. # 1 ¶¶ 18-34). In Count II, Plaintiff asserts that those same
facts support an FMLA interference claim. (Doc. # 1 ¶¶ 35-52). Below, the court addresses whether
there is a sufficient basis in the pleadings for a judgment of liability as to each of his FMLA claims.
A.

Plaintiff’s FMLA Retaliation Claim

FMLA retaliation claims are analyzed using the same framework that applies to Title VII
retaliation claims; so, an FMLA plaintiff must establish the following elements: (1) protected

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activity; (2) adverse action; and (3) causation. Todd v. Fayette Cnty. Sch. Dist., 998 F.3d 1203,
1219 (11th Cir. 2021); Munoz v. Selig Enters., Inc., 981 F.3d 1265, 1280 (11th Cir. 2020).
“The FMLA protects an employee who gives ‘[n]otice of an intent to use FMLA leave in
the future.’” Munoz, 981 F.3d at 1276 (quoting Pereda v. Brookdale Senior Living Cmtys., Inc.,
666 F.3d 1269, 1274-75 (11th Cir. 2012)). Plaintiff alleges that he engaged in a protected activity
because he allegedly sought intermittent FMLA leave to assist in the care of his spouse after she
had fallen several times in late August or early September 2023 and was diagnosed with atrophy
in her brain. (Doc. # 1 ¶¶ 19-21). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant refused to accept the
documentation he submitted for FMLA leave, stating that the documents were deficient because
the health care provider identified two causes of his spouse’s illness: neurological and
cardiovascular. (Doc. # 1 ¶¶ 23-25). Defendant advised Plaintiff that a health care specialist would
have to choose between the two conditions for approval of FMLA leave. (Doc. # 1 ¶ 26). Plaintiff
alleges that while he was attempting to arrange an appointment with the health care specialist to
address Defendant’s request, he was told that his employment had been terminated. (Doc. # 1 ¶
27). On October 10, 2023, Plaintiff was informed that his employment had been terminated via
text. (Doc. # 1 ¶ 29).
Due to entry of default, Plaintiff’s allegations about retaliation in general, and the temporal
proximity between his FMLA request and the termination of his employment in particular, are
deemed admitted and are sufficient to establish the elements of protected conduct, adverse action,
and causation. See, e.g., Farley, 197 F.3d at 1337. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to a default
judgment on his FMLA retaliation claim in Count I.

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B.

Plaintiff’s FMLA Interference Claim

“An FMLA interference claim lies if an employee can demonstrate . . . that she was entitled
to an FMLA benefit and her employer denied her that benefit.” Munoz v. Selig Enters., Inc., 981
F.3d 1265, 1274 (11th Cir. 2020). “The FMLA entitles an eligible employee to twelve work weeks
of unpaid leave during any twelve-month period if []he needs the leave in order ‘to care for the
spouse, or a son, daughter or parent, of the employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or parent has
a serious health condition.’” Cruz v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 428 F.3d 1379, 1382 (11th Cir.
2005) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C)). Plaintiff asserts that he was qualified to take
intermittent FMLA leave to care for his spouse, that he requested it, and that Defendant denied
him that benefit. (Doc. # 1 ¶¶ 35-52). Plaintiff asserts that he was “denied full benefits and rights
under the FMLA in that Defendant interfered with the exercise of rights to which he was entitled
under the FMLA.” (Id. ¶ 49). He alleges that the rights include “being pulled out of service and
ultimately terminated by Defendant.” (Id. ¶ 50). These now admitted allegations are sufficient to
establish that Plaintiff’s right to take FMLA leave was burdened or denied. Accordingly, Plaintiff
is entitled to a default judgment on his FMLA interference claim in Count II.
C.

Damages

Plaintiff seeks an award of damages in the amount of $54,743.86. (Doc. # 12). “Under the
FMLA, any employer who interferes with an employee’s protected rights under the Act is liable
to the employee for ‘damages’ and ‘equitable relief’” Wai v. Fed. Express Corp., 461 F. App’x
876, 884 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(i)(I)). “That subsection also covers
non-wage monetary losses, interest, and liquidated damages.” Id. “Liquidated damages are
awarded presumptively to an employee when an employer violates the FMLA, unless the employer
demonstrates that its violation was in good faith and that it had a reasonable basis for believing

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that its conduct was not in violation of the FMLA.” Cooper v. Fulton Cnty., 458 F.3d 1282, 1287
(11th Cir. 2006). “The second subsection provides for ‘equitable relief,’” which may include “front
pay.” Wai, 461 F. App’x at 884 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(B)).
Because the damages allegations contained in Plaintiff’s complaint are not “for a sum
certain or a sum that can be made certain by computation,” and because he demanded a jury trial,
it will be necessary for a jury to “determine the [appropriate] amount of damages.”1 See Rule 55(b);
Anheuser Busch, 317 F.3d at 1266-67.
III.

Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. #12) is

GRANTED as to liability. The Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. # 12) is DENIED as to
damages pending an evidentiary hearing.
This matter will be SET for an evidentiary hearing regarding Plaintiff’s damages by
separate order.
DONE and ORDERED this October 25, 2024.

_________________________________
R. DAVID PROCTOR
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

When evaluating a claim for damages, a district court must “assure that there is a legitimate basis for any
damage award it enters.” Anheuser Busch, Inc. v. Philpot, 317 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2003). “Damages may be
awarded only if the record adequately reflects the basis for award via a . . . demonstration by detailed affidavits
establishing the necessary facts.” Adolph Coors Co. v. Movement Against Racism & the Klan, 777 F.2d 1538, 1544
(11th Cir. 1985) (cleaned up). Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit regarding his damages, which includes an attachment
that is a computation of his damages. (Docs. # 12-1; 12-2). In his affidavit, Plaintiff alleges that as a result of his
wrongful termination, he has incurred $54,743.86 in damages. (Doc. # 12-1 ¶ 5). Although his “Computation of
Damages” includes “2022 Wages,” “2023 Wages,” and “Liquidated Damages” added together to result in the “Total
Damages” of $54,743.86, Plaintiff has not at this point cited any authority or evidentiary basis to support an award of
that amount. (See Doc. # 12-2 at 2). Plaintiff has also failed to explain how he calculated his wages. For example, he
does not include any evidence that suggests how much money he made at an hourly rate or how many hours a week
he generally worked.
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