USA, et al v. Jefferson Cty, et al

Filing 1824

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER that the Motion to hold Jefferson County in civil contempt and to modify some provisions of its decree is GRANTED an it is ORDERED that defendant, Jefferson County, Alabama, is adjudged to be in contempt for failing to co mply with the requirements of the consent decree entered on 12/29/1982; the parties are ORDERED to file a joint report of their conference by 9/20/2013; the parties are also directed to appear for a Status Conference set for 9/26/2013 09:30 AM in Hugo L Black US Courthouse, Birmingham, AL before Judge C Lynwood Smith Jr., as more fully set out in order. Signed by Judge C Lynwood Smith, Jr on 8/20/2013. (AHI)

FILED
2013 Aug-20 PM 12:50
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
vs.
)
)
JEFFERSON COUNTY, ALABAMA, et al.,
)
Defendants.
)
—————————————————————)
JOHN W. MARTIN, et al.,
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)
CITY OF BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA, et al., )
Defendants.
)

Civil Action No. CV-75-S-666-S

Civil Action No. CV-74-S-17-S

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This opinion addresses the motion filed by the Martin class of plaintiffs and the
Bryant class of plaintiff-intervenors (“the Martin-Bryant parties”), petitioning the
court to hold defendant Jefferson County, Alabama, in civil contempt for failing to
comply with the requirements of the consent decree entered on December 29, 1982,
and seeking a modification of some provisions of that decree.1 Jefferson County was
ordered to respond to the motion, and to show cause why it should not be held in
contempt, and why its decree should not be modified.2
A bench trial on those issues commenced on March 30, 2009, but was recessed
on April 1, 2009, for reasons related to the health of the undersigned. Those same,
1

See doc. no. 1413 (Martin/Bryant Parties’ Motion to Hold Defendant Jefferson County in
Civil Contempt and Modify Jefferson County Consent Decree).
2

See doc. no. 1458.

and subsequent, health issues delayed the resumption of trial until December 3, 2012,
when the court heard seven additional days of live testimony, and received 1,144
documentary exhibits,3 including the designated deposition testimony of several
witnesses.
===========================================================
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

A SHORT HISTORY OF THIS LITIGATION .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
A.

The Beginning: 1974 - 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

B.

The First Twenty-Four Years of Litigation: 1976 - 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

C.

Transitions: 2000 - 2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

D.

The Personnel Board in Receivership: 2002 - 2008 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

E.

The Shift to Birmingham: 2008 - 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.
2.

F.
II.

The Langford interregnum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Mayor Bell and the restoration of focus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Finally, Jefferson County! .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

CIVIL CONTEMPT STANDARDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

III. STANDARDS FOR MODIFICATION OF A CONSENT DECREE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
A.

Significant Change in Facts or Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

B.

“Suitably Tailored” Modifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

3

Of this number, 999 exhibits were offered by the Martin-Bryant parties, and 145 by
Jefferson County.

2

IV. THE COUNTY’S ADMISSIONS OF NONCOMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
V.

THE COUNTY’S STIPULATIONS AS TO MODIFICATIONS .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

VI. DISCUSSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
A.

The County’s Irrelevant Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

B.

Receivership Factors .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
1.

Have there been repeated failures to comply with court orders? .. . . . . . . 57
a.

Human Resources Department .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

b.

Affirmative Action Officers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

c.

Anti-harassment and anti-nepotism policies and training . . . . . . . . . 70

d.

Consent decree training .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

e.

Recruiting at historically black colleges and universities . . . . . . . . . 79

f.

Production of semi-annual and annual reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

g.

Monthly reports and quarterly newsletters .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

h.

Structured interview process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

i.

Other decree violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

2.

Will further efforts to secure compliance only lead to
confrontation and delay? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

3.

Is leadership available to turn the tide within a reasonable time? .. . . . . 101
a.

County Commissioners .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

b.

County Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

4.

Has there been “bad faith” on the part of the County? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

5.

Are resources being wasted? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

3

6.

Can a Receiver provide a quick and efficient remedy? .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

VII. CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

=================================================
I. A SHORT HISTORY OF THIS LITIGATION
Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.
George Santayana, The Life of Reason, vol. 1, ch. 12 (1905).4

The incumbent members of the Jefferson County Commission are George
Bowman (District 1), Sandra Little-Brown (District 2), Jimmie Stephens (District 3),
Joe Knight (District 4), and David Carrington (District 5). Mr. Carrington currently
serves as “President” of the Commission: i.e., the statutory title of the presiding
officer, and a position filled by majority vote of the five District Commissioners. See
Ala. Act No. 97-147. None of those persons exhibited adequate knowledge of the
County’s obligations under its consent decree when testifying. All demonstrated even
less awareness of this litigation’s long and tortuous history. Consequently, their
affirmations of commitment to federal law and fulfillment of the County’s
responsibilities under its decree rang hollow.
The incumbent members of the Jefferson County Commission are serving their
inaugural term of office, however, and their individual failures to fully grasp the
4

Cf., e.g., New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.) (observing
that “a page of history is worth a volume of logic”).

4

significance of this suit and the County’s requirements under its consent decree may,
perhaps, be forgiven for that reason. Nevertheless, the urgency with which Jefferson
County must bring itself into compliance with federal law is a lesson that must be
brought home to each member of the Commission.
Part I of this opinion, therefore, is a summary of the history of this litigation,
provided for the edification of the present Commissioners, because knowledge of the
place from whence the County has come is necessary for understanding why this
court must “give teeth” to the decree’s “provisions requiring valid selection
procedures.” Ensley Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Siebels, 31 F.3d 1548, 1572 (11th Cir.
1994) (Carnes, J.) (alteration and emphasis supplied) (“Ensley II ”).
A. The Beginning: 1974-1975
The parties who commenced the original suit on January 4, 1974 included the
Ensley Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(“N.A.A.C.P.”) and several African-American (“black”) individuals who sued for
themselves, and on behalf of a class of similarly-situated persons.5 The defendants
to that action were: George Seibels, then Mayor of Birmingham, Alabama; the City
5

See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1514 n.1 (11th Cir. 1983) (“The
Ensley Branch of the NAACP is a membership organization of black citizens of Birmingham,
Alabama. It, along with three black males who had applied for positions with the City of
Birmingham, Alabama, and taken tests administered by the Jefferson County, Alabama, Personnel
Board, filed a class action complaint against the City, George Seibels, Jr., then Mayor of
Birmingham, the Board, the three members of the Board and the director of the Board.”).

5

of Birmingham; the individual members of the Personnel Board of Jefferson County,
Alabama (“Personnel Board” or “Board”); and the Board’s Personnel Director. The
complaint alleged that those defendants had engaged in discriminatory hiring
practices against blacks in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
That action was followed just three days later by another suit raising the same
constitutional and statutory allegations, and filed by John W. Martin and six other
black individuals (the “Martin class of plaintiffs”) against the same defendants and
Jefferson County and its individual Commissioners.
The following year, on May 27, 1975, the United States brought suit against
Jefferson County, the Personnel Board, and the various municipalities and other
governmental entities serviced by the Board. The government alleged, among other
things, a pattern or practice of discriminatory employment practices against blacks
and females in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. §
1981, a part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.6

6

Yet a fourth action was filed on February 20, 1976 by Lucy Walker, who challenged the
employment practices of the Jefferson County Nursing Home under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
That suit was settled and dismissed long before the three, principal actions described in text. See,
e.g., Walker v. Jefferson County Home, 726 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1984); Ensley Branch of N.A.A.C.P.
v. Seibels, 616 F.2d 812, 815 (11th Cir. 1980) (“Ensley I ”).

6

B.

The First Twenty-Four Years of Litigation: 1976-2000
All of the cases were consolidated for trial and, on December 20-22, 1976, Judge

Sam C. Pointer, Jr., conducted a bench trial on the limited issue of whether the entrylevel tests used by the Personnel Board to screen and rank applicants for firefighting
and police officer positions violated the constitutional or statutory rights of black
applicants.7 All other issues under the consolidated complaints were reserved until
a later date.8 Judge Pointer concluded that the tests violated Title VII because both
had a significant adverse impact on black applicants, a phenomenon defined
as a passing rate “less than four-fifths . . . of the rate for [whites].” Ensley
Branch, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 11,504, at 6796-97 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The court ruled that the tests could be used only
if, despite their adverse impact, they were sufficiently “job related” to
predict effectively test takers’ future job performance. Id. at 6796 nn.10-11,
6806. After reviewing testing data, the court concluded that the tests failed
to meet this standard. Id. at 6798-6808.

7

The City of Birmingham and Jefferson County — the two largest governmental employers
serviced by the Personnel Board of Jefferson County, an independent governmental entity — and
the Personnel Board share responsibility for hiring and promoting employees of the City or County.
The Board, pursuant to state law, administers written tests and other job selection procedures that
produce a pool of qualified candidates for a particular position (a “register” of persons considered
eligible for the particular position). The Board ranks the passing applicants and, when a vacancy
occurs, forwards a list of candidates to the City or County for final selection (a “certificate of
eligibles”). The original complaints alleged, among other things, that the Board used discriminatory
tests to determine eligibility for hiring and promotion, and that the City, County, and other
governmental employers engaged in still further discrimination when selecting individuals from the
Board’s already tainted certificates of persons eligible for hire or promotion. See, e.g., Ensley
Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Siebels, 31 F.3d 1548, 1552 (11th Cir. 1994) (“Ensley II ”).
8

For example, the United States did not press at this trial its coordinate claim that the tests
also were discriminatory against female applicants.

7

Ensley II, 31 F.3d at 1554 (alterations in original).9 Judge Pointer entered a final
judgment on the limited issues addressed in the first trial on January 10, 1977,10 and
ordered remedial actions by the Board and City.
Specifically, [Judge Pointer] ordered that blacks be referred for
openings on the police and firefighter forces at the rate at which they took
the tests when most recently administered. To accomplish this, [he] ordered
that the names of a sufficient number of blacks be added to the current
police and firefighter eligibility lists so that the lists [would] be
representative of the racial composition of the test-takers, i.e., 28 and 14
percent black for police and firefighter lists, respectively; that, one-third of
future certifications, i.e., referrals from the lists for actual employment,
[were] to be black until, considering all certifications since the relevant
1975 and 1976 dates, the numbers of certifications become representative
of the racial composition of the test-takers. Thereafter, blacks [were] to be
certified in accordance with their representation on the lists, i.e., 28 and 14
percent of certifications for policemen and firefighters, respectively, [were
to] be black. Similarly, referrals from future lists [were to] be a function of
the rate at which blacks [took] the examinations on which the lists [were]
based, until or unless defendants develop[ed] valid tests.
Ensley Branch of the N.A.A.C.P. v. Seibels, 616 F.2d 812, 815 n.6 (5th Cir. 1980)
(alterations supplied) (“Ensley I ”).
The Personnel Board appealed, and the United States and Martin class of
plaintiffs cross-appealed.11 While that appeal was pending, Judge Pointer conducted
9

For a succinct discussion of Judge Pointer’s specific findings on the issue of liability, read
the opinion in Ensley II, 31 F.3d at 1554-55.
10

See Ensley Branch of the N.A.A.C.P. v. Seibels, No. CA 74-2-12-S, 1977 WL 806 (N.D.
Ala. Jan. 10, 1977).
11

The Personnel Board contended that its test devices did not violate Title VII, while the
United States and the Martin plaintiffs contested Judge Pointer’s determination as to the date on

8

a second bench trial during August of 1979. “That trial involved challenges to other
Board practices, including: written tests for eighteen more positions; various rules
affecting promotional opportunities; the imposition of height, weight, and educational
requirements for certain jobs; and the restriction of some job announcements and
certifications to persons of a particular sex.” Ensley II, 31 F.3d at 1556. Notably, the
plaintiffs’ independent claims against the City of Birmingham and Jefferson County
were not tried.
While awaiting Judge Pointer’s decision on the issues raised in the August 1979
trial, and following the former Fifth Circuit’s affirmance of his January 1977 finding
of Title VII violations, see Ensley I, 616 F.2d at 822,12 the parties entered into
settlement negotiations that resulted in the execution of two proposed consent decrees
between all plaintiffs and the City of Birmingham (“the City decree”) and the
Personnel Board (“the Board decree”). The proposed decrees were signed by counsel
for the affected parties on May 19, 1981. Judge Pointer provisionally approved the
proposed consent decrees the following month, but reserved final approval until a
fairness hearing could be convened for the purpose of considering objections that

which Title VII liability commenced. See id. at 815.
12

While the former Fifth Circuit affirmed Judge Pointer’s determination of Title VII liability,
it reversed and remanded for additional proceedings on the question of when the City’s liability
under Title VII commenced. See id. at 822-25.

9

might be filed by interested parties.
The “keystone” of the consent decrees tendered to Judge Pointer was “an
extensive regime of affirmative action for blacks and women.” Ensley II, 31 F.3d at
1556. That fact prompted several interested non-parties to appear at the fairness
hearing conducted during August of 1981, for the purpose of challenging the
proposed decrees. Chief among the objectors was the Birmingham Firefighters’
Association No. 117 (“BFA”), a labor association representing a majority of the
City’s firefighters, almost all of whom were white males. The day after the fairness
hearing, the BFA and two of its members moved to intervene in the pending cases,
based upon their contention that the proposed consent decrees would have a
substantial adverse impact upon the firefighters. Judge Pointer denied the motion as
untimely, and approved the consent decrees. See United States v. Jefferson County,
720 F.2d 1511, 1515 (11th Cir. 1983).
Shortly after Judge Pointer approved the City and Personnel Board consent
decrees, seven white male firefighters filed a complaint in the district court seeking
an injunction against the enforcement of the decrees. They alleged that the operation
of the decrees would discriminate against them in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. After a hearing, Judge Pointer denied relief, and the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed. Id. at 1520.
10

Judge Pointer’s approval of the consent decrees, and the Eleventh Circuit’s
approval of his refusal to allow the BFA to intervene and denial of injunctive relief
in the suit brought by the seven white male firefighters, brought forth a collection of
cases that came to be known as the “Birmingham Reverse Discrimination
Employment Litigation.” In those cases, a number of white male City employees
collaterally attacked the City and Personnel Board consent decrees and the affirmative
action programs adopted under them. See In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination
Employment Litigation, 833 F.2d 1492, 1495 (11th Cir. 1987), aff’d sub nom. Martin
v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
Judge Pointer rejected the reverse-discrimination plaintiffs’ collateral challenge
to the legality of the consent decrees and, at trial, restricted their claims to the
questions of whether the City or Personnel Board had violated the decrees, or had
granted illegal preferences that were not required by the decrees. See In re
Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litigation, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1, 3-4 & n.6, 1985 WL 1415 (N.D. Ala. 1985). At the close of the reversediscrimination plaintiffs’ case, Judge Pointer further limited their action by
dismissing for lack of evidence all claims against the Personnel Board. See Martin
v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 779 n.16 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The Eleventh Circuit reversed, saying that Judge Pointer’s treatment of the
11

reverse-discrimination plaintiffs “as if they were bound by the consent decrees,” as
well as his limitation of their collateral attack to a claim that the City had granted
racial preferences beyond those mandated by its decree, was unfair, because the white
male firefighters had not participated in the negotiation or signing of the consent
decrees. In re Birmingham Reverse, 833 F.2d at 1498-99. The Eleventh Circuit ruled
that the reverse-discrimination plaintiffs had to be allowed to bring an action
challenging the validity of the City and Personnel Board decrees, and directed Judge
Pointer to re-examine the legality of the decrees under the heightened scrutiny
applicable to voluntary governmental affirmative action plans. Id. at 1499-1501; see
also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498-508 (1989) (holding that
race-conscious, affirmative-action programs that were voluntarily adopted by local
governments are subject to strict scrutiny, and must be “narrowly tailored” to the
compelling governmental interest of ending racial discrimination). The Eleventh
Circuit’s decision was upheld by the Supreme Court in Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755,
769 (1989).
Judge Pointer subsequently held a new trial on the reverse-discrimination
plaintiffs’ challenge, but again ruled in favor of the City. Bennett v. Arrington, 806
F. Supp. 926, 931 (N.D. Ala. 1992). Applying strict scrutiny, Judge Pointer found
that the City had “significant evidence” of past discrimination that was more than
12

sufficient to support the affirmative action program incorporated into the City’s
consent decree, and that the affirmative action provisions were “narrowly tailored”
to the compelling governmental interest of ending racial discrimination, because the
alternative measures previously attempted by the City had failed to ameliorate the
discrimination against blacks and females, and also because the affirmative action
provisions incorporated into the City’s consent decree were both flexible and
temporary. Id. at 928-30. The latter part of that ruling was reversed by an Eleventh
Circuit panel. See In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litigation,
20 F.3d 1525 (11th Cir. 1994).
A separate Circuit panel addressed the Personnel Board’s consent decree, and
held that the Board had not satisfied the requirement to develop and enforce “valid,
non-discriminatory selection procedures” — a term that was defined as
selection procedures that either had no disparate impact on blacks and
women or that, despite having disparate impact, were “job related” as that
term is used in Title VII. Moreover, if the Board chose the second
approach, adopting procedures that were job-related despite having some
disparate impact, then the Board was required to search for selection
procedures that were equally job-related but with less adverse impact.
These decree provisions roughly parallel the requirements of Title VII,
which mandates that an employer use either a selection procedure with no
adverse impact or a job-related selection procedure that has no more
adverse impact than other, equally job-related selection procedures. See
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425, 95 S. Ct. 2362, 2375,
45 L. Ed. 2d 280 (1975). Although the decree ordered the Board to comply
with Title VII by developing valid tests, it provided no deadlines or formal
13

review mechanism to ensure that the Board actually did so. That omission
turned out to be a serious flaw.
Ensley II, 31 F.3d at 1571 (emphasis supplied). The Ensley II panel noted that, while
it might prove to be “administratively burdensome to design and validate” nondiscriminatory selection procedures, “minimizing inconvenience is not a
constitutional value,” and administrative burdens “certainly” did not “outweigh the
importance of ending racial [or gender] discrimination.” Id. at 1574 (alteration
supplied, citation omitted). The Ensley II panel also held that, “[i]f the process of
approving selection procedures places undue strain on the district court’s resources,
it may appoint a special master to assist with the task.” Id. (alteration supplied).
In sum, the Ensley II panel observed that nearly thirteen years of experience (i.e.,
the time elapsing between December of 1981, when Judge Pointer ratified the
proposed consent decrees, and the panel’s decision in August 1994) had taught only
that “the decrees as written are simply too weak to make the City and the Board
develop non-discriminatory selection procedures. The district court should remedy
this defect. The provisions requiring valid selection procedures must be given teeth
. . . .” Id. at 1572 (emphasis supplied). The Ensley II panel ordered that, following
remand, Judge Pointer should aggressively compel the City and Personnel Board to
develop “valid, non-discriminatory selection procedures” in accordance with a

14

schedule of specific, “reasonably prompt deadlines.” Id. at 1583, 1584.
In 1995, following remand, Judge Pointer modified the Personnel Board’s
consent decree to require a series of interim deadlines, or “timetables,” for the
production of information necessary for the development of valid selection
procedures.13 When the Personnel Board missed all of its interim deadlines, Judge
Pointer entered an order on July 20, 1995, appointing Dr. John G. Veres, III (who
then served as Executive Director for University Outreach at Auburn University in
Montgomery, but who currently is Chancellor of that institution) to serve as Special
Master for the purpose of “assist[ing] the parties in the development of a realistic
schedule governing the transmission of data among the parties and the completion of
job analysis and validation procedures.”14 Even then, no meaningful progress toward
compliance was made during the remaining years of the Second Millennium.
C. Transitions: 2000 – 2002
Chief Judge Sam C. Pointer, Jr., retired on April 3, 2000, after thirty years of
distinguished judicial service to the United States.15 Supervision of these cases then
13

See 1995 Modification Order for Personnel Board’s Consent Decree.

14

See doc. no. 643 (July 20, 1998 Order Appointing Special Master) (alteration supplied).

15

Sam Clyde Pointer, Jr., was born Nov. 15, 1934, in Birmingham. He was awarded degrees
by Vanderbilt University (A.B. 1955), the University of Alabama School of Law (J.D. 1957,
graduating first in his class, just ahead of two other, future judges of the Northern District of
Alabama: Robert Propst (second) and James H. Hancock (third)), and the New York University
School of Law (LL.M. 1958, graduating first in his class). He was nominated by Richard M. Nixon
on Sept. 22, 1970, and confirmed by the Senate on Oct. 8, 1970. He received his commission on

15

was reassigned to the undersigned.16 From that time until January 27, 2012, the focus
of these consolidated proceedings was on modification, enforcement, and
implementation of the consent decrees of, primarily, the Personnel Board of Jefferson
County17 and, secondarily, that of the City of Birmingham.18 This court’s scrutiny
concentrated upon the Personnel Board’s consent decree because that entity is the
principal civil service agency for persons employed by, or seeking employment with,
the twenty-three county and municipal governmental employers in Alabama’s largest
metropolitan area.19 The Board is charged by Alabama law20 with the function of
administering written tests and other job selection procedures that produce “registers”

Oct. 14, 1970. He served as Chief Judge from 1982-1999, assumed senior status on Nov. 19, 1999,
and retired on Apr. 3, 2000. He departed his life on Mar. 15, 2008.
16

See doc. no. 677 (Notice of Reassignment).

17

See doc. no. 1573 (Order on Joint Motion for Termination of Consent Decree With the
Personnel Board of Jefferson County, Approval of Agreement, and Termination of Receivership),
entered on Nov. 20, 2008.
18

See doc. no. 1724 (Order Terminating City of Birmingham’s Consent Decree), entered on
Jan. 27, 2012.
19

The governmental employers served by the Personnel Board include: Jefferson County;
the Jefferson County Personnel Board as an entity; the Jefferson County Department of Health; the
Jefferson County Nursing Home; the Jefferson County Emergency Management Agency; the
Jefferson County Storm Water and Sewer Administration; and the cities of Birmingham, Bessemer,
Fairfield, Fultondale, Gardendale, Graysville, Homewood, Hueytown, Irondale, Leeds, Midfield,
Mountain Brook, Pleasant Grove, Tarrant, Trussville, Vestavia Hills, and Warrior.
20

The Jefferson County Personnel Board was created by an Alabama statute originally
enacted in 1935, and reenacted in 1945. See Act No. 248, 1945 Acts of Alabama, at 376-400; Act
No. 284, 1935 Acts of Alabama, at 691-713; see also 1940 Code of Alabama, Appendix § 645 et
seq. (Recomp. 1958).

16

and “certificates” of persons considered eligible for employment or promotion21 to
classified positions22 with the governmental entities served by the Personnel Board.
Consequently, until such time as the Personnel Board could be compelled to comply
with the requirements of its consent decree, no meaningful progress could be made
in the development of lawful selection procedures for persons employed by, or
seeking employment with, the two largest governmental employers serviced by the
Board: the City of Birmingham, and Jefferson County, Alabama.
For such reasons, this court entered a revised schedule on December 18, 2000,
requiring the Personnel Board to develop lawful selection procedures in accordance
with a detailed timetable, specifying position-by-position, step-by-step, deadlines for
each task.23 Nevertheless, the Board missed deadline after deadline. Even when the
Board managed to develop selection procedures for some job classifications, those
21

Successful applicants for employment or promotion are placed by the Personnel Board on
“registers of eligibles.” Once a register for a particular job classification has been established, a
governmental entity served by the Board may request a “certificate of eligibles” when vacancies
occur. The certificate contains the names of the highest ranked candidates on the register who have
indicated a desire to work for that particular employer. The number of persons appearing on the
certificate is a function of the number of vacancies to be filled. State law provides that the number
of candidates to be certified to the selecting authority is equal to the number of vacancies to be filled
plus nine. Ala. Code § 36-26-17 (1975). Thus, if there is one vacancy, ten candidates are certified
(the so-called “Rule of Ten”).
22

The Board’s enabling legislation excludes such positions as elected officials, certain
appointed officials and professionals, and “common laborers” from merit positions in the classified
service. See Acts No. 677 and 782, 1977 Acts of Alabama.
23

See doc. no. 708 (December 18, 2000 Order Extending 1981 Consent Decrees and 1995
Modification Orders).

17

procedures did not meet the requirements of federal law, or of the decree itself.24
D. The Personnel Board in Receivership: 2002 - 2008
Now, this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end.
But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.
Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill25

For the reasons discussed in the previous Section — as well as the repeated
failures of the Personnel Board’s professional staff and attorneys to provide the
parties with requested information, the Board members’ ignorance of and disregard
for the requirements of the Board’s consent decree, and the Board’s lack of an
effective infrastructure — this court held the Personnel Board in civil contempt on
July 8, 2002. Dr. Ronald R. Sims, Ph.D., and Floyd Dewey Gottwald Professor in the
Graduate School of Business at the College of William and Mary in Williamsburg,
Virginia, was appointed Receiver of the Board.26
This court initially contemplated that the Receiver’s overhaul of the Personnel
Board could be completed within a year to eighteen months.27 In hindsight, that goal
was comically optimistic. The return of authority from the Receiver to the Personnel
24

See doc. no. 934 (Memorandum Opinion Imposing Receivership on the Personnel Board),
at 38-57 (outlining the Board’s failures from 2000 forward).
25

Remarks delivered during a Nov. 10, 1942 speech at the Mansion House in London,
referring to the defeat of German General Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps by British General Harold
Alexander and Lt. Gen. Bernard Law Montgomery at the Second Battle of El Alamein.
26

See doc. no. 934 (Memorandum Opinion) and 935 (Order Imposing Receivership).

27

See doc. no. 935 ¶ 4 (requiring the Receiver to submit “a twelve-month plan” for the
fulfillment of his duties).

18

Board was not completed until July 11, 2005,28 fully three years after the Receiver
assumed his supervisory responsibilities at the Board, and he remained involved in
the case in an advisory role long after that.
The lifting of the Receiver’s day-to-day control over the Personnel Board did not
end this court’s supervision. The Board was advised that it should move for
termination of its consent decree only when it had, independently of the Receiver,
“developed sufficient evidence of its compliance with the Consent Decree and federal
law and its likely future compliance with federal law.”29 In a fashion that has been
typical of this litigation, issue after issue cropped up to prevent the Board from
making such a showing.
After several months of watching the Board struggle, this court entered an order
on November 15, 2005, appointing Dr. William I. Sauser, Jr., Professor of
Management at Auburn University, to serve as a Monitor, and “to oversee the efforts
of the Personnel Board to comply with its obligations under its [consent decree] and,
to assist this court and the parties in determining the Board’s ability and commitment
to function in compliance with Federal law absent judicial supervision.”30 The
Monitor tendered monthly reports to the court and parties on the Board’s progress (or
28

See doc. no. 1213 (Second Revised Transition Plan) ¶¶ 6-13.

29

Id. ¶ 16.

30

Doc. no. 1270 (Order Appointing Monitor), at 1 (alteration supplied).

19

lack thereof). And the court continued its long-standing practice of holding monthly
status conferences.
More than three additional years elapsed before there was sufficient evidence of
the Board’s commitment to comply with federal law absent judicial supervision.
Plaintiffs and the Board submitted a joint motion to terminate the Board’s decree on
November 7, 2008,31 and this court entered an order on November 20, 2008,
approving the parties’ agreement, terminating the consent decree and judicial
supervision, and formally ending the Receivership.32
E.

The Shift to Birmingham: 2008 – 2012
The City of Birmingham first moved to terminate its consent decree on July 6,

2004, during the second year of the Receiver’s control of the Personnel Board.33
Following a period of discovery and briefing, the court entered an order on July 12,
2005 that granted the motion, but only in part.34 The court found that the City had
complied with almost all of the requirements of its consent decree, and that the City
had demonstrated its good faith commitment to continued compliance with the decree
in the future, but with one significant exception that touched the heart of the claims

31

Doc. no. 1562.

32

Doc. no. 1573.

33

Doc. no. 1113.

34

Doc. no. 1228.

20

asserted by the reverse-discrimination plaintiffs:

that is, the City’s selection

procedure for the “Fire Apparatus Operator” job classification resulted in a
statistically significant adverse impact against whites, and it had not been shown to
be job-related.35 Therefore, this court retained judicial supervision
for the limited purpose of obtaining the City’s compliance with paragraph
8 of the 1995 Modification Order for the Fire Apparatus Operator
classification, until such time as the City either shoulders the burdens of
production and persuasion necessary to validate (i.e., demonstrate the job
relatedness of) its supplemental application, or revises the selection
procedure in a manner that, all parties agree, complies with federal law.36

The City initially was ordered to develop and administer a revised testing
procedure for the Fire Apparatus Operator position by February 14, 2006, with any
results of the procedure, and any objections thereto, to be submitted to the court after
March 28, 2006.37 The deadline for administering the revised test subsequently was
extended to sometime in June of 2006, with any objections to be submitted to the
court approximately eight weeks later.38 The City completed its revision of the Fire

35

Doc. no. 1227 (Memorandum Opinion on City’s Motion to Terminate Consent Decree),

at 43-49.
36

Id. at 48.

37

See doc. no. 1263 (Order Setting Deadlines for the Fire Apparatus Operator position).

38

Doc. no. 1285. See also doc. no. 1271 (City’s Proposed Revision of Fire Apparatus
Operator Deadlines); doc. no. 1274 (Transcript of December 1, 2005 Status Conference), at 30-31
(stating that all deadlines for the Fire Apparatus Operator position would be continued indefinitely
until new deadlines were entered).

21

Apparatus Operator selection procedure, and filed a motion to terminate the
remainder of its decree on February 2, 2007.39 There was no dispute that the City had
adequately revised the testing procedure for that job classification, but the court,
nevertheless, entered an order on August 20, 2007, denying the City’s motion to
terminate the decree.40
The reason for the court’s denial was based upon shifting political winds and
demagoguery on the part of some members of the Birmingham City Council — rants
that had generated uncertainty over the question of whether the City would seek to
withdraw from the jurisdiction of the Personnel Board after the City was released
from federal supervision. Such an action by the largest governmental employer
served by the Personnel Board since its creation in 1935 would have drained most of
the Board’s financial lifeblood, nullified 38 years of work by this court, and wasted
millions of taxpayer dollars expended for attorneys’ fees, the services of expert
witnesses and paralegals, and court costs. The statements of some members of the
Council signaled that the City was not fully committed to complying with federal law
in the absence of court supervision.41 See Board of Education of Oklahoma City

39

Doc. no. 1332.

40

Doc. no. 1399 (Memorandum Opinion and Order denying the City’s Motion to Terminate
the Remainder of its Decree).
41

Id. at 10-20.

22

Public Schools v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247 (1991) (holding that judicial supervision
may be terminated only when the court determines that the public entity “was being
operated in compliance with the commands of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment,” and, “that it was unlikely that the [entity] would return to
its former ways”) (alteration supplied).
For such reasons, this court ordered that discovery be conducted on two issues:
“(1) whether the Birmingham City Council will pass a resolution to remain under the
jurisdiction of the Personnel Board; and, if not, (2) what the City’s plans will be for
establishing a personnel system that can produce hiring and promotional decisions
that comply fully with governing law.”42 The court also set a deadline of December
16, 2007, for the City to file a renewed motion to terminate its consent decree.43

42

Id. at 19. The discovery on this subject was less than conclusive. The least equivocal
response received by the City was that it had no present intent to withdraw from the Board’s
jurisdiction. See doc. no. 1350 (Wilks Class’s Opposition to the City of Birmingham Motions to
Terminate Consent Decree and to be Dismissed as a Party), Exhibit 8 (City’s Responses to MartinBryant Parties’ First Set of Requests for Admission), at Response No. 2 (“The City intends to
continue paying for and receiving the Personnel Board’s services.”), Response No. 3 (“The City is
not seeking to withdraw from the Personnel Board.”) See also doc. no. 1506-1 (Declaration of
Elizabeth Lewis), Exhibit 46 (March 20, 2008 Deposition of Barbara White), at 46-47 (City’s
Personnel Director stating that she was not aware of any plans for the City to remove itself from the
jurisdiction of the Personnel Board). Despite the lack of an unequivocal commitment from the City,
the court became less concerned that the City would separate from the Board’s jurisdiction following
the election of Larry Langford as Mayor (discussed in the following section), and the focus of this
litigation then shifted to the “data interface problems” that are discussed in the following pages.
43

Id. at 20.

23

1.

The Langford interregnum

The deadline for the City to file a renewed motion to terminate its consent decree
subsequently was extended to April 14, 2008, to allow time to determine the impact
of a transition of leadership in City governance. Larry Langford — a former fourterm Mayor of Fairfield, Alabama (1988-2002), member of the Jefferson County
Commission (2002-2007), and future convicted felon — was elected Mayor of
Birmingham during the October 9, 2007 municipal elections, and was sworn into
office on November 13, 2007.44 The transition to the Langford administration marked
the beginning of significant and costly setbacks for the City. Many of the issues that
subsequently arose were the result of Mayor Langford’s lamentably unenlightened
decision to fire the law firm that had represented the City in these cases since their
inception more than three decades before,45 and to replace it with attorneys from three

44

Doc. no. 1422. Langford received 26,230 of 52,510 votes cast in the election: 171 votes
more than needed to avoid a run-off with his nearest challenger, Birmingham attorney Patrick
Cooper. After the votes were certified, Cooper filed suit, claiming that Langford, a former four-term
Mayor of Fairfield who had signed only a six-month lease for a loft apartment in downtown
Birmingham on June 4th, and who had only registered to vote in Birmingham on June 7, 2007, had
failed to establish residency in the City as required by state law. A State judge subsequently
dismissed the suit, holding that residency was “a matter of intent.” See, e.g., Larry Langford,
http://www.bhamwiki.com; Larry Langford, http://en.wikipedia.org; Jay Reeves, Suit Seeks to
Disqualify Mayor of Birmingham, The Decatur Daily, Nov. 15, 2007.
45

See doc. no. 1431 (Dec. 28, 2007 Motion to Withdraw by Anne Yuengert of the
Birmingham law firm then known as Bradley, Arant, Rose & White).

24

firms,46 none of whom possessed sufficient knowledge of the multifaceted history of
this extraordinarily old and complex institutional reform litigation to effectively
represent the City in ongoing proceedings.
The Monitor reported on January 17, 2008, that the City was refusing to act
cooperatively to report personnel actions to the Personnel Board, resulting in
substantial discrepancies between the City’s records and those of the Board.47 Those
problems were intensified by the technical inability of the software programs running
on the computer systems operated by the City and Personnel Board, respectively, to
communicate data (“interface”) with each other. The Monitor’s March 24, 2008
Special Report stated that:
It is clear to the Monitor that this issue cannot be resolved without the
commitment of significant resources in the form of programming
expertise and persons dedicated to data entry corrections. Even with
the provision of sufficient skilled human resources, it may not be possible
to resolve this issue within the 2008 calendar year. Immediate action is
necessary to bring this problem under control and the Monitor urges
the City and the Board to direct sufficient resources to resolving this
issue. This may require the use of external contractors.48
46

Only two of the three firms were located in the City of Birmingham. See doc. no. 1428
(Dec. 10, 2007 Notice of Appearance of Brandy Murphy Lee, Lee Law Firm LLC, Birmingham);
doc. no. 1433 (Notice of Appearance of Hycall Brooks, III, The Brooks Law Firm, Birmingham);
doc. no. 1434 (Notice of Appearance of Charles I. Brooks, The Brooks Law Firm P.C.,
Birmingham); doc. no. 1435 (Notice of Appearance of Tiffany N. Johnson, Law Offices of Robert
Simms Thompson P.C., Tuskegee, Ala.).
47

See doc. no. 1438 (Monitor’s Report November-December 2007).

48

Doc. no. 1457 (Mar. 24, 2008 Special Report of the Monitor), at 4 (emphasis in original).

25

Accordingly, the court entered an order on March 31, 2008, extending the City’s
deadline to refile a motion to terminate its consent decree to June 13, 2008.49 The
court emphasized that any such motion would need to be “supported by clear and
convincing evidence of the City’s commitment to work with the Personnel Board to
resolve the issues raised in the Monitor’s reports to the court.”50
The City filed its renewed motion to terminate the remainder of its consent
decree, and to have itself dismissed as a party to the litigation, on the June 13, 2008
deadline.51 Despite this court’s prior admonition that the City would need to
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that progress had been made toward
resolution of all of the communication problems and data discrepancies between the
City and Personnel Board, the Monitor reported on November 17, 2008 that the data
interface problems and resulting backlog in processing personnel actions had reached
“crisis proportions.”52 As a result, the court extended the Monitor’s duties to include
reporting on the City of Birmingham,53 and entered an order on November 25, 2008,
setting a series of deadlines for the City to resolve the technical difficulties and
reduce the backlog of personnel actions. The court cautioned the City that, if it
49

Doc. no. 1461.

50

Id. at 2.

51

Doc. no. 1486.

52

Doc. no. 1569 (Monitor’s Report October 2008), at 4.

53

Doc. no. 1574.

26

missed any of its deadlines, the court would act immediately to appoint a receiver or
outside services firm to assist with the City’s compliance.54
The City failed to meet its deadline for resolving certain personnel actions by
January 31, 2010.55 Accordingly, the City was ordered to show cause why it and its
Personnel Director should not be held in contempt of court, and why a receiver or
outside services firm should not be appointed to secure the City’s compliance.56 In
the meantime, Larry Langford had been arrested on a 101-count federal indictment
charging him — along with investment banker William B. Blount and former
Alabama Democratic Pary Chairman Al LaPierre — with conspiracy, bribery, fraud,
money laundering, and filing false income-tax returns in connection with a longrunning bribery scheme. His public corruption trial ended on October 28, 2009, with
convictions on 60 counts, and resulted in his automatic removal from office. William
A. Bell, Sr., was elected to serve the balance of Langford’s term, and was sworn in
on January 26, 2010.57

54

Doc. no. 1575.

55

See doc. no. 1672 (Monitor’s Report January 2010), at 4.

56

Doc. no. 1673 (Order for Show Cause Hearing).

57

See doc. no. 1672, at 6.

27

2.

Mayor Bell and the restoration of focus

Mayor Bell’s election marked a positive turn in direction.58 The attorneys who
had been retained by Larry Langford withdrew, and attorneys from the law firm of
Burr & Forman, L.L.P., took their place.59 Even so, it still required more than an
additional year of court supervision, and the retention of an outside technical
consultant to serve as “Executive Project Manager,” supervising teams of employees
from the City and Personnel Board, in order to resolve the software interface
discrepancies between the City’s computerized employee data and the records
maintained by the Personnel Board.60 Ultimately, however, after the City filed its
fourth motion to terminate its consent decree on March 1, 2011,61 and following a
hearing at which no party objected, federal supervision of the City of Birmingham
ceased on January 27, 2012:62 seven and a half years after the City first moved to

58

See generally doc. no. 1691 (Monitor’s Report April and May 2010); doc. no. 1692
(Monitor’s Report June 2010); doc. no. 1693 (Monitor’s Report July 2010); doc. no. 1694 (Monitor’s
Report August 2010); doc. no. 1703 (Monitor’s Report September-December 2010); doc. no. 1723
(Monitor’s Report January 2012).
59

See doc. no. 1679 (Notice of Appearance by Howard Walthall, Jr.); doc. no. 1680 (Notice
of Appearance by Michael K.K. Choy); doc. no. 1690 (Motion to Withdraw by Brandy Murphy Lee),
granted by text order on May 27, 2010.
60

See doc. no. 1684 (order directing Steve Goldsby to preside over a meeting between the
City and the Board as a representative of the Special Master); doc. no. 1723, at 3 (reporting that the
interface problem was resolved on February 24, 2011).
61

Doc. no. 1707.

62

Doc. no. 1724 (Order Terminating City’s Consent Decree and Terminating the City as a

Party).

28

terminate its decree.
F.

Finally, Jefferson County!
During all of the years of litigation addressing the provisions of the consent

decrees of the Personnel Board and City of Birmingham, defendant Jefferson County,
Alabama managed to avoid intensive court scrutiny. The County’s proposed consent
decree was not presented to Judge Pointer until more than a year after the City and
Board decrees. It was signed on December 28 and 29, 1982 by representatives of the
United States and the Martin class of plaintiffs, on one side, and the Jefferson County
Commission and Jefferson County Sheriff on the other.63 Judge Pointer entered the
decree on December 29, 1982.64 No party actively pursued enforcement of the
County’s decree until sometime during the year 2006, when the Martin-Bryant parties
began to gather evidence addressing the County’s compliance with its consent decree.
The motion that precipitated this opinion was filed in the following year.65
The County’s consent decree differs from those of the City and Personnel Board
in at least two respects. First, the County decree does not contain the race and gender

63

See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 13 (Jefferson County Consent Decree) (hereafter, “County decree”),
at 1-2, and 31. The plaintiffs to the original action commenced by the Ensley Branch of the
N.A.A.C.P. and several individual class representatives did not allege claims against Jefferson
County.
64

Id. at 31.

65

See supra note 1.

29

preferences found in the original City and Board decrees. Instead, its “major
purposes” are characterized as ensuring that blacks and women are “considered for
employment by the County on an equal basis with whites and males,” and correcting
for “the effects of any alleged prior discriminatory employment practices by the
County against blacks and women.”66 To those ends, the decree enjoins the County
from “engaging in any act or practice which has the purpose or effect of unlawfully
discriminating against any employee of, or any applicant or prospective applicant [for
employment] with, Jefferson County because of such individual’s race, color or
sex.”67 The County also agreed in its decree “that all hiring, promotion, upgrading,
training, job assignments, discharge or other disciplinary measures, compensation,
or other terms and conditions or privileges of employment shall be maintained and
conducted in a manner which does not unlawfully discriminate on the basis of race,
color or sex.”68 Further, the County’s decree requires that it
seek in good faith to achieve the employment of qualified blacks and
females in job vacancies in the classified service of the County in numbers
approximating their percentage representation among persons on the
eligibility lists for such jobs as determined by the Jefferson County
Personnel Board under nondiscriminatory recruitment and selection
procedures set forth in its Consent Decree . . . and in job vacancies in
laborer positions in the unclassified service in numbers approximating their
66

County decree ¶ 5.

67

Id. ¶ 1 (alteration supplied).

68

Id.

30

percentage representation among qualified applicants for such jobs as
determined by the County under the provisions of this Consent Decree.69
The second major respect in which the County’s consent decree differs from
those of the City and Personnel Board is that it has not been modified.
Now that the historical and procedural framework of the County’s decree has
been laid, the court moves on to discuss, in Part II, the standards that must be met by
the Martin-Bryant parties in order to hold the County in civil contempt; and, in Part
III, the standards that pertain to modification of a contempt decree.
II. CIVIL CONTEMPT STANDARDS
A consent decree “is an agreement that the parties desire and expect will be
reflected in, and be enforceable as, a judicial decree that is subject to the rules
generally applicable to other judgments and decrees.” Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk
County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992). Civil contempt sanctions are the primary
means of compelling a party’s compliance with the provisions of such a decree. The
procedures for invoking such sanctions were outlined by the Eleventh Circuit in
Reynolds v. Roberts, 207 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Reynolds II ”), holding that
consent decrees, like all injunctions, are to be enforced through the district
court’s civil contempt power — exercised after (1) the plaintiff moves the
court to order the defendant to show cause why he should not be held in
contempt for refusing to obey the decree’s mandate, (2) the court grants the
69

Id. ¶ 5.

31

motion, and (3) the defendant fails to present a lawful excuse for his alleged
disobedience . . . .
Id. at 1297. See also, e.g., Reynolds v. Roberts, 251 F.3d 1350, 1358 (11th Cir. 2001)
(“Reynolds III ”) (reiterating a proposition first stated in Thomason v. Russell Corp.,
132 F.3d 632 (11th Cir. 1998), and Reynolds II: i.e., “there are proper procedures to
be followed for the enforcement and litigation of issues related to consent decrees”);
Florida Association for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. Bush, 246 F.3d 1296, 1298 (11th
Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (same); Thomason, 132 F.3d at 634 n.4 (observing that “the
proper method of enforcing a consent decree is not a ‘motion to enforce’ or similar
plea for the court to ‘do something’ about a violation of the decree,” but a motion
asking “the court to issue an order to show cause why [the defendant] should not be
held in contempt and sanctioned for failing to abide by the Decree’s mandate”)
(emphasis in original) (alteration supplied); Wyatt v. Rogers, 92 F.3d 1074, 1078 n.8
(11th Cir. 1996) (“Precedent dictates that a plaintiff seeking to obtain the defendant’s
compliance with the provisions of an injunctive order move the court to issue an order
requiring the defendant to show cause why he should not be held in contempt and
sanctioned for his noncompliance.”) (citation omitted); Mercer v. Mitchell, 908 F.2d
763, 768 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Every civil contempt proceeding is brought to enforce a
court order that requires the defendant to act in some manner.”); Newman v. Alabama,

32

683 F.2d 1312, 1318 (11th Cir. 1982) (“The plaintiffs, if they think [a defendant] is
failing to take the action required by the consent decree and wish the court to
intervene, have available a traditional equitable remedy. They can initiate contempt
proceedings by moving the court to issue an order to show cause why the [defendant]
should not be held in civil contempt.”) (alterations supplied).
Civil contempt proceedings are both coercive and remedial in nature. To prevail
on a motion for civil contempt, a plaintiff must demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that a defendant violated a prior court order that was lawful, clear, and
unambiguous, and that the alleged violator possessed the ability to comply with the
order. McGregor v. Chierico, 206 F.3d 1378, 1383 (11th Cir. 2000). “Once this
prima facie showing of a violation is made, the burden then shifts to the alleged
contemnor ‘to produce evidence explaining his noncompliance’ at a ‘show cause’
hearing.” Chairs v. Burgess, 143 F.3d 1432, 1436 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Watkins, 943 F.2d 1297, 1301 (11th Cir. 1991)).
The contemnor must show “either that he did not violate the court order or that he
was excused from complying.” Mercer, 908 F.2d at 768.
This burden of production is not satisfied by “a mere assertion of inability.”
United States v. Hayes, 722 F.2d 723, 725 (11th Cir. 1984). Rather, in this
circuit, a party subject to a court’s order demonstrates inability to comply
only by showing that he has made “in good faith all reasonable efforts to
comply.” United States v. Rizzo, 539 F.2d 458, 465 (5th Cir. 1976) (citing
33

United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 534, 91 S. Ct. 1580, 1583, 29 L. Ed.
2d 85 (1971)).
United States v. Roberts, 858 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988). Despite that standard’s
use of the subjective term “good faith,” the inquiry is an objective one: that is,
the focus of the court’s inquiry in civil contempt proceedings is not on the
subjective beliefs or intent of the alleged contemnors in complying with the
order, but whether in fact their conduct complied with the order at issue.
Jim Walter Resources, Inc. v. Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of America,
609 F.2d 165, 168 (5th Cir. 1980). Conduct that evinces substantial, but
not complete, compliance with the court order may be excused if it was
made as part of a good faith effort at compliance. Newman [v. Graddick],
740 F.2d [1513,] 1524 [(11th Cir. 1984)].
Howard Johnson Co., Inc. v. Khimani, 892 F.2d 1512, 1516 (11th Cir. 1990)
(alterations supplied).
Even so, the Eleventh Circuit has made it clear that a party’s recent (i.e., hurried,
eleventh-hour) compliance with the requirements of a consent decree in advance of
a contempt hearing does not excuse its past non-compliance. A party has no “license
to flout or wilfully to disobey a court order by violating the order and then complying
with the order before the contempt proceeding begins.” Mercer, 908 F.2d at 769
n.10. If that occurs,
the court still will have two means of coercing compliance or punishing the
defendant. First, the court may conclude that, even though the defendant
is in technical compliance at the time of the proceeding, the defendant’s
prior conduct indicates that he will not continue to comply with the court’s
injunction. In such a case, it may be appropriate to hold the defendant in
34

civil contempt and sanction him until he satisfies the court that he will
indeed obey the injunction. Second, if the court finds the defendant acted
wilfully or maliciously in disregarding the injunction, then the court may
cite the defendant for criminal contempt. See United States v. Hilburn, 625
F.2d 1177, 1179 (5th Cir. 1980). In such a case, the court may fully
vindicate its authority with a fine, imprisonment, or both. Thus, in no
situation is the court left without authority to act when the defendant
appears to be flouting judicial authority.
Id. (emphasis supplied). See also Chairs v. Burgess, 25 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1338 (N.D.
Ala. 1998) (holding that the defendant in a consent decree case could not “moot the
issue [of contempt] by simply bringing itself into compliance by the time of the Show
Cause Hearing”) (alteration supplied).
“The district court has wide discretion to fashion an equitable remedy for
contempt that is appropriate to the circumstances,” bearing in mind that “[t]he
purposes of civil contempt sanctions are ‘to coerce the defendant into compliance
with the court’s order, and to compensate the complainant for losses sustained.’”
EEOC v. Guardian Pools, Inc., 828 F.2d 1507, 1515 (11th Cir. 1987) (quoting Local
28 of Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 481, 443
(1986), and also citing Norman Bridge Drug Co. v. Banner, 529 F.2d 822, 827 (5th
Cir. 1976)) (alteration supplied).70
70

It should be noted that there is a distinction between coercion and punishment, as the
Eleventh Circuit observed in Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Watkins, 943 F.2d 1297 (11th Cir.
1991), holding that the sanctions imposed upon a showing of civil contempt should be sufficient “to
coerce the contemnor to comply with the court’s order, but may not be so excessive as to be punitive
in nature.” Id. at 1304 (citing Matter of Trinity Industries, Inc. 876 F.2d 1485, 1493 (11th Cir.

35

Thus, “‘[t]he measure of the court’s power in civil contempt proceedings is
determined by the requirements of full remedial relief. This may entail the doing of
a variety of acts . . . .’” Guardian Pools, 828 F.2d at 1515 (quoting McComb v.
Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 193 (1949)) (alteration supplied). One such
act is the appointment of a receiver. Dixon v. Barry, 967 F. Supp. 535, 550 (D. D.C.
1997) (holding that the court’s “equitable power includes the power to appoint a
receiver”) (citing Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527, 533 (1st Cir. 1976). See
also, e.g., Bracco v. Lackner, 462 F. Supp. 436, 455 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Petitpren v.
Taylor School District, 304 N.W.2d 553, 557 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)).
“The appointment of a person to carry out functions the court deems necessary
to provide full and complete relief is not a novelty in American jurisprudence.”
Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Lucas, 216 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Mich. 1974) (en banc)
(footnoted citations omitted) (“Wayne I ”); see also, e.g., Wayne County Jail Inmates
v. Wayne County Chief Executive Officer, 444 N.W.2d 549, 556 & n.2 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1989) (“Wayne II ”) (same); Morgan, 540 F.2d at 533 (“A district court’s power
to fashion and effectuate desegregation decrees is broad and flexible, and the
remedies may be ‘administratively awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre.’”)

1989)). See also Mercer, 908 F.2d at 768 n. 9 (“Of course, the sanctions may not be any greater or
more onerous than is necessary to ensure compliance.”).

36

(quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 28
(1971)); District of Columbia v. Jerry M., 738 A.2d 1206, 1213 (D.C. 1999) (“The
court has the power, pursuant to its equity jurisdiction, to take broad remedial action
to secure compliance with its orders, including the power to appoint a receiver.”)
(citing Dixon, 967 F. Supp. at 500); Judge Rotenberg Educational Center, Inc. v.
Commissioner of the Department of Mental Retardation, 677 N.E.2d 127, 148 (Mass.
1997) (“Public officials who fail to abide by legal standards are not immune to these
remedies. . . . A court with equity jurisdiction has the discretion to appoint a receiver
to take over the main functions of public officials.”) (citations omitted), abrogated
on other grounds by In re Birchall, 913 N.E. 2d 799, 813 (Mass. 2009).
Receivers have been appointed “to coerce public officials to comply with legal
mandates in a number of factual settings, including public schools, housing,
highways, nursing homes, and prisons.” Dixon, 967 F. Supp. at 550.
The mechanisms at work in the creation of . . . a receivership of a
public institution, are fairly clear. The political process has failed to
produce an institution conforming to law and those subjected to the
illegality, who are usually politically powerless (cf. United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4, 58 S. Ct. 778, 783, 82 L. Ed.
1234 (1938)), turn to the courts for the vindication of their rights.
Injunctive remedies are called for, but the judge lacks expertness in the
particular field, and lacks time even when he chances to have the
knowledge. Hence the appointment of adjunct officers who supply expert
knowledge and sometimes implicitly encourage acceptance by the parties
and the general public of the results of the judicial intervention.
37

Perez v. Boston Housing Authority, 400 N.E.2d 1231, 1250 n.29 (Mass. 1980).
Even so, the appointment of a receiver to act in the place of “elected and
appointed officials is an extraordinary step warranted only by the most compelling
circumstances.” Morgan, 540 F.2d at 535. “Essentially it is the remedy of last resort,
and therefore, should be undertaken only when absolutely necessary.” Jerry M., 738
A.2d at 1213 (citing LaShawn A., by Moore v. Kelly, 144 F.3d 847, 854 (D.C. Cir.
1998)). See also Canada Life Assurance Co. v. LaPeter, 563 F.3d 837, 844 (9th Cir.
2009) (“Under federal law, appointing a ‘receiver is an extraordinary equitable
remedy,’ which should be applied with caution.”) (quoting Aviation Supply Corp. v.
R.S.B.I. Aerospace, Inc., 999 F.2d 314, 316 (8th Cir. 1993)).
Because the imposition of a receivership is an equitable remedy, it is available
only when there is no adequate legal remedy. United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d
1213, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011). Thus, the primary consideration is “whether any other
remedy is likely to be successful.” Dixon, 967 F. Supp. at 550 (citing Shaw v. Allen,
771 F. Supp. 760, 762 (S.D. W.Va. 1990) (“Where more traditional remedies, such
as contempt proceedings or injunctions, are inadequate under the circumstances a
court acting within its equitable powers is justified, particularly in aid of an
outstanding injunction, in implementing less common remedies, such as a
receivership, so as to achieve compliance with a constitutional mandate.”); Newman
38

v. Alabama, 466 F. Supp. 628, 635 (M.D. Ala. 1979) (“When the usual remedies are
inadequate, a court is justified in resorting to a receivership, particularly when it acts
in aid of an outstanding injunction.”); Bracco, 462 F. Supp. at 456 (noting that a
receiver is a “remedy of last resort; a receiver should not be appointed if a less drastic
remedy exists”); Petitpren, 304 N.W.2d at 557 (finding a receiver appropriate only
when “other approaches have failed to bring compliance with a court’s orders,
whether through intransigence or incompetence”)).
Courts in the District of Columbia — the jurisdiction in which most of the
reported receiverships have been imposed on public institutions — have identified
six, non-exhaustive factors to consider when determining whether other remedies are
inadequate, and whether the imposition of a receivership remains the only viable
option for coercing compliance with court orders. These include:
(1) “whether there were repeated failures to comply with the Court’s
orders”; (2) whether further efforts to secure compliance would only lead
to “confrontation and delay”; (3) whether leadership is available which can
“turn the tide within a reasonable time period”; (4) “whether there was bad
faith”; (5) “whether resources are being wasted”; and, (6) “whether a
receiver can provide a quick and efficient remedy.”
Jerry M., 738 A.2d at 1213 (quoting Dixon, 967 F. Supp. at 550-51 (citing, in turn,
Judge Rotenberg Educational Center, 677 N.E.2d at 148-49, and Morgan, 540 F.2d
at 533 (“Remedial devices should be effective and relief prompt.”))).

39

III. STANDARDS FOR MODIFICATION OF A CONSENT DECREE
The Martin-Bryant parties also have asked this court to modify some provisions
of the County’s consent decree. The Supreme Court promulgated a two-pronged
standard for determining when (and to what extent) an institutional-reform consent
decree that “arguably relates to the vindication of a constitutional right” should be
modified in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 383 n.7 (1992).
The first prong requires the party seeking modification to “establish that a significant
change in facts or law warrants revision of the decree.” Id. at 383. If the moving
party satisfies that prerequisite, then the second prong requires the court to make
modifications that are “suitably tailored” to address the new factual or legal
environment. Id. See also Ensley II, 31 F.3d at 1563.
A. Significant Change in Facts or Law
The prerequisite for proof of a significant change in either the facts or legal
circumstances upon which the consent decree was based “is interpreted flexibly, and
different sorts of factual changes may qualify as changed circumstances permitting
modification.” Reynolds v. McInnes, 338 F.3d 1221, 1226 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing
Ensley II, 31 F.3d at 1563). According to the Supreme Court, modification based on
factual change may be warranted “when changed factual conditions make compliance
with the decree substantially more onerous,” or “when a decree proves to be
40

unworkable because of unforeseen obstacles,” or “when enforcement of the decree
without modification would be detrimental to the public interest.” Rufo, 502 U.S. at
384-85.
The Eleventh Circuit has also held that modification is warranted “when
‘significant time has passed and the objectives of the original agreement have not
been met’ despite the defendants’ efforts, or when a continuation of the decree would
be inequitable.” Reynolds, 338 F.3d at 1227 (citations omitted).
B.

“Suitably Tailored” Modifications
If significant factual or legal changes are established, the court must then

“determine the appropriate scope of the changes, accepting only proposals that are
‘suitably tailored’ to address significant factual developments or conflicts between
new legal standards and the requirements of the decree.” Ensley II, 31 F.3d at 156364 (quoting Rufo, 502 U.S. at 393). The court has broad discretion in making that
determination, but it “may not modify a decree in a way that would ‘violate the basic
purpose of the decree,’ and must under no circumstances ‘create or perpetuate a
constitutional violation.’” Id. at 1564 (quoting Rufo, 502 U.S. at 391).

41

IV. THE COUNTY’S ADMISSIONS OF NONCOMPLIANCE
The County admitted that it has not complied with significant portions of its
consent decree. The admissions are set out in the following paragraphs of the
County’s post-trial brief:
56. The County has not evaluated supervisory personnel, in part, on
the basis of their compliance with their responsibilities as well as their
cooperation with the Affirmative Action Officer as required by paragraph
31 of the Consent Decree.[71] . . .
57. Prior to June 29, 2004, the County did not institute a formal
affirmative recruitment program designed to inform African Americans and
females of job opportunities with the County, as required by paragraph 16
of the Consent Decree.[72] . . .
71

Paragraph 31 states (Nota bene: All quotations from Jefferson County’s Dec. 29, 1982
Consent Decree have been copied from Plaintiff’s Exhibit 13):
The County shall inform supervisory personnel that the County shall not
discriminate against or harass any employee or potential employee on the basis of
race or sex. In addition, the County will instruct such personnel about their
responsibilities as they relate to carrying out the provisions of this Decree.
Supervisory personnel will be evaluated, in part, on the basis of their compliance
with these instructions as well as their cooperation with the Affirmative Action
Officer identified in paragraph 33 below.
72

Paragraph 16 states:

Except for unclassified laborer positions over which the County has sole
recruitment responsibility under this Decree, if the recruitment efforts of the
Personnel Board pursuant to its Consent Decree fail to supply sufficient applicants
for the County to meet the objectives of this Decree, the County shall institute an
affirmative recruitment program designed to inform blacks and women of job
opportunities with the County. This recruitment obligation is intended to supplement
but not duplicate the recruitment efforts of the Personnel Board, as required by the
Consent Decree between plaintiffs and the Board. The County’s recruitment
activities shall be directed specifically at attracting qualified black and female
applicants for the jobs identified in paragraphs 7, 8, and 11, and in Appendices A and

42

58. Prior to June 29, 2004, the County did not consistently inform its
employees of all opportunities for promotion or transfer, nor did it insure
that all written announcements received from the Personnel Board for
hiring, promotion and training opportunities with the County were made
available to all of its employees reasonably in advance of any scheduled
examinations or training for such positions and posted in conspicuous
places, as required by paragraph 18 of the Consent Decree.[73] . . .
59. Prior to February 1, 2005, the County did not consistently
instruct supervisory personnel regarding their responsibilities as they relate
to carrying out the provisions of the Consent Decree, as required by
paragraph 31 of the Consent Decree.[74] . . .
B of this Decree. The recruitment program may include but shall not be limited to
maintaining contacts with area high schools, technical and vocational schools,
colleges, and organizations which have traditionally expressed an interest in
providing minority and female applicants, or which indicate such interest in the
future, and informing them of employment opportunities with the County. In
addition, where appropriate, advertising of employment opportunities may be placed
with or in advertising media primarily directed to black and female audiences for the
purpose of emphasizing to blacks and women the availability of employment
opportunities with the County. Utilization of the above described recruitment
sources in accordance with this paragraph shall constitute compliance by the County
with the affirmative recruitment obligations required by this paragraph.
73

Paragraph 18 states:

The County shall inform its employees of all opportunities for promotion or
transfer. The County shall insure that all written announcements received from the
Personnel Board for hiring, promotion and training opportunities with the County are
made available to all of its employees reasonably in advance of any scheduled
examinations or training for such positions. Such announcements shall be posted in
conspicuous places so that reasonable notice is given to the County’s employees of
such employment opportunities. Notices of job announcements within a department
in either permanent, part-time or temporary positions shall be posted separately and
in conspicuous places from notices of job announcements in other departments.
74

Paragraph 31 states:

The County shall inform supervisory personnel that the County shall not
discriminate against or harass any employee or potential employee on the basis of
race or sex. In addition, the County will instruct such personnel about their

43

60. Prior to February 1, 2005, the County did not maintain a
complete record of all actions taken in pursuit of the duties in the Consent
Decree, including correspondence relating to any complaints or
investigations undertaken pursuant to the decree and any investigatory files,
as required by paragraph 33(e) of the Consent Decree.[75] . . .
61. Prior to June 29, 2004, the County did not maintain a list of all
organizations and schools which are contacted for recruitment purposes for
classified positions, showing the date that any notice of job opportunity was
mailed to them, the title of the job to be filled from that notice, and the date
through which applications would be received for the job, as required by
paragraph 51(a) of the Consent Decree.[76] . . .
62. Prior to June 29, 2004, the County failed to meet its own
independent recruiting obligations under paragraphs 13[77] and 51(a)[78] of
responsibilities as they relate to carrying out the provisions of this Decree.
Supervisory personnel will be evaluated, in part, on the basis of their compliance
with these instructions as well as their cooperation with the Affirmative Action
Officer identified in paragraph 33 below.
75

Paragraph 33(e) requires the County to appoint an Affirmative Action Officer who is
required, among other responsibilities, to “Maintain a complete record of all actions taken in pursuit
of the duties prescribed herein, including all correspondence directed to or from the County with
respect to any complaints or investigations undertaken pursuant to this Consent Decree and any
investigatory files.”
76

Paragraph 51(a) states that the County’s records shall include:

A list of all organizations and schools which are contacted for recruitment
purposes, showing the date that any notice of job opportunity was mailed to them, the
title of the job and number of positions within that job to be filled from that notice,
and the date through which applications would be received for the job. A summary
or compilation of all other recruitment efforts aimed at minorities and women shall
also be maintained, together with the date and nature of the efforts and the names and
job title of the County employees involved.
77

Paragraph 13 states:

In [those departments and divisions identified in “Appendix A” to the
County’s decree, in which blacks and females have not been hired consistent with
their expressed or potential interest in such employment], Jefferson County agrees
that it will make a good faith recruitment effort, in accordance with its affirmative

44

the Consent Decree, which are not delegable to the Personnel Board. . . .
63. Prior to June 29, 2004, the County did not consistently maintain
all written applications and related records for all persons seeking
employment with the County, including applications for transfer or
promotions within or among departments for a period of at least five years,
as required by paragraph 51(b) of the Consent Decree.[79] . . .
64. Prior to February 1, 2005, the County did not consistently
maintain records containing a statement by the appropriate County official,
setting forth the reasons why any applicant was found not to be qualified
for the position(s) applied for, as required by paragraph 51(b) of the
Consent Decree.[80] . . .
65. Prior to October 2008, the County did not consistently produce
recruitment obligations under this Decree, to secure the number of black and female
applicants in entry level (open competitive) jobs in those departments and divisions
that is at least equivalent to the degrees of representation of blacks and women in the
civilian labor force of Jefferson County. The parties preserve the right to adjust these
recruitment goals through agreement and subject to the approval of the Court, where
it can be shown that a professional degree, license or certificate is required to perform
the duties of any particular job or jobs and that blacks and/or women hold such
degrees, licenses or certificates in percentage terms in the relevant labor market
which are inconsistent with these goals. The relevant labor market for the jobs
identified on Appendices A and B will be Jefferson County, unless the parties agree
or the Court requires that for a particular job or jobs some other labor market be used
that will better serve the purposes of this Decree. For purposes of this paragraph,
entry level jobs are those listed in Appendices A and B. [alteration supplied]
78

See supra note 77 for the text of Paragraph 51(a).

79

Paragraph 51(b) states that the County’s records shall include:

All written applications and related records for all persons seeking
employment with the County, including applications for transfer or promotion within
or among departments, for a period of at least five (5) years, which applications shall
include identification by the County of the applicant by race and sex. Such records
shall also contain a statement signed by the appropriate County official, setting forth
the reasons why any applicant was found not to be qualified for the position(s)
applied for.
80

See id.

45

semi-annual reports containing a summary showing the total number of
current employees by race and sex in each job classification for each
department of the County in both the classified and unclassified service, as
required by paragraph 52(a) of the Consent Decree.[81] . . .
66. Prior to October 2008, the County did not consistently produce
semi-annual reports containing a list of all probational appointments for
permanent full-time positions, by job classification and department, during
the six month reporting period, indicating the race and sex of the persons
hired or promoted, as required by paragraph 52(b) of the Consent Decree.[82]
...
67. Prior to October 2008, the County did not consistently produce
annual reports listing all persons, by job classification, department, race and
sex, to whom positions had been offered with an indication thereon of
whether or not the person was accepted, as required by paragraph 53(a) of
the Consent Decree.[83] . . .
68. Prior to October 2008, the County did not consistently produce
annual reports listing all promotions to permanent full-time positions in the
classified service, by job classification and department, during the twelve
month reporting period indicating the race, sex, date of initial hire in the
classified service and date of the promotion, as required by paragraph 53(b)

81

Paragraph 52(a) requires the County to make a semi-annual report containing, among other
items, “[a] summary showing the total number of current employees by race and sex in each job
classification for each department of the County in both the classified and unclassified service”
(alteration supplied).
82

Paragraph 52(b) requires the County to make a semi-annual report containing, among other
items, “[a] list of all probational appointments for permanent full-time positions, by job classification
and department, during the six month reporting period indicating the race and sex of the persons
hired or promoted” (alteration supplied).
83

Paragraph 53(a) requires the County to make an annual report containing, among other
items, “[a] list of persons, by job classification, department, race and sex, to whom positions have
been offered with an indication thereon of whether or not the position was accepted” (alteration
supplied).

46

of the Consent Decree.[84] . . .
69. Prior to October 2008, the County did not consistently produce
annual reports with a breakdown of the applicant flow for employment with
the County which indicates by race and sex the number of applicants for
each department and job classification in the classified and unclassified
service, and the number of applicants hired, rejected and pending for each
job classification and department, as required by paragraph 53(c) of the
Consent Decree.[85] . . .
70. Prior to February 1, 2005, with respect to all applicants who were
certified for hire or promotion and who were not selected for the vacancy
for which the applicant was certified, the County did not record in writing,
signed by the appropriate County official, the reasons for the applicant not
being selected for the vacancy, as required by paragraph 53(c) of the
Consent Decree.[86] . . .
71. Prior to October 2008, the County did not consistently produce
annual summary reports of the recruiting activities conducted by the County
for classified positions and the results of those activities, as required by
paragraph 53(d) of the Consent Decree.[87] . . .
84

Paragraph 53(b) requires the County to make an annual report containing, among other
items, “[a] list of all promotions to permanent full-time positions in the classified service, by job
classification and department, during the twelve month reporting period indicating the race, sex, date
of initial hire in the classified service and date of the promotion” (alteration supplied).
85

Paragraph 53(c) requires the County to make an annual report containing, among other

items:
A breakdown of the applicant flow for employment with the County which
indicates by race and sex the number of applicants for each department and job
classification in the classified and unclassified service, and the number of applicants
hired, rejected and pending for each job classification and department. Applicant
hires shall be separately identified as to Comprehensive Employment Training Act
(CETA) positions.
86

See id.

87

Paragraph 53(d) requires the County to make an annual report containing, among other
items, “[a] summary of the recruiting activities conducted by the County and the results of those
activities” (alteration supplied).

47

Doc. no. 1772 (County’s Post-Trial Brief) ¶¶ 56-71, at 14-19 (emphasis and
alterations supplied).
V. THE COUNTY’S STIPULATIONS AS TO MODIFICATIONS
The County has stipulated to certain modifications of its consent decree.88 With
regard to employee selection procedures, the County believes that there are 177 job
classifications that the plaintiffs have identified as “problematic.”89 The County has
offered to hire by random selection in 165 of those 177 job classifications.
Addressing the remaining twelve jobs — i.e., Chief Accountant, Chief Security
Officer, Environmental Biologist, Environmental Lab Compliance Administrator,
HVAC/Refrigeration Technician, Sewer Construction/Maintenance Supervisor, Sewer
Video Supervisor, Senior Maintenance Repair Worker, Waste Water Treatment Plant
Shift Supervisor, Waste Water Treatment Plant Supervisor, and GIS Manager — the
County proposes that those job classifications should be further analyzed by the
parties “for adverse impact”; and, to the extent that any adverse impact is detected,
the County agrees to retain an “Industrial-Organizational psychologist”90 to develop
88

See doc. no. 1772 (County’s Post-Trial Brief), at 56 (“The County does not dispute the
Decree should be modified.”).
89

Id. at 58. See Part VI(B)(6), infra, for further discussion of the 177 jobs.

90

“Industrial and organizational psychology” (also known as “I-O psychology” or “work
psychology”) is the scientific study of employees, workplaces, and organizations. I-O psychologists
contribute to an organization’s success by improving the performance, satisfaction, and well-being
of its employees. Such psychologists conduct research on employee behaviors and attitudes, and
how these can be improved through hiring practices, training programs, feedback, and management

48

and validate selection procedures for these positions.91
Furthermore, to the extent additional job classifications are shown to have
adverse impact because of the County’s selection procedures, the County
will either choose to hire via random selection or will agree to a schedule
in the modified Decree for the hiring of an I/O psychologist to validate the
selection procedures for those positions.92
In addition to consenting to the foregoing modifications of the consent decree
provisions that pertain to the 177 so-called “Included Jobs,” the County has stipulated
as follows:
C

The County will agree to the appointment of a Monitor who will work
with a County hired I/O psychologist to ensure the County satisfies its
selection procedure development obligations as they are determined by
the Court and the Special Master.

C

The County agrees to have all provisional, temporary or emergency
appointments for the 177 jobs to be submitted, reviewed and approved
by the Monitor, as requested by the Plaintiffs.

C

The County agrees to have the use of independent contractors
submitted, reviewed and approved by the Monitor, as requested by the
Plaintiffs.

C

The County agrees to have all requests to terminate or recertify
certification lists for the 177 jobs to be submitted, reviewed and
approved by the Monitor, as requested by Plaintiffs.

C

The County agrees to retool the Affirmative Action Officer position

systems. See, e.g., Gerald R. Ferris & M. Ronald Buckley, Human Resources Management 156-60,
162-64, 166-69, 173-76 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 3d ed. 1996).
91

Doc. no. 1772 (County’s Post-Trial Brief), at 58-59.

92

Id. at 59.

49

and have the Monitor review and approve improvements to the
Affirmative Action Officer position, as requested by Plaintiffs.
•

The County agrees to work with the Monitor to improve its
recruitment plan, anti-harassment policy, and discrimination complaint
process as requested by Plaintiffs.

•

The County agrees not to terminate or request to recertify a
certification list without having used an objective, job-related selection
procedure to evaluate each certified applicant on that list as requested
by Plaintiffs.

•

As to the remaining paragraphs in Plaintiffs’ Prayer for Relief
regarding provisional appointments/independent contractors, antinepotism policy, employees working outside of classification, antiharassment policy, posting of vacancies, document retention,
mandatory Consent Decree training, anti-nepotism policy training,
harassment/discrimination policy training, diversity training,
recruitment of females and African[-]Americans, and recordkeeping,
[sic] and reporting obligations, the County will review its current
policies and procedures with the Monitor to determine ways to
improve the same. The County is willing to discuss with Plaintiffs and
the Court further modifications to the Consent Decree regarding these
areas.

Doc. no. 1772 (County’s Post-Trial Brief), at 61-62 (alteration supplied).
VI. DISCUSSION
The present posture of this case, if not unique, surely is unusual, in that Jefferson
County has admitted that it willfully disobeyed significant requirements of its consent
decree. The questions that remain to be resolved, then, are the extent of that

50

contumacious conduct, and, the appropriate remedy.93
The Martin-Bryant parties assert that a Receiver should be appointed to control
all of the County’s personnel functions. In response, the County argues that the
drastic remedy of a receivership is unwarranted, based upon the facts presented at
trial and, particularly, the County’s recent efforts at compliance.
A. The County’s Irrelevant Arguments
The County repeatedly asserts three arguments in its post-trial briefing that have
little bearing on this court’s decision of what remedy to impose for the County’s
admitted contempt, and that confuse the actual issues before the court. First, the
County repeatedly compares itself to the Personnel Board of Jefferson County, over

93

See doc. no. 1772 (County’s Post-Trial Brief), at 2 (“[T]he County is willing to stipulate
to specific violations of the decree alleged by Plaintiffs and to most of the relief sought by Plaintiffs
in their Contempt Motion. Thus, the question before the Court is what remedy it is going to impose
for the County’s non-compliance.”) (alteration supplied); id. at 14-19 (detailing the County’s
stipulations as to violations of the decree); id. at 61-62 (setting forth the County’s stipulations as to
appropriate remedies for its contempt); id. at 62 (“While the County maintains it has made good faith
efforts at compliance, particularly in the last four years, it concedes it has not consistently abided by
all aspects of the Decree.”) (emphasis supplied). See also doc. no. 1798 (County’s Response to
Martin-Bryant Parties’ Post-Trial Brief), at 1 (“The County does not dispute that Plaintiffs exercised
the proper procedural vehicle in bringing the County’s non-compliance with the Decree before this
Court. More importantly, the County also does not dispute that it has not complied fully with the
Decree. Indeed, as stated in multiple pleadings . . . and as reaffirmed by the Commissioners and
County Manager during trial, the County is willing to stipulate to specific violations of the Decree
alleged by Plaintiffs and to most of the relief sought by Plaintiffs in their Contempt motion. Thus,
the pertinent question before the Court is what remedy to impose for the County’s non-compliance.”)
(emphasis supplied); id. at 4 (“The County accepts that it has not lived up to the bargain it agreed
to in 1982 and accepts it will be faced with a finding of contempt and modifications of the Decree.”).

51

which this court imposed a receivership in 2002.94 The County seems to believe that,
by arguing that its behavior is not “as bad” as was that of the Personnel Board, it can
be saved from the same fate that befell the Board.95 That is not necessarily the case.
While the court will apply the same factors in the present controversy as it applied
when deciding whether to impose a receivership over the Personnel Board, those
factors will be independently applied to the County’s actions. The Board’s past
misfeasance and nonfeasance has no bearing on the receivership analysis for the

94

See doc. nos. 934 & 935 (Memorandum Opinion and Order imposing receivership).

95

See doc. no. 1772 (County’s Post-Trial Brief), at 2 (“The County maintains that it is not
the Personnel Board circa 2002 and this Court should not impose the severe and drastic remedy of
a receiver . . . .”) (emphasis in original); id. at 3 (“Since none of the factors previously relied on by
the Court in placing a receiver over the Personnel Board weigh in favor of a similar finding for the
County, this Court should not impose such a harsh and extreme remedy here.”) (emphasis in
original); id. at 66 (“In grave contrast to what this Court was facing in 2002 with the Personnel
Board (including the threat of criminal sanctions), the application of these factors to the County and
its current leadership demonstrates a the [sic] extraordinary remedy of a receiver is not necessary.”)
(alteration supplied); id. at 67 (“[T]he County has not repeatedly or cavalierly disregarded Courtimposed deadlines in contrast to previous incarnations of the Personnel Board.”) (alteration
supplied); id. at 71 (contrasting the County’s production of documents during these proceedings to
the Board’s “repeated failures to provide required data and information to the parties”); id. at 73 n.8
(“The current situation is drastically different from what this Court was facing with the Personnel
Board.”); id. at 75 (“The contrast between this Commission and County Manager and the Personnel
Board’s leadership at the time it was placed under receivership is glaring.”); id. at 76 (“Here, the
evidence presented by the County, including its pre-trial stipulations and suggested relief, the change
in government structure and the Commissioners and County Manager’s testimony paint an entirely
different picture than this Court faced with the Personnel Board.”) (emphasis in original); id. at 80
(contrasting the Board’s wasteful patterns to the County’s own, allegedly, more conservative use of
resources). See also doc. no. 1772 (County’s Response to Martin-Bryant Parties’ Post-Trial Brief),
at 219 (“Jefferson County in 2013, no matter its wayward history, is not the Personnel Board in
2002.”); id. at 220 (“Since none of the factors previously relied on by the Court in placing a receiver
over the Personnel Board weigh in favor of a similar finding for the County, this Court should not
impose the remedy of last resort.”) (emphasis in original).

52

County. Indeed, it is possible for the court to find the County’s conduct to not be as
“bad” as was the Board’s in 2002, but still conclude that a receivership should be
imposed.
Second, the County repeatedly references its poor financial situation.96
According to the County:
When the current Commission came into office, the County was faced
with a number of problems such as four billion dollars of debt that the
County could not service financially, economic development issues due to
stymied population growth, a consent decree with the Environmental
Protection Agency and this Federal consent decree related to employment
practices.97
It also is widely known that the County filed for Chapter 9 Bankruptcy protection on
November 9, 2011.98 That proceeding still is pending. Even so, the bankruptcy case
did not prevent the hearing on the present motion of the Martin-Bryant parties from
going forward,99 and neither the County’s bankruptcy nor its general financial
condition will prevent this court from imposing whatever remedy it determines
96

See, e.g., doc. no. 1772 (County’s Post-Trial Brief), at 2 (asserting that the court should not
impose a receivership, in part, because of “the County’s precarious financial situation”).
97

County’s Proposed Fact No. 201 (alteration supplied).

98

See County’s Proposed Fact Nos. 222 (“On November 9, 2011, in the eleventh month of
the new Commissioners’ tenure and the second month of Mr. Petelos’ service, the County filed
Chapter 9 bankruptcy.”) & 224 (“The County remains in bankruptcy with no general fund revenue
sources.”).
99

See doc. no. 1725 (order holding that the automatic stay provisions of Title 11 of the
United States Code do not apply to the portion of this litigation that concerns Jefferson County,
including the Martin-Bryant parties’ motion to hold the County in contempt of court for failure to
comply with the terms of its consent decree).

53

appropriate for the purpose of correcting the County’s contempt.100 As Judge Frank
M. Johnson, Jr., once observed, “[t]he Constitution does not put a price on
constitutional rights, in terms either of time or money. The rights guaranteed by the
Constitution are to be made effective in the present.”101 Those observations hold true
when one considers that the County has been under the obligations of its decree since
1982, decades before it began to suffer the financial problems that ultimately led to
its 2011 bankruptcy filing. If the County and its legal advisors had not squandered
numerous opportunities to profit from observance of the errors of the Personnel
Board’s ways, and to voluntarily bring County government into compliance with the
requirements of its decree during times of plenty, it would not have been necessary
to plead for leniency during a time of depleted resources.102
Finally, the County offers evidence of the overall racial composition of its
workforce in an effort to demonstrate its alleged recent progress toward decree
compliance. Specifically, the County points out that the number of African100

The only relevance that evidence about the County’s financial problems might have to
these proceedings is as background information to explain why the County implemented the 2011
Administrative Leave Without Pay (“ALWOP”) and the 2012 Reduction-In-Force (“RIF”), or as an
indication that the current County leadership is faced with too many other problems to devote an
appropriate amount of time and resources to consent decree compliance.
101

Jack Bass, Taming the Storm 398 (1993) (quoting a written statement made by Judge
Johnson during confirmation proceedings regarding his nomination to a position on the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit) (alteration supplied).
102

Cf. Proverbs 6:6 (“Go to the ant, thou sluggard; consider her ways, and be wise . . . .”)
(King James).

54

Americans working for the County has grown in all but four job classifications since
the decree was entered in 1982, and that the number of females has grown in all but
two jobs. It also points out that the percentage of African-Americans in the County
workforce as a whole has grown from 17 percent in 1982 to 38 percent today, and the
percentage of females in the County workforce as a whole has grown from 32 to 40
percent. Those statistics are even greater for positions in the higher pay grades of 21
through 30.103
Even assuming that the statistics presented by the County are correct, the relative
increase in the number and percentage of blacks and females in the County workforce
does not demonstrate either the County’s good faith, or its compliance with the
requirements of its consent decree. While increasing the overall numbers of blacks
and females employed by the County certainly is not a bad thing, the decree does not
merely require the County to hire more blacks and females. Instead, the decree
prohibits discrimination of any kind on the basis of race or gender,104 and it requires
that blacks and females be considered for employment with the County on the same
basis as whites and males.105 Achieving the goals set forth in the decree requires that
every hiring decision for every job at the County be made without regard to race or
103

See County’s Proposed Fact Nos. 72-77.

104

Consent Decree ¶ 1.

105

Id. ¶ 5 (reciting the “major purposes” of the decree).

55

sex. The decree sets its own benchmarks for evaluating whether those goals have
been met. Specifically, paragraph 5 states that:
The objectives of this Decree will be considered to be attained in entry level
jobs when the percentage of qualified blacks and women employed by the
County in each of the jobs identified in paragraphs 7, 8, and 11 and in
Appendices A and B of this Decree approximates their respective
percentages in the civilian labor force of Jefferson County . . . . For jobs
that require a professional degree, license or certificate, and where it can
be shown that blacks and/or women hold such degrees, licenses or
certificates in percentage terms which are lower than their respective
percentage representations in the civilian labor force of Jefferson County,
the parties agree that the attainment of the objectives of this Decree for such
jobs shall be based upon the best available information as to the availability
of qualified blacks and women for such jobs . . . . If the County fails to
meet these objectives in a particular job or jobs, it shall have the burden of
demonstrating that it made a good faith effort to achieve such objectives,
and that it otherwise complied with the affirmative recruitment and
nondiscriminatory selection requirements for such positions as set forth in
Part II of this Decree.106
Thus, the County’s data about the overall composition of its workforce says
nothing about whether it has attained the decree’s stated goals with regard to specific
positions, and that data has little relevance to the analysis of whether the County has
complied with the decree. If anything, the County’s repeated focus on the overall
employment numbers as an indication of its compliance with the decree demonstrates
a fundamental misunderstanding of the requirements of its decree.

106

Id. (emphasis supplied).

56

B.

Receivership Factors
The court will begin its discussion of whether to appoint a receiver by addressing

six questions. First, have there been repeated failures to comply with court orders?
Second, will further efforts to secure compliance only lead to confrontation and
delay? Third, is leadership available to turn the tide within a reasonable time?
Fourth, has there been “bad faith” on the part of the County? Fifth, are resources
being wasted? Finally, can a Receiver provide a quick and efficient remedy? See,
e.g., Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527, 533 (1st Cir. 1976); Dixon v. Barry, 967
F. Supp. 535, 550-51 (D. D.C. 1997); District of Columbia v. Jerry M., 738 A.2d
1206, 1213 (D.C. 1999); Judge Rotenberg Educational Center, Inc. v. Commissioner
of the Department of Mental Retardation, 677 N.E.2d 127, 148-49 (Mass. 1997).
The foregoing factors are non-exhaustive, and serve only as a starting point for
the equitable analysis.
1.

Have there been repeated failures to comply with court orders?

The County’s consent decree was entered on December 29, 1982, and the County
openly admits that today, more than thirty years later, it still is not complying with all
of the requirements of its decree. If thirty years of failing to comply does not
constitute “repeated failures,” nothing does.
The County makes much of the assertion that it has not been under any “interim
57

deadlines” similar to the “schedule of deliverables” this court imposed upon the
Personnel Board in 2000, requiring certain actions to be completed by specified
dates.107 That is of no consequence. Regardless of whether additional interim
deadlines were imposed after the decree was entered, regardless of whatever else
might be said by way of excuse, this glaring fact remains: the County has repeatedly
failed to comply with significant portions of its decree.108
Indeed, the number and breadth of the admitted violations set out in Part IV of
this opinion, supra, speak loudly, as they represent between 22 and 26 years of
stipulated failures to comply with provisions of the County’s decree. Despite
acknowledging decades of contumacious conduct, the County asserts that it has more
recently — i.e., within the past seven years, or since the date on which the MartinBryant parties began to investigate the County’s contempt and take steps to enforce
its decree — “made efforts” and “taken steps” to bring itself into compliance with the
decree.
These efforts include (1) creating a Human Resources (“HR”) Department
and discussing Decree compliance with the Director when she was hired;
107

See, e.g., doc. no. 708 (Order Extending 1981 Consent Decrees and 1995 Modification
Orders of the City of Birmingham and Personnel Board of Jefferson County), at 6 et seq.
108

The court notes that two of the provisions with regard to which the County has stipulated
its non-compliance are paragraphs 52 and 53, which require the County to submit semi-annual and
annual reports to the plaintiffs. The County has acknowledged its failure to “consistently” satisfy
those interim reporting requirements between 1982 and 2008. Thus, the County has admitted to at
least this “repeated” failure.

58

(2) retaining two Affirmative Action Officers charged with investigating
employee complaints and training; (3) adopting formal anti-harassment and
anti-nepotism policies; (4) conducting training on these policies and having
over 2500 employees complete Employment of Relatives Forms; (5)
training over 1600 employees specifically on the provisions of the Decree;
(6) recruiting for positions at historically black colleges and universities;
(7) consistently producing semi-annual and annual reports to Plaintiffs
since October 2008; (8) producing monthly reports to the Commission
President and now to the County Manager regarding Decree compliance
and (9) distributing quarterly newsletters to employees instructing how to
obtain a copy of the Decree and contact information for the Affirmative
Action Officers.109
While the court does not question that the County has recently made some
progress toward decree compliance, the Martin-Bryant parties have demonstrated that
even the County’s Johnny-come-lately efforts to atone for past sins have fallen short
in many areas.110
a.

Human Resources Department

It is undisputed: that the County created a centralized Human Resources
Department in 2004; that Demetrius Taylor, an African-American female, serves as
Director of that Department; and that the County’s consent decree was discussed with
Ms. Taylor when she was selected for the position.111 It also is undisputed that many

109

Doc. no. 1772 (County’s Post-Trial Brief), at 68-69.

110

Moreover, the fact that the County only recently began to make these efforts at
compliance, and only under the threat of contempt sanctions, is relevant to other factors in the
receivership analysis, particularly those that have to do with the inadequacy of other remedies.
111

See County’s Proposed Fact Nos. 109-110.

59

of the sub-department heads and other employees of the Department are AfricanAmerican and/or female.112
This court does not question that centralization of all human resource functions
under a single department was a responsible decision, or that, in theory, such
centralization should have caused the County’s human resource functions to operate
more smoothly, and should have reduced the potential for improper outside influence.
Despite the appeal of the concept of a centralized Human Resources Department, the
Martin-Bryant parties have pointed out several ways in which the Department has
failed to realize its theoretical potential. For example, the Department has failed to
generate all of the reports, and to make all of the comparisons, required by paragraphs
5, 13, 14, and 16 of the decree (or, if it has generated such reports and comparisons,
Ms. Taylor was not aware of their existence).113
During Ms. Taylor’s deposition in 2007, it became apparent that she did not
understand certain concepts that are fundamental to consent decree compliance,
including the distinction between a job description and a job analysis, and the
concept of validating a structured interview. She also erroneously testified that the
112

See County’s Proposed Fact Nos. 114-22.

113

See Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact Nos. 2.1.3 & 2.2.2 (regarding the comparisons
required by paragraph 5 of the decree), 4.1.3 (regarding the comparisons required by paragraph 13
of the decree), 5.1.2 (regarding the comparisons required by paragraph 14 of the decree), 7.2.2
(regarding the comparisons required by paragraph 16 of the decree).

60

County had an affirmative action program.114
Mercy Ireri, who was placed in charge of administering the County’s structured
interview program, did not have any prior experience with test validation or
structured interviews; and, during her deposition, her testimony revealed that she was
not familiar with all provisions of the consent decree.115
The Martin-Bryant parties also provided several examples of the Human
Resources Department either approving, or overlooking, the hiring of less qualified
male or white applicants for certain positions over more qualified female or AfricanAmerican applicants, including one egregious example of a Human Resources
employee directing a supervisor to change an applicant’s interview score so there
would be justification for hiring a different applicant.116
These facts demonstrate that the Human Resources Department has not been as
effective as it should have been in assisting the County in its compliance with the
consent decree.
114

See Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact Nos. 32.1.3.1.1, 32.1.3.2, and 32.1.5.

115

See Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact Nos. 32.1.3.3 & 32.1.4.

116

See Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No. 32.2. The Martin-Bryant parties also offer
several examples of the Human Resources Department inappropriately or inadequately handling
complaints of discrimination by County employees. See Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No.
33 and all subparts. The court does not feel it necessary to fully explore the details of each
individual employee’s complaint and determine whether the County’s response to each was
appropriate. There is no need for these contempt proceedings to be transformed into a series of minitrials on employee discrimination claims, as ample other evidence exists demonstrating the County’s
contempt of its decree and the need for an effective remedy.

61

b.

Affirmative Action Officers

Paragraph 33 of the County’s consent decree requires the appointment of an
Affirmative Action Officer, who is to be assigned the following, far-reaching
responsibilities:
(a) Advise black and female employees of the terms of this decree;
(b) Post his or her office hours and location and copies of this Decree
in conspicuous places within each department or operational unit of the
County;
(c) Receive and investigate oral or written complaints of race and sex
discrimination and conciliate such complaints when appropriate, and
notwithstanding any other provisions of law, establish a written procedure
which shall govern such complaints;
(d) Meet periodically with department heads to assess their progress
in meeting the objectives of this Decree;
(e) Maintain a complete record of all actions taken in pursuit of the
duties prescribed herein, including all correspondence directed to or from
the County with respect to any complaints or investigations undertaken
pursuant to this Consent Decree and any investigatory files.
(f) If within any six month reporting period prescribed by paragraphs
37 and 39 below, the County determines that it is failing to meet any of the
objectives contained in Part II, subpart A of this Decree, the County shall
require the Affirmative Action Officer to review the future selection
decisions of the appointing authority in the job(s) and Department(s) in
which such objectives were not met in order to insure [sic] compliance with
this Decree. As part of this review the Affirmative Action Officer shall
review the appointing authority’s written justification for failure to select
certified black or female applicants in the jobs for which the objectives of
the Decree were not met, and shall submit his or her written comments
62

together with the appointing authority’s written justification to the County
Attorney. Appointments may be made in the job(s) and Department(s)
under review while such review is pending before the Affirmative Action
Officer or the County Attorney, provided, however, that blacks or women
who are found to have been improperly denied employment or
consideration for employment during the period covered by the review shall
be eligible for recertification and employment in a future vacancy in the
jobs to which they were originally certified, with all rights, benefits and
compensation that they would otherwise be entitled to under the provisions
of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Decree.
(g) The Affirmative Action Officer shall report at least semiannually
to the County Commissioners his findings with respect to any investigations
undertaken pursuant to his above described responsibilities.
(h) The Affirmative Action Officer referred to herein shall be
appointed by the County within thirty (30) days after final approval of this
Decree. The County shall inform the plaintiffs of any changes in the
identity of the Affirmative Action Officer.
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 13 (Jefferson County Consent Decree) ¶ 33.
The County asserts that Kimberly Oden-Webster and Ben Sullen serve as the
“Affirmative Action Officers” required by paragraph 33. Mr. Sullen did not testify
at trial, but Ms. Oden-Webster testified that her job duties include investigating
employee complaints, conducting training on employment policies, and mediating
disputes.117 An African-American female County employee named Malinda Parker
testified that, when she had an employment-related complaint, she knew she should
address it to Ms. Oden-Webster, although she thought Oden-Webster was a
117

County’s Proposed Fact No. 19.

63

“compliance officer,” and not an “affirmative action officer.” She knew the location
of Ms. Oden-Webster’s office, and she had no trouble reaching her for the purpose
of lodging a complaint.

She also believed that Ms. Oden-Webster seriously

considered her complaint, and treated her in a respectful manner.118
Those facts demonstrate that the County has two employees who perform some
of the duties required by paragraph 33 of its decree. Even so, it is questionable
whether either Mr. Sullen or Ms. Oden-Webster should be considered “Affirmative
Action Officers.” And, it is clear that Mr. Sullen and Ms. Oden-Webster do not,
either individually or jointly, perform all of the functions required by paragraph 33.
Moreover, the decree does not authorize the appointment of two Affirmative Action
Officers. Instead, it clearly contemplates a single Affirmative Action Officer.
Furthermore, neither Mr. Sullen nor Ms. Oden-Webster has the job title of
“Affirmative Action Officer.” Instead, Mr. Sullen’s official title is “Personnel
Analyst II,” and Ms. Oden-Webster is classified as an “Employee Relations Officer.”
The County issued an Administrative Order on June 29, 2004, stating that the
Employee Relations Officer would be designated as the County’s Affirmative Action
Officer; and it amended that order on March 25, 2008, to also designate the Personnel

118

County’s Proposed Fact Nos. 20-22.

64

Analyst II position as an Affirmative Action Officer.119 Even so, there is no
indication that anyone was officially deemed the County’s Affirmative Action Officer
prior to 2004, although the County appears to claim that Ms. Oden-Webster has
performed the duties of the Affirmative Action Officer since she was hired in 1993.120
Regardless of the official job title, and even assuming that Ms. Oden-Webster
had the same duties in 1993 as she had in 2004, her position still did not fulfill all the
requirements of paragraph 33 of the consent decree, and there is no indication that
anyone else fulfilled those requirements.
Furthermore, it is undisputed that an Affirmative Action Officer was not
appointed within thirty days of Judge Pointer’s approval of the County’s decree, as
required by paragraph 33(h). Instead, the County did not make any effort to appoint
such an official until 2004 at the earliest, more than two decades after the decree was
approved.
As of March 2009, when the first installment of the contempt trial began, neither
Ms. Oden-Webster nor any other County employee was advising African-American
and female employees of the terms of the consent decree, as required by paragraph
119

Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact Nos. 10.1.3, 10.1.5.

120

If Ms. Oden-Webster had been performing the duties of the Affirmative Action Officer
since 1993, she was unaware of it. During her 2007 deposition, she testified that the County did not
have an Affirmative Action Officer, and had not had one at any time since 1993. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit
1028 (Deposition of Kimberly Oden-Webster), at 110. She reaffirmed that testimony during the first
session of the trial. March 2009 Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 78-79, 87.

65

33(a).121 Sometime in 2009, the County began providing all new employees with one
to two hours of consent decree training. The County also began conducting similar
training with existing employees, but it only reached about half of the existing
workforce before employee shortages in the Human Resources Department caused
it to stop.122 The training consisted of a “Power Point®” presentation and an
accompanying handout explaining certain portions of the decree.123 Although the
training materials contained a link to a full copy of the decree on the County’s
intranet site and other information about where to find full copies of the decree, the
materials themselves omitted any mention of several of the key provisions of the
decree, including paragraph 1, which enjoins the County from engaging in
discriminatory acts, and paragraph 5, which states that a “major purpose” of the
decree is that of hiring qualified African-American and female applicants according
to their percentage representation on certification lists prepared by the Personnel
Board or in applicant pools.124
Moreover, testimony from managers of some County departments revealed that
they lacked a basic understanding of many of the consent decree’s provisions, despite
121

See Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No. 10.2 and all subparts.

122

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 6, at 82-85.

123

See Defendant’s Exhibit 152 (Power Point® Presentation); Defendant’s Exhibit 153

(handout).
124

See Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No. 10.3.2 and all subparts.

66

having attended the consent decree training. For example, Jon Fancher, the Painter
Superintendent, knew that the decree prevented discrimination, but he had never seen
the full decree, he did not know that the position of Painter was subject to special
requirements under the decree,125 and he had hired a lower-ranking white male
candidate over higher-ranking African-American and female candidates.126 Robby
Bennett, a Wastewater Treatment Plant Manager, also attended consent decree
training, but he had never seen or read the decree, and he did not know that the Waste
Water Treatment Plant Operator position was subject to special requirements under
the decree, even though he was in charge of hiring for that position.127 Similarly,
William Corley, the Highway District Superintendent for the Roads and
Transportation Department, testified that, despite attending consent decree training,
he had never read the decree, never been instructed that the County had any
obligation to increase the number of African-Americans and women in the workplace,
and did not know that the Truck Driver position was subject to special requirements
under the decree, even though he was in charge of hiring for that position.128

125

See Consent Decree ¶¶ 12-16 and Exhibit A.

126

See Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No. 9.2.3.1 and all subparts.

127

See Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No. 9.2.3.2 and all subparts. See also Consent
Decree ¶¶ 12-16 and Exhibit A.
128

See Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No. 9.2.3.3 and all subparts. See also Consent
Decree ¶¶ 12-16 and Exhibit A.

67

The County did adopt an Anti-Harassment Policy on March 25, 2008, but the
policy was not drafted by either Ms. Oden-Webster or Mr. Sullen.129 The County has
not presented evidence of any other written procedures governing discrimination
complaints “established” by the Affirmative Action Officer, as required by paragraph
33(c).
Ms. Oden-Webster testified during her 2007 deposition that she had met with
some, but not all, department heads regarding their progress in meeting the objectives
of the decree, as required by paragraph 33(d).130 However, she clarified during her
2009 trial testimony that she did not discuss with the department heads their progress
toward satisfying provisions of the decree that require comparisons of employees
hired to certification lists or applicant pools.131 All of the department heads and
division managers in the General Services, Roads and Transportation, Information
Technology, and Environmental Services departments testified during their
depositions that they had never met with Ms. Oden-Webster regarding their
respective departments’ progress toward decree compliance.132 The parties have
pointed the court to no evidence establishing that, after March of 2009, Ms. Oden-

129

See Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact Nos. 10.5.3-10.5.4.

130

Oden-Webster Deposition, at 125-26.

131

March 2009 Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 112.

132

See Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No. 10.6.4 and all subparts.

68

Webster, or any other county employee, satisfied the requirements of paragraph 33(d).
As discussed, the County has conceded that, prior to 2005, it did not satisfy
paragraph 33(e), which requires the Affirmative Action Officer to maintain a
complete record of all actions taken to comply with the decree. The evidence shows
that paragraph 33(e) also was not fully satisfied after 2005. Ms. Oden-Webster
testified in 2009 that she kept records of all employee complaints and training efforts,
but she did not have any records regarding efforts to comply with other requirements
of the decree.133 The parties have not pointed the court to any evidence establishing
that, after March of 2009, Ms. Oden-Webster, or any other County employee,
satisfied the requirements of paragraph 33(e).
Ms. Oden-Webster testified during the abbreviated trial in March of 2009 that
she was not aware of any of the requirements of paragraph 33(f) of the decree, and
that she had never performed any of the tasks set forth in that paragraph. She also
was not aware of anyone else performing those tasks.134 The parties have not pointed
the court to any evidence establishing that, after March of 2009, Ms. Oden-Webster,
or any other County employee, satisfied the requirements of paragraph 33(f).
Finally, there is no evidence that Ms. Oden-Webster, or anyone else purporting

133

March 2009 Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, at 112-13.

134

Id. at 113-16.

69

to act as the Affirmative Action Officer, has ever made semi-annual reports to the
County Commissioners, as required by paragraph 33(g). Ms. Oden-Webster testified
during her 2007 deposition that she had never made any such reports, and there is no
evidence that she started making those reports at any later date.
c.

Anti-harassment and anti-nepotism policies and training

It is undisputed that the County adopted Anti-Nepotism and Anti-Harassment
Policies on March 25, 2008, the same day this court ordered the County to show
cause why it should not be held in contempt for failing to comply with the consent
decree.135 The Anti-Nepotism Policy restricts the ability of “related persons” to work
together, but it does not restrict the employment or work of friends or other people
in non-romantic, non-familial relationships.

The policy has only prospective

application; it does not affect the employment relationships of “related persons” who
already were working together on the date the policy was adopted.136
Prior to the institution of the Anti-Nepotism Policy, hires based on nepotism and
“cronyism” were common at the County.137 The record also contains evidence of at
least one egregious example of cronyism after the adoption of the Anti-Nepotism

135

See Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact Nos. 30.4.3 & 30.4.4. See also doc. no. 1458
(show cause order).
136

See Defendant’s Exhibit 113 (Anti-Nepotism Policy).

137

See Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No. 26 and all subparts.

70

Policy. Specifically, the position of “Director of Tax Collections” became vacant in
the Spring of 2007 due to the retirement of the previous Director.138 The Personnel
Board’s job description for that position defined its “Essential Functions” as follows:

Directs the collection of current and/or delinquent ad valorem real and
personal property taxes in Jefferson County; directs the collection and
distribution of land redemption revenues, personal property taxes and the
sale of property for non-payment of taxes. Plans, organizes, directs,
coordinates, and evaluates the work of 15 to 25 employees engaged in
billing, collection, posting, and distribution of real and personal property
taxes through supervising staff. Designs and implements an activity
schedule to coordinate the annual billing and collection of 300,000 tax
accounts. Plans and prepares the annual departmental operating budget of
$1,000,000 to $1,500,000; monitors and controls expenditures. Reviews
and analyzes bank services, investment activities and land redemption
process to ensure compliance with the Alabama Code; negotiates and
executes bank contracts affecting the Tax Collector’s Office including
collateral or ledges to secure funds deposited; resolves tax problems with
taxpayers. Conducts feasibility studies and analyze[s] results to ensure
efficiency or reduce expenditures. Develops, revises, and implements
office policies and procedures. Assembles and prepares seasonal and
management reports. Acts as Tax Collector in his/her absence or as
required. Stays current on pertinent laws, regulations and generally
accepted governmental accounting practices.139
The Personnel Board described the knowledge and skill sets necessary to perform the
duties of the position as follows:
Knowledge of the principles, practices and procedures of tax
138

Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No. 25.1.1.7.

139

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 758, at 1 (alteration supplied).

71

collection. Knowledge of all federal, state and local regulatory
requirements applicable to Tax Collection. Knowledge of the funding
process in a municipal environment as related to budgeting, cost
accounting, financial planning and management. Knowledge of the laws
concerning state and federal appeals and bankruptcy. Knowledge of
generally accepted accounting procedures. Ability to plan, assign, and
supervise assigned professional and nonprofessional personnel. Ability to
communicate clearly and effectively, both orally and in writing. Ability to
establish and maintain effective working relationships with employees and
the general public. Ability to use modern office methods, techniques and
equipment. Skill in using a computer.140
The “Compensable Qualifications” for the position were “[p]ossession of a
Bachelor’s Degree in Accounting, Business Administration, Management, Public
Administration or closely related field and five years experience in finance, treasury
operations, banking and investments, or taxes, including three years of related
supervisory experience; or any equivalent combination of training and experience.”141
The hiring decision for the Director of Tax Collection position was made by J.T.
Smallwood, the Tax Collector, an elected official.
Malinda Parker, a black female, applied for the position when it came open
during the Spring of 2007. Ms. Parker has a Bachelor’s degree in Business
Administration, a Master’s degree in Public Administration, and 33 additional hours
of advanced accounting courses. She had worked in the Birmingham division of the

140

Id.

141

Id. (alteration and emphasis supplied).

72

Jefferson County Tax Collector’s Office for sixteen years. In her most recent
position, “Tax Agent,” she was responsible for collecting delinquent personal
property taxes in Jefferson County.142 Ms. Parker had worked closely with the
previous Director of Tax Collection, and she was familiar with the day-to-day
operations of the office.143 She also had additional managerial experience at Compass
Bank and as a military officer prior to coming to work for the County.144 Ms. Parker
was placed on the Personnel Board’s certification list for the position, but she was not
scheduled for an interview until June of 2008, after she contacted Mr. Smallwood’s
office to ask why she had not yet been scheduled. Ms. Parker testified that the
position remained vacant for an unusually long time before interviews were
scheduled, compared to other positions she had observed during her employment with
the County.145
In the meantime, John Michael DeLucia, a white male, had been provisionally
appointed to the position by Mr. Smallwood. Before that provisional appointment,
Mr. DeLucia had served, since 2003, as Mr. Smallwood’s Chief Deputy Tax
Collector. The chief deputy is not a merit system position; thus, the selection for that

142

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 4, at 153-54.

143

Id. at 163-64.

144

Id. at 157-59.

145

Id. at 155-57.

73

position was solely at Mr. Smallwood’s discretion.146 Mr. DeLucia held a law degree
from the Birmingham School of Law, and had been admitted to the Alabama State
Bar on September 2, 2003.147 Ms. Parker testified that Mr. DeLucia did not have an
accounting or business degree, but Mr. DeLucia’s application for the Director of Tax
Collection position stated that he received a Bachelor of Arts degree from the
University of Alabama in Birmingham, and his major and minor areas of study were
listed as “Sociology/Accounting major (still attending); History minor.”148 It is
unclear from the application in which field of study Mr. DeLucia actually obtained
a degree, and in which field he was a “still attending” student. He did list the
following on his application as “training, licenses, special skills or qualifications”:
“Law License, Alabama State Bar; Served as Chief Deputy Tax Collector for 4+
years. Property tax administration classes: Auburn University; Fed. Income Tax,
Income Tax, Estate and Gift Tax, Statutory Rights of Redemption and Property
Law.”149 Mr. DeLucia’s last employment position, before being appointed as Chief
Deputy Tax Collector, was as a law clerk for Mr. Smallwood’s father, the late
Jefferson County Circuit Judge T.M. Smallwood.150 After the interview process, Mr.
146

Id. at 159-62.

147

See http://www.alabar.org/directory.

148

Plaintiff’s Exhibit 898, at HR 274839.

149

Id. at HR 274840.

150

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 4, at 168-70.

74

DeLucia was permanently selected as the Director of Tax Collection.151
Some of the rating factors designed by Mr. Smallwood to apply during the
interview process for the Director of Tax Collection position appear to be designed
to give preference to an applicant with a law license and/or legal background. An
applicant would receive a minus or negative notation (-) (meaning that the applicant
“does not meet job requirements”) if she had a Bachelors degree in a business-related
area; a check mark (x) (meaning “meets job requirements”) if she had a Masters
degree in a business-related area; and a plus notation (+) (meaning the applicant
“exceeds job requirements”) if she had a Doctorate degree in a business-related
area.152

Ms. Parker received an (x) for her Masters Degree in Public

Administration,153 but Mr. DeLucia received a (+) for his law degree.154 For the rating
factor “List any licenses or certifications that would relate to a government tax
setting,” an applicant would receive a (-) for none, an (x) for a Certified Public
Accountant (“CPA”) designation, and a (+) for a law license.155 Ms. Parker received
a (-) because she did not have a CPA or other certification,156 but Mr. DeLucia

151

Id. at 159.

152

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 898, at HR 274861-62.

153

Id. at HR 274863.

154

Id. at HR 274835.

155

Id. at HR 274861-62.

156

Id. at HR 274863.

75

received a (+) for his law license.157 Significantly, however, the Personnel Board’s
job description for the position does not require any licenses, and it only requires a
Bachelors degree and five years of experience, not any advanced degrees.158
Applicants also were asked to name the protected classes in employment law.
They received a (-) if they did not know the answers, and a (+) if they identified race,
age, religion, gender, and “creed” (notably omitting color, national origin, pregnancy,
and disabilities).159 Ms. Parker received a (-) for that category because she only listed
gender, age, disability, and “minorities” (thereby omitting religion and Mr.
Smallwood’s uninformed designation of “creed” as a protected category).160 Mr.
DeLucia received a (+) because — surprise ! — he identified the identical categories
designated by the man for whom he had worked since 2003.161 Again, however, the
Personnel Board’s job description for the position does not make any reference to
knowledge of employment law,162 and there has been no explanation for why that
rating factor might be relevant to the position of “Director of Tax Collections.” When
157

Id. at HR 274835.

158

See Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 758.

159

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 898, at HR 274861-62.

160

Id. at HR 274863. The court can discern no reasonable difference, for purposes of
protection under anti-discrimination laws, between religion and creed. The court also must note that
Mr. Smallwood’s list of acceptable answers is incomplete, as it omits the prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of national origin.
161

Id. at HR 274835-36.

162

See Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 758.

76

questioned about that rating factor during her trial testimony, Human Resources
Director Demetrius Taylor acknowledged that she did not know why that rating factor
had been included.163
Applicants for the position also were asked to identify the elements of a valid
contract. They received a (-) if they did not know the elements, and a (+) if they
identified offer, acceptance, consideration, and “standing.”164 Ms. Parker received a
(-) for that factor because she did not identify any of those elements,165 but Mr.
DeLucia received a (+) for identifying all of the elements, even though Mr.
Smallwood’s interview notes indicate that Mr. DeLucia identified only standing,
offer, and acceptance, but not consideration:

the sine qua non of a binding

agreement!166 Again, the Personnel Board’s job description for the position of
“Director of Tax Collections” does not make any reference to knowledge of contract
law,167 and there has been no explanation for why that rating factor might be relevant

163

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 7, at 65-66.

164

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 898, at HR 274861-62. The court does not understand why “standing”
was listed by Mr. Smallwood as one of the requisite elements of a valid contract. An agent,
principal, third-party beneficiary, or stranger to a contract might have to demonstrate “standing” in
order to bring an action for either breach or to enforce the agreement, see, e.g., Williston on
Contracts §§ 35:41, 35:46, 37:28, 37:1, but “standing” in the sense that term normally is used in the
law generally is not listed as an essential element of a valid contract.
165

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 898, at HR 274863.

166

Id. at HR 274835-36.

167

See Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 758.

77

to the position.
The Human Resources Department approved Mr. Smallwood’s hiring of Mr.
DeLucia as Director of Tax Collections after reviewing the entire structured interview
packet.168 Even so, during her 2012 trial testimony, Ms. Taylor acknowledged the
obvious: the interview process appeared to be a “setup,” designed to create questions
that would elicit favorable responses from Mr. DeLucia and lead to his selection for
the position.169
The County has provided training on both the Anti-Nepotism and AntiHarassment Policies to all new hires since the adoption of those policies in 2008.170
The training also is available to all existing County employees,171 but there is no

168

Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact Nos. 25.1.1.19 and 25.1.1.20.

169

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 7, at 67-68. In addition to asserting that the
interview process for Director of Tax Collection was designed to guarantee the position to Mr.
Smallwood’s pre-selected candidate, the Martin-Bryant parties also argue that Ms. Parker’s failure
to receive the position was the result of race and gender discrimination. See Martin-Bryant parties’
Proposed Fact No. 1.3.1.1 (“Ms. Parker, an African American woman, was denied a promotion to
Director of Tax Collection because of her race and gender.”). They also assert that Ms. Parker’s job
duties later were diminished after her return from a pre-approved military leave of absence, that she
was retaliated against for filing a discrimination complaint about the situation with her military
leave, and that she was adversely affected by the Administrative Leave Without Pay program and
the Reduction-in-Force because of the other discrimination she had already suffered. See MartinBryant parties’ Proposed Fact Nos. 1.3.1.4-1.3.1.7, 25.1.1.18. There is no need to discuss those
allegations of discrimination in this opinion, however. As observed in note 117, supra, there is no
need for these contempt proceedings to be transformed into a series of mini-trials on employee
discrimination claims, as ample other evidence exists demonstrating the County’s contempt of its
decree and the need for an effective remedy.
170

See County’s Proposed Fact No. 41.

171

See County’s Proposed Fact No. 43.

78

indication that it is mandatory, and no data about how many employees have received
the training.
d.

Consent decree training

The court has already discussed the County’s consent decree training in Part
VI(B)(1)(b), supra.
e.

Recruiting at historically black colleges and universities

Ms. Taylor testified that the County has, at least since 2009, conducted general
recruiting at historically black colleges and universities like Alabama A&M
University, Miles College, and Lawson State Community College. Those recruitment
efforts include encouraging students to apply for both “classified positions” available
through the merit-selection system administered by the Personnel Board and Jefferson
County,172 and “unclassified positions.”173

172

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 6, at 196-97. The Martin-Bryant parties assert that
the County has not conducted any recruiting for classified positions. See Martin-Bryant parties’
Proposed Fact No. 7.3.3 and all subparts. Most of the evidence they cite, however, relates to the
County’s activities before 2009. Ms. Taylor’s testimony concerned the County’s activities at the
time of trial in 2012, and there is nothing to dispute that testimony.
As discussed in the text accompanying notes 19-22, supra, the Personnel Board is charged
by Alabama law with the function of administering written tests and other job selection procedures
that produce “registers” and “certificates” of persons considered eligible for employment or
promotion to classified positions with the twenty-two governmental entities served by the Personnel
Board.
173

The Board’s enabling legislation excludes such positions as elected officials, certain
appointed officials and professionals, and — in the sense relevant to the statement in text —
“common laborers” from merit positions in the classified service. See Acts No. 677 and 782, 1977
Acts of Alabama.

79

f.

Production of semi-annual and annual reports

It is undisputed that, since October of 2008, the County has produced the semiannual reports required by its consent decree.174 Even so, it also is undisputed that
the County’s reports are “not perfect.”175 For example, the same individual might be
identified as African-American on one report, but Hispanic, white, or unknown on
another. Or, one individual might be listed as both male and female on the same
report, or as male on one report, but female on another.176
Landon Dowe, the individual hired by the County in 2008 to generate the semiannual and annual reports required by the decree, was not aware of any of those
inconsistencies when he gave trial testimony in 2012.177 For the most part, Mr. Dowe
simply relied upon the information applicants provided in their application packets
to create his reports. He did check for “transpositions,” or situations where an
applicant might have erroneously identified his race in the blank reserved for
identifying gender, or vice versa. However, he did not check for situations where an
applicant might have mistakenly been identified as being of two different genders or

174

See County’s Proposed Fact No. 48. It also is undisputed that, before October of 2008,
the County did not consistently produce the semi-annual and annual reports required by the decree.
See doc. no. 1772 (County’s Post-Trial Brief) ¶¶ 65-71.
175

See County’s Proposed Fact No. 49.

176

See Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No. 15.2.2.1 and all subparts.

177

See Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact Nos. 15.2.3.2.1, 15.2.3.2.2, and 15.2.3.2.3.

80

races, or as being of one race or gender on one report, but of a different race or gender
on another report.178 At the request of plaintiffs’ counsel, the County did at some
point begin to provide the data used to compile these reports in electronic form, and
to provide Social Security numbers for all applicants.179 Even so, the County did not
use Social Security numbers to check the accuracy of its reports.180 The MartinBryant parties’ expert witness, Dr. Kathleen Lundquist, testified that, when such
inconsistencies appeared on the reports, the data had to be excluded from the
calculations of how many persons of each race and gender were hired for particular
jobs. In Dr. Lundquist’s opinion, that reduced the sample size for each job analysis,
and made the statistical analysis less likely to detect differences among race- or
gender-based subgroups.181
Additionally, Dr. Lundquist identified approximately 200 situations in which
individuals were listed on the “Persons Offered Positions Report” required by decree
paragraph 53(a),182 but not on the “Applicant Flow Report” required by paragraph

178

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 6, at 124-27.

179

See County’s Proposed Fact No. 50.

180

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 6, at 126-28.

181

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 8, at 63-68.

182

Paragraph 53(a) requires the County to make an annual report of “all persons, by job
classification, department, race and sex, to whom positions have been offered with an indication
thereon of whether or not the position was accepted.”

81

53(c).183 Mr. Dowe explained that those inconsistencies could occur because the
Applicant Flow Report reflects the persons who were selected by individual
departments to fill a position, but the Persons Offered Positions Report reflects which
individuals actually were extended a formal offer of employment by Human
Resources. Even after being selected by a department, an applicant could fail a preemployment screening evaluation conducted by Human Resources and, consequently,
not be extended a formal offer. Mr. Dowe knew that the reports had been “out of
sync,” but he did not perform a consistency check on any of the reports until 2012.184
Dr. Lundquist testified that if individuals appeared as having received offers on the
Persons Offered Positions Report, but did not also appear on the Applicant Flow
Report, she excluded those persons from her adverse impact analysis, because she did
not want to base the analysis on inconsistent or unreliable data.185
At some point, plaintiffs’ counsel also informed Mr. Dowe that previous semi-

183

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 8, at 69-74. Paragraph 53(c) requires the County
to annually provide
[a] breakdown of the applicant flow for employment with the County which
indicates by race and sex the number of applicants for each department and job
classification in the classified and unclassified service, and the number of applicants
hired, rejected and pending for each job classification and department. Applicant
hires shall be separately identified as to Comprehensive Employment Training Act
(CETA) positions. [Emphasis and alteration supplied.]
184

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 6, at 135-37.

185

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 8, at 72-74.

82

annual reports had included certified applicants with a status of “Pending,” or
“Included on Certification List,” but that more recent semi-annual reports never
updated those applicants’ statuses. Mr. Dowe provided updated information for many
of those individuals in October of 2012. He was not sure of the exact number of
people for whom he had to update the information, but he was not surprised at
plaintiffs’ counsel’s statement that it was approximately 10,000 individuals! Even
after the updated information had been produced, there were numerous entries where
an applicant’s status still was listed as “Pending,” although the County attempted to
explain those entries wherever possible. Moreover, when he provided this updated
information to plaintiffs’ counsel, Mr. Dowe did not verify whether the information
provided on the Applicant Flow Report was consistent with the information on the
Persons Offered Positions Report.186
g.

Monthly reports and quarterly newsletters

Until the County’s 2012 reduction-in-force, the Human Resources Department
sent out a quarterly newsletter to every County employee with an e-mail address, and
also posted copies of the newsletters in various locations.187 A copy of one of these
newsletters was submitted as an attachment to Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 3196. It contains

186

See Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact Nos. 15.2.6 and 15.2.7 and all subparts.

187

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 6, at 193-94.

83

the following statement:
ATTENTION COUNTY EMPLOYEES
Please remember that the Jefferson County Commission is under a
Consent Decree. The decree prohibits discrimination against blacks and
females which is also contrary to the County’s anti-harassment policy.
Please contact your affirmative action officer, Kimberly R. Oden
Webster[188] or Ben Sullen (325-5249), if you have concerns or issues
regarding discrimination. You may also review the Consent Decree at your
affirmative action officer’s office located in the Main Courthouse Rm.
A630.
Jefferson County Commission follows all applicable local, state, and
federal laws concerning equal employment opportunity without regard to
race, color, creed, sex, religious beliefs, national origin, age, or disability.
Further, Jefferson County Commission will not discriminate based on
genetic or family medical history.189
Demetrius Taylor also testified during the 2012 trial that the Human Resources
Department had been generating a monthly report for a few years. At first, the
monthly report was sent to the President of the County Commission, but since Tony
Petelos was hired as County Manager in November of 2011, the reports have been
sent to Mr. Petelos.190 The monthly reports are approximately two to four pages long,
and they “run the gamut” of all of the Human Resources Department’s activities,
including information about hires, terminations, employee complaints, benefits, and

188

Nota bene: Ms. Oden-Webster’s preferred spelling of her last name includes a hyphen.

189

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 3196, at HR 308959 (emphasis in original).

190

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 6, at 197-98; Vol. 7, at 29-30.

84

customer service calls.191 Notably, Mr. Petelos testified that he was “so busy” with
other matters that he did not read the monthly reports until the Spring of 2012, at the
earliest.192
It is unclear which provisions of the decree the County thinks have been satisfied
by the dissemination of quarterly newsletters and monthly reports. It cannot seriously
be contended that the newsletters satisfy the County’s obligation to “inform
supervisory personnel that the County shall not discriminate against or harass any
employee or potential employee on the basis of race or sex” as required by paragraph
31, or the Affirmative Action Officer’s obligation to “[a]dvise black and female
employees of the terms of this decree” as required by paragraph 33(a). Moreover, it
cannot seriously be contended that the two-to-four-page monthly reports could satisfy
the semi-annual or annual reporting requirements set forth in paragraphs 52 and 53,
or any of the requirements of paragraph 33, because the monthly reports are not
issued by the Affirmative Action Officer. Thus, while there may be nothing wrong
with the Human Resources Department’s act of sending County employees a
quarterly newsletter, or sending the County Manager a monthly report, the consent
decree does not require either of those actions. Therefore, those actions do not reflect

191

Id., Vol. 6, at 198.

192

Id., Vol. 7, at 139-41.

85

any progress on the County’s part toward compliance with its decree.
h.

Structured interview process

The County also asserts that its implementation of a structured interview process
is evidence of its recent efforts to comply with the decree. But, even in making this
argument, the County acknowledges that the process it devised was not adequate.
Despite conceding that its structured interview process “had flaws,” and that it “has
not been validated as lawful under the Uniform Guidelines and/or controlling Federal
law,”193 the County weakly asserts that the process “attempted to add a layer of
review and accountability to the County’s hiring process.”194 As discussed more fully
below, however, those attempts were not successful.
Indeed, perhaps the best that can be said about the County’s structured interview
process — and this is all the County does say — is that it “improved the County’s
recordkeeping practices from 2005 forward by centralizing hiring documentation and
requiring maintenance of documents required by paragraph 51(b)-(d) of the
Decree.”195
193

County’s Proposed Fact No. 158.

194

Doc. no. 1172, at 69 (emphasis supplied).

195

Id. Paragraphs 51(b)-(d) of the consent decree require the County to maintain the
following records:
(b) All written applications and related records for all persons seeking
employment with the County, including applications for transfer or promotion within
or among departments, for a period of at least five (5) years, which applications shall

86

The most significant deficiency of the County’s discussion of its structured
interview process is that it overlooks just how woefully inferior the County’s hiring
system was before implementation of structured interviews in 2005. The MartinBryant parties have set forth extensive evidence, most of it uncontested,
demonstrating that, prior to 2005, “County managers had complete discretion over the
interview and hiring procedure, which was not validated, resulting in inconsistent,
arbitrary and biased selections that adversely impacted African-Americans and
women,” and that interviewers did not have any formal training.196 The County may
have attempted to remedy those problems by implementing the structured interview
process in 2005, but, while the process may have brought about some improvement
include identification by the County of the applicant by race and sex. Such record
shall also contain a statement signed by the appropriate County official, setting forth
the reasons why any applicant was found not to be qualified for the position(s)
applied for.
(c) With respect to any applicant who is certified for hire or promotion and
who is not selected for the vacancy for which that applicant is certified, the County
shall record in writing, signed by the appropriate County official, the reasons for the
applicant’s not being selected for that vacancy. Also, the County shall record and
maintain any other written records or comments on an applicant for certification in
accordance with paragraph 32(e) above.
(d) All written communications between the County and applicants for
employment, transfer and promotion.
196

Doc. no. 1773 (Martin-Bryant parties’ Post-Trial Brief), at 102. See also Martin-Bryant
parties’ Proposed Fact Nos. 19-20 and all subparts. The County even states, as one of its own
proposed facts, that, prior to implementation of the Structured Interview Process, “the County
utilized non-validated selection procedures that were manager-driven.” County’s Proposed Fact No.
125.

87

in the County’s recordkeeping procedures, and some centralization of the hiring
process, the evidence as a whole overwhelmingly demonstrates that the process falls
far short of satisfying the County’s obligations under its consent decree.
The County’s decision to implement a structured interview process in the first
place was questionable. Shortly after Ms. Taylor was hired as Director of Human
Resources in 2004, Charles S. Wagner, a former Assistant County Attorney,
instructed her to learn about the City of Birmingham’s structured interview program,
and to adopt a similar procedure for the County. It is significant to note that Mr.
Wagner gave such an instruction to Ms. Taylor despite his act of transmitting a
twelve-page memorandum entitled “Critique of PMG’s Structured Interview Test
Development Procedure” to the other parties in these consolidated cases and the
Special Master on November 21, 2002. That memorandum criticized the use of
structured interviews as a selection device for the City of Birmingham.197 Mr.
Wagner stated that, in his opinion, structured interviews would be the “preferred
methodology” only in “very limited cases,” and that they had “extremely limited
usefulness as a selection instrument.”198 Mr. Wagner further opined that structured
interviews “have a high degree of subjectivity, are prone to rating errors and bias and

197

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 7, at 30-32.

198

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 3150, at 1.

88

have poorer reliability and validity than comparable written or job performance (work
sample) tests.”199 According to Mr. Wagner, a major flaw in the structured interview
process is that “[t]wo different test developers may well come up with totally different
decisions in the exact same situation.”200 Thus, structured interviews would have
“greater subjectivity, errors, and bias with lower reliability and poorer validity than
the written test at a far higher cost for development and administration.”201 Mr.
Wagner’s overall opinion was that such selection devices
would only be appropriate in relatively rare cases, those in which objective
measures of KSAO’s[202] and tasks are sparse or non-existent. Such cases
might be in assessing decision making, team affiliation behaviors,
interpersonal skills or management styles. [Structured interviews] might be
more useful as a minor adjunct selection process to more robust and valid
selection processes. Job performance (work sample) tests and written
test[s] carefully written and analyzed have far better reliability and validity
than [structured interviews]. [Structured interviews] should not be
considered as the primary selection instrument for the majority of positions
at the [Jefferson County Personnel Board].203
No rational explanation has been provided for why Mr. Wagner severely criticized
the option of a structured interview process for the City of Birmingham in 2002, but
then instructed Ms. Taylor to implement just such a process at the County only two
199

Id.

200

Id. (alteration supplied).

201

Id. at 3.

202

“KSAO” is an acronym standing for “knowledge, skills, abilities, and other
characteristics.”
203

Id. at 11 (alterations and emphasis supplied).

89

years later.
When the structured interview process first was implemented, and for an
unspecified time thereafter, the County used a procedure called “short-listing”: a
process that allowed hiring managers to narrow certification lists received from the
Personnel Board by developing their own list of selection criteria. The managers who
developed “short list” criteria were not provided any training or guidance about how
to properly do so. Consequently, their criteria were ad hoc, arbitrarily developed, and
not validated. Sometimes the short list selection criteria included considerations that
were not required by the job description, and sometimes the criteria would vary
among divisions or on different certification lists. The scoring system for short lists
also failed to give particular weight to factors that represented an applicant’s
knowledge, skills, and abilities (“KSA’s”) over other factors.204 In practice, the
managers developing short list criteria often did so only after reviewing the
applications for a particular position, and subjectively evaluating the candidates’
respective qualifications.205 That practice resulted in the obvious problem of short-list
criteria being developed to justify the hire of a pre-selected candidate: not because
the criteria were related to, much less essential to, the performance of the duties of the

204

See Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No. 21.1.1 and all subparts.

205

Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No. 21.1.6.5.

90

job. The County apparently eventually recognized the problems with the short-listing
process, because it repeatedly emphasized in its briefs that the process is no longer
employed.206 It is unclear, however, exactly when the County ceased the practice.
Even without the obvious shortcomings of the irrational short-listing process, the
structured interview process still is too problematic to satisfy the County’s decree
obligations. There is no evidence that the County ever hired any professional job
analysts or outside consultants to conduct defensible job analyses for any positions.
Demetrius Taylor testified that a “thorough job analysis” is not conducted before
developing the questions for any interview, although the Human Resources
Department does review each question and answer, and each structured interview
packet.207 In lieu of the job analysis, the interviewers simply review the job
description provided by the Personnel Board and rely upon their own experience and
the needs they perceive in developing the questions and rating factors.208 In Dr.
Lundquist’s opinion, the failure to conduct thorough job analyses is a major reason
why the County’s structured interview process cannot be validated.209
Moreover, some of the scales by which interviewers rated an applicant’s

206

See, e.g., County’s Proposed Fact No. 165.

207

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 7, at 41.

208

See Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No. 22.1 and all subparts.

209

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 8, at 16.

91

responses to interview questions were vague and ambiguous, even though they had
been approved by the Human Resources Department.210 Department managers
conducting the interviews did not always understand what KSA’s a particular
interview question was designed to evaluate.211 Some interview questions called for
a subjective, unquantifiable, or unverifiable response from the applicant.212 Some
structured interview packets did not contain numerical values for each rating
category, and the managers conducting interviews could not always explain how they
arrived at the overall rating score assigned to each applicant.213 For some positions,
the managers conducting the interviews could not even answer all the interview
questions they were posing to applicants, and they could not always explain the
ratings they had assigned to particular applicants.214 The numerical rating scales for
some positions left gaps that did not encompass all possible candidate responses. For
example, an applicant might receive a (-) if he or she answered 69% of the answers
“correctly,” an (x) for 70-80% correct answers, and a (+) if 88-90% of the questions
were answered correctly. In such instances, there is no explanation of what score to
give an applicant whose correct responses fell into the interstitial space between 80%
210

Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No. 22.2.1.1.

211

Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No. 22.2.3 and all subparts.

212

Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No. 22.2.4 and all subparts.

213

Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No. 22.2.5 and all subparts.

214

Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No. 22.2.7 and all subparts.

92

and 88%, or were above 90%.215 Some of the rating scales contained outright errors,
even though they had been approved by the Human Resources Department. For
example, the rating factors for one position sometimes were used for another position,
and the “meets expectations” and “plus” ratings were switched on some of the
forms.216
Because the structured interview questions were not based on a proper job
analysis, the questions and rating factors were not always related to the knowledge,
skills, and abilities that were necessary for performance of the duties of the job.217
The interview questions for a position sometimes conflicted with the Personnel
Board’s job description for that position.218 The interviewers sometimes could not
explain how they determined the weight assigned to particular questions, or what
benchmarks they used to evaluate each applicant’s responses.219 The questions and
rating factors sometimes were based more on a particular applicant’s years of
experience than on the KSA’s necessary for the job.220 The interview questions did

215

Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No. 22.2.8 and all subparts.

216

Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No. 22.2.9 and all subparts.

217

One egregious example of the potential for abuse in the Structured Interview Process is
the 2008 selection of John DeLucia for Director of Tax Collection in 2008, discussed in Part
VI(B)(1)(c), supra.
218

Martin Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No. 22.3.2 and all subparts.

219

Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact Nos. 22.3.3 and 22.3.4 and all subparts.

220

Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No. 22.3.5 and all subparts.

93

not always match up to the rating factors that were supposedly being used to rate
responses to those questions. Some interview packets did not have any rating factors,
and some interview questions were not designed to produce sufficient information to
apply the rating factors.221 Different candidates for the same position were sometimes
asked different questions by different interviewers, and different interviewers
sometimes assigned different ratings to two candidates who gave the same response
to the same question.222 Finally, the Martin-Bryant parties produced evidence
showing that the County (and particularly the Human Resources Department) failed
to provide effective training or oversight for the development of structured interview
materials, or for the implementation or execution of the interviews themselves.223
The County currently offers hiring managers the option to either conduct
structured interviews, or to hire by random selection from the list of eligible
candidates provided by the Personnel Board.224

The County also has begun

considering whether to convert the structured interview process into an entirely
computer-based one, with no live interviewer actually in the room, and to videotape
221

Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No. 22.4 and all subparts.

222

Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact Nos. 23.1.1-23.1.6 and all subparts.

223

See Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No. 24 and all subparts.

224

County’s Proposed Fact No. 178. The County also asserts that its hiring of Tony Petelos
as County Manager and sole appointing authority represents an effort to comply with the decree. The
court will discuss the impact of Mr. Petelos’ position on the receivership analysis in Part
VI(B)(3)(b), infra.

94

the computer-based interviews.225
i.

Other decree violations

It is disturbing to state, but nevertheless true, that the evidence of noncompliance discussed in the preceding sections barely scratches the surface of the
County’s failures over the course of the past thirty years. Indeed, those matters
represent only a small portion of the evidence presented during trial depicting the
County’s failure to comply with various provisions of its consent decree. The MartinBryant parties’ post-trial brief contains additional, extensive discussion of the
County’s failure to comply with paragraphs 1, 5, 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 31, 33, 51, 52,
and 53 of the decree.226 The Martin-Bryant parties also have presented abundant
evidence that the County’s stipulations of non-compliance with the decree do not tell
the entire story, and that the County’s actual non-compliance is far more extensive
— and more recent — than the County has stipulated.227 Some of that evidence is
disputed,228 but there is no need for the court to resolve all of the disputes, or to
discuss the additional evidence in more detail, because the County’s stipulations,
along with the evidence of the County’s non-compliance discussed in the preceding
225

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 7, at 48-49.

226

Doc. no. 1773, at 14-249.

227

See doc. no. 1797 (Martin-Bryant parties’ Response to County’s Post-Trial Brief), at 37-

228

See doc. no. 1772 (County’s Response to Martin-Bryant Parties’ Post-Trial Brief).

52.

95

sections, are sufficient to demonstrate that the County has repeatedly failed to comply
with its consent decree.
2.

Will further efforts to secure compliance only lead to confrontation and
delay?

The County asserts that future efforts to secure its compliance with its consent
decree will not lead to confrontation and delay because it has attempted to reach a
settlement with plaintiffs, because the testimony of the County Commissioners and
County Manager indicates that achieving decree compliance is important to them, and
because it has stipulated to some violations of the decree and agreed to some of
plaintiffs’ proposed remedies.
The County’s efforts to reach a settlement on the Martin-Bryant parties’ motion
for contempt do not have much relevancy to the question of whether the County is
likely to cooperate with future efforts to secure compliance with its decree. Those
settlement negotiations indicate more of a desire to avoid the expenses of litigation
and the dangers of a contempt finding, than the County’s desire, or willingness, to
comply with its decree.
The County’s willingness to stipulate to a limited number of decree violations
and proposed remedies also does not weigh heavily in its favor. Those stipulations
indicate the County’s willingness to cooperate up to a certain point, but they do not

96

speak to whether the County is willing to cooperate past that point; and, thus, they do
not indicate that the County is likely to cooperate with future efforts to secure
compliance with the decree. Instead, the evidence has demonstrated that the County’s
contempt of its decree is much broader, and has been occurring for far longer, than
the County’s stipulations reflect. That evidence begs the question of why, if the
County is so willing to cooperate, it did not stipulate to more extensive violations.
That leaves the testimony of the County Commissioners, all of whom began
serving four-year terms on November 10, 2010, and the County Manger, who was
hired in November of 2011. County Manager Tony Petelos testified during trial that
he is “committed” to resolving the issue of the County’s non-compliance with the
decree, and he believes the County Commissioners and Human Resources staff are
as well.229 He stated that his goal is to work with the court, and with a Monitor and
Industrial/Organizational Psychologist, if those persons are appointed by the court.230
He also testified to his understanding that, if any directives from the court conflict
with any directives from the Personnel Board, the court’s directives would control.231
County Commission President David Carrington testified that Mr. Petelos and the
entire Commission are “absolutely committed” to complying with the consent
229

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 7, at 129-30.

230

Id. at 130.

231

Id. at 114.

97

decree.232 He also testified that it is important for the County to “clean up the entire
mess” it is in, including the County’s non-compliance with the consent decree.233
Commissioner George Bowman testified that he is committed to complying with the
consent decree, ensuring the County complies with the decree, and allowing Mr.
Petelos to take the steps necessary to bring the County into compliance with the
decree.234 He also testified to his understanding that an order of this court “trumps
all other laws, all other state laws, local laws, any county resolutions. If it conflicts
with an order of this Court, this Court’s authority prevails.”235 He also understood
that this court’s authority is superior to all rules and regulations of the Personnel
Board.236 Commissioner Sandra Little-Brown testified that her level of commitment
to the County’s compliance with the decree is “very wide,”237 and that she wants to
be a “wheel” to facilitate the County’s compliance.238 She “would embrace a monitor
or anything that this Court puts in place to make sure” the County comes into
compliance with the decree.239 Commissioner Joe Knight testified that he also is
232

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 5, at 229.

233

Id. at 235.

234

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 8, at 248-49.

235

Id. at 248.

236

Id.

237

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 5, at 133.

238

Id. at 135.

239

Id. at 136.

98

committed to complying with the decree,240 and understands that the orders of this
court supercede conflicting state or local laws.241 Finally, Commissioner Jimmie
Stephens testified that he and the other Commissioners will work with either a
Monitor or a Receiver, if one should be appointed, “to fix this situation that’s gone
on way too long.”242 He is “100 percent” committed to ensuring that the County
comes into compliance with the decree, and to allowing County Manager Tony
Petelos to take whatever steps are necessary to bring the County into compliance.243
Commissioner Stephens also understands that this court’s orders would override any
state law, local law, or Personnel Board Rule.244
The uniform testimony of the Commissioners is of limited value, because they
only recently passed the halfway point of their initial four-year terms. There is no
way of knowing whether the individuals currently serving on the Commission will
seek re-election, or if they do, whether they will be successful in attaining a majority
of the votes cast within their respective Districts. If different Commissioners are
elected for the next term, there is no way of knowing whether those individuals will
share their predecessors’ professed commitment to comply with all requirements of
240

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 9, at 47.

241

Id. at 54-55.

242

Id. at 19-20.

243

Id. at 20-21.

244

Id. at 18.

99

the County’s consent decree. The next group of Commissioners could have more in
common with those of the past — some of whom still are serving federal prison
sentences on various corruption charges — than those of the present.
That said, there is no reason to question current, subjective desire of the
Commissioners and Mr. Petelos to comply with the County’s decree. There also is
no reason to question their understanding, at the time of trial, of the consent decree’s
supremacy over state or local law — although the record clearly reflects that the
Commissioners did not have such an understanding when they implemented the 2011
Administrative Leave Without Pay process (“ALWOP”), and the 2012 Reduction-inForce (“RIF”).245 Even so, the court does not see any evidence that future efforts to
achieve compliance with the consent decree will result in confrontation with the
current Commissioners or the present County Manager.
Nevertheless, and despite the subjective good intentions of the Commissioners
and County Manager, there is substantial evidence that future efforts to secure
245

Commissioner Carrington testified that the ALWOP was implemented, in part, to comply
with a state law requiring the County to maintain a balanced budget and a federal law requiring the
County to have enough money to pay its workers before requiring them to work. December 2012
Trial Transcript, Vol. 5, at 212-13. He did not recall having any discussions with anyone about
whether the County’s consent decree obligations overrode its obligations under state and local law
when deciding to implement the ALWOP and the RIF. It was his understanding that as long as the
ALWOP and RIF were conducted in accordance with Personnel Board rules, they also would satisfy
the requirements of the consent decree. Id. at 246-48. Commissioner Little-Brown did not recall
giving any consideration to the supremacy of the consent decree when deciding to implement the
ALWOP and the RIF. Id. at 177-78.

100

compliance with the decree in the absence of a receivership will only lead to delay.
As discussed in Part VI(B)(1), supra, the County’s recent efforts to comply with the
decree have failed to produce the required results. Moreover, as discussed more fully
in the following section, the evidence indicates that, despite the professed eagerness
of the present Commissioners and County Manager, there will not be any more
substantial progress toward compliance with the decree in the coming decade than
there has been in the last, unless the court intervenes.
3.

Is leadership available to turn the tide within a reasonable time?

The County asserts that its current Commissioners are able to provide sufficient
leadership to “turn the tide” toward decree compliance.
a.

The current County Commissioners

In addition to the current Commissioners’ expressions of their desire and intent
to bring the County into compliance with its consent decree, the County offers some
evidence of more concrete actions taken by the Commissioners that allegedly reflect
their commitment to compliance. For example, Commissioner Sandra Little-Brown
met with the County’s attorneys, the County Manager, the other Commissioners, and
the Department Heads under her supervision to discuss compliance with the decree.
When employees complained to her about unfair treatment, she made herself
available to them, and told them to document the problems and report to the Human
101

Resources Department.246
David Carrington has read the decree several times, and has discussed it with the
other Commissioners and Demetrius Taylor.247 When Mr. Carrington was elected, he
asked to be assigned to the Human Resources Department, Environmental Services,
and the County Attorney’s office, because he viewed those departments as being of
“crucial importance” to the County.248
That evidence is minimal, however, when compared to the other evidence that
the current Commissioners have failed to fully appreciate the requirements of the
decree, and the extent of the County’s non-compliance.

The Commissioners

approved the County’s stipulation to certain items of non-compliance with the decree,
but the evidence indicates that the extent of the County’s non-compliance actually is
much broader and more recent than the County has admitted.249 During her December
2012 trial testimony, Commissioner Little-Brown did not have any understanding of
the decree’s provisions beyond a general requirement to be fair in employment
decisions, and she could not explain why the County was not in compliance with the
decree.250 Commissioner Little-Brown also fully supported the Structured Interview
246

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 5, at 130-31.

247

Id. at 199-200.

248

Id. at 205.

249

See Part VI(B)(1), supra.

250

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 5, at 145-50.

102

Process when it first was instituted, and she thought that any flaws in the process
could be remedied by videotaping the interviews until she learned that the County had
stipulated that the process was not validated under the Uniform Guidelines.251
Commissioner Carrington’s trial testimony revealed that he did not fully understand
all of the reporting requirements of the decree, and he did not have a complete basis
for determining whether the County was complying with those requirements.252
The most striking evidence of the Commissioners’ failure to fully appreciate the
requirements of the decree relates to the implementation of the ALWOP process in
2011, and the RIF during the following year. In June or July of 2011, faced with
revenue shortfalls, and concerned that the County would violate a state law requiring
it to pass a balanced budget, the Commissioners decided that the most efficacious
way to quickly bring the County’s budgeted expenditures into line with projected
revenues was by slashing its payroll.253 The County considered several methods for
achieving those reductions, including: the elimination of some personal service
contracts; reduction of salaries, wages, and hours worked each week; and, reduction
of workweeks.254 The option to make an across-the-board reduction of the number

251

Id. at 160-66.

252

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 6, at 24-30.

253

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 5, at 210-213.

254

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 9, at 8.

103

of hours in each employee’s workweek was rejected because the Commissioners
believed it would cause more employees to resign their employment positions.255
Instead, the Commissioners decided to place certain employees on administrative
leave without pay for a period of up to one year, hoping that, by the end of that year,
new legislation would have been enacted by the Alabama Legislature that would
permit the County to generate more tax revenues for its General Fund and, thereby,
to cover payroll costs.256
Commissioners Knight, Stephens, and Carrington uniformly testified that they
did not recall any discussion of the consent decree during the process of deciding to
implement the ALWOP.257 That process was supposed to be conducted according to
seniority within job classifications at the County, with employees having the least
seniority within a classification being the first to be placed on administrative leave
without pay: in accounting terms, the last in should have been the first out.258 The
Commission identified a dollar amount that each County department head had to cut
from his or her budget. Each department head then had to identify those job
classifications within their department that were necessary for the department to
255

See County’s Proposed Fact No. 209; Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No. 31.7.3 and
all subparts.
256

See County’s Proposed Fact Nos. 208, 210.

257

Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No. 31.7.1 and all subparts.

258

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 6, at 213-14.

104

function. Once those “necessary” job classifications had been identified, the Human
Resources Department identified, by reverse seniority, the employees in the “nonnecessary” classifications who would be placed on administrative leave without
pay.259 Thus, ostensibly, the ALWOP process was designed to identify positions, not
individuals, and to thereby ensure that all decisions regarding the persons to be placed
on leave would be made without regard to race or gender. In practice, however, as
long as a department head knew all of the employees in his department, he still could
select those individuals he desired to protect from being placed on leave without pay
by simply identifying the positions occupied by those favored employees as
“necessary.”260 On at least one occasion, Commissioner Knight intervened in the
ALWOP process to bring back some employees in the Storm Water Management
division who had been placed on administrative leave without pay. Commissioner
Knight acknowledged that his intervention was not in accordance with the rules for
conducting the ALWOP.261 After Tony Petelos was hired as County Manager, and
following a conference by him with the Human Resources Department and counsel,
he made the decision to reinstate some employees in the Purchasing Department who
had been placed on administrative leave without pay. Although Mr. Petelos did not
259

Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No. 25.3.1 and all subparts.

260

See Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No. 25.3.2 and all subparts.

261

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 9, at 51-52.

105

testify in detail about the basis of that decision, he did state that it was because of a
problem with the way the individuals had been placed on ALWOP.262
It is undisputed that the 2011 ALWOP resulted in adverse impact against
African-Americans and women in some positions.263 After learning of that adverse
impact, however, Commission President Carrington did not take any steps, or even
discuss taking any steps, to mitigate the effect of the ALWOP on African-Americans
and women. He also did not consider whether the adverse impact of the ALWOP had
any effect on the County’s obligations under its consent decree.264 None of the other
Commissioners raised any concerns that the ALWOP may have violated the consent
decree.265
The one-year period for the ALWOP expired in June of 2012, and the
Commissioners had to consider a more permanent solution to the County’s budget
shortfalls, because the state legislature failed to enact legislation that would enable

262

Id. at 118-20. The Martin-Bryant parties rely upon a newspaper article to assert that the
problem with how those individuals were placed on ALWOP was that Commissioner Stephens had
improperly intervened in the ALWOP decision. See Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No. 25.4.1
and all subparts. However, there is no actual testimony or other evidence to establish that
Commissioner Stephens had any such involvement. During his trial testimony, Commissioner
Stephens could not explain what was meant by the article. See December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol.
9, at 33-37.
263

See Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact Nos. 1.2.4, 25.3.4 and all subparts; County’s
Proposed Fact No. 220.
264

Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No. 31.8.4.

265

Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No. 31.8.4.1.

106

the County to increase the tax revenues flowing into its General Fund.266 The
Commissioners ultimately decided to implement a permanent reduction-in-force. In
contrast to the ALWOP, seniority for the RIF was determined based upon an
employee’s time in service within a certain job classification throughout the entire
merit system, not just the period of time the person had been employed by the
County.267 RIF decisions were supposed to be made only with regard to a person’s
seniority within their position, not on an individual basis.268
Despite the fact that the ALWOP had resulted in adverse impact based on race
and gender, Commissioner Carrington could not recall anyone raising a concern over
whether the RIF also would result in adverse impact.269 He did, however, remember
considering whether the RIF would comply with paragraph 2 of the consent decree.270

266

See County’s Proposed Fact Nos. 225-26.

267

County’s Proposed Fact No. 229.

268

County’s Proposed Fact No. 234.

269

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 5, at 283.

270

Id. at 284. Paragraph 2 provides that:

Nothing herein shall be interpreted as requiring the County to hire
unnecessary personnel, or to hire, transfer, or promote a person who is not qualified,
or to hire, transfer or promote a less qualified person, in preference to a person who
is better qualified based upon the results of a job related selection procedure.
Nothing herein shall prohibit the County from discharging, disciplining or demoting
employees for just cause in accordance with applicable law, nor shall it preclude the
County from engaging in layoffs or rollbacks of employees pursuant to State law,
provided however that any such actions are taken and executed without regard to race
or sex.

107

Commissioners Knight, Bowman, and Carrington all testified that they did not recall
any separate discussions, prior to implementing the RIF, regarding the question of
whether the County should require, as an alternative solution, that all employees
uniformly work a reduced number of hours each week.271 After the RIF was
completed, the County did not request an analysis of whether it had an adverse impact
on African-Americans or women.272 Even without the benefit of such an analysis, the
County has stipulated that the RIF resulted in adverse impact in certain departments.
Mr. Petelos testified that there was no way to know beforehand whether the RIF
would result in adverse impact,273 but Commissioner Carrington testified that he
should have known that the RIF would result in adverse impact because the ALWOP
had resulted in adverse impact.274
b.

County Manager

The County also points to the hiring of Tony Petelos as County Manager in
November of 2011 as evidence that the County has leadership in place to turn the tide
toward decree compliance within a reasonable period of time.
Legislation authorizing Jefferson County to employ a County Manager was first
271

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 8, at 269-71 (Bowman); Vol. 9, at 64 (Knight); Vol.
5, at 278 (Carrington).
272

County’s Proposed Fact No. 228.

273

County’s Proposed Fact No. 239.

274

Trial Transcript, Vol. 5, at 290.

108

enacted by the Alabama Legislature during the 2009 Regular Session, but the
language of that enabling Act was precatory, providing only that “[t]he Jefferson
County Commission, by a four-fifths vote, may employ a county manager to serve as
the chief executive officer of the county . . . .” Ala. Act 2009-662, § 2 (alteration and
emphasis supplied). The former County Commission did not exercise that authority.
When the County was forced into the largest governmental bankruptcy up to that
point in history, however, the Alabama Legislature amended Act 2009-662 to make
the employment of a County Manager mandatory: i.e., “The Jefferson County
Commission, by a four-fifths vote, shall employ an at-will county manager to serve
as the chief executive officer of the county . . . .” Ala. Act 2011-69, § 2 (emphasis
supplied). The statute stated that the person thus selected
shall be the chief executive officer of Jefferson County and, as such, shall
carry out the following duties and responsibilities established by the county
commission, including the following:
(1) To act as the primary administrative advisor to the county
commission on all matters relating to the efficient and economical
administration of county government.
(2) To act as the executive agent of the county commission in
overseeing the implementation of authorized projects and programs,
assuring appropriate coordination of departmental operations, and resolving
interdepartmental problems and disputes.
(3) To serve as the appointing authority for and exercise direct
oversight of all department heads and their agencies and departments
109

including all county employees thereof, except for (i) elected officials, (ii)
non-merit system employees, and (iii) the county attorneys and their staff.
The county manager shall have the full authority to select, appoint,
evaluate, terminate, and retain department heads, agency heads, and county
employees for which the county manager is the appointing authority, in
consultation with the whole commission, except that the selection or
termination of a department head made by the county manager may be
vetoed by four members of the commission at a meeting of the county
commission, provided that the veto is made within 30 business days
following the county manager’s selection or termination decision, otherwise
the county manager’s decision shall become final. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, the county commission by a vote of four commissioners, may
terminate the employment of a department head.
(4) To directly manage all county functions and operations except
those that are assigned to the county attorneys or committed by general law
to elected officers of the county.
(5) Conduct research and make studies and investigation which could
result in greater economy and efficiency in county government; approve, on
the basis of management principles, such organizational changes as
proposed by departments; recommend to the county commission the
creation, dissolution, merger, or modification of organization elements or
work programs as deemed necessary for the efficient and economical
operation of county government; and recommend to the county commission
policies and adopt procedures for the orderly conduct of the county’s
administrative affairs.
(6) Cause the planning process for both the operating and capital
budgets to be compatible with approved county policies and long range
plans; review and evaluate the budget estimates of all departments and
submit a recommended annual budget to the county commission in a timely
manner; exercise continuous review of revenues and expenditures
throughout the year to insure budgetary control and implement any
necessary fiscal controls; keep the county commission fully advised as to
the financial condition and needs of the county; and review and give a
recommendation as to all supplemental appropriations and budget transfers
110

which require county commission approval.
(7) Conduct comprehensive management reviews and analyses of
programs, projects, and departments, and report his or her findings and
recommendations to the county commission.
(8) Subject to budget approval, organize, staff, and administer and
carry out the responsibilities of the office of county manager. The county
manager may hire a non-merit system confidential secretary to assist the
county manager with administrative duties and responsibilities. In addition,
with the approval of a majority of the county commission, the county
manager may hire a maximum of two at-will, non-merit system deputy
county managers to assist the county manager in the performance of his or
her duties and responsibilities under this act and an at-will non-merit
system chief financial officer to assist the county manager with the financial
management of the county, all of whom shall report to the county manager,
who shall be their respective appointing authority. The commission may,
by resolution, set forth additional duties and responsibilities for either the
deputy county managers or the chief financial officer. Any position created
by this subsection is authorized to participate in any benefit plan offered to
full-time county employees.
(9) Attend meetings of the county commission other than when he or
she is absent due to illness, scheduled vacation, or another legally
permissible reason and discuss any matter before the commission, but shall
not vote. During the temporary absence of the county manager, a deputy
county manager, should one be appointed, shall attend all commission
meetings in lieu of the county manager.
(10) Supervise the performance of all contracts made by any person for
work done for the county and supervise and regulate all purchases of
materials and supplies for the county within the limitations and under the
rules as may be imposed by the county commission, and to make purchases
and contracts for the county in amounts not exceeding the formal sealed bid
limit set by Alabama law or resolution of the county commission.
(11) Perform such other duties as the county commission may direct
111

and keep the county commission advised of any and all matters which may
be pertinent to the discharge of its responsibilities.
Ala. Act No. 2011-69, § 7 (emphasis supplied).
As required by the foregoing statute, the County Commission formally
established the position of County Manager on September 27, 2011, appointed Tony
Petelos to fill the position, set his salary at $224,000 a year, and stated that he would
be required to “perform the duties and responsibilities set forth in section 7, Alabama
Act 2011-69[, supra], and such other duties and responsibilities as may be assigned
by majority vote of the Jefferson County Commission.” Defendant’s Ex. 146
(Resolution recorded in County Minute Book 162, at 216), at Bates # HR 217118
(alteration supplied).
The hiring of a County Manager represented a shift in the form of County
government, from one in which the Commissioners serve as an executive body to one
in which they sit more in a legislative capacity, formulating policies for execution by
the County Manager. Prior to the enactment of Alabama Act No. 2011-69, the
individual Commissioners were responsible for actually supervising the day-to-day
functions of the various Departments of County government, including each
Commissioner serving as the appointing authority for the departments under his or
her supervision. Now, Mr. Petelos, as County Manager, acts as the Chief Executive

112

Officer of the County and, according to his job description, “directly manage[s] all
County functions and operations except those that are assigned to the County
attorneys or committed by general law to elected officers of the County.”275 The
County Manager’s executive functions include serving as the sole appointing
authority for all County employees in all departments, other than elected officials,
non-merit system employees, and the County Attorney’s office.276 Removing the
ultimate authority over employment decisions from the hands of five elected officials
and placing it in the hands of one appointed executive who, theoretically, will be
more free from political influences and the pressures exerted by interest groups was
a significant step in the direction of improving the County’s ability to make
consistent, unbiased, employment decisions based upon merit, as opposed to
cronyism (e.g., partiality to friends and family, regardless of qualifications).277
Moreover, the record of Mr. Petelos’ professional background supports the
conclusion that the Commissioners reasonably could have believed that choosing him
for the position of County Manager would be a positive step toward bringing the
275

County’s Proposed Fact Nos. 87, 92 (alteration supplied).

276

County’s Proposed Fact Nos. 88-90.

277

Cf., e.g., V.O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation 51 (1949) (describing former
Alabama Governor Bibb Graves as a man who “impressed local politicians over the state as a
practical man who could and would do business with them to meet the immediate practical problems
of governing with mutually beneficial results. With the friends produced by favors and the
expectation of favors, he bound to himself an essentially personal following.”).

113

County into compliance with its decree. Mr. Petelos previously had served in the
Alabama legislature, as the Mayor of Hoover, Alabama (a large municipality within
Jefferson County), and as the Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Human
Resources (“DHR”) from 1997 to 2004.278 During Mr. Petelos’ tenure as DHR
Commissioner, the Department was under a federal consent decree, and was facing
charges of contempt in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Alabama for violation of that decree. A court-appointed Monitor was in place in the
DHR case, and Mr. Petelos worked closely and cooperatively with the Monitor.
Three or four years after Mr. Petelos resigned the position of DHR Commissioner, the
Department’s consent decree was lifted.279
Despite Mr. Petelos’ qualifications and his professed commitment to compliance
with the County’s federal decree, plaintiffs assert that his leadership does not indicate
that the County will be able to turn the tide toward decree compliance within a
reasonable period of time. The record supports that assertion.
During the December 2012 trial, Mr. Petelos testified that he had never
instructed his staff to cease violating the consent decree, or to fulfill the County’s
obligations under the decree.280 Mr. Petelos read the decree shortly after taking office
278

County’s Proposed Fact Nos. 82-84, 93.

279

County’s Proposed Fact Nos. 94-106.

280

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 7, at 169-70.

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in November of 2011,281 but it was nearly a year (August of 2012 at the earliest)
before he learned which provisions the Martin-Bryant parties contended the County
had violated.282 Mr. Petelos attempted to rationalize his omission of any meaningful
attention to the County’s responsibilities under its federal decree by testifying that he
was “overwhelmed” during his first months in office, given his new position and the
County’s bankruptcy filing shortly after he arrived.283 He acknowledged that he did
not focus on the consent decree during his first year in office because he was “too
busy” with other issues.284 Mr. Petelos was not in office when the ALWOP process
was implemented, but he was there for the RIF. He told his staff that the RIF should
be implemented “correctly,” and “according to the rules.” While, in his mind, those
amorphous, imprecise instructions allegedly implied compliance with the County’s
decree, he could not recall whether he had specifically instructed anyone that the RIF
should be conducted in accordance with the consent decree.285 He also did not recall
any conversations, prior to implementation of the RIF, about whether it might violate
the consent decree.286 As already discussed, it is undisputed that the RIF resulted in

281

Id. at 132.

282

Id. at 134-37, 166-69.

283

Id. at 139-40.

284

Id. at 140-41.

285

Id. at 147-51.

286

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 7, at 138.

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adverse impact against African-Americans and females in certain departments.
On the whole, therefore, the evidence reflects that the current Commissioners
and the present County Manager espouse a generalized, subjective desire to move the
County forward, toward compliance with the decree, but there is no evidentiary basis
for concluding that such a goal occupies a high place on any of their personal
agendas, or that any of those persons have the requisite knowledge, skills, abilities,
determination, or perseverance necessary to accomplish that end within a reasonable
period of time. Correcting thirty years of contumacious conduct, and bringing the
County into compliance with all the requirements of a lengthy and complex consent
decree, will take a significant investment of time and resources, and overseeing the
County’s compliance will likely require the devoted, full-time attention of one or
more persons for many more years. There is no quick fix for systemic problems that
have perversely persisted for decades.
Moreover, Jefferson County is riddled with other problems — not the least of
which is the largest governmental bankruptcy in national history — that demand the
attention of its legislative and executive leaders. While Mr. Petelos now may be, as
he says, able to pay more attention to decree compliance, there is no reason to expect
that he, or any other members of his staff, will be able to devote full attention to its
requirements. As well-intentioned and qualified as Mr. Petelos may be, rectifying the
116

depth and breadth of the County’s contempt will require more time and ability than
he can devote to the task.

Furthermore, it bears repeating that the current

Commissioners are elected officials in the middle of their first terms, and there is no
guarantee that all, much less a stable majority, will remain in place for the amount of
time that will be necessary to bring the County into belated compliance.
4.

Has there been “bad faith” on the part of the County?

A distinct line must be drawn between the current Commissioners and their
predecessors. During the period from 1998 to 2008, five members or former
members of the Jefferson County Commission committed crimes involving their
“service” in office for which they were later convicted in federal court.287 Four of the
gang of five were sentenced to lengthy terms of imprisonment: i.e., Jeff Germany to
43 months; Jewel C. “Chris” McNair to 60 months;288 Gary White to 120 months;289
287

In addition to the five persons named in the two sentences following this marginal note,
Gregory John Katopodis, a former member of the Jefferson County Commission, was convicted in
federal court for stealing money that the County, among others, donated to a charity he organized
and managed, ostensibly for the purpose of assisting underprivileged children. See United States v.
Katopodis, 428 F. App’x 902 (11th Cir. 2011) (convictions for mail and wire fraud). Even though
Mr. Katopodis committed those crimes between 2001 and 2008, he was not counted in the tally of
convicted former Commissioners because he left office in 1990.
288

See United States v. McNair, CR-05-PT-61-S and CR-05-S-543-S (N.D. Ala.)
(convictions for conspiracy and for having accepted bribes while in office from contractors in
exchange for steering county sewer reclamation work to them); United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d
1152 (11th Cir. 2010).
289

See United States v. White, CR-07-CO-448-W (N.D. Ala.) (convictions for having
accepted bribes while in office from contractors in exchange for steering county business to them);
United States v. White, 663 F.3d 1207, 1209 (11th Cir. 2011).

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and Larry Langford to 180 months.290 Only Mary Buckelew escaped incarceration,
but she was sentenced to 36 months of probationary supervision by a United States
Probation Officer.291 For such reasons, the Eleventh Circuit suggested that the
Commissioners who served Alabama’s most populous county prior to the present
officeholders provided an example of the definition of “kleptocracy”: a term
describing a “government characterized by rampant greed and corruption.” United
States v. White, 663 F.3d 1207, 1209 (11th Cir. 2011) (Carnes, J.) (citations omitted).
For such reasons, this court is naturally suspicious of whether those previous
Commissioners attempted, in good faith, to advance the purposes of the consent
decree within those Departments of County government over which each exercised
control.292
On the other hand, the current Commissioners and present County Manager do
not appear to have intentionally directed any actions for the purpose of subverting the
consent decree, and the weight of the evidence indicates that they possess a
generalized, subjective intent to bring the County into compliance with its decree.
290

See United States v. Langford, CR-08-CO-245-W (N.D. Ala.) (convictions for bribery,
conspiracy, money laundering, mail fraud, wire fraud, and tax fraud); United States v. Langford, 647
F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2011).
291

See United States v. Buckelew, CR-08-J-357-S (N.D. Ala.) (conviction for obstructing an
official proceeding).
292

See, e.g., United States v. White, 663 F.3d 1207, 1210 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Jefferson County
consists of five districts, each represented by an elected commissioner who serves as the head of a
county department.”).

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The County’s outside, retained attorneys also assert that the following actions
constitute evidence of the incumbents’ good faith:
(1) the implementation of the County Manager and hiring of Mr. Petelos;
(2) the creation of a HR Department that has centralized County recordkeeping and reporting functions and added a layer of accountability to
hiring decisions; (3) the creation and implementation in good faith of the
Structured Interview Process that, while admittedly flawed, was an
improvement over unfettered hiring by department heads; [and] (4)
performing Consent Decree-specific training and providing additional
mechanisms to inform all employees of the Decree.293
Several points must be made in response. First, even good faith efforts to
achieve compliance will not be sufficient to avoid the imposition of a receivership if,
as has been the case with Jefferson County, those efforts have consistently fallen
short of attaining the objectives required by the decree.
Second, the County’s focus on the recent good faith efforts of its current
officials ignores certain actions and inactions on the part of past County officials and
the County Attorney’s office that cannot be characterized so favorably. More than
two decades passed, and a motion for contempt had to be filed, before the County
began to take any of the actions that it now relies upon as evidence of its good faith
efforts. During those decades, the County virtually ignored the decree. In October
of 2000, the County even stated to this court, through the voice of Assistant County

293

Doc. no. 1772 (County’s Post-Trial Brief), at 79 (alteration supplied).

119

Attorney Charles S. Wagner, that the County’s goal in the litigation had “always been
to more or less keep a low profile, almost a stealthy profile, if you will.”294
Third, from 2000 through 2004, the County consistently evaded its reporting
requirements under the decree by asserting, through the County Attorney’s office, that
those requirements had been satisfied by reports submitted by the Personnel Board.295
Finally, this court entered an order on August 1, 2008, excoriating the County
Attorney’s “egregious abuse of the discovery requirements of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure,” and requiring the County to pay the Martin-Bryant parties’ fees and
expenses incurred in pursuing discovery from the County,296 as well as ordering
County Attorney Edwin A. Strickland and Assistant County Attorneys Charles S.
Wagner and Theodore A. Lawson to show cause why sanctions should not be
imposed upon them individually.297 The County moved to reconsider the sanctions
294

Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No. 30.1.3 (emphasis supplied). The adjective
“stealthy,” and its root noun, “stealth,” are pejorative terms that generally connote furtive,
surreptitious, and hidden acts or movements. See, e.g., Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary 2232 (defining stealth as, e.g., “the act or action of going or passing furtively, secretly,
or imperceptibly”) (2002).
295

See Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No. 30.1 and all subparts.

296

See doc. no. 1514 (Order entered Aug. 1, 2008, and requiring Jefferson County to pay the
fees and expenses of counsel for the Martin-Bryant parties as a sanction for discovery abuses). For
more detail about the extent of the County’s discovery abuses, see the Martin-Bryant parties’ motion
for sanctions (doc. no. 1494) and the Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No. 31.5.3 and all
subparts.
297

See doc. no. 1514 (Order entered Aug. 1, 2008), at 2-3 (“Further, the in-house attorneys
from the Jefferson County Attorney’s Office who represented Jefferson County during the period
in which counsel repeatedly failed to comply with the Martin-Bryant parties’ discovery requests —

120

order on August 15, 2008,298 but this court has not ruled upon that motion, and the
sanctions order remains under advisement, pending the outcome of the present
contempt proceedings.299
In summary, even though there is little evidence of recent bad faith on the part
of the current Commissioners or the present County Manager, there have been bad
faith efforts to avoid enforcement of the decree in the past. And, of course, the
County’s admitted failure to comply with the requirements of its decree for more than
three decades certainly does not provide a strong basis for believing that its assertions
of a present good faith intent to comply with the decree will continue into an
indefinite future.
5.

Are resources being wasted?

The County asserts “[t]here is no evidence that the County’s conduct with

i.e., Charles S. Wagner, Theodore A. Lawson, II, and the aforesaid attorneys’ ultimate supervisor,
Jefferson County Attorney Edwin A. Strickland — each are ORDERED to show cause, in writing,
on or before August 15, 2008, why the fees and expenses incurred by the Martin-Bryant parties in
pursuing discovery from Jefferson County should not be imposed upon them individually, not to be
satisfied out of County funds.”) (emphasis in original).
298

See doc. no. 1528 (Jefferson County Motion for Reconsideration of August 1, 2008
Sanction Order [Doc. 1514]), filed Aug. 15, 2008.
299

See, e.g., doc. no. 1561 (Order entered Nov. 7, 2008, and providing in pertinent part that
the motion of Edwin A. Strickland to withdraw as counsel of record due to his retirement from
employment as the Attorney for Jefferson County “will be held in abeyance until such time as the
court decides whether sanctions should be imposed upon Mr. Strickland in his individual capacity
for contributing to Jefferson County’s repeated failure to respond to discovery requests submitted
by the Martin-Bryant parties”).

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respect to the Decree has been a huge waste of the taxpayer’s [sic] resources.”300
After more than thirty years of admitted failures to comply with the decree, that is a
ludicrous assertion. It must be remembered that Edwin A. (“Andy”) Strickland, who
served as Jefferson County’s Attorney from 1975 through October of 2008, was the
highest paid public official in the State of Alabama. Toward the end of his tenure, his
annual salary approached $400,000.301

Yet, Mr. Strickland never bothered to

personally appear on behalf of his client at any of the monthly status conferences held
in this case during the years after supervision of these consolidated cases was
transferred to the undersigned. Further, the evidence is crystal clear that neither he,
nor the Assistant County Attorneys he assigned to this case, took any effective steps
to bring the County into compliance with the requirements of its consent decree.
Given those facts, together with the incredible, staggering breadth of official
corruption perpetrated on Mr. Strickland’s watch — criminal conduct that resulted
in the largest governmental bankruptcy in national history, and the imprisonment of
five members or former members of the County Commission, six County Department
heads or supervisors,302 and thirteen contractors connected with the sewer repair and
300

Doc. no. 1772 (County’s Post-Trial Brief), at 80 (alterations supplied).

301

Mr. Strickland’s successor, Jeff Sewell, whose services were involuntarily terminated by
the Jefferson County Commission earlier this year, was drawing an annual salary of $393,000.
302

The County Department heads and supervisors convicted of criminal acts in connection
with the sewer repair and renovation projects were:

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renovation projects,303 and the farcical financial arrangements for that program304
1. Jack Swann, Director of the Jefferson County Environmental Services Department, was convicted of
one count of Conspiracy to Commit Bribery, six counts of Bribery, and eleven counts of Honest Services
Mail Fraud, and sentenced to 102 months, concurrent. See CR 05-CO-544-S (N.D. Ala.).
2. Harry Chandler, Assistant Director of the Jefferson County Environmental Services Department, was
convicted of one count of Conspiracy to Commit Bribery, and sentenced to 24 months of probationary
supervision. See CR 05-PT-61-S (N.D. Ala.).
3. Ronald Wilson, Chief Civil Engineer of the Jefferson County Environmental Services Department, was
convicted of one count of Conspiracy to Commit Bribery, one count of Bribery, and one count of Mail
Fraud, and sentenced to 13 months, concurrent. See CR 05-CO-545-S (N.D. Ala.) and CR 06-CO-84-S
(N.D. Ala.).
4. Clarence Barber, Construction and Maintenance Supervisor for the Jefferson County Environmental
Services Department, was convicted of one court of Conspiracy to Commit Bribery and sentenced to 5
months of imprisonment. See CR 05-P-542-S (N.D. Ala.).
5. Larry Creel, Maintenance Supervisor for the Jefferson County Environmental Services Department, was
convicted of one count of Bribery and sentenced to 12 months probation. See CR 05-PT-61-S (N.D.
Ala.).
6. Donald R. Ellis, Engineer for the Jefferson County Environmental Services Department and Chairman
of the Product Review Board, was convicted of one count of Bribery and sentenced to 36 months
probation. See CR 05-B-203-S (N.D. Ala.).
7. Civil Engineering and Design Services, Inc., a corporation formed by Ronald Wilson while he was
employed by Jefferson County as Chief Civil Engineer of the Environmental Services Department, was
convicted of one count of Mail Fraud and sentenced to 12 months probation and fined $80,000.00. See
CR 06-C0-84-S (N.D. Ala.).
303

The contractors convicted of criminal conduct in connection with the sewer repair and
renovation projects included:
1. Grady R. (Roland) Pugh, Chairman of the Board and 70 percent owner of Roland Pugh Construction
Co., Inc., was convicted of one count of Conspiracy to Commit Bribery and sentenced to 45 months. See
CR 05-PT-61-S (N.D. Ala.).
2. Grady R. Pugh, Jr., CEO and 10 percent owner of Roland Pugh Construction Co., Inc., was convicted
of two counts of Conspiracy to Commit Bribery, and sentenced to 5 months. See CR 05-PT-61-S (N.D.
Ala.).
3. Joseph E. (Eddie) Yessick, President and 10 percent owner of Roland Pugh Construction Co., Inc., was
convicted of three counts of Conspiracy to Commit Bribery, four counts of Bribery, and eleven counts
of Honest Services Mail Fraud, and sentenced to 24 months, concurrent. See CR 05-PT-61-S, CR 05-P542-S and CR 05-CO-544-S (N.D. Ala.).

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4. Roland Pugh Construction Co., Inc., was convicted of three counts of Conspiracy to Commit Bribery,
nine counts of Bribery, and eleven counts of Mail Fraud, and sentenced to 60 months probation and fined
$19,400,000. See CR 05-PT-61-S, CR 05-P-542-S, CR 05-CO-544-S and CR 05-CO-545-S (N.D. Ala.).
5. Bobby J. Rast, President and 41.5 percent owner of Rast Construction, Inc., was convicted of two counts
of Conspiracy to Commit Bribery and eight counts of Bribery, and sentenced to 51 months, concurrent.
See CR 05-PT-61-S and CR 05-CO-544-S (N.D. Ala.).
6. Daniel B. (Danny) Rast, Executive Vice President and 41.5 percent owner of Rast Construction, Inc.,
was convicted of one count of Conspiracy to Commit Bribery and three counts of Bribery, and sentenced
to 41 months, concurrent. See CR 05-PT-61-S (N.D. Ala).
7. Rast Construction, Inc., was convicted of two counts of Conspiracy to Commit Bribery and ten counts
of Bribery, and sentenced to 60 months probation, concurrent, and fined $1,702,500. See CR 05-PT-61-S
and CR 05-CO-544-S (N.D. Ala).
8. Sohan P. Singh, President of US Infrastructure, Inc., was convicted of two counts of Conspiracy to
Commit Bribery, thirteen counts of Bribery, and one count of Obstruction of Justice, and sentenced to
78 months, concurrent. See CR 05-S-543-S (N.D. Ala.).
9. Edward T. Key, Jr., Vice President of US Infrastructure, Inc., was convicted of two counts of
Conspiracy to Commit Bribery, fourteen counts of Bribery, and one count of Obstruction of Justice, and
sentenced to 60 months, concurrent. See CR 05-S-543-S (N.D. Ala.).
10. US Infrastructure, Inc., was convicted of two counts of Conspiracy to Commit Bribery, thirteen counts
of Bribery, and one count of Obstruction of Justice, and sentenced to 60 months probation and fined
$6,750,000. See CR 05-S-543-S (N.D. Ala.).
11. Floyd W. (Pat) Dougherty, President and fifty percent owner of F.W. Engineering & Associates, Inc.,
was convicted of two counts of Conspiracy to Commit Bribery and two counts of Bribery, and sentenced
to 51 months, concurrent. See CR 05-PT-61-S and CR 05-CO-544-S (N.D. Ala.).
12. F.W. Engineering & Associates, Inc., was convicted of two counts of Conspiracy to Commit Bribery
and two counts of Bribery, and sentenced to 60 months probation and fined $3,830,760. See CR 05-PT61-S and CR 05-CO-544-2 (N.D. Ala.).
13. William H. Dawson, Owner of Dawson Engineering, was convicted of one count of Conspiracy to
Commit Bribery and sentenced to 4 months. See CR 05-PT-61-S (N.D. Ala.).
304

The persons indicted with former Jefferson County Commissioner and Birmingham Mayor
Larry Langford for the sewer bond issues included:
1. William Blount, Chairman and Owner of Blount Parrish & Co., Inc., an investment banking firm, was
convicted of one count of Conspiracy to Commit Bribery, Mail Fraud, and Wire Fraud, and one Count
of Aiding and Abetting, and sentenced to 52 months, concurrent. See CR 08-CO-245-W (N.D. Ala.);
and,

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— it is clear that Jefferson County did not receive adequate value as consideration for
the aggregate amounts paid to its former County Attorney and his subordinates as
salaries.305
2. Albert LaPierre, the former Executive Director of the Alabama Democratic party and a lobbyist
registered in the State of Alabama, was convicted of one count of Conspiracy to Commit Bribery, Mail
Fraud, and Wire Fraud, and one count of Tax Fraud, and sentenced to 48 months, concurrent. See CR
08-CO-245-W (N.D. Ala.).
305

A minute portion of the massive corruption was described in the Eleventh Circuit’s
opinion affirming the conviction of County Commissioner Gary White, United States v. White, 663
F.3d 1207 (11th Cir. 2011):
In 1996 Jefferson County and the United States Environmental Protection Agency
entered into a consent decree, settling a Clean Water Act lawsuit over untreated
waste being released into the county’s rivers and streams. The consent decree
required the county to fix its sewer system, which was a mess. The cost of doing so
was approximately $3 billion.
The county hired engineering firms to design the necessary
repair-and-renovation projects. The Environmental Services Department supervised
the process of hiring those engineering firms. The design contracts were let on a
no-bid basis, so typically either a commissioner or staff member selected the firm
that would receive the contract. The staff then determined the scope of the work
under the contract and negotiated pricing with the contractor. After the staff and the
engineering firm agreed on the contract’s terms, it would go to the director of the
Environmental Services Department for approval and then to the county
commissioner in charge of the department. If the commissioner approved the
contract, it then went to the environmental services committee, which consisted of
that commissioner and two others. They would decide whether to send the contract
to the full commission, consisting of the three of them and the two other
commissioners, for final approval.
The sewer system reconstruction project was lucrative for U.S. Infrastructure,
an engineering firm owned by Sohan Singh. From 1996 to 2005, Singh’s company
and Jefferson County entered into approximately $50 million worth of contracts
involving the sewer system work. Each contract required the county to pay U.S.
Infrastructure for its expenses in performing the work plus a professional fee.
In getting contracts with Jefferson County, U.S. Infrastructure had a
competitive advantage — bribes that Singh and others paid. Singh and Edward Key,

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Have County resources been wasted since 1982, when the consent decree was
entered? The question is rhetorical. Clearly, “resources” have been wasted, even
when that term is limited to money. The word is larger than that, however. It also
encompasses human resources, and there is no way to quantify the “value” of the
adverse impact of the County’s perverse and persistent failure to comply with federal
employment standards upon the lives and employment opportunities of untold
numbers of African-American and female employees and applicants for employment
with the County.
Even the monetary costs associated with many of the County’s more recent
efforts at achieving compliance with its decree have been a waste of taxpayer
resources, insofar as those efforts have been incomplete, ineffective, or both. The
County weakly asserts that its efforts to develop a structured interview process have
not been a waste, because the process “was done in good faith and has, in fact,
brought some benefit to the County.”306 The fact, if it be a fact, that the structured
interview process was developed “in good faith” is not relevant to a determination of
who was a U.S. Infrastructure vice president, began bribing the county’s officials in
1999 in exchange for contracts. See United States v. U.S. Infrastructre, Inc., 576
F.3d 1195, 1202-03 (11th Cir. 2009). One of the officials who was bribed was Chris
McNair, a former commissioner in charge of the Environmental Services
Department. Id. at 1203-06.
White, 663 F.3d at 1210-11 (emphasis supplied, footnote omitted).
306

Doc. no. 1772 (County’s Post-Trial Brief), at 81 (emphasis supplied).

126

whether it was a waste of taxpayers’ resources.
Further, it cannot reasonably be stated that “some benefit” to the County
(presumably, the contention that the structured interview process is better than the
manager-driven hiring system that was in place before, and that the process has
somewhat improved the County’s recordkeeping) is worth the cost of developing a
grossly flawed process. There is no evidence of the precise amount of money the
County spent when developing that process, but the financial costs must have been
high, not to mention the human resources that have been devoted to the effort. For
all that time and money, the County created a process that has not been, and cannot
be, validated under federal guidelines. If the process cannot be validated, the court
sees no way that the County can continue to adhere to it and hope to be released from
its decree. There also is no indication that the County’s only idea for improving the
process — videotaping the interviews — would positively effect validity, and the cost
of videotaping likely would far exceed the $75,000 amount the County has budgeted
to purchase video equipment, because Ms. Taylor acknowledged during trial that she
had not considered the need for Human Resources employees to review each video.307
In short, the structured interview process is a paradigmatic example of waste.
In addition, the County has paid the salaries of Human Resources personnel who
307

See Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact No. 31.4 and all subparts.

127

have failed to effectively carry out their responsibilities under the decree. It also paid
the salary of Charles S. Wagner, the Assistant County Attorney who advised Ms.
Taylor to implement the County’s structured interview process, despite his scathing
criticism of the use of such a procedure in the City of Birmingham.
Finally, the County points to its efforts to reach a settlement of the contempt
issue prior to trial as evidence that it has not wasted taxpayer resources. According
to the County, “for the greater part of the past year, [it] has attempted to take
significant measures — requesting mediation and status conferences, seeking inperson meetings with Plaintiffs’ counsel and voluntarily making concessions and
stipulations — in an attempt to save resources.”308 The implication of those
statements, of course, is that the trial itself was a waste.309 The court does not agree
with that assessment. While the trial no doubt resulted in costs to the County in terms
of time and legal fees, those costs were not wasteful. As a result of the testimony and
other evidence presented at trial, the court learned that the extent of the County’s noncompliance with the requirements of its decree was far greater than reflected in the
County’s pre-trial stipulations. The court also had the opportunity to ask questions
308

Doc. no. 1772 (County’s Post-Trial Brief), at 81 (alteration supplied, emphasis in

original).
309

See id. (“This included making concessions and stipulations in hopes of using the time
allocated for the hearing to resolve outstanding issues instead of having ‘mini-trials’ of individual
complaints and hearing testimony about particular jobs and practices that were no longer relevant
given the concessions and stipulations.”).

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and observe the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses for both sides.

6.

Can a Receiver provide a quick and efficient remedy?

The County asserts that “[s]tripping the authority from the relevant decisionmakers who want to bring the County into compliance with the Decree and placing
it with a receiver is not a reasonable solution under the incredibly unique
circumstances facing all aspects of the County, not just those in the HR
Department.”310 Stated differently, the County contends that a receiver over the HR
Department would have to understand not just the consent decree, but also the
County’s bankruptcy, its budget issues, and the influence of the Alabama Legislature
over the powers and prerogatives of County government. According to the County,
it “could take months — if not years — to fully understand and appreciate” those
issues, resulting in “a delay in the development and implementation of nondiscriminatory selection procedures and [an] increase [in] the risk of even greater
inefficiencies.”311 The County argues that the “disruption caused by the appointment
of a receiver could be devastating,” and it pleads that “[t]he elected officials and other
County employees who understand and recognize the actual, realistic complexities

310

Id. at 82 (alteration supplied).

311

Id. (alterations supplied).

129

facing the County should be given the opportunity to do what they have stipulated to
in writing and stated in open court with respect to the decree.”312
The court does not dispute the County’s characterization of the situation at hand
as a complex one, and recognizes that bringing the County into compliance with its
consent decree will require diverse skill sets and a substantial investment of time and
resources, both human and monetary. There can be no “quick” or “efficient” remedy
for thirty years of contempt, especially when the process of remedying the contempt
is complicated by other problems of the County’s own making. That does not mean,
however, that an outside receiver cannot provide a more efficient or expeditious
remedy than maintenance of the status quo or implementation of any of the remedies
suggested by the County.
The overwhelming weight of the evidence of record indicates that the County
cannot be expected to quickly begin complying with the decree, if left to its own
devices. The County has had thirty years to achieve compliance, but it still has fallen
far short. It has known of the plaintiffs’ intent to enforce the decree since at least
2006, and even though it increased its efforts to comply with the decree since that
time, the actual results of those efforts have been minimal. The Human Resources
Department has not proven itself capable of developing and implementing procedures
312

Id. at 82-83 (alteration supplied).

130

that will satisfy the decree, and the current Commissioners and County Manager also
have not produced convincing evidence of progress. Thus, even if it did take an
outside receiver months, or even years, to fully grasp all of the intertwining issues
facing the County, there is every indication that the receivership still would provide
a quicker and more efficient remedy than trusting the County to come into compliance
on its own.
Moreover, most of the specific remedies proposed by the County are likely to
never bring about complete decree compliance, even if the County did diligently
implement them. The most profound example is the County’s proposal to hire by
lottery in 165 of 177 job classifications. The County touts that proposal as an
“agreed” remedy, as though plaintiffs have agreed to it. But plaintiffs never asked for
a remedy similar to the County’s proposal, and they have not agreed to the County’s
proposal. Instead, the Prayer for Relief in plaintiffs’ motion to hold the County in
contempt and to modify the decree reads as follows:
To redress the County’s violations of its Decree, the Martin-Bryant
parties respectfully request that this Court enter such further orders as are
necessary to compel the County to comply with the purposes of its Decree
and to bring its employment practices in line with Federal law. That relief
may include, but is not limited to, the following:
A. The County must develop lawful selection procedures for
included jobs according to a detailed schedule. Each of the Included Jobs
shall be placed on a schedule, pursuant to which the County will be
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required to develop and implement a selection procedure that either (i) lacks
adverse impact, or (ii) has been validated in accordance with the Uniform
Guidelines. The schedule will provide for interim deliverables to the
parties to the Decree, and periods for comment and objection. As to any
particular job, satisfaction of the test development obligations shall occur
either when the parties to the Decree agree that the obligations may be
terminated or the County proves that the device either (i) lacks adverse
impact or (ii) meets the Uniform Guidelines and cannot be replaced with an
equally valid selection procedure that produces less adverse impact.
B. Until the County demonstrates that it has the technical skills and
resources to develop lawful selection procedures, the County will be
required to retain outside experts to enable it to comply with its selection
procedure development obligations.
C. For each Included Job, until lawful selection procedures are in
place, the County will fill appointments by lottery from those certified as
eligible (for the classified service) or meeting bona fide minimum
qualifications (for the unclassified service).
D. The Court shall enjoin the County from using any job selection
procedure other than random selection from the relevant certification list for
each Included Job unless either: (a) the parties to the Decree agree that a
method may be used; or (b) the County proves that the method (i) lacks
adverse impact, or (ii) is job-related, consistent with business necessity, and
produces less adverse impact than any equally job-related alternative
method.
....
H. The Court shall enjoin the County from using independent
contractors for positions equivalent to those constituting Included Jobs.
....
N. The Court shall appoint a Monitor. For each Included Job, until
the County satisfies its selection procedure development obligations, each
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proposed employment or promotional decision, including a full record of
the basis for that decision, will be submitted to the Monitor and the parties
to the Decree, with a period during which those parties may object, after
which the Monitor shall either approve or deny the proposed appointment.
In the event of any objection, it shall be the County’s burden to justify the
appointment.
O. All provisional, temporary or emergency appointments for
Included Jobs must also be submitted, along with a complete justification,
for review by the parties to the Decree and approval by the Monitor.
....
Q. All requests to terminate or recertify certification lists for Included
Jobs must also be submitted, along with a complete justification, for review
by the parties to the Decree and approval by the Monitor.
....
AA.
In addition to the recordkeeping requirements contained in
the County’s decree, the County will be required to do the following:
(1) Maintain detailed written records pertaining to every Included
Job, completely documenting the selection procedure used to fill
the vacancy and the steps taken to contact and evaluate every
person eligible for appointment to that position;
(2) Maintain detailed written records of its reasons for hiring or
promoting persons to Included Jobs, including a written
explanation as to why others were not hired or promoted. The
County shall be required to maintain any documentation
considered in making those determinations;
(3) For each provisional, temporary or emergency appointment made
by the County to Included Jobs, maintain a written record of the
complete selection procedure used to make any such appointment,
including identification of all persons eligible for such
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appointment, contacted for such appointment, and the reasons for
selecting the particular person given such appointment and for
rejecting others. Also, the County shall maintain a written record
to explain the circumstances under which a provisional
appointment has been requested . . . .313
Doc. no. 1413 (Martin/Bryant Parties’ Motion to Hold Defendant Jefferson County
in Civil Contempt and Modify Jefferson County Consent Decree), at 12-19 (emphasis
supplied).
Thus, it is clear that the Martin-Bryant parties only asked that hiring be
conducted by lottery until lawful selection procedures could be developed for
“Included Jobs.” They did not suggest random hiring as a permanent solution.314
Moreover, the County’s understanding of what is meant by the term “Included
Jobs” appears to be different from that of the Martin-Bryant parties. In their motion,
the Martin-Bryant parties defined “Included Jobs” as
those for which there is a need for development of lawful selection
313

The Martin-Bryant parties originally asked for the appointment of a Monitor, not a
Receiver. They explain that change in their response to the County’s post-trial brief:
The relief necessary to compel the County to comply with the Consent Decree
after 30 years of noncompliance is more extensive and considerably more
complicated than what was outlined in the Martin-Bryant parties’ Contempt Motion,
largely because discovery and trial have demonstrated a far wider pattern of
violations and contempt than were apparent in 2007.
Doc. no. 1797 (Martin-Bryant parties’ Response to County’s Post-Trial Brief), at 10 (MBR 12.3)
(alteration supplied).
314

Id. at 162 (MBR 286.2.2).

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procedures. Unless agreed upon by the parties, the list would be
determined on the basis of evidence concerning incumbency data, selection
procedure results, qualified labor pool data, and whether the County
violated its Decree obligations in a way that may have affected
appointments to those jobs.315
In their response to the County’s post-trial brief, the Martin-Bryant parties state that
they intentionally did not provide a specific list of “Included Jobs” when they filed
the contempt motion, “because the parties did not [then] possess evidence sufficient
to identify the classifications where relief would be required, and because the
determination of the scope of relief could not fully be assessed until after the receipt
of all the evidence at trial.”316 At some point during the course of pre-trial settlement
negotiations, however, the Martin-Bryant parties generated a list of 177 jobs and
presented them to the County as jobs that were viewed as “problematic” in some
sense that has not been fully explained in the record.317 The County first referenced
that list of 177 jobs in its pre-trial brief, stating that it was “the County’s
understanding that the ‘Included Jobs’ referenced by Plaintiffs are the 177 job

315

Doc. no. 1413, at 13 n.2 (emphasis supplied).

316

Doc. no. 1797 (Martin-Bryant parties’ Response to County’s Post-Trial Brief), at 161
(MBR 286.2.1) (alteration supplied).
317

See id. at 162 (MBR 286.3.1) (“The list of 177 job classifications identified by the County
was developed in the process of settlement negotiations, which were explicitly identified as subject
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 408.”).

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classifications found in Exhibit A to this brief.”318 The County offered the following
explanation for how it came to that understanding:
Plaintiffs assert in the Contempt Motion that the “Included Jobs” are
“those for which there is a need for development of lawful selection
procedures. Unless agreed upon by the parties, the list would be
determined on the basis of evidence concerning incumbency data, selection
procedure results, qualified labor pool data, and whether the County
violated its Decree obligations in a way that may have affected
appointments to those jobs.” (Doc. no. 1413, n.2). However, when asked
by the County how the Plaintiffs made a determination with regard to which
jobs to include on the list of 177, Plaintiffs could offer no statistical or
empirical basis for including any of the jobs, and offered only that the 177
jobs were the ones that plaintiffs determined were problematic. Based on
the utter lack of empirical justification for certain positions to be included
on this list, the County maintains that adverse impact must be established
for the 12 positions at issue before the County is required to validate its
selections procedures with regard to those jobs.319
The Martin-Bryant parties refuted the County’s understanding in their response to the
County’s post-trial brief, stating that “[a]t no time have the Martin-Bryant parties
suggested that the list of 177 job classifications was intended to represent or replace
the Included Jobs as defined in the Contempt Motion.”320 Based upon the foregoing,
it cannot be said that the County’s proposal to hire at random in 165 of 177 job
positions is an “agreed” remedy; instead, it is merely a proposal by the County, and
318

Doc. no. 1750 (County’s Pre-Trial Brief), at 25. The brief actually does not contain an
“Exhibit A.” Even so, the list of 177 jobs was submitted at trial as Defendant’s Exhibit 162.
319

Doc. no. 1750 (County’s Pre-Trial Brief) at 25 n.11.

320

Doc. no. 1797 (Martin-Bryant parties’ Response to County’s Post-Trial Brief), at 162
(MBR 286.3) (alteration and emphasis supplied).

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it is flawed for the reasons discussed below.
First, the list of 177 jobs represents only a fraction of the approximately 800 job
classifications at the County.321 Without more of an explanation of how the list of
177 positions was compiled, and without any evidence about the validity of the
selection procedures for the remaining hundreds of job classifications, a remedy that
only addresses 177 jobs appears incomplete. It would be better, as the Martin-Bryant
parties have suggested, to fashion a remedy that addressed all job classifications for
which there was a need for the development of lawful selection procedures (i.e., the
“Included Jobs”).
Further, the County has never explained how it selected the twelve positions for
which it has offered to evaluate adverse impact, and to develop validated selection
procedures if adverse impact is found.322 Mr. Petelos testified that the County
Attorney’s Office worked with the department heads to identify those twelve

321

See December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 6, at 228 (testimony of HR Director Demetrius
Taylor that there are “over 800, maybe” job classifications at Jefferson County); December 2012
Trial Transcript, Vol. 8, at 257 (Commissioner Bowman) (“It is my understanding that we have more
than 177 different jobs at the County . . . .”).
322

The Martin-Bryant parties point out that the trial testimony of Ms. Taylor and some of the
Commissioners indicated that the County was agreeing to develop validated selection procedures
for all of the twelve positions, not just ones for which adverse impact is found. See doc. no. 1797
(Martin-Bryant parties’ Response to County’s Post-Trial Brief), at 163 (MBR 286.4.3). However,
a review of the County’s pre-trial and post-trial briefs reveals that the County intends to develop
validated selection procedures only for those positions in which adverse impact is found.

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positions, but he did not explain what criteria were used.323 Commissioner Carrington
also testified that the twelve positions were selected based on the advice of counsel.
He stated that those positions had been deemed “questionable,” an adjective that
might, or might not, be synonymous with “adverse impact.”324 Commissioner
Bowman testified that the twelve positions were ones for which the County did not
have validated selection procedures, but he did not know whether the other 165
positions had validated selection procedures.325 Commissioner Knight testified that
the twelve positions were selected after a survey was conducted among department
heads to determine the positions in which hiring was most likely to occur in the near
future.326 Curiously, the twelve positions do not include those which were previously
identified by the County’s own expert as having adverse impact on the basis of race
or gender. Instead, for those positions identified by the County’s expert as having
adverse impact on the basis of either race or gender, the County has proposed to hire
by random selection.327
323

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 7, at 115.

324

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 6, at 9-10, 33-42.

325

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 8, at 255-59.

326

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 9, at 45-46, 56-57. It is worth noting that seven of
the twelve positions have never had an African-American incumbent or hire since the decree was
entered, and six of the twelve have never had a female. See Martin-Bryant parties’ Proposed Fact
No. 31.3.4 and all subparts.
327

See December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 7, at 115-17; doc. no. 1750 (County’s pre-trial
brief), at 4.

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Hiring by random selection from the Personnel Board’s certification lists is not
an effective permanent solution in the large number of jobs for which the County
proposes to use that technique. Dr. Lundquist, the Martin-Bryant parties’ expert,
testified that random selection is not a viable selection tool for all positions. If any
job required additional criteria beyond those covered by the Personnel Board’s
certification process, random hiring would not account for those criteria. Dr.
Lundquist also testified that it would take years for one person to determine which
jobs had additional requirements beyond what was covered by the Personnel Board’s
analysis, and to develop valid selection procedures for those positions.328 That is not
a feasible solution, and certainly not a “quick” or “efficient” one.
The court can speculate why the idea of random selection might be appealing to
the County. It is the easiest method, and presumably the least costly, because it
requires only a drawing of names from a hat.329 It also has the appearance of being

328

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 8, at 47-50.

329

Ms. Taylor described the random selection process as follows:

[W]e would assign a number starting with maybe double zero’s and go down the list.
And then we would put numbers in a hat, a container, and allow maybe the
department head or a department representative who’s requesting the position and an
H.R. person and maybe a third person to witness the pull. They would pull the first
number. And whatever number that is, that corresponding name on the cert list
would be the first person called for the position.
December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 6, at 169-70 (alteration supplied).

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a race- and gender-neutral process, unless one of the people involved in the drawing
finds a way to manipulate the results. But the County cannot get by with the easy
way after thirty years of contempt. The requirements of the decree demand a more
complete remedy. The County has offered no evidence — and the court sees none —
that random selection, even if it is a race- and gender-blind process, would help
“correct for the effects of any alleged prior discriminatory employment practices by
the County against blacks and women,” which is one of the “major purposes” of the
decree.330 There also is no indication that random selection will help the County meet
any of the more specific benchmarks in the decree, such as employing blacks and
women in numbers approximating their representation on certification lists or among
qualified applicants,331 or securing a number of black and female applicants in certain
departments that is equivalent to the degree of representation of blacks and women
in the civilian labor force of Jefferson County.332 White applicants could be randomly
selected for every available position within the County and, even though those
selections might not be the result of discrimination, the benchmarks in the decree still
would never be met. Furthermore, the development of lawful, validated procedures
for the selection of candidates from the certification lists received from the Personnel
330

Consent Decree ¶ 5 (emphasis supplied).

331

Id. ¶¶ 5, 9.

332

Id. ¶ 13.

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Board will help ensure that the County will be able to operate in the future in a nondiscriminatory manner. That is an important consideration if the County ever hopes
to have its decree lifted. See Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools
v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247 (1991) (holding that a consent decree can be terminated
when “the purposes of the litigation as incorporated in the decree . . . have . . . been
fully achieved,” and when the evidence shows that it is “unlikely that [the defendant]
would return to its former ways” following the termination of judicial supervision)
(quoting United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 248 (1968))
(alteration supplied).
Finally, even if the County’s proposal to develop valid selection procedures for
only twelve or fewer jobs (depending on the number of jobs for which adverse impact
was demonstrated) were an acceptable remedy, it would not produce a “quick” or
“efficient” result. Commissioner Carrington acknowledged that the process of having
an Industrial and Organizational Psychologist validate selection procedures for even
just the twelve positions identified by the County would be a long-term project,
lasting months.333 The court’s assessment is that the process would take even longer
than predicted by Commissioner Carrington — more like years than months.

333

December 2012 Trial Transcript, Vol. 6, at 13-14.

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In short, the County’s proposal to hire at random in 177 jobs is not likely to
effect the goal of causing the County to come into compliance with its decree, and the
appointment of a Monitor to oversee the County’s proposed procedures will not likely
improve their effectiveness. An ineffective remedy cannot be an efficient one, and
any time and resources invested in implementing the County’s proposals would be
a waste of the taxpayers’ resources. Similarly, it would be inefficient to allow the
current County leaders more time to attempt to comply with the decree on their own
when they have proven themselves incapable of doing so during the two years they
have held the reins of power.
The court is not deluded that an outside receiver will have an easy time
immersing himself or herself in the County’s problems, or that the appointment of a
receiver will cause the County to comply with its decree within weeks, months, or just
a year or so. Even so, any extra time an outside receiver will have to spend
familiarizing himself or herself with the County’s unique situation will be worth it,
in light of the vast amount of time the County already has spent in contempt of its
decree. Receivership will not be a “quick” remedy, but the court expects that it will,
nonetheless, be the most expeditious, most effective, and, in the end, the least
expensive way to cause the County to come into compliance with its decree.

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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND ORDERS
HURRY UP PLEASE ITS TIME
If you don’t like it you can get on with it, I said.
Others can pick and choose if you can’t.
T.S. Eliot, The Waste Land, § II, lines 152-54 (1922).334

This litigation should not have lasted so long. “Federal court supervision of
local government has always been intended as a temporary measure and should not
extend beyond the time required to remedy the effects of past intentional
discrimination.” Ensley II, 31 F.3d at 1574-75 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).335
Over the course of the past thirty-nine years this litigation has become the
American equivalent of the case of Jarndyce vs. Jarndyce that Charles Dickens
depicted in his novel, Bleak House, as having long-ago “passed into a joke” within
the English legal profession, because innumerable children had been born into it;
innumerable young people had married into it; innumerable old people had died out
of it; and, in the course of time, the case had become so complicated that no man alive
334

There are several layers of meaning to Eliot’s use of the exhortation “HURRY UP
PLEASE ITS [sic] TIME,” the traditional call of an English pub-keeper when it is time to close and
for patrons to leave. The phrase hints at the transitory nature of modern life. It suggests the
traditional call to judgment. Eliot also may have been admonishing readers to change the way in
which society works. It is the latter two senses in which the quotation is used here. Of course, the
lines also possess rather obvious allusions to the present posture of this case.
335

See also, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248
(1991); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280–82 (1977); Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ.,
611 F.2d 424, 1245 n. 5 (1976) (Kennedy, J., concurring).

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knew what it meant. It just droned on and on. This litigation is not fictional,
however, and its longevity is no joking matter. Instead, the age of these cases has
become — as Judge Edward E. Carnes observed in Ensley II, addressing the consent
decree of the Personnel Board of Jefferson County — “a badge of shame — a
monument to [the various defendants’] past and present failure to treat all
[employees and applicants for employment] in a fair and non-discriminatory
manner.” Id. at 1577-78 (alterations and emphasis supplied).336
Jefferson County’s admitted violations of express and unambiguous provisions
of its December 29, 1982 consent decree — standing alone, and without even taking
into account the numerous, additional violations detailed in the Martin-Bryant parties’
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law — establish a thirty-year pattern of
intentional, willful disobedience of this court’s orders. Clearly, the Martin-Bryant
parties’ motion to hold Jefferson County in civil contempt, and to modify some
provisions of its decree, is due to be, and it hereby is, GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that defendant

336

It should be noted that Judge Carnes’ scathing condemnation was published on August
25, 1994, nearly nineteen years ago; and, at a point in time when the parties’ consent decrees had
been pending only about twelve years. Judge Carnes also remarked sarcastically that this litigation
“already [is] older than the average college student,” and January of each year marks yet another
“birthday, if such a thing were cause for celebration.” Birmingham Fire Fighters Association 117
v. Jefferson County, 280 F.3d 1289, 1295, 1290 (11th Cir. 2002) (Carnes, J.) (alteration supplied).

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Jefferson County, Alabama is adjudged to be in contempt for failing to comply with
the requirements of the consent decree entered on December 29, 1982.
While the imposition of a receivership is, under normal circumstances, a remedy
of last resort, it is fully justified in the present circumstances. This court finds that
no other remedy would be adequate to correct the effects of three decades of blatantly
contumacious conduct, and that the extraordinary remedy of appointing a Receiver
over the County’s Department of Human Resources — who will be answerable to no
one but this court — is warranted in light of all of the factors addressed in this
opinion. Therefore, the parties are ORDERED to confer regarding, among other
topics, but not limited to, the following subjects: prospective candidates for the
position of Receiver; the extent of the Receiver’s duties; the powers to be conferred
upon the Receiver to select, hire, promote, demote, discipline, or fire employees; the
Receiver’s compensation; the Receiver’s support staff and personnel; office space for
the Receiver and his or her support personnel; the authority of the Receiver to select,
retain, and compensate outside consultants to assisting in devising valid, nondiscriminatory, selection procedures that either have no adverse impact on the basis
of race or gender, or that — despite having disparate impact on the basis of race or

145

gender — are “job related” as the term is used in Title VII jurisprudence.337
The parties are further directed to file a joint report of their conference,
supported by the resumes of any prospective candidates for the position of Receiver,
on or before Friday, September 20, 2013.338 The parties also are requested to send a
proposed order to be entered when a Receiver is formally appointed, in Word Perfect
format, to the chambers of the undersigned at [e-mail],
on or before Wednesday, September 25, 2013.
The parties are further ORDERED to confer regarding what modifications
should be made to the County’s consent decree in light of the evidence presented at
trial and the findings made in this opinion. The parties must file a joint report of their
conference on or before Friday, September 20, 2013. The parties also must submit
a Word Perfect copy of all proposed modifications to the consent decree to the
chambers of the undersigned, at [e-mail], on or before
337

Of course, if the selection procedure is to be justified on the basis of its “job relatedness,”
despite having some adverse impact on the basis of race or gender, the County’s Receiver and/or
outside consultant will be required to demonstrate that he or she searched for selection procedures
that were equally job related, and which produced less adverse impact.
338

Ultimately, the parties will be ordered to confer regarding the creation of a detailed plan
for revision of the County’s selection procedures, as well as any other actions that must be taken in
order to correct the County’s contempt, and to submit a joint report in a format similar to that
employed in the December 18, 2000 “Order Extending 1981 Consent Decrees and 1995 Modification
Orders for the City of Birmingham and the Jefferson County Personnel Board.” See doc. no. 708.
Even so, the specific line-items and deadlines specified in such a document will be dependent upon
and largely influenced by the person appointed to serve as Receiver. For that reason, the present
Order contains no specific requirements for the preparation of such a report. Even so, this marginal
note is provided to alert counsel to the court’s intentions, and to inform their ongoing discussions.

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Wednesday, September 25, 2013.
Finally, counsel for all parties are directed to appear for a status conference
commencing at 9:30 o’clock a.m. on Thursday, September 26, 2013, in Courtroom
5B of the Hugo L. Black United States Courthouse in Birmingham, Alabama.
Counsel are further advised that, with the exception of the months of November and
December of each year, this court presently contemplates that status conferences will
be conducted on the final Thursday of each month thereafter.
DONE and ORDERED this 20th day of August, 2013.

______________________________
United States District Judge

147