Bryant v. United States of America

Filing 103

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 4/18/2018. (KAM)

FILED
2018 Apr-18 PM 02:41
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

MICHAEL ANDRE BRYANT,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

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Case No.: 2:10-cv-08044-RDP-JHE
(2:07-cr-00389-RDP-RRA)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case is before the court on Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate Judgment Pursuant to Rule
60(b)(4) of the Fed. R. Civ. P. (Doc. # 102). Petitioner seeks relief under Rule 60(b)(4) for an
allegedly void judgment. (Id. at 2). According to Petitioner, this court’s order denying his
motion to vacate is void because the court committed a procedural due process violation when it
denied him an evidentiary hearing. (Id.).
Rule 60(b)(4) provides the court limited authority to relieve a party from a final judgment
where the judgment is void. Such relief is available when a judgment is “so affected by a
fundamental infirmity that the infirmity may be raised even after the judgment becomes final.”
United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 270 (2010). Indeed, “Rule 60(b)(4)
applies only in the rare instance where a judgment is premised either on a certain type of
jurisdictional error or on a violation of due process that deprives a party of notice or the
opportunity to be heard.” Id. at 271. For example, a judgment is not void due to a party’s failure
to serve the opponent with a summons and complaint in accordance with a procedural rule where
the opponent received actual notice of the proceeding. Id. at 272 (discussing an adversary

proceeding governed by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure). Nor is a judgment void
when the court committed a legal error by failing to make a factual finding required by statute
before entering the judgment, at least so long as a party is notified of the judgment and fails to
object before the time to appeal expires. Id. at 273-76 (discussing a bankruptcy court’s failure to
make a finding of undue hardship required by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)).
As an initial matter, Petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion effectively is a second or successive
motion to vacate. A Rule 60(b) motion is to be treated as a successive habeas petition if it either
adds a new ground of relief or attacks the court’s “previous resolution of a claim on the merits.”
Williams v. Chatman, 510 F.3d 1290, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original) (quoting
Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 532 (2005)). A claimant’s Rule 60(b) motion is not treated as
a successive motion “when he merely asserts that a previous ruling which precluded a merits
determination was in error—for example, a denial for such reasons as failure to exhaust,
procedural default, or statute-of-limitations bar.” Id. at 1294 (quoting Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532
n. 4). In Williams, the Eleventh Circuit held that the petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion constituted a
second or successive habeas petition “[b]ecause he was attempting to relitigate previous claims
that challenge the validity of his conviction.” Id. at 1295. Similarly, here, Petitioner seeks to
relitigate the issue of whether the court committed structural error by proceeding to trial with
eleven jurors by requesting that the court vacate its order denying Petitioner’s original motion to
vacate. (Doc. # 102 at 1-2). The Williams opinion counsels that such a Rule 60(b) motion is a
second or successive motion to vacate. Because Petitioner has not received leave from the
Eleventh Circuit to file such a motion, Petitioner’s current Rule 60(b) motion is due to be denied
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Williams, 510 F.3d at 1295.

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Even if the court possessed subject matter jurisdiction to review this motion (and, to be
clear, it does not), Petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion is due to be denied because he has not
presented a type of due process violation that deprived him of “notice or the opportunity to be
heard.” Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 271. Indeed, after filing his initial motion to vacate, the court
appointed Petitioner counsel. (Doc. # 5). The court held a teleconference with counsel to
determine whether an evidentiary hearing was required to adjudicate the claims. (See Doc. # 11
at 1). Petitioner’s counsel asked the court to confer with his client before stating whether an
evidentiary hearing was necessary. (See id. at 5-7). The court affirmed to counsel that it was
“happy to conduct” the evidentiary hearing if needed. (Id. at 8). Petitioner’s counsel informed
the court that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary. (Doc. # 9). Throughout this action,
Petitioner has received a full opportunity to present his challenges to his criminal convictions in
writing. Thus, Petitioner has not presented a type of due process violation for which the court
must vacate its judgment under Rule 60(b)(4).1

Cf. Rosas v. United States, No. C

07-4097-MWB, 2011 WL 4015590, at *5 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 9, 2011) (denying a Rule 60(b)(4)
motion contesting the district court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion to vacate
because the denial of an evidentiary hearing was proper, and the petitioner’s Rule 60(b)(4)
motion reargued the merits of the initial claim).
For the preceding reasons, Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate Judgment Pursuant to Rule
60(b)(4) (Doc. # 102) is due to be denied for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to

1

To be clear, the court does not believe that Petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing under 28
U.S.C. § 2255(b). But, even if he were entitled to such a hearing, the court’s failure to conduct a hearing would not
call for voiding the order denying Petitioner’s motion to vacate. Such an error is analogous to a bankruptcy court’s
failure to make a necessary finding before entering a judgment confirming a bankruptcy plan, and the Supreme
Court held in Espinosa that a bankruptcy court’s legal error in that regard does not make its judgment void.
Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 273-76.

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demonstrate that the order at issue is void. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion
will be entered.
DONE and ORDERED this April 18, 2018.

_________________________________
R. DAVID PROCTOR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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