Rudolph v. Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Abdul K Kallon on 04/16/12. (CVA)

FILED
2012 Apr-16 PM 02:58
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MAXINE H. RUDOLPH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
ALABAMA,
Defendant.

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Civil Action Number
2:11-cv-0027-AKK

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the court is the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama’s
(“Defendant”) motion for summary judgment in the above styled action, doc. 13,
which is due to be GRANTED for the reasons stated more fully below.
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary
judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” To
support a summary judgment motion, the parties must cite to “particular parts of
materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations, admissions, interrogatory
answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Moreover, “Rule 56(c)
mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and
Page 1 of 20

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to the
nonmoving party, who is required to “go beyond the pleadings” to establish that
there is a “genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The court must construe the
evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970);
see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the
non-moving party’s favor). However, “mere conclusions and unsupported factual
allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Ellis v.
England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing Bald
Mountain Park, Ltd. v. Oliver, 863 F.2d 1560, 1563 (11th Cir. 1989)). Moreover,
“[a] mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will not
suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for
that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).

Page 2 of 20

II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This action arises from Maxine H. Rudolph’s (“Rudolph”) former
employment with Defendant. See generally doc. 3. Defendant originally hired
Rudolph, an African American female, in September 1982, and beginning in 1999,
employed Rudolph as an Administrative Associate for the Department of Cell
Biology with the University of Alabama at Birmingham (“UAB”). Doc. 14-1, at
48; doc. 20-4, at 1. Defendant generally describes the function of an
Administrative Associate as follows:
Under minimal supervision, provides essential administrative and
business support services within a school, department or unit to
include budget maintenance, personnel processing, policy
communication, facilities/space management, database/files
management and/or office management. Coordinates programmatic
activities and functions. Conducts special projects relating to an
office’s administrative operations at the direction of superior.
Maintains vendor relationships. Interfaces with internal and external
constituencies. May provide confidential secretarial/office support
functions for department chairs, large division directors, deans or
other organization executives. Typically supervises
clerical/secretarial staff. May assist in preparation and submission of
grants. May be responsible for equipment/furniture repair. May
assist with grants and contracts administration. May prepare financial
reports and analyses.
Doc. 20-3, at 14. More specifically, Rudolph’s position as an Administrative
Associate for the Department of Cell Biology included “organizer/liaison for the
Cell Biology Seminar Program. This involves planning and organizing the weekly
events, as well as coordinating the speakers and attendees . . . . [O]rganizer/liaison
for Departmental faculty retreats and other special departmental functions such as
Page 3 of 20

Developmental Biology Day . . . [and] administrative and secretarial support for
four faculty members, housed on the 6th floor of the McCallum building.” Doc.
14-1, at 52; id. at 9-11.
On July 21, 2008, the Department of Cell Biology held a staff meeting, and,
although not on the meeting’s official agenda, the Department raised the issue of
possible position eliminations. Doc. 14-1, at 5; doc. 20-4, at 5. Approximately ten
months later, on June 1, 2009, Defendant eliminated Rudolph’s Administrative
Associate position due to “severe budget constraints and the lack of departmental
state funding.” Doc. 14-1, at 48. In conjunction with eliminating Rudolph’s
position, Dr. Etty Benveniste (“Dr. Benveniste”), the Department of Cell
Biology’s chairman, attested to a Statement of Rationale for Position Elimination
(“Position Elimination Statement”),which, as it relates to Rudolph’s organizing
functions for the Cell Biology Seminar Program, provided that:
Historically, we have invited two external speakers and two internal
speakers (per month) and this has created a substantial workload
(travel reimbursements, honorariums, arranging hotels/airfare,
planning itineraries, and submitting numerous internal UAB
processes such as personal services forms and new vendor requests).
However, this program has been reduced drastically in response to
budget cuts and proration and so the associated workload has
diminished. As an example, we now have just one outside speaker so
this particular aspect has been cut by 50%. In addition to the cut in
external speaker involvement, the number of internal speakers has
also been reduced substantially.
Id. at 58. Morever, regarding Rudolph’s functions as organizer of faculty retreats
and other special departmental events, the Position Elimination Statement
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established that “[h]istorically, our Department has held at least one of these
events each year but we have scaled back these occasions, in response to severe
budget cuts and proration. At the current time, we plan to host a faculty retreat
every three years and we do not have any plans for other future departmental
events.” Id. Finally, for Rudolph’s secretarial and administrative support duties,
the Position Elimination Statement maintained:
Of these [four] faculty members, only three utilize this position on a
regular basis. Furthermore, most faulty members have become more
self-sufficient in recent years and therefore do not fully utilize
supporting positions such as this one. This is due to the fact that
many functions, such as grant submissions and regulatory compliance
submissions, have moved to online systems. Many of these new
systems are username and password driven, so the faculty must
submit the forms themselves. In addition, due to the departmental IT
infrastructure, all faculty members have their own protected “space”
on our departmental server, so they keep up with their own records,
documents, historical data, etc.
Id. Indeed, the Position Elimination Statement concluded that Rudolph’s position
retains “certain inherent qualities which make it a satisfactory reduction, including
a) the position does not have any regulatory/compliance responsibilities, b) the
position is funded entirely from state funds, and c) the position generates zero
revenue for the University or the Department.” Id. at 58-59. As such, “[t]he
department will save an annual amount of $77,418.27, in the form of salary and
fringe benefits. In addition, due to this reduction/reallocation of duties, the
Department will operate with increased efficiency and reduced redundancy among
the other staff members.” Id. at 59.
Page 5 of 20

Rudolph disputes the Department’s justifications for her position’s
elimination, specifically asserting that the Department hired more than one outside
speaker per month, doc. 14-1, at 9-10, that the Department held a Biology Day in
2009 and a faculty retreat in September 2009, id. at 10-11, and that all four faculty
members utilized Rudolph’s administrative services, id. at 12. In support,
Rudolph submits budget reports for the Cell Biology Seminar that demonstrate a
consistent budget from June 2008 until April 2009. See doc. 20-2, at 30-38.
Rudolph also provides a May 4, 2009 email, sent to the Cell Biology Department,
regarding the 2009 Cell Biology Departmental Retreat to take place September 1920, 2009. Doc. 20-3, at 1. Finally, Rudolph submits an October 7, 2008 email
from Cheryl C. Lyles (“Lyles”), an Administrative Manager for the Department of
Cell Biology, stating that there is “no overtime during proration.” Doc. 20-3, at 5.
However, Rudolph submits a subsequent April 14, 2009 email from Lyles
providing that “[w]e can not approve overtime for another administrative
employee as it relates to this event. All overtime must be pre-approved!
Therefore, we are only prepared to submit 1 request for 1 administrative overtime
payment for the Cell Biology Retreat. Additional overtime staffing can not be
approved at this time.” Id. at 3 (emphasis in original).
Additionally, Rudolph contends that, at the time of her termination,
Defendant retained similarly situated white female employees “that could have
been eliminated.” Doc. 14-1, at 15. Specifically, Rudolph lists Renee Eubank, a
Program Coordinator II, Debbie Sewell, an Administrative Supervisor, and Jane
Page 6 of 20

Mason, a Project Manager. Id. at 16. However, Dr. Benveniste testified that thirty
percent of Renee Eubank’s salary consisted of grant funds, and that she “made
significantly less money than” Rudolph. Id. at 56. Additionally, Dr. Benveniste
stated that Debbie Sewell performed “effort reporting, HIPAA [Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act] compliance and other compliance and training
functions.” Id. at 57. Indeed, Rudolph admits that her position had no
responsibilities for HIPAA compliance or annual compliance training. Id. at 1213. Similarly, Dr. Benveniste testified that Jane Mason “had a completely
different job than [Rudolph because] Mason’s job responsibilities included
overseeing renovations, labs and equipment, calling movers and posting notices
regarding equipment.” Id. at 57. See also id. at 16.
After Rudolph’s termination, she received twelve weeks of severance pay.
Id. at 6. See also id. at 50 (UAB’s Severance Pay and Benefits Policy for NonFaculty Employees). Rudolph also applied for other positions with UAB, doc. 202, at 1-25, doc. 14-1, at 7; however, Rudolph’s efforts proved unsuccessful. Id.
Accordingly, Rudolph began drawing retirement from the Retirement Systems of
Alabama in September 2009. Doc. 14-1, at 7, 23. Although Rudolph receives
retirement payments, she contends that, by eliminating her position, Defendant
prevented Rudolph’s eligibility and participation in the State’s Deferred
Retirement Option Plan (“DROP”). This Plan purportedly allows an employee “to
work an additional 3-5 years while accumulating matching funds to be distributed
at retirement.” Doc. 19, at 2.
Page 7 of 20

Rudolph filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)
Charge of Discrimination against Defendant on July 20, 2009, alleging retaliation,
race discrimination, and age discrimination. Doc. 1, at 9. The EEOC issued
Rudolph a Right to Sue Notice on October 7, 2010, id. at 10, and Rudolph timely
filed this action on January 4, 2011. Rudolph, proceeding pro se, filed an
Amended Complaint on February 4, 2011, alleging only race discrimination under
Title VII. Doc. 3, at 4. See also doc. 14-1, at 4. Defendant now moves for
summary judgment against Rudolph’s Amended Complaint. Doc. 13. The motion
is fully briefed, see docs. 19, 22, and ripe for review.
III.

ANALYSIS

Rudolph contends that her termination was racially motivated, and
therefore, Defendant violated Title VII. See doc. 3, at 4; doc. 19, at 7. Title VII
“makes it unlawful for an employer to ‘discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race.’” Brown v. Ala. Dep’t Transp., 597 F.3d 1160,
1174 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). Implicit in a claim for
race discrimination is the contention that racial animus factored in the adverse
employment action at issue, and “a plaintiff may use three different kinds of
evidence of discriminatory intent: direct evidence, circumstantial evidence or
statistical evidence. The analytical framework and burden of production varies
depending on the method of proof chosen.” Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161
F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998).
Page 8 of 20

Where, as here, a plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence to show
discriminatory intent, see doc. 14-1, at 6; doc. 19, at 6-10, the court applies the
burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973).1 Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff must
first create an inference of discrimination by establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination. Burke-Fowler v. Orange Cnty., Fla., 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th
Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). If the plaintiff satisfies her initial burden, “then the
defendant must show a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its employment
action.” Id. (citation omitted). “If it does so, then the plaintiff must prove that the
reason provided by the defendant is a pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Id.
(citation omitted). In other words, assuming the plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case, and the defendant provides a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
adverse employment action, to show pretext, the plaintiff must “cast sufficient
doubt on the defendant’s proffered nondiscriminatory reasons to permit a
reasonable factfinder to conclude that the employer’s proffered ‘legitimate reasons

1

Rudolph provides in her brief opposing summary judgment that she “did not hear direct
statements of bias against her on her race but has experienced, and have[sic] knowledge of
differential treatment throughout her employment at the University of Alabama at Birmingham.”
Doc. 19, at 3. Indeed, at deposition, counsel for Defendant asked Rudolph “within the year
before your position was eliminated, did you ever hear anyone make a statement to you
indicating that they were biased against you based on your race,” and Rudolph answered in the
negative. Doc. 14-1, at 6. Later in the deposition, Rudolph refers to purported “negative
statements” made by co-employees about her; however, Rudolph never alleges that these
“negative statements” referred to her race and admits that the co-employees probably made these
statements three or four years before her termination. Id. at 19-21. Accordingly, the court finds
no evidence of direct discrimination.
Page 9 of 20

were not what actually motivated its conduct.’” Combs v. Plantation Patterns,
106 F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Cooper-Houston v. S. Ry. Co., 37
F.3d 603, 605 (11th Cir. 1994)). “The district court must evaluate whether the
plaintiff has demonstrated such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for
its action that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” Id.
(quotation marks and citations omitted). However, “[t]he ultimate burden of
persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against
the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Springer v. Convergys
Customer Mgmt. Group Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation
omitted).
Here, Defendant argues that summary judgment is appropriate because
Rudolph fails to sufficiently demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination.
Furthermore, Defendant maintains that, even if Rudolph satisfies her initial
burden, she fails to establish that the non-discriminatory reasons for Rudolph’s
termination constitute pretext. Doc. 14, at 8-12. The court will address each
contention in turn.
A.

Prima Facie Case

“To establish a prima facie case for disparate treatment in a race
discrimination case, the plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a member of a
protected class; (2) she was subjected to an adverse employment action; (3) her
employer treated similarly situated employees outside of her protected class more
Page 10 of 20

favorably than she was treated; and (4) she was qualified to do the job.” BurkeFowler, 447 F.3d at 1323. Defendant concedes that Rudolph satisfies the first,
second, and fourth prima facie elements, but asserts that “Plaintiff cannot identify
a similarly situated employee of a different race who was treated more favorably
than she.” Doc. 14, at 8. More specifically, Defendant contends that Rudolph’s
named comparators—Renee Eubank, Debbie Sewell, and Jane Mason—are not, in
fact, “similarly situated.” Id. at 9.
The Eleventh Circuit instructs that “[t]he plaintiff and the employee she
identifies as a comparator must be similarly situated ‘in all relevant respects.’”
Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1091 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Turnes v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 36 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 1994)). Indeed, the
“comparator must be nearly identical to the plaintiff to prevent courts from
second-guessing a reasonable decision by the employer.” Id. By eliminating
Rudolph’s position and retaining the comparators’ positions, Defendant certainly
treated Rudolph less favorably than the comparators—however, the court must
ascertain whether Rudolph is actually comparing “apples to apples.” See
Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368-69 (11th Cir. 1999). Based on Rudolph
and her comparators’ respective employment responsibilities and burdens on the
Department’s finances, the court finds that Rudolph fails to meet her burden of
establishing that the comparators are “similarly situated in all relevant respects.”
Cf. Beaver v. Rayonier, Inc., 200 F.3d 723, 727-28 (11th Cir. 1999).

Page 11 of 20

i.

Renee Eubank

Rudolph first asserts that Renee Eubank is a similarly situated comparator.
See doc. 14-1, at 16. Eubank served as a “Program Coordinator II” for UAB, not
an Administrative Associate. Id. However, employment titles are not necessarily
dispositive for a “comparator” analysis. See, e.g., Walton v. Cowin Equip. Co.,
Inc., 774 F. Supp. 1343, 1347-48 (N.D. Ala. 1991). Accordingly, Eubank’s
employment responsibilities serve as another important consideration. Generally,
a Program Coordinator II for UAB:
Under minimal supervision, coordinates administrative, personnel and
logistical support for a defined department program(s), often of a
large and/or complex nature. Carries out established program
objectives and directives. Follows established guidelines or
protocols. Determines the best approach to accomplish assignments.
May participate in program planning and in setting program
objectives. May supervise support staff. May act as a
communication liaison and special events planner. Interfaces with
outside resources such as volunteers, alumni, patients, other
professionals in a defined field or with continuing education students.
May be responsible for adherence to program budget and/or other
fiscal duties. May assist with grant and contract preparation and
submission. May handle data management.
Doc. 20-3, at 15. For purposes of summary judgment, the general job description
of Eubank’s position and Rudolph’s position are arguably similar. See id. at 14.
However, Dr. Benveniste, the chairman of the Cell Biology Department, testified
that Eubank’s salary was 30% grant-funded, and she earned “significantly less
money” than Rudolph. Doc. 14-1, at 56. Moreover, the Department funded
Rudolph’s position entirely by state funds, as opposed to grant funds. Id. at 58.
Page 12 of 20

These undisputed facts demonstrated that Eubank is not “similarly situated in all
relevant respects.” Defendant contends that it eliminated Rudolph’s position “due
to severe budget constraints and the lack of departmental state funding.” Id. at 55.
Thus, the fact that Eubank earned a smaller salary, 30% of which grant money
funded, makes her an unsuitable comparator. The court cannot infer
circumstantial evidence of racial discrimination based on Defendant’s decision to
retain Eubank instead of Rudolph because choosing to do the opposite—terminate
Eubank and retain Rudolph—would impose a substantially greater financial
burden on the Cell Biology Department. See doc. 14-1, at 56. In other words,
using Eubank as a comparator second guesses a reasonable financial business
decision made by Defendant.
ii.

Debbie Sewell

Rudolph also fails to demonstrate that Debbie Sewell is a satisfactory
comparator because Sewell, unlike Rudolph, performed regulatory and compliance
functions for the Cell Biology Department. Dr. Benveniste testified that, as an
Administrative Supervisor, Sewell “had responsibility for effort reporting, HIPAA
compliance and other compliance and training functions.” Id. at 57. Rudolph
admits that her position entailed no responsibility for HIPAA compliance or
annual compliance training. Id. at 13. Moreover, Defendant’s Position
Elimination Statement provides a section labeled “[e]limination satisfies criterion
given by UAB Leadership,” which states, “[t]his position possesses certain
inherent qualities which make it a satisfactory reduction, including a) the position
Page 13 of 20

does not have any regulatory/compliance responsibilities . . . .” Id. at 58. For
circumstantial evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff is not required to establish
that a comparator’s job responsibilities were identical; however, there is a
“substantiality” requirement. And indeed, Sewell’s regulatory and compliance job
functions render her position materially different than Rudolph’s position. Cf.
Mulhall v. Advance Sec., Inc., 19 F.3d 586, 592-93 (11th Cir. 1994) (discussing
comparators in Equal Pay Act context, and asserting that “the standard for
determining whether jobs are equal in terms of skill, effort, and responsibility is
high”). Due to the different job functions performed by Sewell, especially those
functions pertaining to regulatory compliance within the Department, Rudolph
cannot satisfy her initial burden that Sewell is “similarly situated in all relevant
respects.” See, e.g., Fisher v. Wayne Dalton Corp., 139 F.3d 1137 (7th Cir. 1998)
(in age discrimination context, court found comparator not similarly situated
because she, unlike plaintiff, possessed “extensive experience in inputting
information into the PMF/BOM”—a computer manufacturing program).
iii.

Jane Mason

Finally, Jane Mason performed completely different job duties than
Rudolph. Dr. Benveniste provided that “Mason’s job responsibilities included
overseeing renovations, labs and equipment, calling movers and posting notices
regarding equipment,” doc. 14-1, at 57, and Rudolph admits that her position
included none of these responsibilities, id. at 16. Again, the comparator employee
must perform substantially similar job functions. Here, Rudolph fails to establish
Page 14 of 20

that she performed any of the same duties as Mason. Furthermore, Rudolph
argues that she “could have performed some of Jane Mason’s duties of overseeing
renovations, calling movers, posting notices and sending out e-mails before and
after her rehire to the Department. Some of her job responsibilities would not
have been [] difficult for Plaintiff to acquire if trained for and given the
opportunity.” Doc. 19, at 6. While this may be true, Rudolph’s argument misses
the mark. A plaintiff cannot raise an inference of discrimination merely by
claiming that she could have performed the job functions of a completely different
employment position held by a person outside of plaintiff’s protected class. When
an employer reduces its workforce for economic reasons, an inference of racial
discrimination requires the plaintiff and comparator to have held similar positions
because only then can the court infer an improper motive for choosing to eliminate
plaintiff’s position. Otherwise, the court is forced to second guess an employer’s
business decision to eliminate a position with job functions that differ significantly
from a position with other job functions.
Put simply, the prima facie case “serves an important function in the
litigation: it eliminates the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the
plaintiff’s” termination. Collado v. United Parcel Serv., Co., 419 F.3d 1143, 1151
(11th Cir. 2005). Here, by providing dissimilar comparators, Rudolph fails to
eliminate the obvious nondiscriminatory reasons for her discharge.
B.

Pretext

Alternatively, even if the court assumes that Rudolph meets her initial
Page 15 of 20

burden under McDonnell Douglas, she fails to demonstrate that Defendant’s nondiscriminatory justifications for eliminating her position were merely pretext to
mask racial discrimination. Defendant asserts that it eliminated Rudolph’s
position because of budget constraints and a lack of departmental state funding,
and indeed, Rudolph’s position was entirely state-funded and generated no
revenue for the University or Department. Doc. 14-1, at 48, 58-59. Moreover, as
it relates to Rudolph’s specific job functions, Defendant contends that budget cuts
reduced her workload as the organizer/liaison for the Cell Biology Seminar and for
special departmental functions such as faculty retreats. Id. at 58. Finally,
Defendant provides that Rudolph’s secretarial and administrative support
workload decreased because faculty members utilized this position less. Id. Thus,
Defendant concluded that the Department “will save an annual amount of
$77,418.27, in the form of salary and fringe benefits. In addition, due to this
reduction/reallocation of duties, the Department will operate with increased
efficiency and reduced redundancy among the other staff members.” Id. at 59.
These reasons satisfy Defendant’s burden because Defendant “need only
produce evidence that could allow a rational fact finder to conclude that
[Rudolph’s] discharge was not made for a discriminatory reason.” Standard, 161
F.3d at 1331. Defendant’s detailed explanation in its Position Elimination
Statement, doc. 14-1, at 58-59, certainly allows for such a conclusion by a rational
fact finder. See Standard, 161 F.3d at 1331. Assuming Rudolph satisfied her
initial burden—which she failed to do—Defendant sufficiently “rebutted the
Page 16 of 20

presumption of discriminatory intent. In light of this, [Rudolph] must now create a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the reasons advanced are pretextual.
In other words, [Rudolph] must provide sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable
fact finder to conclude that the proffered reasons were not actually the motivation
for [her] discharge.” Id. at 1332.
To demonstrate pretext, Rudolph first offers UAB’s budget reports for the
Cell Biology Seminar ending in April 2009. See doc. 20-2, at 30-38. At best,
these reports reveal that the Cell Biology Seminar maintained a consistent budget
from June 2008 until April 2009. However, Defendant eliminated Rudolph’s
position on June 1, 2009, see doc. 14-1, at 48; accordingly these prior budget
reports offer insufficient evidence to demonstrate pretext. Without evidence
pertaining to the Cell Biology Seminar’s financial situation or budget at the time
of the discharge or even perhaps shortly thereafter, Rudolph fails to provide such
“weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in
the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable
factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” See Combs, 106 F.3d at 1538
(citations omitted). Defendant maintains that, in June 2009, it eliminated
Rudolph’s position due to, in part, budget restrictions in the Cell Biology
Seminar—an April 2009 budget report insufficiently casts doubt on this
justification.
Rudolph also maintains that, despite its assertion of budget restrictions, the
Cell Biology Department went on a departmental retreat in September 2009. See
Page 17 of 20

doc. 20-3, at 1. In support, Rudolph offers a May 4, 2009 email she sent to the
Cell Biology Department reminding the participants about logistical arrangements
for the September retreat. Id. Assuming the September 2009 retreat actually
occurred, this is still insufficient evidence of pretext. Defendant’s Position
Elimination Statement provides that, as opposed to holding a faculty retreat every
year, “we plan to host a faculty retreat every three years and we do not have any
plans for other future departmental events. As such these reductions create much
less work for this particular position.” Doc. 14-1, at 58. Accordingly, even
though the Department held a retreat in 2009, Rudolph presents no evidence that
the Department held, or plans to hold, retreats annually—rather than once every
three years. Indeed, hosting a faculty retreat in September 2009, an event planned
since at least April 2009, see doc. 20-3, at 1, lends no support to an inference that
Defendant actually discharged Rudolph for racially motivated reasons.
Moreover, Rudolph argues that the four faculty members she assisted
consistently utilized her administrative and support services; therefore, Rudolph
claims Defendant’s assertion—that faculty members “have become more selfsufficient in recent years and therefore do not fully utilize supporting positions
such as this one,” see doc. 14-1, at 58—constitutes pretext. Doc. 19, at 4 (citing
doc. 14-1, at 11-12, 14). However, Rudolph admits that many administrative
functions, such as grant and compliance submissions, have moved online, and that
faculty members submit these forms themselves. Doc. 14-1, at 12. Rudolph also
provides that the four faculty members she supported generally did not utilize her
Page 18 of 20

assistance every day. Id. at 14. Rudolph’s testimony concerning her
administrative services for faculty members fails to cast sufficient, if any, doubt on
Defendant’s proffered non-discriminatory justification that the need for these
support services decreased prior to Rudolph’s termination. Cf. Brown v. Am.
Honda Motor Co., Inc., 939 F.2d 946, 954 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Although the
plaintiff has produced scattered pieces of circumstantial evidence, none of it, even
taken as a whole, raises sufficient questions to undermine [defendant’s]
nondiscriminatory rationale.”).
Finally, Rudolph contends that “[a]lthough it was stated to me ‘no overtime
during proration’ [t]here were promotions, raises and overtime given during
proration and budget cuts.” Doc. 19, at 5.2 Rudolph offers an October 7, 2008
email from the Department’s Administrative Manager that there is “no overtime
during proration” and a subsequent April 14, 2009 email from the same employee
that “all overtime must be pre-approved.” Doc. 20-3, at 3-5. The court refuses to
speculate about Defendant’s overtime payment policy change between October
2008 and April 2009; however, assuming such change occurred, it offers no
evidence of pretext regarding the non-discriminatory justifications for terminating
Rudolph’s position. Put simply, Defendant paying some overtime wages in April
2

As it relates to Defendant’s policies, Rudolph also alleges that “[t]he University policy
regarding hiring of the position was violated.” Doc. 19, at 3. However, in support of this
assertion, Rudolph submits the University’s 1997 “Promotions and Transfers” policy and a 2002
EEOC Charge of Discrimination that Rudolph filed against the University. Doc. 20-4, at 15-19.
While the court is unaware of the disposition of this 2002 EEOC Charge, Rudolph may not
relitigate these grievances against Defendant here.
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2009 fails to raise the reasonable inference that Defendant discharged Rudolph for
discriminatory, rather than financial, reasons.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Absent any inference or indication of a racially charged motive arising from
Rudolph’s termination, the court must dismiss her claim. The court’s
responsibility is not to second guess the Defendant’s reasons for a business
judgment, but instead to determine if the “reasons given were merely a cover for a
discriminatory intent.” See Brown, 939 F.2d at 951. Here, the court finds
insufficient evidence of Defendant’s purported discriminatory intent to survive
summary judgment. The court will enter a separate order dismissing this case,
consistent with this opinion.

DONE the 16th day of April, 2012.

________________________________
ABDUL K. KALLON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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