Murray v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Abdul K Kallon on 04/24/12. (CVA)
2012 Apr-24 AM 11:24
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
Civil Action Number
Plaintiff Rhondria Jamise Murray (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to
Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking
review of the final adverse decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”). This court finds that the Administrative Law Judge’s
(“ALJ”) decision - which has become the decision of the Commissioner - is
supported by substantial evidence, and, therefore, AFFIRMS the decision denying
I. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed her application for Title II disability insurance benefits and
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Title XVI Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) on October 19, 2006, (R. 45),
alleging a disability onset date of October 19, 2007,1 (R. 45, 81, 86), due to
seizures, (R. 99). Plaintiff’s disability report alleged also that she is unable to
work because she “cannot stand for long periods [of] time [because] I will blank
out. I cannot be anywhere because I will get too hot and blank out. I have to be
cold. Symptoms became more severe during my pregnancy.” (R. 99). After the
SSA denied her applications on November 20, 2006, (R. 65), Plaintiff requested a
hearing on January 22, 2007, (R. 74), which she received on February 3, 2009, (R.
41). At the time of the hearing, Plaintiff was 22 years old, (R. 45), had a high
school diploma, (R. 62), and past relevant work that included medium and semiskilled work as a life guard, and light and semi-skilled work as a deli worker and
cashier, (R. 62). Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
September 16, 2006. (R. 13).
The ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claims on July 22, 2009, (R. 8), which became
the final decision of the Commissioner when, after considering Plaintiff’s October
1, 2009, brief, the Appeals Council refused to grant review on December 1, 2010,
(R. 4). Plaintiff then filed this action pursuant to section 1631 of the Act, 42
Plaintiff originally alleged a disability onset date of October 19, 2006, (R. 81), but
subsequently amended the disability onset date to October 19, 2007, (R. 45).
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U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). Doc. 1.
II. Standard of Review
The only issues before this court are whether the record contains substantial
evidence to sustain the ALJ’s decision, see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Walden v.
Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982), and whether the ALJ applied the
correct legal standards, see Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988);
Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g)
and 1383(c) mandate that the Commissioner’s “factual findings are conclusive if
supported by ‘substantial evidence.’” Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529
(11th Cir. 1990). The district court may not reconsider the facts, reevaluate the
evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner; instead, it must
review the final decision as a whole and determine if the decision is “reasonable
and supported by substantial evidence.” See id. (citing Bloodsworth v. Heckler,
703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)).
Substantial evidence falls somewhere between a scintilla and a
preponderance of evidence; “[i]t is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person
would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Martin, 849 F.2d at 1529
(quoting Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239) (other citations omitted). If supported by
substantial evidence, the court must affirm the Commissioner’s factual findings
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even if the preponderance of the evidence is against the Commissioner’s findings.
See Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529. While the court acknowledges that judicial review
of the ALJ’s findings is limited in scope, it notes that the review “does not yield
automatic affirmance.” Lamb, 847 F.2d at 701.
III. Statutory and Regulatory Framework
To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must show “the inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairments which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 416(I). A physical or mental
impairment is “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or
psychological abnormalities which are demonstrated by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).
Determination of disability under the Act requires a five step analysis.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f). Specifically, the Commissioner must determine in
whether the claimant is currently unemployed;
whether the claimant has a severe impairment;
whether the impairment meets or equals one listed by the Secretary;
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whether the claimant is unable to perform his or her past work; and
whether the claimant is unable to perform any work in the national
McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986). “An affirmative
answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next question, or, on steps
three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative answer to any question, other
than step three, leads to a determination of ‘not disabled.’” Id. at 1030 (citing 20
C.F.R. § 416.920(a)-(f)). “Once a finding is made that a claimant cannot return to
prior work the burden shifts to the Secretary to show other work the claimant can
do.” Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
IV. The ALJ’s Decision
The court turns now to the ALJ’s decision to ascertain whether Plaintiff is
correct that the ALJ committed reversible error. In that regard, the court notes
that, performing the five step analysis, initially, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff
had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date, and
therefore met Step One. (R. 13). Next, the ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff’s
severe impairments of “major depressive disorder, borderline intellectual
functioning, personality disorder and seizure disorder” met Step Two. Id. The
ALJ then proceeded to the next step and found that Plaintiff did not satisfy Step
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Three since she “does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments.” Id. Although the ALJ
answered Step Three in the negative, consistent with the law, see McDaniel, 800
F.2d at 1030, the ALJ proceeded to Step Four, where she determined that Plaintiff
has the residual functional capacity [“RFC”] to perform a full range
of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional
limitations: secondary to seizure disorder, [Plaintiff] should have no
exposure to hazards. She can understand, remember and carry out
only simple work instructions.
The extent of [Plaintiff’s] mental impairments impact on her ability to
work has been assessed by two consulting psychologists and by
[Plaintiff’s] treating source at the Western Mental Health Center (“the
Center”). Dr. Boll concluded that [Plaintiff] had no restrictions in her
ability to perform in both a social and a work setting. Dr. Lowery
estimated moderate to marked impairment interacting with
supervisors and coworkers. Her treating source opined mild to
moderate impairment in her ability to function in both a social and a
work setting. Considering all the evidence, [Plaintiff] has no more
than mild to moderate mental impairment.
Although [Plaintiff’s] reports of her daily activities, pain, functional
limitations, etc. are generally consistent with her severe impairments,
they are not consistent with the overall objective evidence. Overall,
[Plaintiff’s] daily activities, going to school 5 days a week, and
making good to average grades as reported to consulting
psychologists, Drs. Boll and Lowery, indicate that [Plaintiff] is
capable of maintaining employment on a sustained basis for an 8 hour
work day or a 40 hour work week.
(R. 15, 17). In light of Plaintiff’s RFC and nonexertional limitations, the ALJ held
that Plaintiff was “unable to perform any past relevant work.” (R. 18). The ALJ
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then moved on to Step Five where she considered Plaintiff’s age, education, work
experience, and RFC, and determined that there are “jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that [Plaintiff] can perform.” Id. As a result, the
ALJ answered Step Five in the negative, and determined that Plaintiff is not
disabled. (R. 19); see also McDaniel, 800 F.2d at 1030. It is this finding that
Plaintiff challenges in this action.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ committed reversible error because (1)
Plaintiff’s RFC “findings are not based on reliable substantial evidence,” doc. 7 at
7, (2) the ALJ failed to attached an exhibit list to her opinion, and (3) the Appeals
Council failed to “remand for review of important new and material evidence,”
doc. 7 at 10. As discussed fully below, the court disagrees.
The Plaintiff’s RFC is supported by substantial evidence.
Plaintiff’s RFC is consistent with her Global Assessment of
Functioning (“GAF”)2 scores.
Plaintiff contends that her GAF scores of 50 and below “indicat[e] an
inability to sustain work” and cites several treatment reports to support her
The American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders 34 (4th ed. 2000), presents the Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) Scales,
which is widely used to score the severity of psychiatric illnesses.
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contention. Doc. 7 at 7. A review of the treatment notes Plaintiff cites reveal that
Plaintiff presented to University of Alabama at Birmingham’s (“UAB”) emergency
department on September 12, 2007, after an epileptic seizure and complaining of
suicidal ideation and auditory and visual hallucinations. (R. 172). Dr. Rayford
Thweatt (“Dr. Thweatt”) assessed Plaintiff’s GAF score as 35,3 prescribed Plaintiff
Celexa4 and Tegretol,5 and diagnosed her with major depressive disorder,
dysphonia, post traumatic stress disorder, and epilepsy. (R. 172). Significantly,
Dr. Thweatt noted on Plaintiff’s September 14, 2007, discharge summary that
[b]y the time [Plaintiff] was discharged from the hospital, she
reported that she was improving. On initial interview, she was
withdrawn, tearful and stated that she felt hopeless and stated that she
had difficulty dealing with the stressors of her life involving problems
with her mother, problems with her job, her financial situation, and
not being able to return to school. However, the patient became
interactive with other patients while in the hospital and she began to
develop a brighter affect over the few days she stayed in the hospital.
[Plaintiff] at the time of discharge was stable, had no thoughts of
suicidal or homicidal ideation.
(R. 174). At discharge, Dr. Thweatt assessed Plaintiff a GAF score of 55, which
A GAF score of 35 indicates some impairment in reality testing or communication or
major impairment in several areas, such as work or school, family relations, judgment, thinking,
Celexa is used to treat depression.
Tegretol is used to control seizures.
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indicated moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning. (R.
Plaintiff cites next her October 3, 2007, intake evaluation from Eastside
Mental Health Center (“Eastside”). (R. 205). Eastside’s social worker evaluated
and diagnosed Plaintiff with “major depressive disorder, severe, recurrent, with
psychotic features,” personality disorder, and epilepsy, and assigned her a GAF
score of 50, indicating serious impairments in social, occupational, and school
functioning. (R. 209).
Plaintiff’s next GAF assessment occurred when UAB admitted Plaintiff on
October 24, 2007, because Plaintiff “cut [her] arm yesterday and wanted to die.”
(R. 211). On admission, Plaintiff’s GAF score was assessed as 30. Id. After
treatment for polysubstance dependence, depression, borderline personality
disorder, and seizure disorder, UAB discharged Plaintiff on November 5, 2007,
with a GAF score of 70, indicating some mild difficulty in social, occupational,
and school functioning, and with instructions to follow up with the Western
Mental Health Center (“the Center”). (R. 211, 213).
Plaintiff obtained treatment next at the Center, which she first visited on
January 14, 2008, after Plaintiff’s “[a]pplication for treatment [at the Center] was
initiated by UAB Hospital staff. Preliminary information suggest[ed] that
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[Plaintiff] may benefit from treatment for a mood disorder with psychotic
symptoms.” (R. 322). The initial intake noted that Plaintiff reported hearing
voices, mood swings, irritability, crying spells, paranoia, panic attacks if left
alone, and insomnia. Id. On February 3, 2008, Plaintiff failed to show for her
initial assessment and the Center “postpone[d] the decision regarding admission.”
(R. 320). Almost three months after the intake, on April 1, 2008,6 Plaintiff
returned to the Center and met with treating psychologist, Belynda Adams (“Dr.
Adams”), who evaluated Plaintiff and noted that Plaintiff reported that her current
medications “are not working for her” because she “hears voices that are command
in nature,” feels depressed, has insomnia and mood swings, and admits to misuse
of marijuana, ecstacy, Xanax, alcohol, and Tussinex. (R. 317). Dr. Adams
diagnosed Plaintiff with major depression with psychotic features, alcohol abuse,
personality disorder, epilepsy, assessed Plaintiff’s GAF score as 50, prescribed
Plaintiff Celexa, Seroquel,7 and Trileptal,8 and rescheduled Plaintiff for a follow
up visit in two months. (R. 316-17).
On March 20, 2008, Plaintiff was thirty minutes late for her initial psychiatric
assessment, which was rescheduled for April 1, 2008. (R. 319).
Seroquel is used to treat symptoms of schizophrenia.
Trileptal is used to treat seizures and Dr. Adams instructed Plaintiff to “pursue [a]
prompt appointment with a neurologist to manage Trileptal.” (R. 316).
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Dr. Adams noted that Plaintiff improved in subsequent visits. On May 29,
2008, Dr. Adams evaluated Plaintiff and noted that she “states that she has been
taking two Celexa and voices and depression have improved.” (R. 314). Four
months later, on September 8, 2008, Plaintiff stated that “she has been doing well
other than not sleeping.” (R. 312). However, on Plaintiff’s next visit on January
6, 2009, Plaintiff reported that she was depressed, had recently ended a
relationship, and “started drinking approximately one six pack of beer each day.”
(R. 311). Dr. Adams denied Plaintiff’s request for Xanax, and scheduled Plaintiff
to return in one week. Significantly, when Plaintiff returned on January 12, 2009,
Dr. Adams noted
[Plaintiff] is most capable of working if she address[es] substance
abuse issue and followed treatment recommendation. She will not
follow treatment plan so therefore will not complete hardship forms
in her favor.
Plaintiff last visited the Center on March 3, 2009, when she called in for
medication. (R. 309). Finally, as it relates to the Center, on March 16, 2009, a
Center psychiatrist or psychologist completed a psychological evaluation and
noted that although Plaintiff had moderate restrictions in most categories, the
restrictions would not apply absent Plaintiff’s alcohol abuse and that the duration
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of the limitations was “unknown, would need to evaluate when [Plaintiff was ] not
misusing [alcohol].” (R. 325).
The next month, UAB admitted Plaintiff from April 18, 2009, through April
22, 2009, where she presented with “worsening depression with suicidal and
homicidal ideation” and non-compliance with her medications due to her
pregnancy,9 and was assessed with a GAF score of 45. (R. 339, 354). During the
hospitalization, UAB diagnosed and treated Plaintiff for depression, marijuana
abuse, borderline personality disorder, and epilepsy. (R. 339). UAB discharged
Plaintiff with a GAF score of 50. Id.
Based on its review of Plaintiff’s medical history, the court finds that
Plaintiff’s GAF scores are consistent with the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff
has a RFC to perform a full range of work with nonexertional limitations. Rather
than support Plaintiff’s contention that she is disabled, the record before the court
demonstrates an increase of Plaintiff’s GAF score when Plaintiff is compliant with
her medications and refrains from alcohol and drug abuse. Importantly, Dr.
Adams, who treated Plaintiff from April 2008 until March 2009, opined that
Plaintiff was capable of working if she remained compliant with her treatment
During Plaintiff’s hospitalization, she was found to have a molar pregnancy and
underwent a D&C. (R. 349).
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regimen. In short, Plaintiff obtained her lower GAF scores while she was abusing
drugs and alcohol and noncompliant with her medications. As such, the evidence
is insufficient to show that the ALJ erred in assigning her RFC.
The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s mental limitations in determining her
Plaintiff contends next that the ALJ failed to properly include in the RFC
determination Plaintiff’s mental limitations. In other words, Plaintiff asserts that
the ALJ did not account for Plaintiff’s moderate limitations in activities of daily
living, social functioning, and maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace.
Doc. 7 at 8. This argument is unpersuasive.
First, the ALJ’s opinion clearly states that she considered Plaintiff’s nonexertional limitations when she determined Plaintiff’s RFC. As the ALJ properly
noted, consultative physician, Dr. Thomas Boll (“Dr. Boll) evaluated Plaintiff on
September 16, 2008. Dr. Boll administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
Third Edition (“WAIS-III”), and Plaintiff scored 71, 80, and 74 on the verbal,
performance, and full scale portions, respectively, placing Plaintiff in the
borderline range of intellectual functioning. (R. 269). Dr. Boll noted that
Plaintiff’s thought processes were “normal,” her insight was “adequate,” and that
she was “able to make adequate work decisions and manage her own funds.” Id.
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Dr. Boll noted that Plaintiff’s daily activities included rising at 6:45a.m. to eat
breakfast, getting dressed, and attending class five days a week. (R. 270).
Significantly, Dr. Boll noted that Plaintiff “is able to function fully independently.
She is able to carry out, understand, and remember instructions and respond
appropriately to supervisors and co-workers and deal with work pressures in a
work setting.” Id.
The ALJ also considered the opinion of consulting physician, Dr. Dan
Lowery (“Dr. Lowery”), who examined Plaintiff on May 8, 2009, and observed
that Plaintiff “demonstrated that she has average interpersonal skills,” that her
affect was “blunted,” and her mood was “mildly to moderately depressed.” (R.
332). Dr. Lowery opined that Plaintiff’s “concentration and attention were likely
impaired,” evidenced by her inability to count backwards by three and the ensuing
agitation from having to concentrate. Id. Further, Dr. Lowery found that Plaintiff
had average insight related to her condition, fair judgment, and that her immediate
memory was “within normal limits,” and her recent and remote memories were
normal. Id. Dr. Lowery diagnosed Plaintiff with major depressive disorder,
recurrent, severe, with psychotic features, alcohol abuse (history), cannabis abuse
(history), borderline personality disorder suspected, seizures, occupational
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problems, and assessed her GAF score as 55. (R. 333).10 Significantly, the ALJ
held that after “considering all the evidence,” including consulting psychologists
Dr. Boll and Dr. Lowery, and treating source, Dr. Adams, Plaintiff has “no more
than a mild to moderate mental impairment.” (R. 17).
In addition to Drs. Boll, Lowery, and Adams, the ALJ also considered
Plaintiff’s activities of daily living. Specifically, the ALJ stated that Plaintiff’s
reports of her daily activities and functional limitations were inconsistent “with the
overall objective evidence” because, contrary to Plaintiff’s reports, she attended
school five days per week, and maintained good grades (as reported to Drs. Boll
and Lowery), and “employment on a sustained basis.” (R. 17). Indeed, Plaintiff’s
work history indicates that Plaintiff’s mental limitations do not prevent her from
sustaining employment. In fact, Plaintiff testified that she did not return to her job
at Sam’s Club due to the risk of “falling down again and having another seizure,”
(R. 47), as opposed to any mental or social limitations. In other words, the ALJ
thoroughly considered Plaintiff’s mental limitations and the ALJ’s assessment of
Plaintiff’s RFC is supported by substantial evidence.
The ALJ considered also Plaintiff’s records from the Center, which are discussed supra
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The ALJ’s failure to assign weight to consulting and reviewing
physicians, including Dr. Lowery, is not reversible error.
Plaintiff contends also that the ALJ erred by failing to assign weight to the
consulting and treating medical sources, including Dr. Lowery. Doc. 7 at 8-9.
Unfortunately for Plaintiff, this contention is unavailing. Plaintiff is correct that in
“assessing the medical evidence . . ., the ALJ [is] required to state with
particularity the weight [given] the different medical opinions and the reasons
therefor.” Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 279 (11th Cir. 1987) (citation
omitted). Generally, the ALJ gives more weight to opinions that are more
consistent with the record as a whole. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(4).
The ALJ discussed thoroughly the opinions of consulting physicians Drs.
Boll and Lowery, and treating source, Dr. Adams, and determined that
Plaintiff’s testimony is not consistent with the medical evidence or
with the opinions of the treating and consulting sources. . . . The
extent of [Plaintiff’s] mental impairments impact on her ability to
work has been assessed by two consulting psychologists and by [Dr.
Adams] at the Western Mental Health Center. Dr. Boll concluded
that [Plaintiff] had no restrictions in her ability to perform in both
social and work setting[s]. Dr. Lowery estimated moderate to marked
impairment interacting with supervisors and coworkers. [Dr. Adams]
opined mild to moderate impairment in her ability to function in both
a social and a work setting. Considering all the evidence, [Plaintiff]
has no more than a mild to moderate mental impairment.
(R. 17). Consistent with the regulations and implicit in this finding, the ALJ gave
controlling weight to the treating source, Dr. Adams, and consulting physician, Dr.
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Boll, because their opinions were consistent with the record as a whole. See 20
C.F.R. 404.1527(d)(2) and (4). Alternatively, although the ALJ failed to state
specifically the weight she assigned to these sources, the error is harmless and
does not require a remand to reconsider the evidence. As discussed supra at
V.A.1. and 2., the ALJ’s opinion is supported by substantial evidence.
The ALJ’s failure to attach an exhibit list is not reversible error.
Plaintiff argues next that the ALJ failed to attach an exhibit list to her
decision, as required by HALLEX11 I-2-I-20 and I-2-1-93.12 This argument is
unpersuasive. HALLEX Chapter I-2-1-20 applies to Prehearing Analysis and
Case Workup and provides that when the ALJ issues an unfavorable decision, an
“exhibit list must be prepared in final form and placed in the claim file” such that
additional evidence received after the hearing is marked “with the next exhibit
number” under the heading “RECEIVED SUBSEQUENT TO HEARING.”
(Emphasis added). Therefore, the ALJ was not required to attach the exhibit list to
her decision. Instead, the claim file contains the exhibit list on the second and
third pages.13 Plaintiff’s additional medical evidence, dated April 18, 2009,
HALLEX is the SSA’s Office of Disability Adjudication and Review Hearings, Appeals
and Litigation Law Manual. HALLEX I-2-1-93 is a sample Exhibit list.
The exhibit list does not have a record page number.
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through April 22, 2009, from UAB Hospital is the last exhibit and is designated as
Exhibit F on pages 335-381. Although the additional evidence is not marked
“received subsequent to the hearing,” the court finds that the failure to label it is
not reversible error and has no impact whatsoever on the substantive analysis of
Plaintiff’s disability claim.
There is no evidence that the Appeals Council did not properly consider
Plaintiff’s additional medical evidence.
Finally, Plaintiff argues and that the Appeals Council failed to consider the
additional evidence she submitted with her brief because the Appeals Council
placed the evidence in a separate place in the record from the brief. Doc. 7 at 10.
The Appeals Council’s December 1, 2010, order noted that it “received additional
evidence [Plaintiff’s Representative Brief, dated October 1, 2009] which it is
making part of the record,” and marked it Exhibit 8E. (R. 5); see also R. 119-121.
However, the medical evidence Plaintiff attached to the brief is filed separately in
the record as Exhibit 13F, (R. 335-381), which is the basis for Plaintiff’s
contention that the Appeals Council failed to consider the evidence. The court
simply cannot conclude solely on this basis that the Appeals Council failed to
consider this medical evidence, especially since it stated unequivocally that it
“considered the reasons [Plaintiff] disagree[d] with the decision and the additional
evidence listed on the enclosed Order of Appeals Council.” (R. 1) (emphasis
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added). Moreover, the court declines to speculate that because the medical records
are separated from the brief that the Appeals Council failed to consider this
evidence because, as discussed in section V.B., the Commissioner followed
HALLEX I-2-1-20 by marking the additional evidence received after the hearing
“with the next exhibit number.” Therefore, Plaintiff’s point on this issue ignores
the relevant procedures of the SSA and instead relies on impermissible speculation
and conjecture. Significantly, Plaintiff’s contention is undermined by the fact that
the additional medical evidence is, in fact, a part of the record, which, of course,
belies her contention that the Appeals Council failed to consider it. Moreover, any
purported failure by the Appeals Council to review the additional medical records
is harmless because, as this court outlined in the court’s summary of the medical
records, supra at V.A.1 and 2, the records show that Plaintiff’s impairments are
controlled when she is compliant with her medications and abstains from alcohol
and drug use. In other words, the additional records Plaintiff submitted support
the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff does not have a qualifying disability. Therefore,
remand is not warranted.
Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the ALJ’s determination
that Plaintiff is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence, and that the ALJ
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applied proper legal standards in reaching this determination. Therefore, the
Commissioner’s final decision is AFFIRMED. A separate order in accordance
with the memorandum of decision will be entered.
Done the 24th day of April, 2012.
ABDUL K. KALLON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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