Wallace v. Holder

Filing 47

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART and DENYING IN PART 42 MOTION for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Virginia Emerson Hopkins on 5/10/2013. (JLC)

FILED
2013 May-10 PM 05:17
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JESSICA LEE WALLACE,
Plaintiff,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., in his
Official Capacity as Attorney
General of the United States
Department of Justice, (Federal
Bureau of Investigation), Agency,
Defendant.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Jessica Lee Wallace (“Ms. Wallace”) initiated this job discrimination

case arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against Defendant Eric
H. Holder, Jr., in his official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice (the “Attorney General”), on July 29, 2011. (Doc. 1). The
lawsuit stems from Ms. Wallace’s efforts to become employed with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (the “FBI”).
Ms. Wallace filed an amended complaint (Doc. 28) on March 12, 2012. Ms.
Wallace’s amended complaint contains five counts: one for sex discrimination and

the remaining four for retaliation. See generally id.
Pending before the court is the Attorney General’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 42) (the “Motion”) filed on October 12, 2012. The parties have
briefed the Motion (Docs. 43-46), and it is now under submission. For the reasons
explained below, the Motion is GRANTED as to counts one and five of Ms.
amended complaint and is otherwise DENIED.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
During 2007-2009, Ms. Wallace was a female applicant in Birmingham,

Alabama, for a special agent position (“SA”) with the FBI. AF No. 1.2 In order to be

Keeping in mind that when deciding a motion for summary judgment the
court must view the evidence and all factual inferences in the light most favorable to
the party opposing the motion, the court provides the following statement of facts.
See Optimum Techs., Inc. v. Henkel Consumer Adhesives, Inc., 496 F.3d 1231, 1241
(11th Cir. 2007) (observing that, in connection with summary judgment, a court must
review all facts and inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party).
This statement does not represent actual findings of fact. See In re Celotex Corp.,
487 F.3d 1320, 1328 (11th Cir. 2007). Instead, the court has provided this statement
simply to place the court’s legal analysis in the context of this particular case or
controversy.
1

The designation “AF” stands for admitted fact and indicates a fact offered by
the Attorney General that Ms. Wallace has admitted in her written submissions on
summary judgment or by virtue of any other evidence offered in support of her case.
Whenever Ms. Wallace has adequately disputed a fact offered by the Attorney
General, the court has accepted Ms. Wallace’s version. The court’s numbering of
admitted facts (e.g., AF No. 1) corresponds to the numbering of the Attorney
General’s statement of facts as set forth in Doc. 43 and responded to by Ms. Wallace
in Doc. 45. A number following a decimal point corresponds to the particular
2

2

hired as an FBI SA, applicants must pass a physical fitness test (“PFT”). AF No. 2.
There is a specific protocol for each of the four events in the PFT–sit-ups,
push-ups, a 300 meter sprint, and a 1.5 mile run. AF No. 3. Applicants receive a
score for the PFT derived from a rating scale which assigns points based on the
number of sit-ups and push-ups an applicant performs correctly, along with the times
the applicant completes the 300 meter sprint and the 1.5 mile run. AF No. 4.1. Those
points and the final score are shown on the applicant’s PFT report which is completed
by the employee who is administering the testing and signed by the applicant at the
close of the PFT. AF No. 4.2. As indicated on the PFT report, an applicant must
receive a minimum score of 12 points to pass the PFT. AF No. 5.
Between July 2007 and March 2009, Ms. Wallace took four PFTs –July 17,
2007; July 17, 2008; November 14, 2008; and March 16, 2009, respectively. AF No.
6. Ms. Wallace took her first PFT, administered by FBI Special Agent Harold Keeler,
on July 17, 2007. AF No. 7. Ms. Wallace has admitted that the reason she failed the
first PFT was because she was “not physically ready”and testified at her deposition
that she does not maintain she was discriminated against during that PFT. AF No. 7.

sentence within the numbered statement of facts. For example, (AF No. 4.2) would
indicate the second sentence of paragraph 4 of the Attorney General’s statement of
facts is the subject of the court’s citation to the record. Other facts referenced by the
parties that require further clarification are dealt with later in the court’s opinion.
3

Ms. Wallace took the second PFT, this time administered by Brad Snider (“SA
Snider”), exactly one year later on July 17, 2008. AF No. 9. Ms. Wallace admitted
that the reason she failed the second PFT was because of a “lingering hip injury” and
testified during her deposition that she does not claim she was discriminated against
during that second PFT. AF No. 10.
Ms. Wallace took the third PFT, again administered by SA Snider, on
November 14, 2008, and did not pass that PFT either. AF No. 11. During this third
PFT, Ms. Wallace complained to SA Snider that he did not use the proper protocol
during that PFT because he made her start her push-ups from the down, rather than
up, position. AF No. 12.
After Ms. Wallace complained to SA Snider that starting the push-ups in the
down position was not in the FBI’s protocol, he agreed to void the November 14,
2008, PFT and allowed her to re-take that PFT the following Friday. AF No. 16.
Ms. Wallace does not allege in her complaint that she was discriminated against
during the November 14, 2008, PFT. AF No. 18.
Due to a recurrence of mononucleosis, Ms. Wallace was unable to take the
re-test PFT the following Friday and was not released by her doctor to take the re-test
until March 9, 2009. AF No. 17. Ms. Wallace took the fourth PFT (the re-test of the
November 14, 2008, PFT) on March 16, 2009, and this PFT test forms the basis of
4

her claim of gender discrimination against the FBI. AF No. 19.
SA Snider administered the March 16, 2009, PFT to two persons – Ms. Wallace
and a male applicant. AF No. 20. A minimum overall score of 12 points is required
to pass the PFT. (Doc. 44-15 at 2-3 ¶ 4). Both Ms. Wallace and the male applicant
did not pass the March 16, 2009, PFT. AF No. 22.
While Ms. Wallace’s overall score of 11 was higher than the male applicant’s
total of 10 points and her assigned points in the area of push-ups was higher too (2
for her versus 1for him), SA Snider credited her with fewer completed push-ups (19)
than the male applicant (30). (Compare Doc. 44-2 at 18, with Doc. 44-15 at 7). Ms.
Wallace maintains that she did not pass this fourth test due to improper scoring by SA
Snider in the area of push-ups specifically. (Doc. 45 at 4 ¶ 22).
Ms. Wallace further complains that during the March 16, 2009, PFT, SA Snider
spoke condescendingly to her when, as the male applicant was about to begin his
sit-ups, SA Snider asked her if she was “okay with holding the male applicant’s feet
and wanted to make sure that she was strong enough because he did not want [Ms.
Wallace] to hurt the rest of [her] score.” AF No. 24.
During his deposition, SA Snider explained his reasoning for asking Ms.
Wallace this question:
You know, as a matter of routine when we were giving these applicant
5

tests, you know, just during the course of the conversation we would ask
the applicant, you know, who has been, you know, holding your feet,
you know, during testing. You know, it may be their wife, it may be,
you know, their–you know, a buddy of theirs or whatever, and what it
comes down to is the physical end, this portion, sit-up portion of the
physical fitness test is a counterbalance issue, so if you have an
individual that weighs two hundred and thirty pounds, there’s no way
that sit-ups is going to be able to be done in accordance with FBI
protocol.
The protocol requires the individual that’s holding the feet of the
applicant that’s conducting the test to place their knees–or they can do
it this way, you can’t do anything more than this. Place their knees on
the applicant conducting the test toes, the palms of their hands across the
laces , and then the applicant is able to begin doing the sit-ups.
So, the question, you know, posed to Jessica, and this based off,
you know, the routine that we practiced time and time again in testing
these applicants was directed to the individual doing the sit-ups, you
know, are you comfortable with her holding your feet, are you
comfortable and, Jessica, are you comfortable holding this individual’s
feet.
And the reason the females are asked that question is, you’re
placed in a precarious position, I mean, you’re holding, you know, the
feet of a male applicant looking at the groin area of the male. So that’s
the question posed to both of the individuals.
(Doc. 44-5 at 12 at 36-38 at lines 17-23, 1-23, 1-15). In response to a follow-up
question, SA Snider testified:
Q.

It just strictly had to do with counterbalancing and looking at a
groin area?

A.

That’s correct. Very rarely do we have females and males taking
a test at the same time. You know, the others–you know, I guess
6

three occasions that we had females out there, we either would
have another female agent or the females hold each other’s feet.
So, that’s the issue.
(Id. at 39 at lines 7-17).
Ms. Wallace also maintains that during the March 16, 2009, PFT, SA Snider
did not use proper protocol in instructing her on her push-ups because he told her that
“she needed to look forward with [her] head” rather than looking down. (AF No. 26).
SA Snider gave Ms. Wallace this advice because at the time of the March 2009 PFT,
he was aware from the previous PFT which he administered (and subsequently
voided) that Ms. Wallace’s weakest area was push-ups. AF No. 27.3
Although Ms. Wallace questions the validity of SA Snider’s explanation for
instructing her in this manner,4 he has stated that his reasoning for doing this was so

The court notes that Ms. Wallace attempts unsuccessfully to dispute this fact.
(Doc. 45 at 4 ¶ 27). However, noticeably absent from this factual challenge is any
citation to proof. Moreover, Ms. Wallace’s own deposition testimony and earlier
sworn statement undisputedly establish that SA Snider was her testing administrator
on November 14, 2008, and that she completed and complained about his
administering of the push-up portion of that examination. (Doc. 44-1 at 10 at 33 at
lines 20-24; id. at 11 at 34 at lines 8-9 (“I went into the push-up part of the test and
Brad Snider said that I needed to lay flat on the ground . . . .”)); (see also Doc. 44-2
at 8 (“On November 14, 2008, I retested with Snider.”)).
3

Ms. Wallace suggests in her factual opposition that “[S.A.] Snider’s
explanation is in direct contradiction with proper FBI protocol for push-ups.” (Doc.
45 at 3 ¶ 14). For evidentiary support, Ms. Wallace cites to page 7 of SA
Ellingwood’s “Report of Counseling” (the “Report”). In her Report, SA Ellingwood
states that “[Ms.] Wallace believes that she was subjected to a different and more
4

7

that Ms. Wallace would more likely lower her body to the necessary level to be
successfully credited with completing the push-up. (AF No. 29); (Doc. 44-6 at 4-5).
Ms. Wallace did not complain directly to SA Snider about any protocol issue during
the March 16, 2009 PFT. AF No. 32.
After completing the PFT on March 16, 2009, Ms. Wallace signed the report
which indicated that she had completed 19 push-ups5 and, also reflected, in a
handwritten note, that her “conditional offer of employment has been verbally
rescinded due to [her] failure of [the] 3rd PFT.” (Doc. 44-2 at 18). While Ms.
Wallace recalls signing the report, she testified that when she did so, she believed that

difficult push-up protocol” and that “[Ms.] Wallace believes that . . . this same tester’s
more difficult standards resulted in the disqualification of six of her push-ups,
causing her to fail the APFT by one point.” (Doc. 44-2 at 26 (emphasis added)).
Nowhere within her Report does SA Ellingwood affirmatively conclude that SA
Snider unfairly administered the push-up portion of the PFT to Ms. Wallace.
Ms. Wallace has indicated that she questions the report’s accuracy in
reflecting only 19 push-ups because she has never seen the original (Doc. 45 at 4 ¶
23), and “when [she] signed the sheet, [she] thought it had 25 written on it.” (Doc.
44-1 at 14 at 48 at lines 24-25). The Attorney General responds that Ms. Wallace
never asked to see the original of this document during the discovery process (Doc.
46 at 6) and further that Ms. Wallace’s March 31, 2009, correspondence to AD
Raucci confirms that SA Snider only gave her credit for completing 19 acceptable
push-ups. (See Doc. 44-4 at 3 (“At push up number twenty-five, Agent Snider told
me that he was only counting nineteen. I was frustrated.”)). Ms. Wallace’s earlier
deposition testimony further confirms that SA Snider told her that he was only giving
her credit for 19 push-ups. (See Doc. 44-1 at 14 at 46 at lines 15-18 (“And Snider
stood over me the entire time yelling at me, telling me that he wasn’t counting any of
these push-ups. And that all he was counting was 19.”)).
5

8

the number of push-ups she completed was actually 25. (Doc. 44-1 at 14 at 48 at line
25).
Although SA Snider is not a certified PFT administrator, he has indicated that
he followed the same process for all applicants, male and female. AF No. 34. SA
Snider also has explained that he was trained by the FBI Division’s PFT Coordinator,
SA Harold Keeler (“SA Keeler”), regarding the process and protocols of the PFT so
that he could act as SA Keeler’s back-up test administrator while he was in Iraq.
(Doc. 44-6 at 3).
On March 18, 2009, Ms. Wallace met with Administrative Specialist
Sherolynne Coachman (“AS Coachman”) and another FBI employee, Raymond
Zicarelli (“SA Zicarelli”), and complained to them about the protocol used by SA
Snider while administering the March 16, 2009, PFT. AF No. 40. During that March
18, 2009 meeting, AS Coachman suggested to Ms. Wallace that she send an appeal
letter to the Assistant Director of the FBI headquarters, John Raucci (“AD Raucci”),
concerning the March 16, 2009, PFT. AF No. 41.
In response to AS Coachman’s suggestion, Ms. Wallace sent a letter dated
March 31, 2009, to AD Raucci complaining about the protocol SA Snider used during
the November 2008 and March 2009 PFTs; alleging that SA Snider had retaliated
against her because she had complained to him about his protocol; and alleging that
9

SA Snider had treated her differently than male applicants. AF No. 42.1. In that
letter she requested that she be certified as passing the PFT or, alternatively, be given
a chance to retake the PFT in the Mobile, Alabama field office. AF No. 42.2.
Ms. Wallace also initiated contact with EEO counselor and SA Rebecca
Ellingwood (“SA Ellingwood”) on March 27, 2009. AF No. 43; (Doc. 44-1 at 32).
On April 17, 2009, Ms. Wallace filed a formal EEO complaint alleging gender
discrimination and retaliation by SA Snider. AF No. 44.1. In the section of that
administrative complaint which asked Ms. Wallace to explain how she had been
discriminated against, Ms. Wallace referred the FBI to her March 31, 2009,
correspondence to FBI AD Raucci. AF No. 44.2; (Doc. 44-1 at 35).
In a letter dated May 26, 2009, Ms. Wallace was advised that her retaliation
claim against SA Snider was being rejected since that claim did not appear to be
based on protected EEO activity. AF No. 45. Ms. Wallace agreed with the decision
to reject the retaliation claim against SA Snider. In her pending complaint, Ms.
Wallace does not allege any retaliatory conduct on the part of SA Snider.
Ms. Wallace was verbally advised by SA Ellingwood on May 4, 2009, and then
again by letter from FBI Headquarters dated May 28, 2009, that she would be allowed
to retake the PFT at the Mobile, Alabama, field office before a certified PFT
administrator as Ms. Wallace had requested in her appeal letter to FBI AD Raucci and
10

in her administrative EEO complaint. AF No. 48. On June 10, 2009, Ms. Wallace
was contacted by SA Ruth Krona (“SA Krona”) of the FBI’s Mobile field office to
schedule a date for Ms. Wallace to re-take the PFT. AF No. 49.
In response to that June 10, 2009, contact, Ms. Wallace advised SA Krona that
she had been on medication that restricted her from running and, as a result, her
re-test would need to be delayed. AF No. 50. On June 23, 2009, Ms. Wallace sent
AS Coachman an email advising that she had been diagnosed with mononucleosis.
AF No. 51.
On July 1, 2009, Ms. Wallace sent AS Coachman a second email advising that
she was still awaiting a medical release from her physician and indicated she might
need time to get her strength back before taking the offered PFT. AF No. 52. On
July 9, 2009, Ms. Wallace sent AS Coachman a third email advising that she
remained under her doctor’s care and that she was seeking a new physician. AF No.
53.1. In that email, Ms. Wallace also asked AS Coachman if she needed a medical
release signed by her current physician. AF No. 53.2.
On July 10, 2009, AS Coachman replied via email to Ms. Wallace and advised
her that she would be required to provide a medical release from her doctor certifying
that she is in good health to take the PFT. AF No. 54.1. Ms. Wallace then responded
stating “Great. Basically I can have any physician I see complete the form. Thanks!
11

…” AF No. 54.2.
On September 30, 2009, Ms. Wallace sent AS Coachman an email advising that
she had been diagnosed with Sjogren’s syndrome and fibromyalgia and advising that
she “would like to redo the PFT with the female agent from Mobile in about 6-8
weeks.” AF No. 55.1. Ms. Wallace also asked AS Coachman “[w]hat do you need
from me as far as medical information goes.” AF No. 55.2.
On November 13, 2009, Ms. Wallace sent AS Coachman an email stating “I’d
like to retake the [PFT] in the next couple of months. I have a doctor’s appointment
in early December and I could probably get released medically at that point. What
do I need to do in order to test again? Do I need to get all of my doctor’s records or
do I just need to get some kind of note from the doctor that has been treating me (the
Rheumatologist)? Please let me know.” AF No. 56.
On November 23, 2009, AS Coachman emailed Ms. Wallace stating “Jessica
I forward [sic] to you earlier today the form the doctor need [sic] to sign. He just
need [sic] to certify that you are in good condition to take the PFT. You will be
scheduled for a pre-employment physical examination once you pass the PFT and
polygraph….” AF No. 57. On November 23, 2009, Ms. Wallace responded to the
above email stating “Great. Thanks. I will be in contact with you after my
appointment.” AF No. 58.
12

At some point during this time period, Ms. Wallace contacted SA Ellingwood
and communicated that she wanted to file an EEO complaint on AS Coachman for
failing to contact her regarding PFT retakes. (Doc. 44-1 at 18 at 65 at lines 16-24).
Even though Ms. Wallace has not alleged retaliation by AS Coachman in her
amended complaint, AS Coachman has submitted her declaration explaining that the
delay in responding to Ms. Wallace’s emails was because AS Coachman was waiting
on a reply from FBI headquarters to her inquiry as to how long the offer to allow Ms.
Wallace to be retested would stay open. AF No. 61.
Ms. Wallace testified that SA Ellingwood did not ever respond to her request
for a separate EEO complaint to be filed against AS Coachman and SA Zicarelli.
(Doc. 44-1 at 22 at 78 at lines 20-23; id. at 23 at 82 at lines 20-23; id. at 83 at lines
5-9 ). SA Ellingwood also “told [Ms. Wallace] that by filing an EEO initially [she]
would more than likely be labeled a troublemaker.” (Id. at 22 at 79-80 at lines 25-25,
1). Additionally, SA Ellingwood tried to persuade Ms. Wallace “several times . . . to
drop [her] case.” (Doc. 44-1 at 22 at 80 at lines 2-3). Dissatisfied with the handling
of her situation, Ms. Wallace indicated at her deposition that sometime between
November 23, 2009, and December 2009, she decided she did not want to work for
the FBI. AF No. 60.
SA Ellingwood and EEO Investigator and Supervisory Special Agent Gary
13

Ludwick (“SSA Ludwick”) have each submitted declarations concerning the
allegations made against them in counts two through five of Ms. Wallace’s amended
complaint. AF No. 62. Concerning count two of Ms. Wallace’s complaint, SA
Ellingwood states that, although she does not recall advising Ms. Wallace that she
might be labeled a troublemaker, she does recall informing Ms. Wallace that she
might want to extend the counseling period before proceeding forward with her EEO
complaint to see if FBI headquarters agreed to the relief Ms. Wallace had requested
in her March 30, 2009, letter to FBI AD Raucci. AF No. 63.1. When Ms. Wallace
advised SA Ellingwood that she wanted to proceed with the EEO complaint, SA
Ellingwood immediately provided Ms. Wallace with all the necessary EEO forms.
AF No. 63.2.
III.

STANDARDS
A.

Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R . Civ. P.
56(c). All reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved
in favor of the nonmovant. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th
Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
14

242, 248 (1986). “Once the moving party has properly supported its motion for
summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to ‘come forward with
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” International Stamp
Art, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Service, 456 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)).
B.

Employment Discrimination Generally

A plaintiff in an employment discrimination case maintains the ultimate burden
of proving that the adverse employment decision was made because of intentional
discrimination. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133
(2000); St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509-12 (1993); Nix v. WLCY
Radio/Rahall Comms., 738 F.2d 1181, 1184 (11th Cir. 1984). Although the Supreme
Court previously established the basic allocation of burdens and order of proof in a
disparate treatment case, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973);
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Desert Palace v.
Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003), that allocation scheme applies only in cases in which there
is no direct evidence of discrimination. Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 821 F.2d
590, 595 (11th Cir. 1987).6
As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, “only the most blatant remarks, whose
intent could be nothing other than to discriminate on the basis of [sex or retaliation],
. . . constitute direct evidence of discrimination.” Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d
6

15

Under the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine scheme, a plaintiff first has the burden
of proving by a preponderance of evidence a prima facie case of discrimination.
Second, once the plaintiff proves a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts
to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
employment decision. Finally, if the defendant carries its burden, the plaintiff must
either prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered
by the defendant are merely a pretext for discrimination or present sufficient
evidence, of any type, for a reasonable jury to conclude that discrimination was a
“motivating factor” for the employment action, even though the defendant’s
legitimate reason may also be true or have played some role in the decision.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-05; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-54; Desert Palace,
539 U.S. at 101-02.
IV.

ANALYSIS
A.

Title VII Sex Discrimination

Ms. Wallace’s sex discrimination claim centers upon SA Snider’s
administering of her PFT on March 16, 2009, in connection with her application to

578, 782 (11th Cir. 1989) (footnote omitted). Based upon this standard, Ms.
Wallace’s case is presented to the court as purely a circumstantial evidence one. (See
Doc. 45 at 9 (citing to McDonnell Douglas as well as other circumstantial evidence
employment decisions)).
16

become a SA with the FBI. (Doc. 28 at 6 ¶ 45). More specifically, Ms. Wallace
alleges that the reason she failed the PFT is because SA Snider was “unqualified” to
perform the testing, “had a track record of not passing female applicants[,]” and
“unfairly deducted six push-ups [in calculating the results of her] test” (Id. ¶¶ 46, 47).
In his Motion, the Attorney General contends that Ms. Wallace lacks evidence
to establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination. (Doc. 43 at 22-23).7
Alternatively, the Attorney General maintains that Ms. Wallace cannot demonstrate
pretext. (Id. at 23-25). The court addresses the merits of each ground below.
1.

Prima Facie Case

To establish a claim for gender discrimination under Title VII based on
circumstantial evidence, Ms. Wallace must prima facially show that:
(1) [s]he is a member of a protected class; (2) [s]he was qualified for the
position; (3) [s]he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) [s]he
was replaced by a person outside his protected class or was treated less
favorably than a similarly-situated individual outside h[er] protected
class.
Maynard v. Bd. of Regents, 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003). The Attorney
General only challenges Ms. Wallace’s ability to establish the last element. As the
Attorney General argues, Ms. Wallace’s gender claim fails because “she cannot show

The page references for documents 43, 44-1, 44-2, 44-5, 44-6, 44-14, 44-15,
44-16, and 46 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering system.
7

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that Snider treated male employees more favorably.” (Doc. 42 at 22).
In the argument section of her opposition brief, Ms. Wallace does not dispute
the Attorney General’s prima facie position on count one in any appreciable manner
and has essentially abandoned this issue. (See generally Doc. 45 at 11-22 (discussing
only Ms. Wallace’s ongoing protected Title VII activity relating to her retaliation
claims and asserting violations of EEO confidentiality as an unlawful employment
practice)); see, e.g., Coalition for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of
Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1326 (11th Cir. 2000) (“The appellants’ failure to brief and
argue this issue during the proceedings before the district court is grounds for finding
that the issue has been abandoned.” (citing Fehlhaber v. Fehlhaber, 681 F.2d 1015,
1030 (5th Cir. 1982))); Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir.
2001) (“[S]ince Wilkerson did not raise this issue until her supplemental reply brief,
we deem it abandoned, and the district court's grant of summary judgment on this
claim is consequently affirmed.” (citing McGinnis v. Ingram Equip. Co., 918 F.2d
1491, 1496 (11th Cir. 1990) (en banc))); Bute v. Schuller International, Inc., 998 F.
Supp. 1473, 1477 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (“Because plaintiff[, in opposing summary
judgment,] has failed to respond to this argument or otherwise address this claim, the
Court deems it abandoned.”).
Pointing solely to SA Snider’s lack of formal PFT credentialing and her
18

uncorroborated perception that SA Snider overlooked sloppiness on the part of the
male applicant’s efforts during the testing (Doc. 44-1 at 13 at 45 at line 21-25; Doc.
44-1 at 14 at 46-47 at lines 21-25, 1-3),8 Ms. Wallace offers no appreciable proof that
SA Snider’s final scoring of her during the March 2009 PFT was less favorable than
that for the male applicant, who SA Snider also examined on that same day.
In fact, Ms. Wallace admits that the male applicant also did not pass the PFT.
(See Doc. 45 at 4 ¶ 22 (disputing only that Ms. Wallace “failed” her PFT and
suggesting instead that what occurred was “improper[] scor[ing]” on the part of SA
Snider)). Therefore, that particular male applicant is an unsuitable comparator
witness. Additionally, Ms. Wallace does not rely upon any examples of other male
prospective employees who purportedly received better treatment from SA Snider
than she did on the PFT.
Furthermore, Ms. Wallace has not cited to any other circumstantial evidence
that might satisfy this last element, such as a sexist comment made to Ms. Wallace by
SA Snider during the course of her testing9 or a statistically significant analysis of SA

8

Ms. Wallace’s breadth of experience with PFTs is limited to her role as a test

taker.
The court acknowledges that Ms. Wallace testified during her deposition that
upon finishing the PFT:
9

Brad Snider then was pretty condescending talking to me about
19

Snider’s overall scoring results for male versus female applicants, suggesting that SA
Snider may hold a gender-related bias. Cf. Burke-Fowler v. Orange County, 447 F.3d
1319, 1325 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Because she failed to establish valid comparators and
presented no other circumstantial evidence suggesting racial discrimination,
Burke-Fowler did not establish a prima facie case of race discrimination.” (citing
EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1286 (11th Cir. 2000)). Thus, the
court agrees with the Attorney General that Ms. Wallace’s prima facie case of sex
discrimination is lacking.
2.

Pretext

Alternatively, her gender discrimination claim fails due to Ms. Wallace’s
inability to demonstrate pretext. Regarding the results of Ms. Wallace’s PFT, as
articulated by SA Snider in his declaration:
I do not recall the number of push-ups that Wallace complete on
March 16, 2010. I do not remember if I credited Wallace with every
push-up she attempted during the test, or if I did not count some of the
push-ups attempted by Wallace due to an inability to complete the push-

how some people just aren’t made for the physical positions of the
Bureau and how maybe I needed to look at an agency that wasn’t as
physical as the Bureau or maybe I could do an analyst position, but
basically, he was just extremely condescending to me.
(Doc. 44-1 at 14 at 49 at lines 1-7). However, SA Snider’s general reference to “some
people” lacks any indicia of a specific bias against women.
20

up using proper protocol. I know that it is common for applicants, both
male and female to not be credited with all the sit-ups and/or push-ups
they attempt, based on the sit-ups and/or push-ups not being completed
using the proper protocol.
(Doc. 44-6 at 5).
As for advising Ms. Wallace about how she should alter her positioning when
doing push-ups, SA Snider has stated that he gave her this information because he
was aware of her previous difficulties with the push-ups component of the PFT and
he was trying to assist her in having more of them counted as completed ones.
Finally, with respect to questioning Ms. Wallace about whether she was strong
enough to hold the male applicant’s legs during the testing period, SA Snider has
explained that he routinely asks applicants if they are comfortable in maintaining such
a holding position if there is a potential counterbalance issue stemming from
significant weight differentials in the individuals being tested.
As the Eleventh Circuit has addressed the pretext prong in the context of an
alleged discriminatory discharge:
In any event, for purposes of the case before us, we need not
resolve the apparent conflict within this circuit on whether a fact
finder’s possible disbelief of the employer’s proffered reasons is
sufficient to defeat judgment for the defendant or whether a plaintiff
must show both that the employer’s reason for the decision was false
and that discrimination was the real reason, because Mayfield has failed
to produce any evidence that Patterson’s explanation is false or
unworthy of credence.
21

In this case, Mayfield had to produce evidence that Patterson’s
reasons for his discharge were a pretext for discrimination. A plaintiff
may prove pretext “either directly by persuading the court that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly
by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S. Ct. at 1095. “[B]ecause the
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing pretext [for discrimination], he
must present ‘significant probative’ evidence on the issue to avoid
summary judgment.” See Isenbergh v. Knight-Ridder Newspaper Sales,
Inc., 97 F.3d 436, 443-44 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Young v. General
Foods Corp., 840 F.2d 825, 829 (11th Cir. 1988)) (quoting Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510-11, 91
L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)). “Conclusory allegations of discrimination,
without more, are not sufficient to raise an inference of pretext or
intentional discrimination where [an employer] has offered . . . extensive
evidence of legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions.”
Isenbergh v. Knight-Ridder Newspaper Sales, Inc., 97 F.3d 436, 443-44
(11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Young v. General Foods Corp., 840 F.2d 825,
830 (11th Cir. 1988)) (quoting Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 821
F.2d 590, 597 (11th Cir. 1987)).
Mayfield v. Patterson Pump Co., 101 F.3d 1371, 1375-76 (11th Cir. 1996) (emphasis
added).
Ms. Wallace offers no significantly probative evidence to refute these
explanations provided by SA Snider. Instead, Ms. Wallace spends a considerable
amount of time disputing SA Snider’s qualifications to administer PFTs. However,
merely demonstrating improper or mistaken scoring by SA Snider due to a possible
lack of training and/or understanding, without more, is not the equivalent of
establishing gender-biased scoring. (See Doc. 46 at 2 (“Since Snider administered
PFTs to both male and female applicants without being certified, the fact that he was
22

not certified has no bearing on Plaintiff’s gender claim.”)).
Also, while Ms. Wallace claims to have taken offense when SA Snider asked
her if she was strong enough to handle holding the male applicant in position when
he was doing the sit-up portion of the PFT, the purpose behind this question has been
explained by SA Snider (i.e., the counterbalancing and awkward positioning
concerns) and, regardless, such an arguably gender-related inquiry, by itself, is
insufficient to establish pretext. Cf. Scott v. Suncoast Beverage Sales, Ltd., 295 F.3d
1223, 1229 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Although a comment unrelated to a termination may
contribute to a circumstantial case for pretext, it will usually not be sufficient absent
some additional evidence supporting a finding of pretext.”) (citation omitted)
(emphasis in original).
At best, Ms. Wallace offers only her personal impressions and beliefs about
SA Snider’s unfavorable scoring of her during the PFT in an effort to substantiate
pretext. Nevertheless, Ms. Wallace’s own opinions are legally superfluous as “[t]he
inquiry into pretext centers upon the employer’s beliefs, and not the employee’s own
perceptions of his performance.” Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1565 (11th Cir.
1997) (citing collection of appellate opinions from Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth
Circuits embracing this fundamental Title VII principle).
Regarding the triable nature of a discrimination claim, the Supreme Court has
23

clarified:
Thus, a plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence
to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the
trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.
This is not to say that such a showing by the plaintiff will always
be adequate to sustain a jury’s finding of liability. Certainly there will
be instances where, although the plaintiff has established a prima facie
case and set forth sufficient evidence to reject the defendant’s
explanation, no rational factfinder could conclude that the action was
discriminatory. For instance, an employer would be entitled to judgment
as a matter of law if the record conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer’s decision, or if the plaintiff
created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer’s reason
was untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent
evidence that no discrimination had occurred.
Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148 (emphasis in original).
Because Ms. Wallace lacks any suitable comparator evidence and relies upon,
at best, only weak issues of fact regarding pretext, the record, with respect to sex
discrimination, lacks “‘evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and
fairminded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different
conclusions.’” MacPherson v. University of Montevallo, 922 F.2d 766, 776 (11th Cir.
1991) (quoting Verbraeken v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 881 F.2d 1041, 1045 (11th
Cir. 1998)). Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED on both prima facie and pretext
grounds with respect to count one of Ms. Wallace’s amended complaint.

24

B.

Title VII Retaliation

The Attorney General’s Motion primarily asserts that Ms. Wallace cannot
establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Secondarily, the Attorney General
contends that Ms. Wallace cannot show pretext.
In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S. Ct.
2405, 165 L. Ed. 2d 345 (2006), the Supreme Court held regarding retaliation under
Title VII:
We conclude that the anti-retaliation provision does not confine
the actions and harms it forbids to those that are related to employment
or occur at the workplace. We also conclude that the provision covers
those (and only those) employer actions that would have been materially
adverse to a reasonable employee or job applicant. In the present
context that means that the employer’s actions must be harmful to the
point that they could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination.
Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 57, 126 S. Ct. at 2409. Prior case law in the
Eleventh Circuit limited the foundation of retaliation claims to treatment amounting
to adverse employment actions. Accordingly, the prima facie elements for retaliation
under Title VII pre-Burlington Northern were proof of: “(1) statutorily protected
expression; (2) . . . an adverse employment action; and (3) . . . a causal connection
between the two events.” Brochu v. City of Riviera Beach, 304 F.3d 1144, 1155 (11th
Cir. 2002).
The Eleventh Circuit has explained the impact of Burlington Northern on the
25

second prima facie element to a Title VII retaliation claim as:
[T]he Supreme Court has defined an adverse employment action in the
context of a retaliation claim as an action by an employer that is harmful
to the point that it could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making
or supporting a charge of discrimination.
Wallace v. Georgia Dept. of Transp., 212 Fed. App’x 799, 802 (11th Cir. 2006)
(citation omitted). Accordingly as reformulated post-Burlington Northern, “[t]o
establish a claim of retaliation under Title VII or section 1981, a plaintiff must prove
that he engaged in statutorily protected activity, he suffered a materially adverse
action, and there was some causal relation between the two events.” Butler v.
Alabama Dept. of Transp., 536 F.3d 1209, 1212-13 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261,
1277 (11th Cir. 2008)).
As this court has previously explained in this very lawsuit:
The court finds that the pressuring and repeated nature of these
alleged acts, which all arose subsequent to and directly out of Ms.
Wallace’s filing of her EEO Title VII complaint at the administrative
level and which were made by FBI personnel, falls squarely within the
material adversity standard of retaliatory actions that are “harmful to the
point that they could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington, 548 U.S. at 57, 126
S. Ct. at 2409. Under Burlington’s enlarged definition of Title VII
retaliation, Ms. Wallace no longer must identify an adverse
employment-related action taken by the FBI to support her claim as Title
VII’s “antiretaliation provision does not confine the actions and harms
it forbids to those that are related to employment or occur at the
workplace.”
26

(Doc. 27 at 18-19); see also Gaujacq v. EDF, Inc., 601 F.3d 565, 577 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (“In other words, the proscription against retaliation sweeps more broadly than
the proscription against gender discrimination.”).
As the Eleventh Circuit described protected activity in E.E.O.C. v. Total System
Services, Inc., 221 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 2000):
Title VII’s retaliation provisions do protect certain kinds of activity.
Under the opposition clause, an employer may not retaliate against an
employee because the employee “has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3
(a). And, under the participation clause, an employer may not retaliate
against an employee because the employee “has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding,
or hearing under this subchapter.” Id. . . .
The participation clause covers participation in “an investigation . . .
under this subchapter,” that is, an investigation under subchapter VI of
Chapter 21 of Title 42 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e- 2000e-17). 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-3(a). This clause protects proceedings and activities which occur
in conjunction with or after the filing of a formal charge with the EEOC;
it does not include participating in an employer’s internal, in-house
investigation, conducted apart from a formal charge with the EEOC. See
Silver v. KCA, Inc., 586 F.2d 138, 141 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating that
participation means “participation in the machinery set up by Title VII
to enforce its provisions”). We conclude that, because no EEOC
complaint had been filed before Warren’s termination, her taking part in
Defendant’s internal investigation did not constitute protected
expression under the participation clause of Title VII.
Total System, 221 F.3d at 1174 (footnotes omitted).
Here, while Attorney General has stipulated that Ms. Wallace engaged in
protected EEO activity (see Doc. 46 at 8 (“Defendant admits this and has never
27

contended otherwise.”)), neither side has expressly characterized what type of Title
VII retaliation claims Ms. Wallace is pursuing. Two of Ms. Wallace’s retaliation
claims (counts two and three) allegedly arise prior to her filing of an EEO complaint
and the remaining two (counts four and five) arise after that statutorily protected
conduct.
Count Two (Pre-EEO Complaint)
Count two is premised upon SA Ellingwood telling Ms. Wallace that if she
formally filed an EEO complaint about her PFT, she might be labeled a
“troublemaker” and to “wait and see” before taking such an action.
Count Three (Pre-EEO Complaint)
Count three is premised upon SA Ellingwood’s failure to respond to Ms.
Wallace’s email dated November 23, 2009, in which she indicated her desire to file
a discrimination complaint against AS Coachman of the FBI and the Chief Division
Counsel SA Zicarelli concerning her PFT.
Count Four (Post-EEO Complaint)
Count four is premised upon SA Ellingwood’s repeated efforts to persuade Ms.
Wallace to drop her EEO complaint, including allegedly telling her that “[s]ometimes
you have to look out after yourself and not be a martyr.”

28

Count Five (Post-EEO Complaint)
Count five is premised upon FBI EEO Investigator SSA Ludwick’s repeated
efforts to persuade Ms. Wallace to drop her EEO complaint.
Based upon the definitions contained in Total System, this means that counts
two and three of Ms. Wallace’s amended complaint are most likely opposition-based
retaliation claims, while counts four and five appear to be participation-based.
1.

Retaliation Counts Two, Three, and Four
Involving SA Ellingwood
a.

Prima Facie Case

Against this backdrop, the court addresses the merits of the Attorney General’s
challenges of Ms. Wallace’s collection of retaliation claims, which all are commonly
connected to her decision to file an EEO complaint asserting gender discrimination
in the administering of her PFT by SA Snider. The Attorney General’s prima facie
position presents “the issue of whether any of the alleged acts of retaliation raised by
[Ms. Wallace] rise to the level of a materially adverse action under the standard set
forth in Burlington [Northern].” (Doc. 46 at 8).
In moving for summary judgment, the Attorney General frankly acknowledges
that he “has been unable to find any Eleventh Circuit case law with facts analogous
to the retaliation claims made by [Ms.] Wallace . . . .” (Doc. 43 at 28). Instead, he
relies upon Gaujaco, supra, a decision issued by the Court of Appeals for the District
29

of Columbia, for the proposition that Ms. Wallace is unable, as a matter of law, to
establish the materially adverse element with respect to her retaliation claims.
In agreeing with the district court that granting summary judgment on the
plaintiff’s retaliation claim premised upon certain verbal statements was appropriate,
the Gaujaco court reasoned:
Appellant’s third claim of retaliation-Creuzet’s statement that
“[y]our career is dead in EDF if you file the claim”-also fails. A
threatening verbal statement, standing alone, might well constitute a
materially adverse action. However, in assessing such a claim,
Burlington emphasizes that “[c]ontext matters” and that “the
significance of any given act of retaliation will often depend upon the
particular circumstances.” Burlington, 548 U.S. at 69, 126 S. Ct. 2405.
Therefore, a statement that literally appears to be threatening is not
necessarily a materially adverse action. An employer’s words and other
actions must be considered in context to determine whether they would
“dissuade a reasonable worker” from filing a claim and thus result in
actionable retaliation. See id. at 57.
Gaujacq contends that Creuzet’s statement was a materially
adverse action sufficient to make out a prima facie case of retaliation.
We disagree. In the context of this case, a reasonable worker in
Gaujac’s position would not have taken Creuzet’s brief, fleeting, and
unadorned verbal statement as an act or threat of retaliation. Both
before and after Creuzet’s statement, top EDF officials went out of their
way to accommodate Gaujacq’s desire to stay in the United States,
despite her increasing insubordination and refusal to consider any future
employment decision that did not meet her precise demands. Neither
her contract nor company practice gave Gaujacq any right to remain in
Washington, D.C. once she completed her term as General Delegate and
EDFINA President. Yet, EDF officials indulged her at every turn-first
by extending her contract by a year, then by negotiating with her to find
a way to allow her stay in Washington, D.C., and finally by creating a
Vice President’s position for her. But nothing that the company did
30

satisfied Gaujacq and she persisted in disparaging Nadal’s authority and
refusing to cooperate with him.
Creuzet’s disputed statement to Gaujacq came at a time in late
July when Gaujacq was telephoning company officials to complain
again about her situation with Nadal. Creuzet first told her that he did
“not have time to discuss the differences of views between managers”
and then stated, “[y]our career is dead in EDF if you file the claim.” In
this context-given all that the company had done for her-Creuzet’s
statement appears less a threat than an expression of exasperation over
Gaujacq’s ongoing antics. After all, it was Creuzet who spent so much
time earlier in the year negotiating with Gaujacq in an effort to find a
way for her to remain in Washington, D.C. No reasonable employee
who received as much accommodation as did Gaujacq could construe
Creuzet’s statement as an unlawful retaliatory threat. Therefore, in the
“particular circumstances” of this case, we hold that the verbal statement
made by Creuzet did not constitute a materially adverse action.
Burlington, 548 U.S. at 69, 126 S. Ct. 2405.
Gaujacq, 601 F.3d at 578 (emphasis added).
Of course, because the decision is non-binding precedent within the Eleventh
Circuit, this court is not obligated to follow Gaujacq. Moreover, given the dearth of
any on-point published or even unpublished opinions issued by the Eleventh Circuit
in which the alleged materially adverse acts are tied directly to a plaintiff’s pursuit of
an EEO claim against the prospective employer, the court has no indication about
whether the Eleventh Circuit would likely agree with Gaujacq’s reasoning.
However, even if it were binding precedent, Gaujacq is significantly
distinguishable for at least two reasons. One, Ms. Wallace, if believed by a jury,
endured a series of verbal statements and conduct by SA Ellingwood, her assigned
31

EEO counselor, with some of those predating the filing of her EEO complaint and
others postdating it. Therefore, SA Ellingwood’s disputed reactions to Ms. Wallace’s
decision to participate in the EEO process were neither “brief,” “fleeting,” nor
“unadorned” in nature.
Two, Ms. Wallace disagrees with the Attorney General’s facts surrounding her
opportunity to take the makeup PFT, and testified that she encountered difficulties in
trying to schedule a retaking of the PFT and only got AS Coachman’s cooperation
after threatening to file an EEO claim against her. (See, e.g., Doc. 44-1 at 18 at 65 at
lines 16-18 (“I tried to take the re-test later on. In 2009 I contacted Sherolynne
Coachman several times to which she did not respond to me.”); id. at 23 at 84 at lines
12-16 (“This is–this was the email that was sent [by AS Coachman] only after I
contacted Ellingwood telling her that I wanted to file an EEO complaint against
Sherolynne Coachman. This was the only contact I received, only after requesting
an EEO.”)). In contrast, Gaujacq indicates that many efforts were made by many
managers to accommodate the plaintiff’s request to remain employed in the
Washington, D.C. area and this history of undisputed accommodations in favor of the
plaintiff militated against any reasonable finding of material adversity.
Therefore, because “[c]ontext matters” under Burlington Northern, the court
is not persuaded to apply Gaujacq to the “particular circumstances” of this lawsuit
32

that relate to SA Ellingwood’s contested comments and conduct. Instead, because
reasonable minds can differ as to whether Ms. Wallace has satisfied Burlington
Northern’s material adversity standard, she has established a prima facie case of
retaliation that survives summary judgment under counts two, three, and four.
Therefore the material adversity portion of the Attorney General’s Motion is
DENIED as to those particular counts.
b.

Pretext

Alternatively, the Attorney General maintains that SA Ellingwood, through her
declaration, reasonably explained her interactions with Ms. Wallace and that Ms.
Wallace’s retaliation claims involving her fail because of the absence of any pretext
with respect to those explanations. In making this argument, the Attorney General
presumes that the only manner by which Ms. Wallace can survive summary judgment
is by meeting the McDonnell Douglas model.
However, as the Eleventh Circuit has articulated in its reversal of a summary
judgment dismissal of a race discrimination claim:
The district court, in dismissing Mitten’s claim of race discrimination,
did as federal courts routinely do in disposing of cases, like this, in
which the plaintiff claims that his employer applied a
workplace-conduct rule in violation of Title VII: the court used
McDonnell Douglas’s burden-shifting framework. In so doing, the
district court focused on whether Mitten’s termination for his violation
of the zero tolerance policy was more severe than the discipline
Lockheed imposed on similarly situated black comparators. Mitten’s
33

comparators were deemed not “similarly situated,” so the court found no
tenable claims of race discrimination. If the record contained no
circumstantial evidence from which a jury could otherwise infer that
Mitten was fired because of his race, our discussion would end here, and
we would affirm the district court’s judgment.
However, establishing the elements of the McDonnell Douglas
framework is not, and never was intended to be, the sine qua non for a
plaintiff to survive a summary judgment motion in an employment
discrimination case. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s failure to produce a
comparator does not necessarily doom the plaintiff’s case.
Rather, the plaintiff will always survive summary judgment if he
presents circumstantial evidence that creates a triable issue concerning
the employer’s discriminatory intent. See Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d
1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997) (declaring that, in cases where a plaintiff
cannot establish a prima facie case, summary judgment only will be
“appropriate where no other evidence of discrimination is present.”
(citations omitted)); Silverman v. Bd. of Educ., 637 F.3d 729, 733 (7th
Cir. 2011) (“To avoid summary judgment . . . the plaintiff must produce
sufficient evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to create a triable
question of intentional discrimination in the employer’s decision.”). A
triable issue of fact exists if the record, viewed in a light most favorable
to the plaintiff, presents “a convincing mosaic of circumstantial
evidence that would allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination by
the decisionmaker.” Silverman, 637 F.3d at 734 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted); see also James v. N.Y. Racing Ass’n, 233 F.3d
149, 157 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[T]he way to tell whether a plaintiff’s case is
sufficient to sustain a verdict is to analyze the particular evidence to
determine whether it reasonably supports an inference of the facts
plaintiff must prove—particularly discrimination.”).
A plaintiff may raise a reasonable inference of the employer’s
discriminatory intent through various forms of circumstantial evidence.
Rioux v. City of Atlanta, 520 F.3d 1269, 1281 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding
that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of racial discrimination
when he did not present evidence of a comparator but presented other
circumstantial evidence that was sufficient); see also Alvarez v. Royal
34

Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010) (stating that
the circumstantial evidence necessary to present a Title VII case of
discrimination under McDonnell Douglas is “flexible and depend[s] on
the particular situation” (citations omitted)); cf. Burke–Fowler v. Orange
County, Fla., 447 F.3d 1319, 1325 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming the
district court’s grant of summary judgment because plaintiff “failed to
establish valid comparators and presented no other circumstantial
evidence suggesting racial discrimination” (emphasis added)). Yet, no
matter its form, so long as the circumstantial evidence raises a
reasonable inference that the employer discriminated against the
plaintiff, summary judgment is improper.
Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1327-28 (11th Cir. 2011) (footnotes
omitted) (emphasis added).
Even though Lockheed involved a Title VII race discrimination claim, the court
cannot think of any compelling reason why its reasoning should not apply equally to
a Title VII retaliation claim. Moreover, the conventional articulation of a legitimate
explanation/pretext model10 does not neatly operate under the disputed factual
circumstances of SA Ellingwood’s counseling of Ms. Wallace. For example, SA
Ellingwood’s statements in her declaration indicate the existence of a material factual
dispute over whose idea it was to withdraw Ms. Wallace’s EEO complaint–hers or
Ms. Wallace’s. (Doc. 44-16 at 4 ¶ 11).

In more routine retaliation actions, the parties are agreement over the
allegedly materially adverse action that occurred (e.g., a decrease in pay, a discharge,
a non-promotion, etc.), and only disagree about what motivated the decisionmaker to
engage in that specific conduct. In this situation, however, the parties’ factual
accounts of SA Ellingwood’s dealings with Ms. Wallace materially diverge.
10

35

Also, SA Ellingwood states that: (i) she does not “recall ever advising Ms.
Wallace that she would be labeled a ‘troublemaker’” (Doc. 44-16 at 4-5 ¶ 15); (ii) she
does not “recall” receiving an email from Ms. Wallace on November 23, 2009,
indicating “that she wanted to file a discrimination complaint against Administrative
Specialist Sherolynne Coachman and Chief Division Counsel Ray Zicarelli” (Doc.
44-16 at 5 ¶ 17); and (iii) she does not “recall ever advising Ms. Wallace that she
should ‘look out after’ herself or that she should not be a ‘martyr’” (Doc. 44-16 at 6
¶ 20).
Setting aside the issue of whether vaguely “not recalling” doing something is
the evidentiary equivalent of affirmatively remembering “not doing” something, these
declarative statements by SA Ellingwood, if believed, are in conflict with Ms.
Wallace’s version of the facts. Therefore, they cannot and do not explain the
legitimacy of SA Ellingwood’s treatment of Ms. Wallace if Ms. Wallace’s factual
account of their interaction is found to be credible. Put differently, because this court
is obligated on summary judgment to view the record in a light most favorable to Ms.
Wallace, the Attorney General’s advancement of a legitimate explanation which
requires this court’s acceptance of disputed testimony about what occurred between
SA Ellingwood and Ms. Wallace leading up to and during the course of the FBI

36

internal EEO process is simply underdeveloped and unworkable.11
In sum, the record regarding SA Ellingwood’s retaliatory acts as presented by
Ms. Wallace contains “evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and
fairminded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different
conclusions.” Verbraeken, 881 F.2d at 1045. Accordingly, the Motion is DENIED
regarding counts two, three, and four of Ms. Wallace’s amended complaint.
2.

Retaliation Count Five Involving SSA Ludwick

The court reaches a different conclusion concerning Ms. Wallace’s retaliation
count involving SSA Ludwick. SSA Ludwick’s declaration provides that while he
does “generally recall conversations with Ms. Wallace regarding preparation of her
signed, sworn statement[,] [a]t no point did I ever threaten, coerce, or otherwise
pressure Ms. Wallace to drop her EEO complaint, nor did I otherwise retaliate against
her in any way for participating in protected EEO activity.” (Doc. 44-14 at 3-4 ¶ 4).
In effort to dispute this evidence, Ms. Wallace states that SSA Ludwick did tell

The bulk of the Attorney General’s briefing on retaliation focuses upon his
material adversity arguments. (Compare Doc. 43 at 25-30, with id. at 30-31).
Further, the only case cited by the Attorney General in his pretext section, Goldsmith
v. Bagby Elevator Co., Inc., 513 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2008) (Doc. 43 at 31), is
unhelpful as it involves a retaliatory discharge claim asserted against a private sector
employer as opposed to retaliation arising out of a public sector applicant’s decision
to engage in Title VII protected activities and that respective federal agency’s internal
handling of the EEO process.
11

37

her to drop her complaint and cites to certain testimony from her deposition transcript
as underlying support. (See Doc. 45 at 7 ¶ 66 (“The Plaintiff was threatened, coerced,
or otherwise pressured, to drop her complaint because SSA Ludwick improperly
advised her to do so.”)).
While Ms. Wallace suggests that her deposition testimony establishes that SSA
Ludwick advised her to drop her EEO complaint (See Doc. 45 at 7 ¶ 66 (citing Doc.
44-1 at 28 at 104 at line 2)), a reading of an excerpt from a portion of the transcript
to which she has cited complains only about SSA Ludwick’s “shoddy” EEO
investigation12 and does not otherwise substantiate her position that he urged her to
drop her complaint:
Q.
And, so, while you said you believe you wouldn’t have been
given a fair test, do you have any facts to support your belief in that
regard?
A.
I do. The fact that I had with the situation with Ludwick doing
the shoddy – the shoddy investigation.
Also the numerous people that requested I drop my complaint,
which was – just really didn’t . . . it looked to me that – that evidence
supports that fact that the Bureau was talking at multiple levels, multiple

The court has previously dismissed, on sovereign immunity grounds, all of
Ms. Wallace’s claims premised exclusively upon an allegedly deficient EEO process.
(See Doc. 27 at 12-13 (“Accordingly, the court agrees with the Attorney General that
counts two and three of Ms. Wallace’s complaint are due to be dismissed on
sovereign immunity grounds “‘except to the extent that they allege a claim of
retaliation for prior protected EEO activity.’” )).
12

38

cities.
And so, I feel like even in Mobile, at that point, I don’t believe I
would have gotten a fair test.
(Doc. 44-1 at 28 at 103-04 at lines 21-25, 1-9); (see also Doc. 46 at 9 (“Regarding
Ludwick, Plaintiff has not even identified any statements that she claims Ludwick
made to her, much less that she suffered any harm because of Ludwick.”)).
Therefore, in the absence of any proof adduced by Ms. Wallace which
contradicts the concretely-expressed contents of SSA Ludwick’s declaration, Ms.
Wallace is unable to satisfy Burlington Northern’s material adversity standard in
connection with the retaliation claim involving him. Accordingly, the Motion is
GRANTED on prima facie grounds with respect to count five, and the court does not
address the issue of pretext.
V.

CONCLUSION
In sum and as reasoned above, the Attorney General’s Motion is GRANTED

IN PART with respect to counts one and five of Ms. Wallace’s amended complaint
and otherwise is DENIED. By separate order, the court will set this case for a final
pretrial conference.
DONE and ORDERED this the 10th day of May, 2013.

VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS
United States District Judge
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