Wayton v. United Mine Workers of America Health and Retirement Funds
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Abdul K Kallon on 11/4/2013. (PSM)
2013 Nov-04 AM 08:32
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
DAVID WAYTON and JAMIE
COX, personal representative of
the Estate of David Wayton,
UNITED MINE WORKERS OF
AMERICA 1974 PENSION
Civil Action Number
Jamie Cox and David Wayton1 filed this action under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq.,
challenging Defendant United Mine Workers of America 1974 Pension Trust
Trustees’ decision to deny him disability pension benefits. Before the court are
UMWA’s motions for summary judgment and for leave to file excess pages, and
Wayton’s motion to continue or deny summary judgment. Docs. 38, 44, 46. The
Cox replaced Wayton as the personal representative of Wayton’s estate after Wayton’s
counsel filed a Suggestion of Death. Docs. 24, 25; January 25, 2013 text order. Nevertheless,
for the sake of consistency, the court will refer only to Wayton.
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motions are briefed and ripe for resolution.2 Docs. 42, 45. For the reasons stated
below, summary judgment is due to be granted.
WAYTON’S RULE 56(d)3 MOTION TO CONTINUE OR TO DENY
DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION
Wayton moves the court under Rule 56(d) to deny summary judgment
because he has not had an opportunity to obtain discovery of information outside
the administrative record. Doc. 44. Basically, Wayton is attempting to re-litigate
the motion to compel the court denied previously. Docs. 26, 34. For the same
reasons the court stated in its April 4, 2013 order, doc. 34, and Wayton’s failure to
establish that the Trustees relied on information outside of the administrative
record, the court DENIES Wayton’s motion.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 56’s general principle that summary judgment is proper “if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” has limited application here because the
district court “sits more as an appellate tribunal than as a trial court” and
The motion for leave to file excess pages is GRANTED since UMWA’s reply brief
addressed Wayton’s response and motion to continue or deny Defendant’s summary judgment
motion. Doc. 46.
Although Wayton cites Rule 56(f), the 2010 revision of Rule 56 resulted in the former
section (f) currently designated as section (d).
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“evaluates the reasonableness of an administrative determination in light of the
record compiled before the plan fiduciary.” Leahy v. Raytheon Co., 315 F.3d 11,
18 (1st Cir. 2002). To that end, the court is guided by the Eleventh Circuit’s sixstep sequential framework for reviewing ERISA benefit denials, which requires
(1) Apply the de novo standard to determine whether the claim
administrator’s benefits-denial decision was “wrong” (i.e., the court
disagrees with the administrator’s decision); if it is not, then end the
inquiry and affirm the decision.
(2)If the administrator’s decision in fact is “de novo wrong,” then
determine whether he was vested with discretion in reviewing claims;
if not, end judicial inquiry and reverse the decision.
(3) If the administrator’s decision is “de novo wrong” and he was
vested with discretion in reviewing claims, then determine whether
“reasonable” grounds supported it (hence, review his decision under
the more deferential arbitrary and capricious standard).
(4) If no reasonable grounds exist, then end the inquiry and reverse
the administrator’s decision; if reasonable grounds do exist, then
determine if he operated under a conflict of interest.
(5) If there is no conflict, then end the inquiry and affirm the decision.
(6) If there is a conflict, the conflict should merely be a factor for the
court to take into account when determining whether an
administrator’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.
Williams v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc., 373 F.3d 1132, 1138 (11th Cir.
2004), overruled on other grounds by Doyle v. Liberty Life Assurance, 542 F.3d
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1352 (11th Cir. 2008); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 123-24 (2008);
Blankenship v. Metro. Life. Ins. Co., 644 F.3d 1350, 1355 (11th Cir. 2011). This
court’s review of the Trustees’ decision is limited to “consideration of the material
available to the administrator at the time it made its decision.” Blankenship, 644
F.3d at 1354, citing Jett v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 890 F.2d 1137, 1140 (11th
Cir. 1989). Furthermore, the claimant has the burden of proving entitlement to
ERISA benefits. Glazer v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 524 F.3d 1241, 1248 (11th
Wayton, a former mine helper for Jim Walters Resources and beneficiary
under the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1974 and the United
Mine Workers of America 1974 Pension Plan and Trust (“the Plan”), challenges
the Plan Trustees’ denial of his application for disability pension benefits. The
Trustees reached this decision based on a determination that Wayton’s workplace
injury was not causally related to his Social Security Administration (“SSA”)
disability award. Docs. 39-2 at 2; 41-1 at 51.
Wayton’s workplace injury and medical treatment
On April 10, 1997, Wayton informed his supervisor that he had “pull[ed] on
a heavy object and felt pain in [his] right hip and upper leg radiating down to [his]
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foot.” Docs. 41-2 at 23; 41-10 at 6-7; 41-1 at 51. Wayton visited the Bessemer
Carraway Medical Center’s emergency room the next day and an x-ray revealed
early foci of degenerative arthritis and possible narrowing of the right hip joint.
Doc. 41-2 at 24. A physician diagnosed Wayton with possible severe hip strain,
prescribed pain mediation, and released Wayton to return to work. Id. at 22-23.
A week later, Dr. Gaylon Rogers evaluated Wayton for hip, leg, and calf
pain that radiated to Wayton’s toe, ordered a MRI that revealed an L4-L5
“concentric disc bulge with a right paramedian disc herniation that causes
compression of the right L5 nerve root within the lateral recess,” and
recommended that Wayton “remain off work at the moment.” Doc. 41-2 at 25, 27.
Wayton subsequently underwent two procedures to treat his pain: an epidural
block in April that improved his pain, and a laminectomy and microdiskectormy
on June 2, 1997, that revealed a herniation nucleus polposus. Doc. 41-2 at 28, 31,
34. When Wayton returned in mid-June for a follow-up visit, Dr. Rogers noted
that Wayton was “doing excellent” and ordered physical therapy. Doc. 41-2 at 36.
A month later, Dr. Rogers released Wayton to return to light duty. Doc. 41-2 at
Wayton returned to Dr. Rogers on August 18, 1997 and reported an increase
in pain as a result of performing house work a week earlier. Doc. 41-2 at 47.
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Consequently, Dr. Rogers recommended Wayton remain off work and ordered an
epidural block, which failed to improve Wayton’s pain. Docs. 41-2 at 47, 48; 41-3
at 1. A MRI conducted on September 10, 1997 showed a “recurrent disc at the L45 level covered with scar tissue. This recurrent disc is exerting mass effect on the
thecal sac at this level and obliterating the right lateral recess.” Doc. 41-3 at 2.
The MRI results led to a second laminectomy and discectomy that revealed
“recurrent herniated nucleus pulposus.” Id. at 5. The procedure resulted in
Wayton “feeling good.” Id. at 7.
In light of Wayton’s continued improvement, Dr. Rogers released Wayton
to return to work on January 12, 1998. Doc. 41-3 at 19. However, in April 1998,
Dr. Rogers ordered Wayton to suspend work temporarily and resume physical
therapy due to a back injury Wayton sustained while lifting a jackhammer. Doc.
41-3 at 25, 27. When Wayton returned two months later, Dr. Rogers remarked
that the “impression from therapy is that [Wayton] is able to perform slow,
deliberate movement, but still guarding some. This leads to a question as to
whether he will be able to go back to work. The patient definitely want to and
needs to, I think.” Doc. 41-3 at 32. Later that month, after receiving an epidural
block and reporting worse pain in a “very severe way,” id., Wayton decided to
undergo a laminectomy/discectomy with rayed threaded fusion, id. at 38.
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Wayton’s cerebrovascular episodes
Sometime before the procedure, Wayton visited a clinic complaining of low
back pain, episodes of numbness on his mouth, and a loss of his peripheral vision.
Doc. 41-3 at 23. After being admitted to Bessemer Carraway Hospital, Wayton
received a CT scan that was “suspicious for a possible small infarct in the left
occipital lobe.” Id. at 40. A physician discharged Wayton three days later with a
diagnosis of “cerebrovascular accident, left occiput.” Id. at 43. This condition
prevented Wayton from receiving the repeat laminectomy/discectomy.
On December 15, 1998, Wayton again presented to Bessemer Carraway
complaining of “[left] arm and chest numbness.” Doc. 41-4 at 14. A head CT and
brain MRI revealed a large lucunar infarction in the left basal ganglia. Id. at 1920, 26. Dr. Peter Lane, who treated Wayton, noted “symptoms [that] largely
resolved on the Heparin” and discharged Wayton two days later with a diagnosis
of “cerebrovascular accident.” Id. at 24.
The medical record in 1999 also shows that Wayton was diagnosed with
cerebral lesions that likely represent strokes. Docs. 41-4 at 45, 47. Wayton was
also treated for CNS lyme disease. Id. at 48. Apparently, as a result of these
ongoing issues, Wayton informed Dr. Rogers on February 3, 1999 that he “elected
to proceed with attempting to procure SSI . . . .” Id. at 42. As for Wayton’s back
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pain, Dr. Rogers noted that the
proposed spinal stabilization might or might not let him return to
work in the mines, but as a practical matter, he is not able to pursue
that at this point for non work-related medical reasons. Therefore, I
would consider him at this point at a [maximum medical
improvement] status at least for the time being with a 10-20%
permanent impairment based on the back problems.
Id. (emphasis added).
Wayton’s SSA disability insurance benefits and UMWA disability
pension benefits applications
Wayton applied for SSA disability insurance benefits in February 1999,
alleging a disability onset date of April 22, 1998, due to back problems and
strokes. Doc. 41-5 at 30. The SSA approved Wayton’s claim, finding that
Wayton “became disabled under [the SSA] rules on July 1, 1998.” Doc. 41-5 at
16; 41-2 at 64. However, the SSA reached this decision solely on the evidence
regarding the strokes. Specifically, the SSA listed Wayton’s primary diagnosis as
organic mental disorders, secondary diagnosis as “late effects of cerebrovascular
disease,” and noted in the remarks section that Wayton met Listing 12.02, i.e.
organic mental disorders. Doc. 41-10 at 11.
After the SSA approved his application for disability benefits, Wayton
applied for disability pension benefits through the UMWA Plan on January 13,
2000. Doc. 41-9 at 44-50. Under the Plan, disability pension benefits are
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available to a
Participant who (a) has at least 10 years of signatory service prior to
retirement, and (b) becomes totally disabled as a result of a mine
accident [ ]. A Participant shall be considered to be totally disabled
only if by reason of such accident such Participant is subsequently
determined to be eligible for Social Security Disability Insurance
Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act . . . .
Doc. 39-2 at 6 (emphasis added). Therefore, the Plan requires a causal link
between the mine accident and claimed disability. Doc. 43 at 2. To determine
whether a causal link exists, the Plan’s pension processing manual instructs the
Trustees to consider, among other things, the applicant’s “SSDI determinations
and the correlation between the effective date of the SSDI award and the most
recent mine accident” and medical records. Id. However, under the Plan, a
physician’s statement regarding the applicant’s disability “is not necessarily
conclusive” and is given weight based on “the extent to which it is supported by
specific objective clinical findings and its consistency with other evidence in the
Ultimately, the Plan Trustees denied Wayton’s application because
Social Security disability benefits were not based upon his back
condition. His disability benefits were based upon “organic mental
disorders and late effects of cerebrovascular disease,” conditions
related to his repeated cerebrovascular accidents (strokes). There is
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no relationship between these conditions and the April 10, 1997
Doc. 41-10 at 1-2. The Trustees subsequently denied Wayton’s appeal because
Wayton “was not disabled due to the mining accident.” Doc. 41-1 at 47 through
41-2 at 12.
Since the UMWA admits that Wayton suffered a mining accident and is
totally disabled, the issue before this court is whether Wayton’s disability is the
result of a mining accident. In resolving this issue, the court must utilize the
Eleventh Circuit’s sequential framework to review the Trustees’ decision. For the
reasons stated below, the court needs to only reach the first step since the evidence
supports the Trustees’ decision to deny Wayton’s claim.
The Trustees’ benefits denial decision was correct
Under the Plan, Wayton is eligible for pension disability benefits only if his
mining accident is the basis of his disability, or combined with a later condition to
cause his disability. Docs. 43 at 2-3. Therefore, the court begins with a review of
the SSA disability determination and notes that, although Wayton stated in his
application for SSA disability insurance benefits that his disability began on April
22, 1998 due to back problems and strokes, doc. 41-5 at 30, the SSA found only
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that Wayton had a disability because of his strokes. According to the SSA,
Wayton “became disabled under [the SSA] rules on July 1, 1998,” doc. 41-5 at 16;
41-2 at 64, i.e. the period when Wayton’s first cerebrovascular event occurred, as
reflected by Wayton’s complaint of numbness on his mouth and a loss of
peripheral vision. Doc. 41-3 at 23. Wayton’s physicians ultimately diagnosed
these symptoms as a “cerebrovascular accident,” i.e. stroke. Since the medical
evidence preceding July 1 consisted exclusively of Wayton’s back condition, the
SSA either rejected it in assessing Wayton’s disability or never reached the issue.
Significantly, the SSA’s disability determination form records Wayton’s primary
diagnosis as Listing 12.02, organic mental disorders. Doc. 41-20 at 11.
Therefore, although Wayton applied for disability benefits based on his back
condition and strokes, the SSA found only that his strokes met the disability
In light of this finding, Wayton can only receive UMWA pension disability
benefits if he establishes that his work related back injury was “aggravated or
compounded by” his strokes, “and the two combined conditions result[ed] in total
disability as determined by the [SSA].” Doc. 43 at 3 (emphasis added).
Unfortunately for Wayton, there is no evidence before this court for it to find that
the Trustees erred when they determined that Wayton failed to make this showing.
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In fact, Wayton failed to present any evidence to suggest that his back injury
exacerbated his strokes or that his back condition factored in the SSA’s
determination. Without more, this court has no basis to infer that the SSA
determined that Wayton’s back injury in combination with the strokes was
Dr. Rogers’ opinions fail to support Wayton’s disability claim
The evidence also does not support Wayton’s contention that Dr. Rodgers
opined that Wayton’s back injury rendered him disabled. In fact, the record
establishes that Dr. Rogers never rendered a determination on this issue. For
example, in February 1999, Dr. Rogers noted that the “proposed spinal
stabilization might or might not let [Wayton] return to work in the mines, but as a
practical matter, he is not able to pursue that at this point for non work-related
medical reasons. Therefore, I would consider him at this point at a [maximum
medical improvement] status at least for the time being with a 10-20% permanent
impairment based on the back problems.” Doc. 41-4 at 42 (emphasis added).
Presumably the “non-work related medical reasons” included Wayton’s strokes
since Wayton first reported a loss of vision and numbness in July 1998. In any
event, Dr. Rogers’ determination that the proposed stabilization procedure could
allow Wayton to return to work and that Wayton was at maximum medical
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improvement “at least for the time being” suggests that Dr. Rogers viewed
Wayton’s condition as temporary and anticipated that Wayton’s back injury could
improve. In other words, the February 1999 opinion does not support Wayton’s
Likewise, Dr. Rogers’ November 2000 statement that he could “validate the
fact that [Wayton] had a significant lumbar spine problem which in all likelihood
would have prevented him from returning to work and heavy labor underground
regardless of the presence or absence of the cardiovascular difficulties,” doc. 41-2
at 13, also does not establish that Wayton had a disabling condition. As a
threshold matter, Dr. Rogers rendered this opinion after the Trustees denied
Wayton’s claim. Moreover, even if Dr. Rogers had made this statement before the
Trustees reviewed Wayton’s claim, the Plan is explicit that the Trustees only give
deference to a medical opinion when the evidence is “consisten[t] with other
evidence in the file.” Doc. 43 at 2. No such deference would have been warranted
here because of the inconsistency between Dr. Rogers’ statements and the SSA’s
disability determination. Furthermore, Dr. Rogers’ opinion is not dispositive
because, even if Wayton’s back injury prevented him from returning to his former
position as a mine helper, that fact alone does not establish that Wayton met the
SSA’s disability standard. In fact, the SSA considers a series of factors to
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determine disability, including age, education, past relevant work, the severity of
the impairment, and the presence of transferable skills, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520,
none of which Dr. Rogers addresses. Therefore, Dr. Rogers’ opinion fails to
establish that Wayton’s back injury rendered him disabled or supports a
conclusion that the back injury caused Wayton’s cerebrovascular condition or
combined with his strokes to render him disabled.
Wayton’s claim that UMWA breached its fiduciary duty
Wayton contends that the Trustees breached their fiduciary duty by ignoring
the medical evidence and failing to request additional evidence or contact
Wayton’s health care providers. See doc. 10 at 7; 29 U.S.C. § 1104. This issue is
not properly before this court because Wayton failed to allege a breach of
fiduciary duty claim in his complaint and is foreclosed from adding it at this
juncture. See Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1314-15 (11th
Cir. 2004). Moreover, any such claim would fail since the Trustees were not
required to request additional information or contact Wayton’s physicians because,
ultimately, Wayton has the burden of establishing that he is entitled to ERISA
benefits. See Glazer, 524 F.3d at 1248. Finally, the claim would fail also because
the record supports the Trustees’ decision.
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Based on a review of the record, the court finds that the Trustees’ decision
was reasonable and is due to be affirmed. Therefore, by separate order, the court
will grant UMWA’s motion for summary judgment
Done the 4th day of November, 2013.
ABDUL K. KALLON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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