Banks et al v. Birmingham Board of Education

Filing 200

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER - For the reasons discussed above, the Court enters judgment for the Board on the claims of Tammra Harris, Doris Pope Howard, Eliza Means, LaGretta Moultry, and David Rice. The Court will address the balance of the Boards motion for summary judgment by separate order. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 7/28/2017. (KEK)

FILED
2017 Jul-28 AM 09:07
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ELEAZIER BANKS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
BIRMINGHAM BOARD OF
EDUCATION,
Defendant.

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Case No.: 2:12-cv-01682-MHH

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The plaintiffs in this opt-in FLSA action allege that the defendant, the
Birmingham Board of Education, failed to compensate them for work performed in
excess of 40 hours per workweek. Among the more than 300 opt-in plaintiffs are
these five Board employees: Tammra Harris, Doris Pope Howard, Eliza Means,
LaGretta Moultry and David Rice. Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Board has asked the Court to enter judgment on the FLSA
claims of these five plaintiffs—as well as more than 200 other plaintiffs. The
Board contends that these five plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that “they worked
over 40 hours per week” during the relevant class period, “April 25, 2009 to April
25, 2012.” (Doc. 157). Because the evidence in the record, viewed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiffs, supports the Board’s argument, the Court will

grant the Board’s motion for summary judgment with respect to these plaintiffs’
claims. In a separate order, the Court will address the Board’s motion with respect
to the balance of the plaintiffs identified in the motion.
I.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To demonstrate that there is a genuine
dispute as to a material fact that precludes summary judgment, a party opposing a
motion for summary judgment must cite “to particular parts of materials in the
record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information,
affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the
motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c)(1)(A).
When considering a summary judgment motion, the Court must view the
evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
See White v. Beltram Edge Tool Supply, Inc., 789 F.3d 1188, 1191 (11th Cir. 2015).
Accordingly, the Court presents the facts in this opinion in the light most favorable
to the plaintiffs. See White, 789 F.3d at 1191; see also Feliciano v. City of Miami
Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1252 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[W]hen conflicts arise between the
facts evidenced by the parties, [courts] must credit the nonmoving party's
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version.”). “The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider
other materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
II.

ANALYSIS
The FLSA provides that in any given workweek, an employee shall not work

“longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his
employment . . . at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at
which he is employed.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). Thus, to trigger the FLSA’s overtime
protections, a plaintiff must establish that he or she worked more than 40 hours in a
workweek. The opt-in class in this case consists of various categories of nonexempt employees who worked for the Board between April 25, 2009 and April
25, 2012.

(Doc. 72-1).

Therefore, as a threshold matter, to recover FLSA

overtime wages, each opt-in plaintiff must be able to prove that he or she worked
more than 40 hours in one or more workweeks between April 25, 2009 and April
25, 2012. None of the five identified plaintiffs can do so.
A. Tammra Harris
During the relevant class period, Ms. Harris served as a CNP worker at
Woodlawn High School. (Doc. 108-12, p. 2). As a CNP worker, Ms. Harris
“cook[ed], serve[d], wash[ed] dishes, clean[ed] the lunchroom, put the leftover
food up, mop[ped] the floor” and “t[ook] out trash.” (Doc. 108-13, p. 3).

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In her deposition testimony, Ms. Harris contends that the Board scheduled
her to work 32.5 hours per workweek. (Doc. 108-13, p. 3). According to Ms.
Harris, she generally began working off-the-clock 15 minutes before her shift
began, and even though Ms. Harris was told to clock out by her school, she usually
worked 30 minutes after her shift had ended. (Doc. 108-13, pp. 3–8; Doc. 108-12,
p. 2). In addition, because she was “working off the clock preparing lunch, getting
food out of the over, getting the food set up on the line and stuff like that,” Ms.
Harris asserts that she “didn’t get a full 30-minute break.” (Doc. 108-13, p. 5;
Doc. 108-12, p. 2).
Based on Ms. Harris’s testimony, during the relevant class period, she
worked 38.75 hours in a workweek. (Docs. 108-12; 108-13). Thus, although the
record demonstrates that Ms. Harris worked more than her scheduled hours, she
did not work more than 40 hours in a workweek. Accordingly, the Court enters
judgment for the Board on Ms. Harris’s FLSA claim.
B. Doris Pope Howard
According to Ms. Howard, during the relevant class period, she was a CNP
worker at Carver High School. (Doc. 108-26, p. 2). In this role, “[i]f food was
needed for breakfast,” Ms. Howard states that she “would back up the breakfast
line.” (Doc. 108-26, p. 2). Ms. Howard also alleges that she “cook[ed] and

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prepare[d] food for lunch, clean[ed] up the kitchen and equipment,” and “put away
left over food.” (Doc. 108-26, p. 2).
During the relevant class period, Ms. Howard reports that she was scheduled
to work 32.5 hours per workweek. (Doc. 108-26, p. 2). According to Ms. Howard,
she began working off-the-clock 15 minutes before her scheduled start time; she
did not receive a duty-free period “4 out of 5 days per week”; and she clocked out
and continued working “off the clock” for approximately 30 minutes past her
scheduled end time. (Doc. 108-26, p. 2).
Aggregating these hours, Ms. Howard can prove that she worked 38.25
hours per week, but she cannot establish that she worked more than 40 hours in a
workweek. Therefore, the Court enters judgment for the Board on Ms. Howard’s
FLSA claim.
C. Eliza Means
During the relevant class period, the Board employed Ms. Means as both a
CNP worker and a CNP manager at Carver High School. (Doc. 109-6, pp. 1–2).
Ms. Means explained that as a CNP worker, she was responsible for “cooking,
cleaning, [and serving as a] cashier.” (Doc. 109-6, p. 2). As a CNP manager, Ms.
Means’s duties included “[m]anaging employees, overseeing the daily function of
the kitchen, paperwork, banking, cooking and cleaning.” (Doc. 109-6, p. 2).

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According to Ms. Means, she was scheduled to work 32.5 hours per week.
(Doc. 109-6, p. 2). Ms. Means maintains that she “began her duties” 15 minutes
before the start of her scheduled shift; that she “worked through [her] break
everyday by constantly cooking and checking on [her] food”; and that she worked
approximately 30 minutes after she had clocked out. (Doc. 109-6, p. 2). Ms.
Means’s evidence shows that, at most, she worked 38.75 hours in any given
workweek during the relevant class period. (Doc. 109-6). Even crediting Ms.
Means’s evidence, Ms. Means cannot establish that she worked more than 40 hours
in a workweek.

Therefore, the Court enters judgment for the Board on Ms.

Means’s FLSA claim.
D. LaGretta Moultry
Based on her evidence, Ms. Moultry began serving as a CNP worker at
Hudson K-8 School in August 2014. (Doc. 109-10, p. 2). August 2014 falls
outside of the class period in this case. Accordingly, because Ms. Moultry only
alleges an August 2014 FLSA violation, the Court enters judgment for the Board
on Ms. Moultry’s FLSA claim.
E. David Rice
For the 2010–2011 school year, David Rice was a CNP worker at Huffman
High School, and for the 2011–2012 school, Mr. Rice was a CNP worker at
Phillips Academy. (Doc. 109-36, p. 2). As a CNP worker at both schools, Mr.
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Rice “[p]rep[ped] milk and juices for students, clean[ed] tables, ke[pt] [the]
cafeteria clean and stock[ed].” (Doc. 109-36, p. 2).
At both schools, Mr. Rice explains that he was scheduled to work 35 hours
per workweek. (Doc. 109-36, p. 2). Moreover, according to Mr. Rice, he began
working approximately 15 minutes prior to the start of his scheduled shift in the
mornings; worked through his 30-minute duty free period “3 out of 5 days per
week, although [he was] required to clock out for it”; and left work in the
afternoons “at [his] scheduled time.”

(Doc. 109-36, p. 2).

Based on the

information that Mr. Rice provided, during the relevant class period, he worked
37.75 hours per workweek. (Doc. 109-36). That is not adequate to meet the 40hour threshold for recovering overtime wages under the FLSA. Therefore, the
Court enters judgment for the Board on Mr. Rice’s FLSA claim.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court enters judgment for the Board on

the claims of Tammra Harris, Doris Pope Howard, Eliza Means, LaGretta Moultry,
and David Rice. The Court will address the balance of the Board’s motion for
summary judgment by separate order.
DONE and ORDERED this July 28, 2017.

_______________________________
MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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