Shipman v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge L Scott Coogler on 9/29/2014. (KAM, )

FILED
2014 Sep-29 PM 04:00
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DEBRA L. SHIPMAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN COLVIN,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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2:12-CV-1795-LSC

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
I.

Introduction
The plaintiff, Debra L. Shipman, appeals from the decision of the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying her
application for a period of disability and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). Ms.
Shipman timely pursued and exhausted her administrative remedies and the decision
of the Commissioner is ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).
Ms. Shipman was forty-one years old at the time of the Administrative Law
Judge’s (“ALJ’s”) decision, and she has a high school education. (Tr. at 24, 80.) Her
past work experiences include employment as a mail sorter for the United States
Postal Service. (Id. at 25, 91.) Ms. Shipman claims that she became disabled on
December 17, 2000, due to back pain and depression. (Id. at 85-86.)

When evaluating the disability of individuals over the age of eighteen, the
regulations prescribe a five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520, 416.920; see also Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The
first step requires a determination of whether the claimant is “doing substantial
gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If he or she is, the
claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If he or she is not, the
Commissioner next considers the effect of all of the physical and mental impairments
combined. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). These impairments
must be severe and must meet the durational requirements before a claimant will be
found to be disabled. Id. The decision depends on the medical evidence in the record.
See Hart v. Finch, 440 F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971). If the claimant’s impairments
are not severe, the analysis stops. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii).
Otherwise, the analysis continues to step three, which is a determination of whether
the claimant’s impairments meet or equal the severity of an impairment listed in 20
C.F.R. pt. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii),
416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant’s impairments fall within this category, he or she
will be found disabled without further consideration. Id. If they do not, a
determination of the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) will be made

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and the analysis proceeds to the fourth step. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).
The fourth step requires a determination of whether the claimant’s
impairments prevent him or her from returning to past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant can still do his or her past
relevant work, the claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If the claimant
cannot do past relevant work, then the analysis proceeds to the fifth step. Id. Step five
requires the court to consider the claimant’s RFC, as well as the claimant’s age,
education, and past work experience in order to determine if he or she can do other
work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v) 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant can do other
work, the claimant is not disabled. Id.
Applying the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Ms. Shipman
was insured through December 31, 2006. (Tr. at 22, 35.) He further determined that
Ms. Shipman has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of
her disability through her date of last insured, December 31, 2006. (Id. at 35.)
According to the ALJ, Plaintiff’s degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, history
of depression/anxiety, and obesity are considered “severe” based on the requirements
set forth in the regulations. (Id. at 36.) However, he found that these impairments
neither meet nor medically equal any of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,

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Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Id.) The ALJ did not find Ms. Shipman’s allegations to be
totally credible, and he determined that she has the RFC to perform light work which
allows the ability to sit or stand at her option; occasional bending, stooping, or
climbing; and no upper or lower pushing/pulling of her extremities. (Id.)
According to the ALJ, Ms. Shipman is unable to perform any of her past
relevant work, she is a “younger individual,” and she has “at least a high school
education” as those terms are defined by the regulations. (Id.) He determined that the
“transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because
using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the
claimant is ‘not disabled.’” (Id.) Even though Plaintiff could not perform the full
range of light work, the ALJ used Medical-Vocation Rule 202.21 as a framework for
deciding that there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy that she
is capable of performing, such as a shipping and receiving clerk. (Id.) The ALJ
concluded his findings by stating that Plaintiff “was not under a ‘disability,’ as defined
in the Social Security Act, at any time from December 17, 2000, the alleged onset
date, through December 31, 2006, the date last insured.” (Id.)
II.

Standard of Review
This Court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is

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a narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether there is
substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the
Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. See
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d
1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). The Court approaches the factual findings of the
Commissioner with deference, but applies close scrutiny to the legal conclusions. See
Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996). The Court may not decide facts,
weigh evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Id. “The
substantial evidence standard permits administrative decision makers to act with
considerable latitude, and ‘the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions
from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being
supported by substantial evidence.’” Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir.
1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620
(1966)). Indeed, even if this Court finds that the evidence preponderates against the
Commissioner’s decision, the Court must affirm if the decision is supported by
substantial evidence. Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400. No decision is automatic, however, for
“despite this deferential standard [for review of claims] it is imperative that the Court
scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the reasonableness of the decision

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reached.” Bridges v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987). Moreover, failure to
apply the correct legal standards is grounds for reversal. See Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d
629, 635 (11th Cir. 1984).
III.

Discussion
Ms. Shipman alleges that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed and remanded

for several reasons. First, she claims that the Commissioner violated her procedural
due process rights by not notifying her of her date of last insured (“DLI”) for DIB
purposes. (Doc. 6 at 5.) Second, Plaintiff contends generally that the ALJ’s RFC
assessment is not based on substantial evidence, and sets forth various sub-claims,
such as that the ALJ erred in giving little weight to her treating physician’s opinion,
the ALJ erred in not obtaining a consultative examination, and the ALJ did not comply
with Social Security Ruling 96-8p. (Id.) Third, she claims that the ALJ failed to apply
Social Security Ruling 83-20 because he did not obtain testimony from a medical
expert.
A.

Plaintiff was not deprived of her procedural due process rights in
connection with her DLI

Plaintiff states generally that the Commissioner’s treatment of her claim “lacks
due process from start to finish,” (doc. 6 at 5), but the only argument she makes with
any specificity is that the Commissioner violated her due process rights by not
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notifying her of her DLI for DIB purposes. “The fundamental requirement of due
process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (internal quotations marks
omitted). Moreover, “there must be a showing of prejudice before it is found that the
claimant’s right to due process has been violated to such a degree that the case must
be remanded to the [Commissioner] for further development of the record.” Graham
v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1423 (11th Cir. 1997).
In making her argument that she was entitled to be advised of her DLI, Plaintiff
relies solely on a Middle District of Florida district court case, Frazzetto v. Chater, 904
F. Supp. 1371 (M.D. Fla. 1995), which she miscites as an Eleventh Circuit case. Even
if the case were binding on this Court, which it is not, it is also not applicable here
because it dealt with whether a claimant is entitled to a supplemental hearing on the
grounds of mistake and newly discovered evidence when an ALJ used the incorrect
DLI in making his findings. See Frazzetto, 904 F.Supp. at 1373. In contrast here,
Plaintiff has never argued that the ALJ used an incorrect DLI, and in fact, Plaintiff was
put on notice of her DLI prior to the hearing. At the outset of the hearing, the ALJ
asked Plaintiff’s representative whether he had any objections to the proposed
exhibits—Exhibits 1A through 10F—which included a certified earning record

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indicating Plaintiff’s DLI was December 31, 2006. (Tr. 78, 126). Thus, Plaintiff’s
argument that she was not aware of her DLI and her due process rights were violated
is not well taken. Plaintiff has failed to show she was prejudiced, especially in light of
the fact that her representative was in possession of the exhibits in this case which
indicated her DLI, and presented no objections to the exhibits or the DLI at the
hearing.
B.

Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s RFC Assessment

The plaintiff contends generally that the ALJ’s RFC finding was not based on
substantial evidence, making various sub-claims in connection with this claim. The
regulations specifically state that the responsibility for assessing a claimant’s RFC
rests with the ALJ. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c); Social Security Ruling (“SSR”)
96-5p. The assessment of a claimant’s RFC is “based on all the relevant evidence in
[the claimant’s] case record,” and not simply on a doctor’s opinion. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545(a)(1). Here, as discussed below, the ALJ properly considered all of the
relevant evidence in assessing Plaintiff’s RFC, including the objective medical
findings, Plaintiff’s treatment history and the opinions of the doctors. (Tr. 24-35).
Plaintiff claimed that she was disabled due to back pain. When a claimant
attempts to establish disability based on her subjective complaints, she must provide

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evidence of an underlying medical condition and either objective medical evidence
confirming the severity of his alleged symptoms or that the medical condition could
be reasonably expected to give rise to his alleged symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1529(a), (b); SSR 96-7p. As the following evidence established, the medical
evidence of record does not support the plaintiff’s allegations and instead supports the
ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s condition did not cause disabling limitations and she
could perform light work with additional exertional restrictions. (Tr. at 36-37).
In December 2000, Plaintiff presented to Thomas R. Bryant, M.D., for lower
back pain after lifting a Christmas tree. (Tr. 546). Dr. Bryant noted lumbar spine
x-rays were normal, a straight leg test was negative, and diagnosed Plaintiff with a
lumbar strain. (Tr. 27, 545). Several days later, Plaintiff returned much improved with
minimal pain on movement and negative straight leg raises. (Tr. 545). A January 2001
MRI of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine showed some disc desiccation at L3-4, but at L4-5
there was no herniated disc or disc desiccation and very minimal broad based disc
bulge but no effacement of the nerve. (Tr. 27, 181). Plaintiff received a lumbar
epidural block in February 2001 and it was suggested she receive a series of three
more. (Tr. 27, 249-50).
In February and March 2001, Plaintiff had eleven physical therapy treatments.

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(Tr. 27, 204). Upon discharge, the physical therapist indicated Plaintiff had not been
compliant with neutral spine education, and that she was able to paint her bedroom
walls, bath cabinets, and scrub floor grout. (Tr. 27, 204). In addition, the physical
therapist noted occupational tasks could be tolerated if Plaintiff complied with a
suggested routine of exercise and maintaining neutral spine mechanics. (Tr. 204). In
February 2001, Dr. Bryant noted that although Plaintiff’s lumbar area was sore and
tender, she had negative straight leg raises. (Tr. 537).
In March 2001, Plaintiff presented to Keith W. Weaver, M.D., at Birmingham
Bone and Joint Surgeons. (Tr. 27, 536). Dr. Weaver noted that Plaintiff’s most recent
MRI showed no herniated disc, Plaintiff was walking well in the office, had negative
straight leg raises, 0/2 knee and ankle reflexes, and 5/5 motor strength. (Tr. 27, 536).
In April 2001, Plaintiff presented again to Dr. Bryant for continuing back pain, and Dr.
Bryant indicated that he did not feel Plaintiff could do her post office job that required
she carry 70 pounds all day long, and occasional lifting of 45 pounds over the head.
(Tr. 28, 534).
Also in April 2001, Plaintiff presented to Edwin L. Kelsey, M.D., at Southeast
Rehab Medicine, for lower back pain. (Tr. 28, 557). Dr. Kelsey noted that
flexion/extension of the lumbar spine and lateral bending and rotation were within the

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normal limits. (Tr. 28, 557). Dr. Kelsey recommended Plaintiff start physical therapy,
including endurance exercises, range of motion exercises, strengthening exercises, and
an aggressive home exercise program. (Tr. 557). A January 2003 MRI of Plaintiff’s
lumbar spine showed only mild focal midline disc protrusion/bulge at L4-L5, but it
was not causing any significant spinal stenosis or significant impingement on exiting
nerve roots. (Tr. 28, 184).
In September 2003, Plaintiff reported to Dr. Bryant that her back pain was
controlled fairly well with ibuprofen, Lortab, and Soma. (Tr. 28, 526). See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1527(d)(4), 404.1529(c)(3)(iv); Harwell v. Heckler, 735 F.2d 1292, 1293 (11th
Cir. 1984) (suggesting that an ailment controlled with medication is not disabling). In
addition, Plaintiff had a negative straight leg test, despite some tenderness in the
lumbar spine. (Tr. 526). Plaintiff presented again to Dr. Bryant in November 2004 for
complaints of back pain. (Tr. 410). However, Dr. Bryant noted that while Plaintiff’s
back was tender at the lumbosacral area, her motor, sensory, and reflex functions were
normal and her straight leg raise test was negative bilaterally. (Tr. 410).
On November 24, 2004, Dr. Bryant wrote a letter to the United States Office
of Personnel Management indicating that Plaintiff’s low back pain would constitute
risk of injury or hazard to herself or others, from performance of the essential duties

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of her job. (Tr. 33, 521). The ALJ gave this opinion little to no weight because the
letter was specific to Plaintiff’s ability to work at her medium-to-heavy exertional
position at the Post Office, and had no bearing on the RFC for light work assessed by
the ALJ. (Tr. 33). In June 2005, Plaintiff presented to Dr. Bryant for complaints of
back pain and he found some tenderness in the right posterior superior iliac spine area,
and Plaintiff had positive straight leg tests on the right at 60 degrees. (Tr. 411).
However, Plaintiff’s motor, reflex, and sensory functions were all normal. (Tr. 411).
In March 2006, Plaintiff received a left sacroiliac joint injection, and received relief
from pain immediately afterwards. (Tr. 29, 423). A May 2006 MRI of Plaintiff’s
lumbar spine showed disc extrusion with lateralization to the left at L4-5 and severe
facet hypertrophy, worse on the right than the left, and additional facet hypertrophy
at L4-5 and to a lesser extent L3-4. (Tr. 29, 182). Otherwise the MRI was normal and
no additional disc herniation was seen. (Tr. 182). In June 2008, Dr. Bryant opined
that Plaintiff could not perform full-time work on a sustained basis because of
absences exceeding two days per month, a need for frequent, unscheduled breaks, and
an inability to stay on task and/or complete tasks in a timely manner due to chronic
pain and/or side effects of pain medication. (Tr. 33, 552). The ALJ gave Dr. Bryant’s
opinion no weight because it was not consistent with the medical records, including

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Dr. Bryant’s own treatment notes. (Tr. 33). In addition, Dr. Bryant’s opinion did not
indicate that it relates back to the relevant time period in this case, which ended
December 31, 2006. (Tr. 552). Later in January 2010, Dr. Bryant filled out a medical
source statement where he opined Plaintiff could lift and/or carry 20 pounds
occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, could sit for 2 hours and stand and walk for 2
hours, occasionally push/pull, climb, perform gross and fine manipulation, bend,
stoop and reach, and never work around hazardous machinery. (Tr. 588). The ALJ
also gave this opinion no weight because it was not consistent with the evidence of
record and also did not pertain to the time period relevant in this case, ending
December 31, 2006. (Tr. 33).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision to give little weight to Dr. Bryant’s
opinions was error, but she has not demonstrated that the ALJ lacked “good cause”
for giving his opinions little weight. A treating physician’s testimony is entitled to
“substantial or considerable weight unless ‘good cause’ is shown to the contrary.”
Crawford v. Commissioner of Social Security, 363 F.3d 1155, 1159 (11th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997)) (internal quotations
omitted). “Good cause” exists for an ALJ to discount the weight of a treating
physician’s opinion when the: “(1) treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by

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the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician’s
opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical records.”
Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1241 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Lewis, 125 F.3d at
1440); see also Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 583-84 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding
“good cause” existed where the opinion was contradicted by other notations in the
physician’s record). With regard to Dr. Bryant’s opinion that Plaintiff could not
perform her former job as Postal Service worker, the ALJ correctly noted that
Plaintiff’s inability to perform such a medium to heavy exertional job has no bearing
on the ALJ’s RFC indicating that Plaintiff could still perform light work.1 As to Dr.
Bryant’s two later opinions, Plaintiff acknowledges that they post-date the DLI and
because they do not indicate that Plaintiff had disabling limitations during the DIB
period, they are not relevant.
Plaintiff also suggests in passing that the ALJ should have obtained a
consultative examination to further develop the record. Although there is evidence
that the Commissioner attempted to obtain a consultative examination of Plaintiff but
was unable to locate her, (tr. 167, 169-70), Plaintiff has still failed to show she was

1

Plaintiff also appears to take issue with the fact that the Postal Service deemed her
disabled, and she receives disability benefits from that agency. The ALJ considered this,
correctly noting that decisions of other agencies are not binding on the Commissioner, as each
agency has different standards by which disability is determined. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504.
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prejudiced regarding the development of the record. The ALJ has a duty to develop
the facts fully and fairly and to probe conscientiously for all of the relevant
information. Ware v. Schwieker, 651 F.2d 408, 414 (5th Cir. 1981). However, in all
social security disability cases, the claimant bears the ultimate burden of proving
disability, and is responsible for furnishing or identifying medical and other evidence
regarding her impairments. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987);
Doughty, 245 F.3d. at 1278; 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5). Furthermore, social security
regulations provide that “when the evidence [on record] . . . is inadequate for us to
determine whether you are disabled, [the ALJ] will need additional information to
reach a determination or a decision.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(e), 416.912(e) (emphasis
added). Therefore, where the ALJ’s findings are supported by evidence sufficient for
a decision, the ALJ is not obligated to seek additional medical testimony. See Wilson
v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 1999). Furthermore, Plaintiff must make a
“clear showing of prejudice before it is found that the [plaintiff’s] right to due process
has been violated to such a degree that the case must be remanded to the [ALJ] for
further development of the record.” Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.2d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir.
1997). Thus, Plaintiff must show that the lack of a record created an evidentiary gap,
resulting in unfairness or clear prejudice. See Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 586

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(11th Cir. 1991) (finding that plaintiff was not prejudiced by a lack of representation
because record did not contain any discernible evidentiary gaps). Here, the objective
medical evidence of record, as discussed above, contained sufficient evidence for the
ALJ to make an informed decision about the limiting effects of Plaintiff’s back pain.
See Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1281; Graham, 129 F.3d at 1422-23. A consultative
examination need not be obtained to establish absolute certainty regarding a claimant’s
condition, as the Social Security Act requires only substantial evidence to support an
ALJ’s findings. See Holladay v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 1988). Thus,
the ALJ clearly had enough evidence, without a consultative examination, to make an
informed decision and substantial evidence supports his RFC finding.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in his RFC finding because the record
did not include a medical opinion from the period at issue that “[met] the specificity
requirements of SSR 96-8p.” This ruling states the Commissioner’s policies
regarding the assessment of a claimant’s RFC and calls for a function by function
analysis of each category including exertional, postural, manipulative, and
environmental as well as mental for the period at issue. See SSR 96-8p. As an initial
matter, the ALJ was not required to rely on a doctor’s opinion in making his RFC
finding. Although a doctor may provide an opinion regarding what a claimant can still

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do, the assessment of a claimant’s RFC is not a “medical opinion,” and the
responsibility of assessing a claimant’s RFC, and determining whether the claimant
is disabled, rests with the ALJ. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e), 404.1545, 404.1546(c),
SSR 96-5p; Bell v. Brown, 796 F.2d 1350, 1353-54 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Langley v.
Astrue, 777 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1252-61 (N.D. Ala. 2011) (discussing why a claimant’s
RFC is not a medical assessment and an ALJ is not required to rely on a doctor’s
opinion in assessing a claimant’s RFC). The ALJ discussed the relevant evidence in
accordance with SSR 96-8p and specifically addressed Plaintiff’s ability to sit, stand,
and walk as well as other exertional limitations. (Tr. 25-36). The ALJ, therefore, was
not required to further discuss Plaintiff’s ability to perform each of the exertional
demands. Thus, although the ALJ may not have drafted his decision as Plaintiff may
have wished, the ALJ properly considered the record and substantial evidence
supports his RFC finding.
Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff did not have
any mental limitations on her ability to work. (Tr. 36). As discussed by the ALJ,
undermining Plaintiff’s complaints of depression are the facts that her mental
complaints were well-controlled with medication prescribed by her primary care
physician and Plaintiff did not have psychiatric treatment on a consistent basis. (Tr.

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33). See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(4), 404.1529(c)(3)(iv). As discussed by the ALJ,
in October 2005 Plaintiff had a psychiatric evaluation performed by Wayne Gossman,
M.D., at the Birmingham Pain Center. (Tr. 29, 481-84). As noted by the ALJ, Plaintiff
reported taking her prescription medication correctly “most of the time,” but would
increase her medication with increased amounts of pain, causing her to run out of
medication early each month. (Tr. 29, 481). While out of medication, Plaintiff
reported that she “toughs it out.” (Tr. 29, 481). Plaintiff also reported that she was
able to care for herself, including bathing, dressing, and tying her shoes, and she did
a limited amount of chores around the house and cooked. (Tr. 29, 482). As the ALJ
noted, the results of her personality assessment inventory also showed some symptom
magnification, which indicates that she was over-representing her symptoms. (Tr. 29,
483). In sum, Plaintiff has failed to show she had any work-related mental limitations
and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC finding.
C.

The ALJ Was Not Required to Obtain Evidence from a Medical
Expert (“ME”)

Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ failed to apply SSR 83-20 by failing to obtain the
testimony of an ME. Plaintiff’s argument is without merit because SSR 83-20 does
not apply to her case. SSR 83-20 discusses the need for the ALJ to use an ME to
determine the onset date when the claimant has been found disabled. Here, the ALJ
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did not find Plaintiff disabled. See Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 274 (6th Cir. 1997)
(“Since there was no finding that the claimant is disabled as a result of his mental
impairment or any other impairments or combination thereof, no inquiry into onset
date is required.”). As such, the ALJ properly considered the relevant evidence in
finding that Plaintiff was not disabled on or before December 31, 2006.
IV.

Conclusion
Upon review of the administrative record, and considering all of Ms. Shipman’s

arguments, the Court finds the Commissioner’s decision is consistent with all due
process requirements, supported by substantial evidence and in accord with the
applicable law. A separate order will be entered.
Done this 29th day of September 2014.

L. Scott Coogler
United States District Judge
[160704]

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