Patterson v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge L Scott Coogler on 06/03/2013. (MSN)

FILED
2013 Jun-03 AM 10:49
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
SANDRA K. PATTERSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

2:12-cv-1943-LSC

MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.

Introduction
The plaintiff, Sandra K. Patterson, appeals from the decision of the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying her
application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). Mrs. Patterson timely pursued
and exhausted her administrative remedies and the decision of the Commissioner is
ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).
Mrs. Patterson was fifty-five years old at the time of the Administrative Law
Judge’s (“ALJ’s”) decision. (Tr. at 46.) She is a high school graduate and has
attended one year of business college. (Id.) Her past work experiences include

Page 1 of 14

employment as a secretary and administrative assistant. (Id.) Mrs. Patterson claims
that she became disabled on August 2, 2005, due to degenerative disc disease and
fibromyalgia. (Tr. at 46.)
When evaluating the disability of individuals over the age of eighteen, the
regulations prescribe a five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520, 416.920; see also Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The
first step requires a determination of whether the claimant is “doing substantial
gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If he or she is, the
claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If he or she is not, the
Commissioner next considers the effect of all of the physical and mental impairments
combined. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). These impairments
must be severe and must meet the durational requirements before a claimant will be
found to be disabled. Id. The decision depends on the medical evidence in the record.
See Hart v. Finch, 440 F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971). If the claimant’s impairments
are not severe, the analysis stops. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii).
Otherwise, the analysis continues to step three, which is a determination of whether
the claimant’s impairments meet or equal the severity of an impairment listed in 20
C.F.R. pt. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii),

Page 2 of 14

416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant’s impairments fall within this category, he or she
will be found disabled without further consideration.

Id.

If they do not, a

determination of the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) will be made
and the analysis proceeds to the fourth step. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).
The fourth step requires a determination of whether the claimant’s
impairments prevent him or her from returning to past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant can still do his or her past
relevant work, the claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If the
claimant cannot do past relevant work, then the analysis proceeds to the fifth step. Id.
Step five requires the court to consider the claimant’s RFC, as well as the claimant’s
age, education, and past work experience in order to determine if he or she can do
other work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v) 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant can do
other work, the claimant is not disabled. Id.
Applying the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Mrs. Patterson
meets the nondisability requirements for a period of disability and DIB and was
insured through the date of his decision. (Tr. at 28-29.) He further determined that
Mrs. Patterson has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset
of her disability. (Tr. at 29.) The ALJ found that Mrs. Patterson has the severe

Page 3 of 14

impairments of fibromyalgia and degenerative disc disease. (Id.) However, according
to the ALJ, Plaintiff’s degenerative disc disease and fibromyalgia are not considered
to be impairments or combinations of impairments that meet or equal any of the listed
impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. at 26.) The ALJ did
not find Mrs. Patterson’s allegations to be fully credible, and he determined that she
retains the following residual functional capacity: sedentary work which allows
occasional bending or stooping in a temperature controlled environment with no
upper extremity pushing or pulling movements. (Tr. at 28.)
Mrs. Patterson is considered a person of “advanced age,” as defined by the
regulations. (Id.) The ALJ found that Mrs. Patterson is capable of performing any of
her past relevant work as a secretary and administrative assistant and that she has the
residual functional capacity to perform a range of sedentary work. (Id.) Even though
Plaintiff cannot perform the full range of sedentary work, the ALJ noted that under
Social Security Ruling 82-61, an individual will be found not disabled “when it is
determined that he or she retains the residual functional capacity to perform the actual
functional demands and job duties of the occupation as generally required by
employers throughout the national economy.” (Id.) After soliciting testimony from
a vocational expert, the ALJ found Mrs. Patterson could meet the functional demands

Page 4 of 14

of her past work. The ALJ concluded his findings by stating that Plaintiff “was not
under a ‘disability,’ as defined in the Social Security Act, from August 2, 2005
through the date of this decision.” (Id.)
II.

Standard of Review
This Court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is

a narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether there is
substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the
Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. See
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d
1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). The Court approaches the factual findings of the
Commissioner with deference, but applies close scrutiny to the legal conclusions. See
Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996). The Court may not decide facts,
weigh evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Id. “The
substantial evidence standard permits administrative decision makers to act with
considerable latitude, and ‘the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions
from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being
supported by substantial evidence.’” Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir.
1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607,

Page 5 of 14

620 (1966)). Indeed, even if this Court finds that the evidence preponderates against
the Commissioner’s decision, the Court must affirm if the decision is supported by
substantial evidence. Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400. No decision is automatic, however, for
“despite this deferential standard [for review of claims] it is imperative that the Court
scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the reasonableness of the decision
reached.” Bridges v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987). Moreover, failure to
apply the correct legal standards is grounds for reversal. See Bowen v. Heckler, 748
F.2d 629, 635 (11th Cir. 1984).
III.

Discussion
Mrs. Patterson contends that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed and

remanded because the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the credibility of her testimony
of disabling symptoms in accordance with the Eleventh Circuit’s “pain standard.”
(Doc. 8 at 4.)
Disability benefits may not be paid solely on the basis of a claimant’s own selfserving complaints. See: 42 U.S.C §§ 423 (d)(5)(A), 1382c (a)(3)(H)(I) (“An
individual shall not be considered to be under a disability unless he furnishes such
medical and other evidence of the existence thereof as the Commissioner of Social
Security may require An individual’s statement as to pain and other symptoms shall

Page 6 of 14

not alone be conclusive evidence of disability.”) However, subjective testimony of
pain and other symptoms may establish the presence of a disabling impairment if it is
supported by medical evidence. See Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir.
1995). To establish disability based upon pain and other subjective symptoms, the
Eleventh Circuit has set forth a three-part standard: “The pain standard requires (1)
evidence of an underlying medical condition and either (2) objective medical evidence
that confirms the severity of the alleged pain arising from that condition or (3) that the
objectively determined medical condition is of such a severity that it can be reasonably
expected to give rise to the alleged pain.” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th
Cir. 2005) (citing Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991)); see also
Landry v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1551, 1553 (11th Cir. 1986).
The ALJ may discredit the claimant’s subjective testimony of pain and other
symptoms if he articulates explicit and adequate reasons for doing so based on
substantial evidence. Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002); see also
Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186 (1996) (“[T]he adjudicator must carefully
consider the individual’s statements about symptoms with the rest of the relevant
evidence in the case record in reaching a conclusion about the credibility of the
individual’s statements.”) Although the Eleventh Circuit does not require explicit

Page 7 of 14

findings as to credibility, “‘the implication must be obvious to the reviewing court.’”
Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210 (quoting Foote, 67 F.3d at 1562). “[P]articular phrases or
formulations” do not have to be cited in an ALJ’s credibility determination, but it
cannot be a “broad rejection” which is “not enough to enable [the district court or
this Court] to conclude that [the ALJ] considered her medical condition as a whole.”
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
In this case, the ALJ did not find Mrs. Patterson’s statements “fully credible
in light of medical history, reports from treating and examining practitioners, and the
objective clinical findings on examination.” (Tr. at 26.) The ALJ did find that Plaintiff
had the “severe” impairments of fibromyalgia and degenerative disc disease (id.) but
that she did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
equals one of the listed impairments as required by 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1. The ALJ found that “[t]he evidence as a whole fails to confirm disabling
limitations arising from the claimant’s impairments, and her impairments have not
been of such severity that they could reasonably be expected to give rise to disabling
limitations.” (Tr. at 29.)
In determining whether Mrs. Patterson had the residual functional capacity to
perform her past relevant work, despite her impairments, the ALJ considered her

Page 8 of 14

subjective complaints. Specifically, the ALJ found that the documentary evidence
established underlying medical conditions capable of producing some pain and other
limitations, but that substantial evidence did not support a conclusion that the
objectively determined medical conditions were of such severity that they could
reasonably be expected to give rise to disabling pain and the other limitations alleged
by Mrs. Patterson. (Tr. at 28.) The ALJ noted that while Mrs. Patterson alleges that
fibromyalgia and degenerative disc disorder are principally what kept Plaintiff from
working, the documentary evidence fails to confirm such disabling limitations. (Tr.
at 29.)
The ALJ’s conclusions are supported by the record. Plaintiff alleges that her
disability began in August 2005, but she admittedly did not seek treatment for
fibromyalgia until she saw Dr. Shepherd in January 2010. (Tr. at 508.) Even then, Dr.
Shepherd’s assessment of Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms was only “probable
fibromyalgia,” and any mention of physical limitations resulting from the fibromyalgia
are absent from his medical record. (Id.) During the same visit, Dr. Shepherd
performed a routine physical examination of Mrs. Patterson, noting that she was
within normal limits, her lower back pain was “much improved,” and she had a
“normal gait.” (Id.) In May 2010, Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Watterson, who

Page 9 of 14

noted that a “lumbar MRI demonstrated only small disc bulges at the L1-L4 levels and
a small disc bulge at the L5/S1 level, which appeared to be insignificant.” (Tr. at 28,
537.) Mrs. Patterson denied any sensory deficits, motor weaknesses, and any bladder
or bowel dysfunction. (Id.) These unremarkable visits do not corroborate Plaintiff’s
subjective claims of disabling pain.
It would be significant if the Plaintiff could definitively establish that she has
fibromyalgia because “[f ]ibromyalgia, if properly diagnosed, satisfies the pain
standard.” Bennet v. Barnhart, 288 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1249 (N.D. Ala. 2003). The
presence of fibromyalgia can be objectively verified by the presence of “tender areas,”
or “trigger points,” which are well defined and cause pain upon palpation. Id. Clinical
support for a diagnosis of fibromyalgia may be present if “injections of pain
medication to the trigger points are prescribed.” Id. Although Mrs. Patterson alleges
pain at these points, it does not appear from the record that any formal tender point
testing or treatment was ever performed. The ALJ noted that the American College
of Rheumatology (ACR) has determined that a diagnosis of fibromyalgia must be
supported by widespread pain in all four quadrants of the body for a minimum of three
months and positive results in at least 11 of 18 specified tender points. (Tr. at 27.)
There is no evidence in the record that these tests were ever performed or that there

Page 10 of 14

was a reason to perform them.
Mrs. Patterson’s testimony indicated that her back pain was getting
progressively worse, to the point that it caused her to scream involuntarily. (Tr. at 8.)
However, the ALJ noted that such symptoms and levels of pain do not appear in any
of the clinical notes taken by her doctors and that Dr. Watterson cited a 70-80%
decrease in back pain from regular epidural blocks. (Tr. at 27, 537.) Plaintiff contends
that the ALJ overstated the relief from the epidurals, incorrectly implying that the
relief was longstanding when, in fact, it only lasted for two to three weeks at a time.
(Doc. 8 at 6.) However, the ALJ also observed that Plaintiff’s pain was managed with
Mobic and Ibuprofen, which are mild analgesics, rather than narcotics that might be
indicative of severe disabling pain. (Tr. at 27.) This finding supports the ALJ’s
decision to afford little credibility to Plaintiff’s subjective complaints.
Plaintiff also contends that her pain causes her to lie in bed for several hours a
day. (Tr. at 27, 48, 50.) However, as the ALJ stated, she has not reported this
symptom to any physician nor does it appear in the clinical notes in the record. The
ALJ additionally pointed out that lying down does not appear to be a prescribed
treatment or therapy for Mrs. Patterson’s conditions. (Tr. at 27.) Plaintiff alleges that
the ALJ is attempting to “play doctor” in making the above determination because the

Page 11 of 14

longitudinal history of Mrs. Patterson’s complaints of pain and continued treatment
for the same symptoms demonstrate her attempts to follow the treatment once it is
prescribed. (Doc. 8 at 7.) She contends that this history should lend support to her
allegations of intense or persistent pain or other symptoms for the purposes of judging
the credibility of her statements. (Id.) The ALJ, however, found that not only was
lying down not a prescribed treatment for Mrs. Patterson’s symptoms, but that
exercise was actually recommended. (Tr. at 27, 277, 367, 471, 476, 479, 508, 509, 515.)
He concluded from that evidence that Plaintiff is not only capable of performing
exercises but also that her treating physicians believed it would be therapeutic. (Tr.
at 27.)
Finally, Plaintiff contends that medical evidence dating back to 2004 supports
her testimony that she is unable to complete an eight hour work day at any exertional
level because of chronic moderately severe back and lower body pain. Such evidence
includes total knee replacements in her right knee and multiple injections. (Doc. 8 at
7.) While her joint pain was described at one time as “uncontrolled,” (tr. at 410, 412),
the ALJ pointed out that the results from her current physical examinations
undermined her allegations of disabling pain. (Tr. at 27, 508-13, 537.) The recent
physical examinations yielded results that were either good or unremarkable, with

Page 12 of 14

doctors noting that her straight leg tests were negative and that she maintained full
motor strength in all major muscle groups. (Tr. at 27, 325, 450-1, 458, 471, 476, 478,
493, 539.) The ALJ pointed to the fact that none of Mrs. Patterson’s treating
physicians specifically found her to be so limited as to call her “disabled,” (tr. at 28)
and that Dr. Nortick, who performed a consultative physical evaluation, believed that
Mrs. Patterson could frequently sit and stand for up to six hours. (Tr. at 28, 456.)
Finally, when asked to consider Mrs. Patterson’s age, education, work experience, and
assigned RFC, Mr. Parsons, the vocational expert, testified that Plaintiff could return
to her past relevant work or pursue work as a ticket taker, medical transcriptionist, or
an appointment clerk. (Tr. at 31-33.)
The ALJ specifically addressed Plaintiff’s allegations of pain in his opinion, and
he provided explicit and reasonable reasons for rejecting her testimony. The reasons
articulated are not a “broad rejection” and do not indicate that the ALJ failed to
consider Plaintiff’s medical condition as a whole. The objective medical and other
evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s condition did not cause
disabling limitations, and instead shows that she could perform a reduced range of
sedentary work. (Tr. at 28.) The ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s testimony of her
disabling pain was not credible is supported by substantial evidence. This court will

Page 13 of 14

not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ’s when, as here, it is supported by
substantial evidence.
IV.

Conclusion
Upon review of the administrative record, and considering all of Mrs.

Patterson’s arguments, the Court finds the Commissioner’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence and in accord with the applicable law. A separate order will be
entered.
Done this 3rd day of June 2013.

L. Scott Coogler
United States District Judge
[170956]

Page 14 of 14