Sparks v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 11

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge L Scott Coogler on 06/10/2013. (MSN)

FILED
2013 Jun-10 AM 11:02
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JOSEPH SPARKS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

2:12-CV-02092-LSC

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
I.

Introduction
The plaintiff, Joseph Sparks, appeals from the decision of the Commissioner of

the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying his application for
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”).
Mr. Sparks timely pursued and exhausted his administrative remedies and the
decision of the Commissioner is ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),
1383(c)(3).
Mr. Sparks was fifty-seven years old at the time of the Administrative Law
Judge’s (“ALJ’s”) decision, and he has a twelfth grade education, as well as
specialized training in the mining industry. (Tr. at 30.) His past work experiences
include employment as an office manager and an auto salesman. (Tr. at 32-33.) Mr.
Page 1 of 15

Sparks claims that he became disabled on September 7, 2009, due to elbow pain,
seizures, depression, and anxiety. (Tr. at 32-33.)
When evaluating the disability of individuals over the age of eighteen, the
regulations prescribe a five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520, 416.920; see also Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The
first step requires a determination of whether the claimant is “doing substantial
gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If he or she is, the
claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If he or she is not, the
Commissioner next considers the effect of all of the physical and mental impairments
combined. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). These impairments
must be severe and must meet the durational requirements before a claimant will be
found to be disabled. Id. The decision depends on the medical evidence in the record.
See Hart v. Finch, 440 F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971). If the claimant’s impairments
are not severe, the analysis stops. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii).
Otherwise, the analysis continues to step three, which is a determination of whether
the claimant’s impairments meet or equal the severity of an impairment listed in 20
C.F.R. pt. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii),

416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant’s impairments fall within this category, he or she

Page 2 of 15

will be found disabled without further consideration.

Id.

If they do not, a

determination of the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) will be made
and the analysis proceeds to the fourth step. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).
The fourth step requires a determination of whether the claimant’s
impairments prevent him or her from returning to past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant can still do his or her past
relevant work, the claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If the
claimant cannot do past relevant work, then the analysis proceeds to the fifth step. Id.
Step five requires the court to consider the claimant’s RFC, as well as the claimant’s
age, education, and past work experience in order to determine if he or she can do
other work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v) 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant can do
other work, the claimant is not disabled. Id.
Applying the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Mr. Sparks
meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through Dec. 31,
2013. (Tr. at 15.) He further determined that Mr. Sparks has not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of his disability. (Id.) According to
the ALJ, Plaintiff’s s/p fracture of the left elbow; s/p left elbow replacement with
resulting mild wasting osteoarthritis; and seizure disorder are considered “severe”

Page 3 of 15

based on the requirements set forth in the regulations. (Id.) However, he found that
these impairments neither meet nor medically equal any of the listed impairments in
Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4. (Tr. at 17.) The ALJ did not find Mr.
Sparks’s allegations to be totally credible, and he determined that he has the following
residual functional capacity: light exertional work; he cannot climb ladders, ropes or
scaffolding; he should avoid unprotected heights and moving machinery; and he is
limited to jobs where it is acceptable to rely on his dominant right arm for lifting and
carrying. (Id.)
According to the ALJ, Mr. Sparks is able to perform his past relevant work as
an office manager. (Tr. at 20.) Using the testimony of a vocational expert (VE), the
ALJ found that he can perform the job of office manager, not as he actually performed
it, but as it is generally performed in the national economy. (Id.) The ALJ concluded
his findings by stating that Plaintiff “has not been under a ‘disability,’ as defined in
the Social Security Act, from September 7, 2009, through the date of this decision.”
(Tr. at 21.)
II.

Standard of Review
This Court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is

a narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether there is

Page 4 of 15

substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the
Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. See
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d
1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). The Court approaches the factual findings of the
Commissioner with deference, but applies close scrutiny to the legal conclusions. See
Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996). The Court may not decide facts,
weigh evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Id. “The
substantial evidence standard permits administrative decision makers to act with
considerable latitude, and ‘the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions
from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being
supported by substantial evidence.’” Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir.
1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607,
620 (1966)). Indeed, even if this Court finds that the evidence preponderates against
the Commissioner’s decision, the Court must affirm if the decision is supported by
substantial evidence. Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400. No decision is automatic, however, for
“despite this deferential standard [for review of claims] it is imperative that the Court
scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the reasonableness of the decision
reached.” Bridges v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987). Moreover, failure to

Page 5 of 15

apply the correct legal standards is grounds for reversal. See Bowen v. Heckler, 748
F.2d 629, 635 (11th Cir. 1984).
III.

Discussion
Mr. Sparks alleges that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed and remanded for

two reasons. First, he believes that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the credibility
of the plaintiff’s testimony regarding his disabling symptoms. (Doc. 8 at 4.) Second,
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not properly consider the combined effects of his
impairments. (Doc. 8 at 7.)
A.

Subjective Pain Standard

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly evaluated the credibility of his
testimony. (Doc. 8 at 4.) It has been established that disability benefits may not be
awarded solely on the basis of a claimant’s own subjective complaints. 42 U.S.C.
§§423 (d)(5)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(H)(I) (“An individual shall not be considered to be
under a disability unless he furnishes such medical and other evidence of the existence
thereof as the Commissioner of Social Security may require. An individual’s
statement as to pain and other symptoms shall not alone be conclusive evidence of
disability.”) However, a claimant’s subjective claims of pain and other symptoms can
support a finding of disability if they are supported by medical evidence that fulfills the

Page 6 of 15

Eleventh Circuit’s “pain standard” and are not discredited by the ALJ. See Foote v.
Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1995). In order to satisfy the pain standard, a
claimant must show “evidence of an underlying medical condition, and either (1)
objective medical evidence to confirm the severity of the alleged pain arising from that
condition, or (2) that the objectively determined medical condition is of a severity that
it can reasonably be expected to give rise to the alleged pain.” Id. at 1560; see also Dyer
v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005); Landry v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1551,
1553 (11th Cir. 1986).
Once the pain standard is satisfied, the ALJ must consider a claimant’s
subjective testimony of pain and other symptoms. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560; see also
Minter v. Astrue, 722 F.Supp. 2d 1279, 1282 (N.D. Ala. 2010) (holding that “if a
claimant testifies to disabling pain and satisfies the three part pain standard, he must
be found disabled unless that testimony is properly discredited.”) If the ALJ discredits
the claimant’s subjective testimony of pain and other symptoms, he must articulate
explicit and adequate reasons for doing so. Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225
(11th Cir. 2002); see also Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186 (1996) (“[T]he
adjudicator must carefully consider the individual’s statements about symptoms with
the rest of the relevant evidence in the case record in reaching a conclusion about the

Page 7 of 15

credibility of the individual’s statements.”) “Although [the Eleventh Circuit] does
not require an explicit finding as to credibility. . . the implication must be obvious to
the reviewing court.” Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210 (quoting Foote, 67 F.3d at 1562). The ALJ
is not required to cite “particular phrases or formulations” in his credibility
determination, but it cannot be a broad rejection that is insufficient to enable this
Court to conclude that the ALJ considered the claimant’s medical condition as a
whole. Id.
In this case, Plaintiff claims that although the ALJ articulated several reasons
for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony, none of these reasons were supported by
substantial evidence of record. (Doc. 8 at 5.) The ALJ found that the plaintiff showed
evidence of his underlying medical condition, as required by the Eleventh Circuit’s
pain standard, but that the medical evidence failed to support the severity of the
limitations to which the plaintiff testified. (Tr. at 18.) Specifically, the ALJ found that
the “longitudinal medical evidence cannot be fully reconciled with the level of
symptoms and limiting effects of the impairments as alleged.” (Id.) To support this
conclusion the ALJ noted, for example, that Plaintiff has undergone an x-ray of his left
elbow, which was replaced in 1999, that revealed no complication in the resulting
hardware. (Tr. at 18, 204.) Additionally, the plaintiff underwent a subsequent x-ray

Page 8 of 15

on the same elbow in November 2009 with similar results. (Tr. at 18, 293.) The ALJ
also noted that, following Plaintiff’s complaints of pain in his left knee, a November
2009 x-ray of the plaintiff’s left knee revealed pathology consistent with a disease
called Osgood-Schlatter. (Tr. at 18, 295.) However, the plaintiff’s medical records
lack previous reports of pain in this knee. (Tr. at 18, 235, 244, 293.) Plaintiff contends
that he did not seek medical care because he could not afford it. The ALJ
acknowledged that Plaintiff lost his medical insurance after losing his job in 2009;
however, he had an “extensive longitudinal history with his primary care physician,
Dr. Jerry McLane, prior to losing his insurance,” and there is no indication in any of
these medical records that the plaintiff complained of pain in his knee or elbow. (Tr.
at 18.)
The ALJ also noted that while there is evidence in the record that the plaintiff
suffers from “occasional seizures,” the medical evidence reveals that the seizures
occur infrequently. (Tr. at 18.) Plaintiff suffered one seizure in 2009; prior to that, the
medical record shows that Plaintiff had not suffered a seizure since the very first one
he experienced in 1986. (Tr. at 236.) After his 2009 seizure, Plaintiff saw a
neurologist, who noted that his epilepsy was controlled with medication (Tr. at 225.)
Likewise, a neurological examination of the plaintiff at that time showed that he had

Page 9 of 15

normal strength, coordination, gait, and cerebellar function. (Id.) In any event, the
ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff’s seizures occur without warning, and accounted for
Plaintiff’s seizures in his RFC by precluding him from climbing ropes, ladders, or
scaffolds and from being near unprotected heights or moving machinery. (Tr. at 19.)
Additionally, during a January 2010 consultative examination, the plaintiff informed
Raveendran Meleth, M.D., the consultative examiner (CE), that he was capable of
sitting and standing for two hours at a time. (Tr. at 261.) The CE also found that
Plaintiff’s hand grip and dexterity were within normal limits and that he had strength
of 5/5 in his upper and lower extremities bilaterally with only a slight loss of sensation
in his left forearm. (Id.) In sum, the medical record indicates minimal muscle loss and
sparse complaints of pain, which are consistent with the aforementioned residual
functional capacity and inconsistent with the plaintiff’s allegations of disabling
symptoms. (Tr. at 19.)
The ALJ also found that the nature of Plaintiff’s daily activities contradicts his
allegations of disabling functional limitations. (Id.) The ALJ cannot use daily activities
alone to determine whether a claimant is disabled. However, in considering the entire
record, the ALJ may consider a claimant’s activities, to make a finding regarding
credibility. 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3) (“Factors relevant to your symptoms, such as

Page 10 of 15

pain, which we will consider include: (I) Your daily activities....”) The plaintiff
admitted that he drives up to five times per week. (Tr. at 44.) The plaintiff also claims
a need to rest for 10-15 minutes every hour. (Tr. at 38.) However, he shops for and
carries groceries and does the laundry. (Tr. at 44.) He also performs heavier
household chores such as vacuuming and dusting, and does yard work such as mowing
the grass without assistance. (Tr. at 45.) These activities can be physically demanding,
and the fact that the plaintiff performs them regularly and without assistance is
inconsistent with his claims of disabling pain.
Furthermore, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s demeanor at the hearing raised
questions about his credibility. (Tr. at 19.) The Eleventh Circuit has held that an ALJ
is “not prohibited from considering a claimant’s appearance and demeanor at the
hearing.” See Macia v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 1009, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987). The regulations
and Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-7p also allow an ALJ to consider his or her
observations of the claimant in assessing the credibility of the claimant’s allegations.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(vii), (4), 416.929(c)(3)(vii), (4); SSR 96-7p. The
plaintiff repeatedly evaded the ALJ’s questions regarding the frequency of his driving
and did not admit to driving up to five times per week until the ALJ asked the question
multiple times. (Tr. at 19, 43-44.) When considered alongside the medical evidence

Page 11 of 15

offered, this lack of candor indicates inconsistency in the plaintiff’s subjective pain
testimony.
Inferences drawn by the ALJ from the evidence are not to be overturned if they
are supported by substantial evidence. Savor v. Shalala, 868 F. Supp. 1363, 1366
(M.D. Fla 1994). In fact, this Court “may not decide facts anew, reweigh the
evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the Commissioner.” Dyer, 395 F.3d
at 1210. In this case, the ALJ carefully examined all of the available evidence and
explained in detail his reasoning for rejecting the plaintiff’s complaints regarding the
severity of his elbow and knee pain, and the ALJ set restrictions for the plaintiff based
on this evidence. This is sufficient to satisfy this Court that the adverse credibility
determination is supported by substantial evidence. See Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d
1219, 1226 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that the “ALJ made a reasonable decision to
reject [the claimant’s] subjective testimony, articulating, in detail, the contrary
evidence as his reasons for doing so”).
B. Combined Effects of Plaintiff’s Multiple Impairments
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not properly consider the combined effects
of his multiple impairments, noting that he complained of problems with his left elbow
and knees. (Doc. 8 at 7.) A claim for social security benefits based on disability may

Page 12 of 15

exist even when the individual impairments are not disabling; in these situations, the
ALJ must make “specific and well-articulated findings” as to the effect of the
impairments in combination and decide whether the combined impairments cause the
claimant to be disabled. Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635 (11th Cir. 1984). In
considering the plaintiff’s alleged impairments, the ALJ must, at step two of the
sequential evaluation process, determine whether the claimant has a medically
determinable impairment that is “severe” or a combination of impairments that is
“severe.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. If the claimant has a severe impairment or
combination of impairments, the analysis proceeds to the third step.
In this case, the ALJ found in favor of the plaintiff and determined that he had
severe impairments. “Even if the ALJ erred in not indicating whether [a condition]
was a severe impairment, the error was harmless because the ALJ concluded that [the
claimant] had a severe impairment: and that finding is all that step two requires.”
Heathy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 382 F. App’x 823, 824-825 (11thCir. 2010). “Nothing
requires that the ALJ must identify, at step two, all of the impairments that should be
considered severe. Instead, at step three, the ALJ is required to demonstrate that it has
considered all of the claimant’s impairments, whether severe or not, in
combination.”Id. at 825. See also Diorio v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 726, 728 (11th Cir. 1991)

Page 13 of 15

(applying the harmless error doctrine to social security cases); Jamison v. Bowen, 814
F.2d 585, 588 (11th Cir. 1987) (“the finding of any severe impairment. . . whether or
not it results from a single severe impairment or a combination of impairments that
together qualify as severe” is enough to satisfy step two).
The ALJ identified the plaintiff’s ailments as severe in step two and proceeded
to step three, where it was determined that the plaintiff’s impairments or combination
of impairments did not meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments in 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. at 17.) The ALJ considered both the
plaintiff’s knee and elbow impairments and his seizure disorder and determined that
these impairments, while severe, do not meet the requirements under any listed
impairment. (Id.) Additionally, the ALJ found that “the record does not document
medical findings that the claimant’s impairments, individually or in combination,
equal the level of severity and duration contemplated under any listed impairment.”
(Id.) The ALJ examined the medical records and carefully considered the effects of
the plaintiff’s impairments before making a finding, which provides sufficient
evidence that the ALJ considered the combined effect of the plaintiff’s impairments.
Moreover, the ALJ accounted for limitations caused by Plaintiff’s left knee by
limiting Plaintiff to never climbing ladders, ropes, scaffolds and avoiding hazards,

Page 14 of 15

unprotected heights, and moving machinery. (Tr. at 17.) The ALJ also gave Plaintiff
the benefit of the doubt with respect to his allegations that he had problems with his
left elbow. The ALJ accounted for this limitation by restricting plaintiff to jobs where
he could rely on his dominant right arm for lifting and carrying. (Id.)
IV.

Conclusion
Upon review of the administrative record, and considering all of Mr. Sparks’s

arguments, the Court finds the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence and in accord with the applicable law. A separate order will be entered.
Done this 10th day of June 2013.

L. Scott Coogler
United States District Judge
[160704]

Page 15 of 15