Hernandez et al v. Hankook Tire America Corporation et al

Filing 59

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER re #51 Joint MOTION for Summary Judgment Ford and Wal-Mart Defendants' Joinder and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and #49 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment ; For reasons as noted within, the court finds that defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of plaintiffs standing to pursue her wrongful death claim. The motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED. Signed by Judge William M Acker, Jr on 10/30/13. (SAC )

FILED
2013 Oct-30 PM 03:37
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
GREGORIA HERNANDEZ HERNANDEZ, }
et al.,
}
}
Plaintiffs,
}
}
}
HANKOOK TIRE AMERICA
}
CORPORATION, et al.,
}
}
Defendants.
}

Case No. 2:12-CV-03618-WMA

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court is the motion for partial summary judgment
filed by Hankook Tire America Corporation and Hankook Tire Company,
Ltd., and joined in part by Ford Motor Company, Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., and Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P. (collectively “defendants”).
Defendants seek summary judgment on the wrongful death claim
brought

by

Paloma

Santiago

Hernandez

(“plaintiff”),

as

administrator ad litem for the estate of Valente Santiago Garcia,
deceased, based on lack of standing.1

Defendants’ motion will be

denied because, as explained more fully below, Alabama law grants
standing to administrators ad litem to pursue wrongful death claims
and prohibits collateral attacks upon the orders appointing the
administrators ad litem except on the basis of lack of jurisdiction
in the appointing authority.
1

Hankook Tire America Corp. and Hankook Tire Co. also sought summary
judgment on the failure to warn claims by Paloma Santiago Hernandez and
Gregoria Hernandez Hernandez. Ford Motor Co., Wal-Mart Stores, and Wal-Mart
Stores East did not join in that part of the motion. The failure to warn
claims were later dismissed, so the court need not consider them. Doc. 57.

1

Background
The parties do not dispute the material facts relating to
plaintiff’s appointment as administrator ad litem.

Plaintiff was

appointed administrator ad litem for the estate of Valente Santiago
Garcia, deceased, by the Circuit Court of Shelby County, Alabama,
on January 30, 2012. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. Ex. D.

The order

specifies that the appointment is “for the limited purpose of
bringing a wrongful death cause of action.” Id.

Plaintiff brought

the instant wrongful death action on October 16, 2012.
Analysis
To grant summary judgment, a court must determine that no
genuine dispute of material fact exists and that movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. F. R. CIV. P. 56.

For the purposes

of summary judgment, the court views all admissible evidence in the
light

most

favorable

to

the

nonmoving

party

and

draws

all

reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Scott v. Harris, 550
U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369
U.S. 654, 655 (1962)).
the

material

facts

As noted above, the parties do not dispute
relating

to

plaintiff’s

appointment

as

administrator ad litem. Accordingly, the motion centers on whether
these facts entitle defendants to judgment as a matter of law.
Defendants make two primary arguments for summary judgment.
First, they argue that all administrators ad litem lack standing to
pursue wrongful death claims in Alabama.

2

Second, they argue that

plaintiff’s appointment as administrator ad litem was improper
because the order pre-dated any related proceedings.

The court

finds, first, that the Supreme Court of Alabama has unambiguously
ruled that administrators ad litem do have standing to pursue
wrongful

death

claims

and,

second,

that

defendants

cannot

collaterally attack the appointment order here on the basis that it
pre-dates any related proceedings.

The below sections provide the

court’s reasoning.
Standing of Administrators Ad Litem
Two Alabama statutes pertain to defendants’ argument that
administrators ad litem lack standing to pursue wrongful death
claims.

The first statute,

ALA. CODE § 43-2-250 (1975), mandates

that courts appoint an administrator ad litem when a decedent’s
estate

requires

representation

and

where

no

executor

or

administrator exists or where the executor or administrator has an
interest adverse to the estate.

The second statute,

5-410

“personal

(1975),

authorizes

the

decedent to file a wrongful death action.

ALA. CODE § 6-

representative”

of

a

The latter statute does

not make clear whether an administrator ad litem qualifies as a
“personal representative” so as to have standing to file a wrongful
death action. See id.
Although the statutes are silent on the questions raised, the
Supreme Court of Alabama has ruled that administrators ad litem do
have standing to file wrongful death actions. Affinity Hospital,

3

LLC v. Williford, 21 So. 3d 712, 718 (Ala. 2009).

Although the

Supreme Court in Williford acknowledged that the statutes neither
expressly grant nor expressly deny administrators ad litem the
authority

to

file

wrongful

death

actions,

the

Supreme

Court

concluded that the plaintiff in that case, “acting in her capacity
as an administrator ad litem, was a ‘personal representative’
within

the

meaning

of

Ala.

Code

1975,

§

6-5-410,

and

was,

therefore, vested with the authority conferred by that section to
file

a

wrongful-death

action.”

Id.

(emphasis

added).

Thus,

Williford unambiguously holds that administrators ad litem have
standing to pursue claims identical to the claim pursued here. Id.
This being a diversity case, this court is bound by Williford.
Defendants emphasize the contrary conclusion that was drawn by
a single justice of the Supreme Court. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. 19–21
(citing Golden Gate Nat. Senior Care, LLC v. Roser, 94 So. 3d 365
(Ala. 2012) (Bolin, J., concurring)).

Defendants’ arguments in

support of Justice Bolin’s position would be better addressed to
the Supreme Court.

Until the Supreme Court changes its mind, this

court must adhere to Williford.

Accordingly, the court finds that

plaintiff has standing to pursue her wrongful death claim.
Plaintiff’s Appointment as Administrator Ad Litem
Defendants also contend that plaintiff lacks standing because
her appointment was improper. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. 18-19.

The

alleged impropriety derives from the fact that the appointment pre4

dated the filing of the instant action, admittedly a related
proceeding. Id.
The applicable statute, ALA. CODE § 43-2-250 (1975), requires
appointment of an administrator ad litem “when, in any proceeding
in any court,” a decedent’s estate needs representation and either
no

executor

or

administrator

exists

or

the

executor

administrator has an interest adverse to the estate.

or

The statute

does not speak directly to the timing of the appointment, i.e.,
whether it must occur in the course of an existing proceeding in
order to be effective.2 See id.
The Supreme Court has not expressly ruled on whether the
appointment of an administrator ad litem must occur during an
existing proceeding in order to be proper and to give standing to
the administrator. See Affinity Hospital, LLC v. Williford, 21 So.
3d 712, 718 n.4 (Ala. 2009).

The language quoted by defendants

purporting to limit appointments to existing proceedings comes from
a concurrence and does not bind this court. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J.
18-19 (quoting Golden Gate Nat. Senior Care, LLC v. Roser, 94 So.
3d 365, 370 (Ala. 2012) (Bolin, J., concurring)).

The fact that

the Supreme Court has allowed administrators ad litem to pursue
wrongful death claims, even when their appointments pre-dated

2

The language “in any proceeding” may support the interpretation that
the appointment must be made during an existing proceeding. See § 43-2-250.
However, that interpretation would greatly limit the statute’s coverage,
effectively redefining “any proceeding” to mean only those proceedings that
have already begun. See id. The ambiguous language “in any proceeding” does
not justify such a significant limitation on the statute’s coverage. See id.

5

related proceedings, gives indirect if not direct guidance toward
the finding of a valid appointment. See Williford, 21 So. 3d at
716–17.
Defendants’ argument is answered, if not by its lack of merit,
by

the

circumstances

in

which

defendants

have

raised

it.

Defendants are disputing and purporting to attack the Shelby County
court’s appointment order in a subsequent wrongful death action.
An Alabama judgment or order is “conclusive on collateral attack”
if it appears “regular on its face and indicates subject matter and
personal jurisdiction.” Randolph Cnty. v. Thompson, 502 So. 2d 357,
362 (Ala. 1987) (citation omitted); see also Greenhill v. Bear
Creek Dev. Auth., 519 So. 2d 938, 939 (Ala. 1988).

Franks v.

Norfolk Southern Railway Company, 679 So. 2d 214 (Ala. 1996)
applies this limiting principle to collateral attacks on orders
appointing administrators ad litem.

In Franks, the defendant in a

wrongful death action disputed the probate court’s appointment of
the administrator ad litem. Id.

The defendant had not directly

attacked the appointment order in probate court or filed an appeal
from the appointment order. Id. at 215–16. The Supreme Court first
noted that collaterally attacking the appointment order in the
wrongful death action could not succeed unless the record showed on
its face that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to make the
appointment. Id. at 217–18 (quoting Meriwether v. Reynolds, 289
Ala. 361, 364 (1972)). When the Supreme Court thereupon found that

6

probate courts and circuit courts both have jurisdiction to appoint
administrators ad litem, the order of appointment was presumed
valid and could not be collaterally attacked in the subsequent
wrongful death action. Id.
Similarly, in the instant case, defendants cannot attack
plaintiff’s appointment order as a means of attacking her standing.
Defendants did not seek to vacate the appointment order in circuit
court and did not appeal the order, even though the order recited
the express purpose of authorizing the administrator ad litem to
“bring[] a wrongful death cause of action.” See Def.’s Mot. Summ.
J. Ex. D.

Defendants do not and cannot allege that the appointment

order is void because the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to
issue it. See Franks, 679 So. 2d at 217-18 (both circuit courts and
probate courts have jurisdiction to appoint administrators ad
litem).

Absent a defect that renders it void, the appointment

order is deemed conclusive regardless of the merit of defendants’
argument that appointments must occur during existing proceedings
to be proper.
Last but not least, it seems to the court that defendants’
position translates to “there is no redress for this decedent’s
death even if we caused it.” Defendants conspicuously do not argue
that plaintiff or any representative of the decedent’s estate could
have found their way to court but failed to know how to accomplish
that feat.

Instead, defendants imply that the redressability of a

wrongful death in circumstances requiring an administrator ad litem
7

depends entirely on serendipity— whether a related proceeding
happens to be pending when someone seeks to be named administrator
ad litem.
Alabama

In and of itself, this observation does not mean that

could

not

provide

by

statute

that

appointments

of

administrators ad litem, in order to be effective, must occur
during existing proceedings. See Clapper v. Amnesty Intl. USA, 133
S.Ct. 1138, 1154 (2013) (citation omitted) (“[t]he assumption that
if respondents have no standing to sue, no one would have standing,
is not a reason to find standing”).

However, the hypertechnical

interpretation that defendants place on § 43-2-250 would preclude
redress

automatically

for

all

wrongful

deaths

that

need

administrators ad litem but that happen to occur when no related
proceeding is pending.

Would defendants be satisfied if the case

were stayed while plaintiff obtains a redundant appointment as
administrator ad litem while this case is pending?

Logically, the

creation of an administrator ad litem must come before the said
administrator can file a suit.

The horse ordinarily goes before

the cart.
Based

on

the

foregoing

analysis,

the

court

finds

that

defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the
issue of plaintiff’s standing to pursue her wrongful death claim.
The motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED.

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DONE this 30th day of October, 2013.

_____________________________
WILLIAM M. ACKER, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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