Williams v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Abdul K Kallon on 07/30/2013. (PSM)

FILED
2013 Jul-30 AM 09:41
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JEANETTE H. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,
COMMISSIONER,
Defendant.

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Civil Action Number
2:12-cv-03930-AKK

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Jeanette H. Williams (“Williams”) brings this action pursuant to Section
205(g) of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking review
of the final adverse decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”). This court finds that the Administrative Law Judge’s
(“ALJ”) decision - which has become the decision of the Commissioner - is
supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, AFFIRMS the decision denying
benefits to Williams.
I. Procedural History
Williams filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits on July 23,

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2009, alleging a disability onset date of July 8, 2009, due to diabetes mellitus and
an anxiety disorder. (R. 25, 86). After the SSA denied Williams’ claim, she
requested a hearing before an ALJ. (R. 87, 93). The ALJ subsequently denied
Williams’ claim, (R. 22-38), which became the final decision of the Commissioner
when the Appeals Council refused to grant review, (R. 1-6). Williams then filed
this action for judicial review pursuant to § 205(g) and § 1631(c)(3) of the Act, 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) and § 1383(c)(3). Doc. 1; see also doc. 9.
II. Standard of Review
The only issues before this court are whether the record contains substantial
evidence to sustain the ALJ’s decision, see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Walden v.
Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982), and whether the ALJ applied the
correct legal standards, see Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988);
Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g)
and 1383(c) mandate that the Commissioner’s “factual findings are conclusive if
supported by ‘substantial evidence.’” Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529
(11th Cir. 1990). The district court may not reconsider the facts, reevaluate the
evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner; instead, it must
review the final decision as a whole and determine if the decision is “reasonable
and supported by substantial evidence.” See id. (citing Bloodsworth v. Heckler,
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703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)).
Substantial evidence falls somewhere between a scintilla and a
preponderance of evidence; “[i]t is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person
would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Martin, 849 F.2d at 1529
(quoting Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239) (other citations omitted). If supported by
substantial evidence, the court must affirm the Commissioner’s factual findings
even if the preponderance of the evidence is against the Commissioner’s findings.
See Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529. While the court acknowledges that judicial review
of the ALJ’s findings is limited in scope, it notes that the review “does not yield
automatic affirmance.” Lamb, 847 F.2d at 701.
III. Statutory and Regulatory Framework
To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must show “the inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairments which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 416(I). A physical or mental
impairment is “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or
psychological abnormalities which are demonstrated by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).
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Determination of disability under the Act requires a five step analysis.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(g). Specifically, the Commissioner must determine in
sequence:
(1)

whether the claimant is currently unemployed;

(2)

whether the claimant has a severe impairment;

(3)

whether the impairment meets or equals one listed by the Secretary;

(4)

whether the claimant is unable to perform his or her past work; and

(5)

whether the claimant is unable to perform any work in the national
economy.

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986). “An affirmative
answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next question, or, on steps
three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative answer to any question, other
than step three, leads to a determination of ‘not disabled.’” Id. at 1030 (citing 20
C.F.R. § 416.920(a)-(f)). “Once a finding is made that a claimant cannot return to
prior work the burden shifts to the Secretary to show other work the claimant can
do.” Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
Lastly, where, as here, a plaintiff alleges disability because of pain, she must
meet additional criteria. In this circuit, “a three part ‘pain standard’ [is applied]
when a claimant seeks to establish disability through his or her own testimony of

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pain or other subjective symptoms.” Holt v. Barnhart, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th
Cir. 1991). Specifically,
The pain standard requires (1) evidence of an underlying medical
condition and either (2) objective medical evidence that confirms the
severity of the alleged pain arising from that condition or (3) that the
objectively determined medical condition is of such a severity that it
can be reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged pain.1
Id. However, medical evidence of pain itself, or of its intensity, is not required:
While both the regulations and the Hand standard require objective
medical evidence of a condition that could reasonably be expected to
cause the pain alleged, neither requires objective proof of the pain
itself. Thus under both the regulations and the first (objectively
identifiable condition) and third (reasonably expected to cause pain
alleged) parts of the Hand standard a claimant who can show that his
condition could reasonably be expected to give rise to the pain he
alleges has established a claim of disability and is not required to
produce additional, objective proof of the pain itself. See 20 CFR §§
404.1529 and 416.929; Hale [v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th
Cir. 1987)].
Elam v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 921 F.2d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 1991) (parenthetical
information omitted) (emphasis added). Moreover, “[a] claimant’s subjective
testimony supported by medical evidence that satisfies the pain standard is itself
sufficient to support a finding of disability.” Holt, 921 F.2d at 1223. Therefore, if
a claimant testifies to disabling pain and satisfies the three part pain standard, the
ALJ must find a disability unless the ALJ properly discredits the claimant’s

1

This standard is referred to as the Hand standard, named after Hand v. Heckler, 761
F.2d 1545, 1548 (11th Cir. 1985).
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testimony.
Furthermore, when the ALJ fails to credit a claimant’s pain testimony, the
ALJ must articulate reasons for that decision:
It is established in this circuit that if the [ALJ] fails to articulate reasons
for refusing to credit a claimant’s subjective pain testimony, then the
[ALJ], as a matter of law, has accepted that testimony as true. Implicit
in this rule is the requirement that such articulation of reasons by the
[ALJ] be supported by substantial evidence.
Hale, 831 F.2d at 1012. Therefore, if the ALJ either fails to articulate reasons for
refusing to credit the plaintiff’s pain testimony, or if the ALJ’s reasons are not
supported by substantial evidence, the court must accept as true the pain testimony
of the plaintiff and render a finding of disability. Id.
IV. The ALJ’s Decision
After noting that Williams meets the insured status requirements, the ALJ
properly applied the five step analysis and first determined that Williams has not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 8, 2009, and therefore met Step
One. (R. 28). The ALJ also acknowledged that Williams’ diabetes, hypertension,
and sleep apnea were severe impairments that met Step Two. Id. The ALJ
proceeded to the next step and found that Williams failed to meet or equal one of
the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, Appendix 1 and thus did not
satisfy Step Three. (R. 33). Although he answered Step Three in the negative,
consistent with the law, see McDaniel, 800 F.2d at 1030, the ALJ proceeded to
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Step Four where he determined that Williams
has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work, as
defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c), which she can perform while restricted
from any exposure to unprotected heights, driving, the operation of
hazardous machinery, and from the performance of any right lower
extremity pushing and/or pulling.
(R. 33). With respect to the pain standard, the ALJ found that “the claimant’s
medically determinable impairment could reasonably be expected to cause some,
but not all of the alleged symptoms. The claimant’s statements concerning the
intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the
extent they are inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity
assessment.” (R. 34). As a result, the ALJ found that Williams is capable of
performing past relevant work as an administrative assistant. (R. 35).
Accordingly, the ALJ found that Williams is not disabled. Id.; see also McDaniel,
800 F.2d at 1030.
V. Analysis
Williams contends that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed because his
RFC finding is not supported by substantial evidence and he failed to assess the
effect Williams’ obesity has on her physical and mental ability to work. See doc.
9. The court addresses each contention in turn.

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A.

Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s RFC Finding
Williams raises two bases for her contention that the ALJ’s RFC finding is

not supported by substantial evidence. First, Williams alleges that the ALJ
improperly relied on a Single Decision-Maker (“SDM”) RFC Assessment. Doc. 9
at 8-11. This first assertion fails because the ALJ explicitly noted that he afforded
no weight to the SDM RFC assessment “as it is an adjudicatory document only
and is therefore not considered to be evidence.” (R. 34). Although Williams
contends that the ALJ must have afforded “more than no weight” to the RDM
because it is the only opinion in the record that supports the ALJ’s sedentary work
RFC, doc. 9 at 9, Williams failed to point to specific evidence in the record that
contradicts the ALJ’s finding. She cannot do so because a review of the record
supports the ALJ’s finding that Williams can perform sedentary work and shows
that her impairments are generally well controlled by medications and other
treatments. See e.g., (R. 207-220, 237, 272, 275, 284, 290, 293, 319-22, 332).
Therefore, the court finds that the ALJ did not erroneously rely on the SDM RFC
assessment.
Second, Williams contends that the ALJ failed to obtain a consultative
examination from a physician to support his finding. Williams bases this
argument on an old Social Security Regulation defining RFC as “[a] medical
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assessment of what an individual can do in a work setting in spite of the functional
limitations and environmental restrictions imposed by all of his or her medically
determinable impairments(s).” SSR 83-10 (1983) (emphasis added). However,
the phrase “medical assessment” was later removed from the regulations. See 56
FR 36932-01 (August 1, 1991). Moreover, Williams’ assertion fails irrespective
of the inclusion of the term “medical assessment” in the definition of RFC. A
determination regarding a claimant’s RFC is an issue reserved for the
Commissioner and properly delegated to the ALJ. 42 U.S.C. § 405(a),(b)(1); 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.929, 404.944, 404.946, 404.953, and 404.955. Therefore, “[g]iving
controlling weight to [source opinions] would, in effect, confer upon the treating
source the authority to make the determination or decision about whether the
individual is under a disability, and thus would be an abdication of the
Commissioner’s statutory responsibility to determine whether an individual is
disabled.” SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *2 (July 2,1996).
Instead, the regulations direct the ALJ to make a RFC finding “based upon
consideration of all relevant evidence in the case record, including medical
evidence and relevant nonmedical evidence, such as observations of lay witnesses
of an individual’s apparent symptomology, an individual’s own statement of what
he or she is able or unable to do, and many other factors that could help the
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adjudicator determine the most reasonable findings in light of all the evidence.”
Id., at * 5 (emphasis added). In other words, the ALJ must make a determination
based on the record as a whole, not simply a medical assessment provided by a
treating physician or consultative examiner. In this instance, the ALJ’s finding is
supported by the record as a whole, including the medical reports of Williams’
treating physicians.
Moreover, the ALJ is only required to obtain a consultative examination “to
try to resolve an inconsistency in the evidence, or when the evidence as a whole is
insufficient to allow [the ALJ] to make a determination” after “consider[ing] not
only existing medical reports, but also the disability interview form containing
[the claimant’s] allegations as well as other pertinent evidence in [her] file.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1519a. However, Williams failed to point to any inconsistency in or
insufficiency of the medical evidence; rather, Williams simply contends that an
ALJ may not make a RFC finding without first obtaining a RFC assessment from a
physician. Doc. 9 at 8-9. Unfortunately for Williams, as stated above, requiring an
ALJ to rely on such an assessment “would be an abdication of the Commissioner’s
statutory responsibility to determine whether an individual is disabled.” SSR 965p. Instead, an ALJ may make a RFC determination without a RFC assessment so
long as the determination is supported by substantial evidence. Green v. Social
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Sec. Admin., 223 F. App’x 915, 923-924 (11th Cir. 2007); Parker v. Astrue,
No.11-0084-CG-N, 2013 WL 593497, at *2-3 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 14, 2013). Based on
the record before this court, the ALJ’s RFC determination is supported by
substantial evidence.
B.

The ALJ Did Not Err in Failing to Find Obesity a Severe Impairment
Williams contends next that the ALJ erroneously deemed her obesity a non-

severe impairment by failing to follow the “slight abnormality” standard and,
further, that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Williams’ obesity related
limitations. Doc. 9 at 12. The court first notes that Williams failed to list obesity
as an illness, injury, or condition limiting her ability to work. See (R. 185) (listing
only diabetes, high blood pressure, post-traumatic stress disorder, chronic sinus
issues and allergies, sleep apnea, and acid reflux). Regardless, the ALJ’s finding
that this impairment is not “severe” is supported by substantial evidence.
As the ALJ noted, an impairment must be more than “a slight abnormality or
a combination of slight abnormalities that causes no more than minimal functional
limitation.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(c). However, the record fails to support
Williams’ assertion that her obesity is more than a “slight abnormality.” Although
Williams’ medical records reference her obesity, they fail to note any symptoms or
functional limitations attributable to obesity. See (R. 232, 237, 242, 272, 279, 284,
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290, 319, 332, 345). Instead, Williams’ doctors consistently note that she should
simply continue the low carbohydrate diet, as it was helping her successfully lose
weight. See id. In light of this evidence, the ALJ did not err in failing to list
obesity as a severe impairment. See Wilson v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th
Cir. 1999) (affirming an ALJ’s finding that an impairment was not severe where
substantial medical evidence showed that the claimant “manifested few symptoms
of the disease”).
Alternatively, even if the ALJ erred in failing to list obesity as a severe
impairment, “the error was harmless because the ALJ concluded that [Williams]
had a severe impairment: and that finding is all that step two requires.” Heatly v.
Commissioner of Social Sec., 382 F. App’x, 823, 824-25 (11th Cir. 2010), citing
Jamison v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 585, 588 (11th Cir. 1987) (stating also that “[n]othing
requires that the ALJ must identify, at step two, all of the impairments that should
be considered severe.”).
Lastly, the ALJ did not fail to consider the effects of Williams’ obesity on
her physical and mental functional capabilities. As discussed above, the evidence
fails to demonstrate any functional limitations attributable to obesity. However,
the ALJ explicitly considered all of Williams’ purported impairments and
symptoms in making his disability determination. (R. 28-34). Even considering
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any obesity-related symptoms, the record fails to establish that Williams is
disabled. Accordingly, the ALJ’s determination is supported by substantial
evidence.
VI. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the ALJ’s determination
that Williams is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and proper legal
standards were used in making this determination. Therefore, the Commissioner’s
final decision is AFFIRMED.
DONE the 30th day of July, 2013.

________________________________
ABDUL K. KALLON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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