Jackson v. United States of America

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Virginia Emerson Hopkins on 6/6/12. (SAC )

FILED
2012 Jun-06 PM 02:23
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JAWANA KESHUN JACKSON,

)
)
Movant,
)
)
vs.
)
)
)
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Respondent.
)

2:12-CV-8014-VEH-RRA
2:09-CR-0453-VEH-RRA

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The magistrate judge entered a report and recommendation, recommending that
this § 2255 motion to vacate be denied because it is barred by the statute of
limitations. The movant has filed objections to the report and recommendation.
In her objections, Jackson argues for the first time that the limitations period
should not apply to her because she is actually innocent. The Supreme Court has
never addressed whether actual innocence is available to overcome the procedural bar
of the one-year statute of limitations established by the AEDPA. However, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “the factual issue of whether the
petitioner can make a showing of actual innocence should be first addressed, before
addressing the constitutional issue of whether the Suspension Clause requires such

an exception for actual innocence.” Wyzykowski v. Department of Corrections, 226
F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir. 2000).
In Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), the Supreme Court elaborated on the
fundamental miscarriage of justice exception and the necessity of showing innocence.
To meet this exception, the petitioner “must show that it is more likely than not that
no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. The standard focuses on the actual innocence of the
petitioner. As the Supreme Court explained:
Instead, the emphasis on “actual innocence” allows the reviewing
tribunal also to consider the probative force of relevant evidence that
was either excluded or unavailable at trial. Indeed, with respect to this
aspect of the Carrier standard, we believe that Judge Friendly’s
description of the inquiry is appropriate: the habeas court must make its
determination concerning the petitioner’s innocence “in light of all the
evidence, including that alleged to have been illegally admitted (but
with due regard to any unreliability of it) and evidence tenably claimed
to have been wrongfully excluded or to have become available only after
trial.”
Id. at 327. (Quoting Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on
Judgment, 38 U.Chi.L.Rev. 142, 160 (1970)). To be credible, a claim of actual
innocence must be based on reliable evidence not presented at trial. Fortenberry v.
Haley, 297 F.3d 1213, 1222 (11th Cir. 2002).

2

Jackson maintains that she is actually innocent of Count 2 because her plea was
coerced. However, she has not provided any new evidence that would establish that
it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found her guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. Therefore, she has failed to meet the requirements of the Schlup
test.
The court has considered the entire file in this action, together with the report
and recommendation and the objections, and has reached an independent conclusion
that the report and recommendation is due to be adopted and approved. Accordingly,
the court hereby adopts and approves the findings and recommendation of the
magistrate judge as the findings and conclusions of the court.
The motion to vacate is due to be DENIED. An appropriate order will be
entered.
DONE this the 6th day of June, 2012.

VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS
United States District Judge

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