Dixon v. Birmingham, Alabama, City of
Filing
37
MEMORANDUM OPINION Signed by Judge William M Acker, Jr on 1/27/15. (SAC )
FILED
2015 Jan-27 PM 03:08
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CAROL DIXON,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA,
Defendant.
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CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:13-CV-404-WMA
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On
January
7,
2015,
the
magistrate
judge's
report
and
recommendation was entered in this case, and the parties were
allowed
fourteen
days
in
which
to
file
objections
to
the
recommendations made by the magistrate judge. No objections to the
magistrate judge's report and recommendation have been filed.
After careful consideration of the entire record and the
magistrate judge's report and recommendation, the court hereby
ADOPTS the report of the magistrate judge as its opinion. The court
further
ACCEPTS
the
recommendations
of
the
magistrate
judge.
Accordingly, the court finds and concludes that defendant's motion
for summary judgment (Doc. 19) is due to be granted. The action
will be dismissed with prejudice as to all counts except Count IV
of the amended complaint (Doc. 3). The action as stated in Count IV
will be dismissed without prejudice.
The court notes that plaintiff’s claim of ADA retaliation is
further barred by University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center
v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013). In Nassar, the Supreme Court
held that a plaintiff asserting a Title VII retaliation claim must
satisfy a “but-for” causation standard, meaning that a retaliatory
motive must be the only reason for the defendant’s actions. Because
the language of 42 U.S.C. § 12203, the ADA retaliation provision,
is nearly identical to that of Title VII’s retaliation provision,
this court finds that Nassar applies to ADA retaliation cases.
Plaintiff
alleges
that
defendant
took
two
actions
in
retaliation for her filing of her EEOC charge: (1) denial/delay of
IDIS training and (2) failure to promote plaintiff to the position
of Principal Administrative Analyst. (Doc. 35 at 16). Because
plaintiff
also
alleges
that
these
actions
were
taken
as
discrimination because of her disability (Doc. 35 at 12), she
cannot meet her burden of showing that retaliation was defendant’s
only motivation for the complained-of actions.
A separate order will be entered.
DONE this 27th day of January, 2015.
_____________________________
WILLIAM M. ACKER, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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