Delbridge v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 2/11/15. (CTS, )

FILED
2015 Feb-11 PM 02:20
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
AUGUSTA A. DELBRIDGE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case Number 2:13-cv-1306-SLB

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Augusta Delbridge brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking
review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her application
for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits [“DIB”], and supplemental security
income [“SSI”]. Upon review of the record, the submissions of the parties, and the relevant
law, the court is of the opinion that the Commissioner’s decision is due to be affirmed.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability, DIB, and SSI on June 8, 2010,
alleging a disability onset date of April 19, 2010. (R. 48, 117.)1 This application was denied
on July 21, 2010 by the Social Security Administration [“SSA”], (R. 57), and plaintiff
subsequently requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge [“ALJ”], which was

Reference to a document number, (“Doc.___”), refers to the number assigned to each
document as it is filed in the court’s record. References to page numbers in the
Commissioner’s record are set forth as (“R.___”).
1

held on February 7, 2012, (R. 27). After the hearing, the ALJ found that plaintiff was able
to perform her past relevant work as a teacher’s aide and a cashier and that she was capable
of making a vocational adjustment to other occupations, such as packager of small parts,
price tagger, and storage facility clerk, which are jobs that exist in significant numbers in
Alabama and in the national economy. (R. 21-22.) In light of these findings, the ALJ denied
plaintiff’s request for a period of disability, DIB, and SSI on February 16, 2012. (R. 23.)
On April 11, 2012, plaintiff petitioned the Appeals Council to review the ALJ’s
decision, (R. 7-8), and on May 30, 2013, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for
review, thereby rendering the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security. (R. 1.) Following denial of review by the Appeals Council, plaintiff filed an
appeal in this court on July 12, 2013. (Doc. 1.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act, this court “is limited to an
inquiry into whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the
Commissioner, and whether the correct legal standards were applied.” Wilson v. Barnhart,
284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir.
1988). The court gives deference to factual findings and reviews questions of law de novo.
Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 1991). The court “may not decide the
facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner];
rather the court must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is

2

reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.” Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529
(11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983))
(internal quotations and other citation omitted). “The Commissioner’s factual findings are
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.” Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1221 (citing Martin,
894 F.2d at 1529; Allen v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 600, 602 (11th Cir. 1987)). “Substantial evidence
is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178
(11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Conclusions of law made by the Commissioner are reviewed de novo. Cornelius, 936
F.2d at 1145. “[N]o . . . presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner’s] conclusions
of law.” Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982).
III. DISCUSSION
A. THE FIVE-STEP EVALUATION
The regulations require the Commissioner to follow a five-step sequential evaluation
to determine whether a claimant is eligible for DIB or SSI.2 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(1)-

2

The Regulations state:
The sequential evaluation process is a series of five “steps” that we follow in
a set order. . . . If we can find that you are disabled or not disabled at a step, we
make our determination or decision and do not go on to the next step. If we
cannot find that you are disabled or not disabled at a step, we go on to the next
step. Before we go from step three to step four, we assess your residual
functional capacity. . . . We use this residual functional capacity assessment at
both step four and step five when we evaluate your claim at these steps.
3

(2); Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470 (1986). For the purposes of this
evaluation, the meaning of disability is the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can
be expected to result in death or has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The specific
steps in the evaluation process are as follows:
1. Substantial Gainful Employment
First, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is engaged in
“substantial gainful activity.” Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 137 (1987).3 If the claimant

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
3

The Regulations define “substantial gainful activity”:
(a) Substantial work activity. Substantial work activity is work activity
that involves doing significant physical or mental activities. Your work
may be substantial even if it is done on a part-time basis or if you do
less, get paid less, or have less responsibility than when you worked
before.
(b) Gainful work activity. Gainful work activity is work activity that
you do for pay or profit. Work activity is gainful if it is the kind of work
usually done for pay or profit, whether or not a profit is realized.
(c) Some other activities. Generally, we do not consider activities like
taking care of yourself, household tasks, hobbies, therapy, school
attendance, club activities, or social programs to be substantial gainful
activity.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1572.
4

is engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner will find that the claimant is not
disabled, regardless of the claimant’s medical condition or her age, education, and work
experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b); § 416.920(b). “Under the first step, the claimant has
the burden to show that she is not currently engaged in substantial gainful activity.”
Reynolds-Buckley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 457 F. App’x 862, 863 (11th Cir. 2012).4
The ALJ found that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April
19, 2010, the alleged onset date. (R. 15.)
2. Severe Impairments
If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner must
next determine whether the claimant suffers from a severe impairment or combination of
impairments that significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic
work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c); § 416.920(a)(4)(ii), (c). “[A] ‘physical
or mental impairment’ is an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or
psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3); § 1382c(a)(3)(D). The regulations
provide: “[I]f you do not have any impairment or combination of impairments which
significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, we will find

Eleventh Circuit Rule 36-2 provides, in pertinent part, “An opinion shall be unpublished
unless a majority of the panel decides to publish it. Unpublished opinions are not
considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir.
R. 36-2 (emphasis added).
4

5

that you do not have a severe impairment and are, therefore, not disabled. We will not
consider your age, education, and work experience.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c); § 416.920(c).
An impairment is “severe” if it “significantly limits [a] claimant’s physical or mental
ability to do basic work activities.”5 Crayton v. Callahan, 120 F.3d 1217, 1219 (11th Cir.
1997); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(a). When an impairment “is a slight
abnormality which has such a minimal effect on the individual that it would not be expected
to interfere with the individual’s ability to work, irrespective of age, education, or work
experience,” it will be classified as non-severe. Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 920 (11th
Cir. 1984); see also SSR 85-28, 1985 WL 56856 (1985). A claimant may be found disabled
based on a combination of impairments even though none of the individual impairments
alone are disabling. Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 1001 (11th Cir. 1987); see also 20
C.F.R. § 404.1523; § 416.923. A claimant has the burden to show that she has a severe
impairment or combination of impairments. Reynolds-Buckley, 457 F. App’x at 863.

5

Basic work activities include:
(1) Physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting,
pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling; (2) [c]apacities for
seeing, hearing, and speaking; (3) [u]nderstanding, carrying out and
remembering simply instructions; (4) [u]se of judgment; (5)
[r]esponding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual
work situations; and (6) [d]ealing with changes in a routine work
setting.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b)(1)-(6).
6

The ALJ found that plaintiff had severe impairments of “neck strain and carpal tunnel
syndrome in right wrist.” (R. 15.)
3. The Listings
If the claimant has a severe impairment, the Commissioner must then determine
whether the claimant’s impairment meets the duration requirement and whether it is
equivalent to any one of the listed impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d)-(e);
§ 404.1525; § 404.1526. Listed impairments are so severe that they prevent an individual
from performing substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii), (d)-(e); see 20
C.F.R. pt. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 [The Listings]. If the claimant’s impairment meets or
equals a Listing, the Commissioner must find the claimant disabled, regardless of the
claimant’s age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d); § 416.920(d). The
claimant has the burden of proving that her impairment meets or equals the criteria contained
in one of the Listings. Reynolds-Buckley, 457 Fed. App’x. at 863.
The ALJ found that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that met or medically equaled a Listing. (R. 16.)
4. Residual Functional Capacity and Past Relevant Work
If the impairment does not meet or equal the criteria of a Listing, the claimant must
prove that her impairment prevents her from performing her past relevant work. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (f); § 416.920(a)(4)(iv), (f). At step four, the Commissioner
“will first compare [the Commissioner’s] assessment of [the claimant’s] residual functional

7

capacity [“RFC”] with the physical and mental demands of [the claimant’s] past relevant
work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b); § 416.960(b). “Past relevant work is work that [the claimant
has] done within the past 15 years, that was substantial gainful activity, and that lasted long
enough for [her] to learn to do it.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(1); § 416.960(b)(1). If the
claimant is capable of performing her past relevant work, the Commissioner will find that
she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(3); § 416.920(f). The claimant bears the burden
of establishing that the impairment prevents her from performing past work.
Reynolds-Buckley, 457 F. App’x at 863.
The ALJ found that plaintiff has a high school education and was an individual closely
approaching advanced age on the alleged onset date. (R. 21.) The ALJ made the following
findings regarding plaintiff’s RFC:
[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light
work . . . with the clarifications or deviations as noted hereafter. The
claimant can lift and/or carry up to twenty pounds occasionally and up
to ten pounds frequently. She can sit for up to two hours at a time in
order to complete a normal, eight-hour workday. She can stand and/or
walk for up to two hours at a time in order to complete a normal, eighthour workday. She can use her left upper extremity and both of her
lower extremities without limitation in regards to pushing or pulling
movements. The claimant experiences a moderate level of pain in her
back and right arm, which occasionally has only a moderate affect [sic]
on her ability to concentrate during an eight-hour workday. She has
moderate limitations regarding the use of her right upper extremity,
which only occasionally affects her ability to perform repetitive actions
such as simple grasping, pushing or pulling arm controls or performing
fine manipulation. The claimant has no communicative or visual
limitations.
(R. 16.)
8

5. Other Work in the National Economy
If the claimant establishes that she is unable to perform her past relevant work, the
Commissioner must show that the claimant—in light of her RFC, age, education, and work
experience—is capable of performing other work that exists in substantial numbers in the
national economy. Reynolds-Buckley, 457 F. App’x at 863; see also 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(c)(1); § 416.920(g). The regulations provide:
If we find that your residual functional capacity does not enable you to do any
of your past relevant work . . . we will use the same residual functional
capacity assessment when we decide if you can adjust to any other work. We
will look at your ability to adjust to other work by considering your residual
functional capacity and the vocational factors of age, education, and work
experience . . . . Any other work (jobs) that you can adjust to must exist in
significant numbers in the national economy (either in the region where you
live or in several regions in the country).
20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c)(1); § 416.960(c)(1). If the claimant is not capable of performing
such other work, the Commissioner must find the claimant disabled. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(g); § 416.920(g).
The ALJ consulted a Vocational Expert [“VE”] to determine whether any jobs exist
in the national economy that plaintiff could perform, considering her RFC, age, education,
and work experience. The VE testified that an individual with plaintiff’s limitations and
vocational factors could perform plaintiff’s past relevant work as a teacher’s aide and a
cashier, and that individual could perform the jobs of packager of small parts, price tagger,
and storage facility clerk, which are jobs that exist in significant numbers in Alabama and
in the national economy. (R. 43-44.)
9

Because the ALJ found that jobs consistent with plaintiff’s RFC and vocational
factors exist in significant numbers, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled. (R. 22.)
B. MS. DELBRIDGE’S CLAIMS
Plaintiff argues that (1) there is no evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s finding
that plaintiff can perform a restricted range of light work, and (2) the ALJ erred in failing to
identify the following impairments as “severe”: “shoulder pain with prominent muscle
spasm, headaches of the occipital neuralgia type and lumbosacral pain with SI joint
inflammation.” (Doc. 8 at 2-3, 12.) Upon reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs, the
court finds that the Commissioner’s decision is due to be affirmed.
1. Substantial Evidence Supporting the ALJ’s Findings
Plaintiff argues that the record contains no evidence upon which the ALJ could rely
to find that plaintiff can perform a restricted range of light work. Furthermore, plaintiff
contends that three emergency room visits and a consultative neurological evaluation by Dr.
Hisham Hakim, a non-treating medical source, demonstrate that plaintiff is disabled. (Doc.
9 at 6-7.)
Social Security Ruling 96-7p explains the two step process set out in 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1529 and § 416.929 that the ALJ must follow6: “First, the adjudicator must consider

Apparently the Eleventh Circuit considers the standard set out in the regulations and the
standard in Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir.1991), as one and the same.
Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1226 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Furthermore, the ALJ cites to
20 C.F.R.§ 404.1529, which contains the same language [as Holt] regarding the
subjective pain testimony that this Court interpreted when initially establishing its
6

10

whether there is an underlying medically determinable physical or mental impairment—i.e.,
an impairment(s) that can be shown by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques—that could reasonably be expected to produce the individual’s pain
or other symptoms.” This determination does not consider the “intensity, persistence, or
functionally limiting effects of the individual’s symptoms.” SSR 96-7p. If the ALJ finds that
the plaintiff’s case survives the first step, then
the adjudicator must evaluate the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of the individual’s symptoms to determine the
extent to which the symptoms limit the individual’s ability to do
basic work activities. For this purpose, whenever the
individual’s statements about the intensity, persistence, or
functionally limiting effects of pain or other symptoms are not
substantiated by objective medical evidence, the adjudicator
must make a finding on the credibility of the individual’s
statements based on a consideration of the entire case record.
SSR 96-7p. The ALJ found that, under step one, “the claimant’s medically determinable
impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms,” but under step
two, “the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of
these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the above residual
functional capacity assessment.” (R. 17.)

three-part pain standard. In citing to § 404.1529 and based on the findings and discussion,
it is clear that the ALJ applied this Circuit's pain standard [from Holt].”). Because SSR
96-7p offers an in-depth explanation of the regulations and is more recent than Holt, the
court looks to it for guidance.
11

The ALJ first reviewed plaintiff’s testimony about the nature of her pain:
At the hearing, the claimant testified that she was unable to work secondary
to neck pain, back pain and right arm pain. She stated that [her] neck pain
worsens with activity and that her arm pain causes her to drop objects. She
also testified that her back pain worsens with increased activity. The claimant
rated her neck and back pain as being a “seven”, on a standard one to ten
point pain scale. She stated that her pain was not constant in nature but that
it came and went with activity. The claimant testified that she could walk for
about fifteen minutes, sit for about ten minutes and stand for about ten to
thirty minutes before her pain level increased to the point that she would have
to adjust her posture. She also alleged problems with bending, standing and
lifting. She indicated that she had to lie down about three times per day for up
to thirty minutes at a time because of her pain . . . [and] that she had carpal
tunnel syndrome in her right hand and bad discs in her lumbar spine. She
indicated that she had been experiencing this level of pain ever since her car
accident roughly twenty years earlier.
(R. 17.)
The ALJ found that plaintiff’s testimony was unsupported by the record for several
reasons. First, the record contains only four relevant medical reports, and none support
plaintiff’s testimony about the limiting effects of her pain. The first three medical reports
document plaintiff’s visits to the emergency room on February 27, 2010, October 21, 2010,
and January 20, 2012. On February 27, 2010, plaintiff presented to the ER for chronic neck
pain and pain radiating through her right arm. (R. 187.) Plaintiff reported that “she had no
acute event, that this is simply a chronic problem that flares up on her periodically.” (Id.)
Plaintiff received an injection during that visit and did not seek further treatment, according
to the record, until she returned to the ER on October 21, 2010 with complaints of back and
neck pain. During this visit, plaintiff received an injection and a prescription for Lodine, an

12

anti-inflammatory medication. (R. 202.) During her last visit on January 20, 2012, plaintiff
complained of neck and back pain and numbness in her right hand. (R. 199.) During her
general examination, plaintiff had a 5/5 grip strength in her right hand. (Id.) Plaintiff received
two injections and another prescription for Lodine. (Id.)
The ALJ noted that “[w]hile the claimant has reported experiencing chronic pain on
a few occasions, she has never been on any type of narcotic pain relievers and has simply
taken over-the-counter medications or only anti-inflammatory medications prescribed to her
during one-time visits to the emergency room.” (R. 19.) Additionally, the ER notes show that
plaintiff was only in mild distress and never in acute distress during those visits. (See R. 20,
187, 199, 202.) The ALJ correctly found that these “records only document sporadic,
infrequent treatment for [plaintiff’s] alleged symptoms ” (R. 17), which does not support
plaintiff’s pain testimony. See Griffin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 560 Fed. App’x 837, 843 (11th
Cir. Mar. 19, 2014) (finding that “[t]he sporadic nature of [the plaintiff’s] treatments
supported the ALJ’s finding that his statements regarding his symptoms were not fully
credible”).
Furthermore, the ALJ thoroughly discussed his reasons for rejecting the medical
opinion of Dr. Hisham Hakim, a non-treating source who examined plaintiff during a
neuropsychological evaluation. (R. 18.) See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502 (“Nontreating source
means a physician, psychologist, or other acceptable medical source who has examined you
but does not have, or did not have, an ongoing treatment relationship with you.”). During the

13

examination, Dr. Hakim found that plaintiff had a decreased range of motion in her neck on
the right side but adequate neck flexion and extension, that plaintiff had almost equal grip
strength in each hand, and that plaintiff experienced tenderness in her back at the SI joint and
sciatic notch. (R. 192.) Plaintiff could bend forward 60-70 degrees but could not touch her
toes. (Id.) Based on this evaluation, Dr. Hakim gave the following diagnosis:
1. Neck and shoulder pain with prominent muscle spasm appeared to have
musculoskeletal pain with headache as well as occipital neuralgia type. 2.
Back pain lumbosacral area going down to the buttock area more on the right
side and I believe more symptoms are arising from SI joint inflammation
bilateral. 3. Carpal tunnel syndrome on the right side. Clinically rated to be
moderate.
(R. 193.) Dr. Hakim opined that “the patient will have difficulty performing gainful
employment on a fulltime base on her above medical condition,” (id.), and in a Clinical
Assessment of Pain form, he indicated that “[p]ain is present to such an extent as to be
distracting to adequate performance of daily activities or work,” (R. 194).
The ALJ assigned little weigh to Dr. Hakim’s opinion, finding that “Dr. Hakim based
all of his findings on the claimant’s subjective allegations alone, and no formal testing was
performed which would warrant the diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome.” (R. 20.) As the
ALJ pointed out, the “record as a whole is . . . void of any nerve conduction studies that
would justify this diagnosis.” (R. 19.) Dr. Hakim’s opinion that plaintiff’s pain would
prohibit her from performing daily activities or work is unsupported by the medical evidence
of record, and the ALJ did not err in assigning little weight to his opinion.

14

The ALJ also considered conflicting reports in the record. For example, plaintiff told
Dr. Hakim that she had not worked since 1991, but a summary of plaintiff’s yearly earnings
shows that she earned money from 1992 through 1996 and from 2006 through 2010. (R. 19,
130, 191.) Additionally, plaintiff testified that she has not tried to work since she filed her
application for DIB and SSI, but on a Function Report dated July 12, 2010, plaintiff wrote
that she needed assistance working her computer because she was applying for jobs online.
(R. 40, 158.) Plaintiff’s daily activities were inconsistent with her testimony as well. Plaintiff
testified that she can sit no longer than ten minutes, stand no longer than ten to thirty minutes,
and that she must lie down for thirty minutes at a time about three times a day. (R. 35-37.)
However, plaintiff’s daily activities consisted of watching movies, reading, regularly
attending church, and visiting her son at his college. (R. 39.) Plaintiff also stated that she can
work a weed eater with help, likes planting flowers, and can drive long distances. (R. 38,
157.) These activities belie plaintiff’s contention that her pain is disabling.
The ALJ relied on substantial evidence in discrediting plaintiff’s testimony about the
limiting effects of her pain and in finding that plaintiff can perform a restricted range of light
work.
2. Consideration of Additional Impairments
Plaintiff next argues that she has three additional severe impairments that the ALJ
erroneously failed to identify. (Doc. 8 at 3.) Dr. Hakim diagnosed plaintiff with the three
impairments—shoulder pain with prominent muscle spasm, headaches of the occipital

15

neuralgia type, and lumbosacral pain with SI joint inflammation—that plaintiff contends the
ALJ should have identified as severe. (See R. 193.) The ALJ found that plaintiff had severe
impairments of only neck strain and carpal tunnel syndrome in the right wrist. (R. 15.)
“Nothing requires that the ALJ must identify, as step two, all of the impairments that
should be considered severe. Instead, at step three, the ALJ is required to demonstrate that
it has considered all of the claimant’s impairments, whether severe or not, in combination.”
Heatly v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 382 Fed. App’x 823, 825 (11th Cir. June 11, 2010); see also
382 Fed. App’x at 824-25 (“Even if the ALJ erred in not indicating whether [a condition]
was a severe impairment, the error was harmless because the ALJ concluded that [the
claimant] had a severe impairment: and that finding is all that step two requires.”). Here, the
ALJ found at step three that, “[e]ven when the effects of the claimant’s impairments are
considered singly and in combination, the record does not establish that the claimant is
subject to an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals the
requirements of any section of the Listings of Impairments,” thus showing that the ALJ
considered all of plaintiff’s impairments, both severe and non-severe. See Jones v. Dep’t of
Health and Human Servs., 941 F.2d 1529, 1533 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding that “[t]he ALJ’s
determination evidence[d] consideration of the combined effect of appellant’s impairments,”
where the ALJ stated that the claimant did not have “an impairment or combination of
impairments” that met or medically equaled a listed impairment).

16

Furthermore, the ALJ’s assessment of plaintiff’s RFC demonstrates that the ALJ
considered and accounted for plaintiff’s impairments. The ALJ placed limitations on the
weight plaintiff can lift or carry and the time plaintiff can sit, stand, or walk before she must
adjust. (R. 16.) Additionally, the ALJ specifically discussed plaintiff’s back pain, stating that
“[t]he claimant experiences a moderate level of pain in her back and right arm, which
occasionally has only a moderate affect [sic] on her ability to concentrate during an eighthour workday.” (Id.) The court finds that the ALJ considered all of plaintiff’s impairments
and did not err in choosing not to identify shoulder pain with prominent muscle spasm,
headaches of the occipital neuralgia type, and lumbosacral pain with SI joint inflammation
as severe impairments.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the reasons set forth above, the decision of the ALJ, as adopted by the
Commissioner, denying plaintiff’s claim for a period of disability, DIB, and SSI is due to
be affirmed. An Order affirming the decision of the Commissioner will be entered
contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion.
DONE this 11th day of February, 2015.

SHARON LOVELACE BLACKBURN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

17