Macfarlanes LLP v. Clark
MEMORANDUM OPINION - Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Macfarlaness renewed motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 35). The Court DENIES WITH PREJUDICE Mr. Clarks cross-motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 69). The Court DENIES M acfarlaness motion to strike Mr. Clarks sur-reply as moot. (Doc. 74). The Court will enter judgment against Mr. Clark by separate order. Macfarlanes shall file a brief and evidentiary material in support of its demand for attorneys fees, expenses, and costs on or before August 5, 2016. Mr. Clark shall file a response on or before August 10, 2016. Macfarlanes may file a reply on or before August 15, 2016. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 7/28/2016. (KEK)
2016 Jul-29 AM 08:45
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
CHARLES LANGE CLARK,
Case No.: 2:13-cv-01519-MHH
Thus far, the death of Kathryn Marie Lange, a native of Alabama and longtime resident of London, has generated two probate actions, one in Alabama and
one in England. A will contest begun and then abandoned in the probate action in
England generated a fee collection proceeding before the High Court of Justice in
England, which in turn generated the instant action to enforce in Alabama the
judgment of the High Court of England, which in turn generated a petition for a
writ of mandamus that effectively asks the Alabama Supreme Court to decide who
ultimately will be responsible for paying the High Court judgment if the judgement
can be enforced in Alabama.1
The probate action in Alabama remains open. Charles Lange Clark, Ms.
Lange’s nephew, is the administrator of Ms. Lange’s Alabama estate. Mr. Clark
Technically, the petition for writ of mandamus concerns the Probate Court of Jefferson
County’s order of escrow. (See Doc. 51-1).
launched the will contest in the English probate court action with the assistance of
Macfarlanes, LLP. The English probate proceeding settled at mediation. (Doc.
12-1, pp. 38–45). When Mr. Clark refused to pay Macfarlanes in full for its efforts
in the English probate court proceeding, Macfarlanes brought a breach of contract
action in the High Court of England to collect outstanding fees.2 Armed with a
favorable judgment, Macfarlanes has crossed the pond to seek satisfaction of that
judgment in this Court pursuant to Alabama’s Uniform Foreign-Country Money
Judgments Recognition Act. Mr. Clark offers a host of statutory defenses to
Macfarlanes’s attempt to enforce its judgment. Macfarlanes has filed a motion for
summary judgment, as has Mr. Clark.
This opinion examines the parties’
arguments and resolves the case as a matter of law.
Standard of Review
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To demonstrate that there is a genuine
The High Court of Justice is divided into the Queen’s Bench, Chancery, and Family Divisions.
Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, High Court, https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/you-and-thejudiciary/going-to-court/high-court/. The Queen’s Bench Division possesses both civil and
criminal jurisdiction and typically hears contract and tort actions. Courts and Tribunals
Judiciary, Queen’s Bench Division: Work, https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/you-and-thejudiciary/going-to-court/high-court/queens-bench-division/work/. The Chancery Division hears
civil cases, “including specialist work such as companies, patents and contentious probate.”
dispute as to a material fact that precludes summary judgment, a party opposing a
motion for summary judgment must cite “to particular parts of materials in the
record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information,
affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the
motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c)(1)(A). “The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may
consider other materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
When considering a summary judgment motion, a court must view the
evidence in the record and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party. White v. Beltram Edge Tool Supply, Inc., 789 F.3d 1188,
1191 (11th Cir. 2015). “In practice, cross motions for summary judgment may be
probative of the nonexistence of a factual dispute, but this procedural posture does
not automatically empower the court to dispense with the determination whether
questions of material fact exist.” Georgia State Conference of NAACP v. Fayette
Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 775 F.3d 1336, 1345 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation
marks and brackets omitted) (quoting Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341, 349 (7th Cir. 1983)). “If both parties
proceed on the same legal theory and rely on the same material facts . . . the case is
ripe for summary judgment.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Shook v. United States, 713 F.2d 662, 665 (11th Cir. 1983)).
On February 5, 1930, Kathryn Marie Lange was born in Birmingham,
Alabama. (Doc. 73-1, p. 5). On January 4, 2010, Ms. Lange died in London,
England after residing in London for over forty years. (Doc. 19-1, ¶ 9; Doc. 73-1,
p. 6). Soon thereafter, Ms. Lange’s nephew, Mr. Clark, filed a petition for letters
of administration in the Probate Court of Jefferson County, Alabama, and the
Probate Court appointed Mr. Clark administrator of Ms. Lange’s estate. (Doc. 731, p. 2; Doc. 69-2, ¶ 2).
While the probate action was proceeding in Jefferson County, Ms. Lange’s
former attorney lodged Ms. Lange’s purported will with the English courts. (Doc.
19-1, p. 8). The Probate Court of Jefferson County advised Mr. Clark “to get legal
counsel in England to question the [validity]” of the will and other legal documents
produced in the English probate action and authorized Mr. Clark, “within reason,
to pay . . . legal fees for the estate in both Birmingham and England . . . .” (Doc.
18-2, pp. 2–3).
Mr. Clark retained Macfarlanes in connection with the English probate
proceeding. (Doc. 69-2, pp. 17–19; Doc. 34, ¶ 1). The parties dispute whether the
agreement between Mr. Clark and Macfarlanes obligated Mr. Clark to pay
Macfarlanes’s fees in his individual capacity or solely in his capacity as the
administrator of Ms. Lange’s estate. (Cf. Doc. 9, pp. 19–21, with Doc. 69-1, p. 4).
Macfarlanes provided Mr. Clark with legal services for several months, during
which time Macfarlanes submitted bills for substantial fees for those services, fees
that largely went unpaid. (Doc. 10-3, pp. 44–48). When Macfarlanes and Mr.
Clark failed to reach an agreement regarding payment of the outstanding fees,
Macfarlanes withdrew as Mr. Clark’s counsel of record in the English probate
proceeding. (Doc. 10-3, pp. 37–41).
Macfarlanes made informal attempts to collect the unpaid fees. When those
efforts proved unsuccessful, Macfarlanes initiated a debt collection proceeding
against Mr. Clark in England in the Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court of
Justice. (Doc. 10-3, pp. 49–50; Doc. 10-2). Macfarlanes served its claim on Mr.
Clark in Alabama pursuant to an order of the High Court of Justice. (Docs. 10-5,
10-6, 10-7, 10-8). Mr. Clark retained K.A. Arnold & Co. to present his defence to
Macfarlanes’s claim. (Doc. 10-9; Doc. 10-12). See Civil Procedure Rule 15.2 (“A
defendant who wishes to defend all or part of a claim must file a defence.”).3 K.A.
Arnold served Mr. Clark’s defence on Macfarlanes and waived any defects in
Macfarlanes’s service on Mr. Clark. (Doc. 10-11).
At some point after filing Mr. Clark’s defence, K.A. Arnold ceased receiving
instructions from Mr. Clark, and the High Court allowed K.A. Arnold to withdraw
its representation. (Docs. 10-13, 10-14). Because Mr. Clark did not secure other
Available at https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part15.
counsel or participate personally in the debt collection proceeding after the
departure of K.A. Arnold, the High Court of Justice issued an order informing Mr.
Clark that his defence would be struck unless he complied with the High Court’s
scheduling order and responded to Macfarlanes’s requests for information. (Doc.
10-19). See Civil Procedure Rule 3.4(2) (“The court may strike out a statement of
case if it appears to the court . . . that there has been a failure to comply with a rule,
practice direction or court order.”).4 Mr. Clark failed to respond, and Macfarlanes
applied for an order striking Mr. Clark’s defence and entering judgement for
Macfarlanes. (Doc. 10-21). The High Court of Justice entered judgment against
Mr. Clark for £126,611.21 with interest to “accrue at the rate of 8% from the date
of [the] Order until the date on which the Judgment Debt is satisfied.” (Doc. 1022, p. 2).
Macfarlanes then filed a complaint in this Court seeking recognition of the
High Court judgment against Mr. Clark under the Alabama Uniform ForeignCountry Money Judgments Recognition Act, Ala. Code §§ 6-9-250–61, or
“pursuant to traditional principles of international comity.”
(Doc. 33, p. 1).
Macfarlanes also seeks an award of its attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs. (Doc.
33, pp. 13, 15).
Available at https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part03#3.4. Although
Macfarlanes filed its claim against Mr. Clark in the Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court of
Justice, the case later was transferred to the Chancery Division. (Doc. 34-1, ¶ 3). The Chancery
Division issued the order informing Mr. Clark that his defence would be struck if he did not
comply with the scheduling order.
Macfarlanes, as the “party seeking recognition of a foreign-country
judgment,” bears “the burden of establishing that [the Act] applies to the foreigncountry judgment.” Ala. Code § 6-9-252(c). To meet this burden, Macfarlanes
must show that the foreign-country judgment for which it seeks recognition “grants
or denies recovery of a sum of money” and, “under the law of the foreign country
where rendered, is final, conclusive, and enforceable.” Ala. Code § 6-9-252(a).
The parties do not dispute that Macfarlanes has satisfied the basic
requirements for recognition of a foreign-country judgment under Alabama law.
England is a foreign country, and the High Court judgment is a foreign-country
judgment as defined in § 6-9-251. The High Court judgment grants a sum of
money to Macfarlanes. (Doc. 10-22). And that judgment in favor of Macfarlanes
is “final, conclusive, and enforceable” because it is “not subject to additional
proceedings in the rendering court,” it determined the “legal rights and
obligations” of Macfarlanes and Mr. Clark, and it could be enforced through “the
legal procedures of the state” if Mr. Clark had assets subject to the High Court’s
jurisdiction. Ala. Code § 6-9-252 uniform comment 3; see also Eurodis Electron
PLC v. Unicomp, Inc., No. CIVA1:04CV2669-JEC, 2006 WL 1209922, at *3–5
(N.D. Ga. Apr. 28, 2006) (relying on the unrebutted affidavit of an English
solicitor for an explication of English law in connection with Georgia’s Uniform
Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act); (Doc. 10-1, ¶¶ 4–6; Doc.
34-1, ¶ 5; Doc. 65-1, ¶ 9). Therefore, the Court finds that Macfarlanes has satisfied
the basic requirements for recognition of a foreign-country judgment under
Alabama law. As a result, the Court must recognize the High Court judgment
unless the judgment falls within one of a limited number of exceptions. Ala. Code
§ 6-9-253(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in subsections (b) and (c), a court of
this state shall recognize a foreign-country judgment to which this article
Relying on the statutory exceptions to mandatory recognition, Mr. Clark
contends that the Court cannot recognize the High Court judgment because the
High Court did not have personal jurisdiction over him. (Doc. 69-1, p. 26); Ala.
Code §§ 6-9-253(b)(2), 254. Mr. Clark also argues that the Court should not
recognize the High Court judgment because the judgment “is repugnant to the
public policy” of Alabama, “conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment,”
is based on a proceeding that was “contrary to an agreement between the parties,”
and was rendered in a “seriously inconvenient forum.” (Doc. 69-1, p. 26); Ala.
Code §§ 6-9-253(c)(3)–(6). The Court examines each of Mr. Clark’s contentions
in turn, keeping in mind that Mr. Clark bears the burden of establishing that
recognition should not occur.
Ala. Code § 6-9-253(d) (“A party resisting
recognition of a foreign-country judgment has the burden of establishing that a
ground for nonrecognition . . . exists.”).
A. Personal Jurisdiction
The Act provides that a court “shall not recognize a foreign-country
judgment if . . . the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the
defendant . . . .” Ala. Code § 6-9-253(b). The Act lists six potential bases for
personal jurisdiction over a defendant that are sufficient to support a foreigncountry judgment, but “[t]he list of bases for personal jurisdiction . . . is not
exclusive.” Ala. Code § 6-9-254(b). Macfarlanes asserts that the High Court had
jurisdiction over Mr. Clark because Mr. Clark, “before the commencement of the
proceeding, had agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign court with
respect to the subject matter involved . . . .” Ala. Code § 6-9-254(a)(3); (Doc. 9, p.
18). As an additional basis for the High Court’s jurisdiction, Macfarlanes argues
that Mr. Clark “voluntarily appeared in the proceeding, other than for the purpose
of . . . contesting the jurisdiction of the court . . . .” Ala. Code § 6-9-254(a)(2);
(Doc. 9, p. 18).
Macfarlanes’s argument that Mr. Clark agreed to submit to the jurisdiction
of the High Court is based on the engagement letter and terms of business provided
to Mr. Clark by Macfarlanes. (Doc. 9, p. 18). The engagement letter, a copy of
which Mr. Clark signed and returned to Macfarlanes, provides that the terms of
business “will apply both to this matter and any further matters on which we act for
you.” (Doc. 10-3, p. 13; Doc. 21-1, p. 29). Term of business 14.8 states, “[o]ur
relationship will be governed by the laws of England and will be subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts.” (Doc. 10-3, p. 22).
Mr. Clark responds that he is not personally bound by the forum selection
clause of the terms of business or required to submit to the jurisdiction of the
English courts because he signed the engagement letter in his capacity as
administrator of Ms. Lange’s estate.
(Doc. 69-1, p. 27).
In support of this
contention, Mr. Clark points to the signature page of the engagement letter, which
under “Name:” reads, “Lange Clark, Administrator of the Estate of Kathryn M.
Lange.” (Doc. 21-1, p. 29).
Had Mr. Clark remained an active participant in the fee proceeding, the High
Court surely would have had to grapple with whether Mr. Clark retained
Macfarlanes in his personal capacity, in his capacity as administrator, or both. The
lack of any reference in the detailed engagement letter to Mr. Clark in his role as
administrator might argue in favor of a finding that Mr. Clark retained Macfarlanes
in his individual capacity. (See Doc. 10-3, pp. 14–18). Particular provisions of the
engagement letter relating to payment also might lend credence to the idea that the
engagement letter obligated Mr. Clark personally. (See, e.g., Doc. 10-3, p. 14
(“We have identified you as our client for professional purposes and we will only
address our bills to you.”)).
On the other hand, the signature page of the engagement letter constitutes
evidence that Mr. Clark retained Macfarlanes in his capacity as administrator of
Ms. Lange’s estate. (Doc. 21-1, p. 29). Had the High Court had the opportunity to
evaluate the evidentiary weight to be given to the signature page, the High Court
might have considered whether the signature page was provided to Macfarlanes on
August 11, 2010 when Mr. Clark sent by email the other documentation
Macfarlanes had requested from Mr. Clark.5 (Doc. 10-3, pp. 24–28). Based on the
record before this Court, Mr. Clark appears to have provided the signature page to
Macfarlanes for the first time on December 2, 2010—the day after Macfarlanes
terminated its client relationship with Mr. Clark. (Doc. 10-3, pp. 37–38, 41–43;
see also Doc. 10-2, p. 3; Doc. 5-1, p. 50 (“The Claimant has been unable to locate
the signature page attached to the email. However, the Defendant did subsequently
provide a signed signature page on 2 December 2010.”); Doc. 10-12, ¶ 5 (“It is
averred that the said the copy of the Engagement Letter which accompanied the
same was not then returned to [Macfarlanes] . . . .”)).
Mr. Clark’s August 11, 2010 email was addressed to Lucy Hawks, a senior solicitor at
Macfarlanes, and included as attachments a copy of Mr. Clark’s passport, a copy of Mr. Clark’s
water bill, and a copy of the letter Mr. Clark sent to Charles Russell LLP to inform that firm he
had retained other counsel. (Doc. 10-3, pp. 24–28). No other attached files are listed on Mr.
Clark’s email to Ms. Hawks. (Doc. 10-3, p. 24).
But this Court is not the High Court, and this Court does not have to address
the many questions that Mr. Clark left unanswered when he abandoned the High
Court fee proceeding because there is an alternative basis for personal jurisdiction.6
The second basis offered by Macfarlanes for the High Court’s jurisdiction over Mr.
Clark concerns Mr. Clark’s voluntary participation in the debt collection
proceeding. (Doc. 9, pp. 18–19). Mr. Clark responds that the defence he offered
in the debt collection proceeding challenged the High Court’s jurisdiction and thus
meets the limitation contained in § 6-9-254(a)(2). Ala. Code § 6-9-254(a) (court
cannot refuse recognition of a foreign-country judgment “for lack of personal
jurisdiction if . . . the defendant voluntarily appeared in the proceeding, other than
for the purpose of protecting property seized or threatened with seizure in the
proceeding or of contesting the jurisdiction of the court over the defendant . . . .”).
The record does not bear out Mr. Clark’s contention.
Mr. Clark did not limit his defence in the High Court to a challenge to that
court’s jurisdiction over him. In fact, Mr. Clark never mentioned the jurisdiction
of the High Court. Instead, Mr. Clark, through his attorneys, denied that he was
indebted to Macfarlanes. (Doc. 10-12, ¶ 2.1). Mr. Clark repeatedly argued that he
Mr. Clark makes two additional arguments: one concerning whether the engagement letter was
addressed—or only sent—to him personally and one concerning the meaning of the word “our”
in the terms of business. (Doc. 69-1, pp. 27–29, 31–33). Because the Court finds a genuine
dispute exists that precludes summary judgment on the issue of the High Court’s jurisdiction
over Mr. Clark under § 6-9-254(a)(3), the Court need not reach Mr. Clark’s additional
retained Macfarlanes solely in his capacity as the administrator of Ms. Lange’s
(Doc. 10-12, ¶¶ 2.2–2.4, 2.6, 5–10).
He added that the fees that
Macfarlanes charged were “grossly excessive for the work done by the Claimant.”
(Doc. 10-12, ¶ 3.1). Mr. Clark questioned Macfarlanes’s computation of the fees
claimed. (Doc. 10-12, ¶ 3.2). Mr. Clark accused Macfarlanes of inflating the
number of hours for which it charged, or alternatively, of spending an excessive
number of hours on the English probate proceeding, “bearing in mind the nature of
the work and the way in which it was carried out.” (Doc. 10-12, ¶¶ 3.5, 3.6). Mr.
Clark set out his assessment of the specific shortcomings of the work that
Macfarlanes performed in the English probate proceeding. (Doc. 10-12, ¶¶ 3.6.1–
3.6.8). Thus, Mr. Clark voluntarily appeared and participated in the High Court
proceeding that Macfarlanes brought against him.
Mr. Clark asks this Court to construe his argument regarding the capacity in
which he retained Macfarlanes as a challenge to the jurisdiction of the English
courts. (Doc. 69-1, pp. 33–34). But doing so would reinvent the argument that
Mr. Clark made to the High Court.
Mr. Clark’s defence raised the capacity
argument in relation to his potential liability to Macfarlanes, not in relation to the
High Court’s power to adjudicate the dispute between the parties. (See, e.g., Doc.
10-12, ¶ 2.3). Expecting the High Court—or this Court—to discern an argument
about jurisdiction within statements about capacity shifts the burden off the litigant
to present his own case and demands clairvoyance from the High Court. See T.P.
ex rel. T.P. v. Bryan Cty. Sch. Dist., 792 F.3d 1284, 1291 (11th Cir. 2015)
(“[D]istrict courts should not ‘be expected to construct full blown claims from
sentence fragments . . . .’”).
Moreover, even if the Court were to give Mr. Clark the benefit of his current
characterization of his High Court argument regarding capacity, the Court already
has illustrated that Mr. Clark’s arguments to the High Court ventured well beyond
capacity issues. Mr. Clark expressed his intent, if found personally liable, to
contest the amount of the recovery sought by Macfarlanes. (Doc. 10-12, ¶ 3). Mr.
Clark reserved the right to dispute the interpretation given to the engagement letter
and terms of business if those documents were found to apply to Mr. Clark
personally. (Doc. 10-12, ¶ 5). Mr. Clark reserved the right to have Macfarlanes’s
fees audited if Mr. Clark was found personally liable. (Doc. 10-12, ¶ 16). In each
instance, Mr. Clark’s defence, while denying that a judgment against him
personally would be proper, addressed the merits of Macfarlanes’s claim. (See
also Doc. 10-12, ¶¶ 2.2–2.4, 2.6, 3.1, 3.2, 3.5, 3.6, 3.6.1–3.6.8, 5–10).
Therefore, Mr. Clark voluntarily appeared in the debt collection proceeding
for a purpose other than contesting the jurisdiction of the High Court, and the
judgment that the High Court rendered may not be refused recognition for lack of
personal jurisdiction under § 6-9-254. See Genujo Lok Beteiligungs GmbH v.
Zorn, 943 A.2d 573, 580 (2008) (finding under Maine’s Uniform Foreign Moneyjudgments Recognition Act that raising jurisdictional and substantive arguments
constituted appearing “other than for the purpose of . . . contesting the jurisdiction
of the court over the defendant”); CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel Corp.
N.V., 792 N.E.2d 155, 161–62 (2003) (finding same under New York’s Uniform
Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act).
B. Public Policy
Unlike the absence of personal jurisdiction over the defendant, which
precludes recognition of a foreign-country judgment, the remaining grounds for
nonrecognition that Mr. Clark offers are discretionary. See Ala. Code § 6-9-253(c)
(describing circumstances in which “[a] court of this state need not recognize a
In Mr. Clark’s first discretionary argument, he
contends that the “judgment is repugnant to the public policy of Alabama because
it violates Alabama’s doctrines of judicial estoppel, equitable estoppel, and
Alabama’s statutory scheme for the protection of Administrators in probate cases.”
(Doc. 69-1, p. 36); see also Ala. Code § 6-9-253(c)(3) (A foreign-country
judgment need not be recognized if “the judgment or the claim for relief on which
the judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of this state or of the United
States . . . .”).
As an initial matter, it seems a stretch to characterize the well-settled
common law principles of judicial and equitable estoppel as statements of the
public policy of the State of Alabama. “[J]udicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine
invoked by a court at its discretion . . . .” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742,
750 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Likewise, equitable
estoppel—by its very name—relies upon the equitable powers of a court. Both
doctrines rely on common law principles older than the state of Alabama. See,
e.g., Hamilton v. Zimmerman, 37 Tenn. 39, 48–49 (1857) (applying judicial
estoppel on the basis of preexisting doctrines of estoppel); Langston v. McKinnie, 6
N.C. 67, 68 (1811) (applying equitable estoppel); Alabama Department of
Union as the 22nd state on December 14, 1819.). Neither form of estoppel is
grounded in a state statute or another local legislative enactment, and “[i]t is well
established that the Legislature is endowed with the exclusive domain to formulate
public policy in Alabama.” Leonard v. Terminix Int’l Co., L.P., 854 So. 2d 529,
534 (Ala. 2002) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
Assuming though, for argument’s sake, that judicial and equitable estoppel
represent the public policy of Alabama, Mr. Clark fails in his attempt to show that
the doctrines should apply in this case. A party that invokes judicial estoppel must
(1) [another] party’s later position [is] clearly inconsistent with its
earlier position; (2) the party [was] successful in the prior proceeding
so that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later
proceeding would create the perception that either the first or second
court was misled; and (3) the party seeking to assert an inconsistent
position [will] derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair
detriment on the opposing party if not estopped.
Ex parte First Alabama Bank, 883 So. 2d 1236, 1244–45 (Ala. 2003), as modified
on denial of reh’g (Nov. 21, 2003) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
According to Mr. Clark, Macfarlanes’s actions before the Probate Court of
Jefferson County provide a basis for applying judicial estoppel to Macfarlanes’s
efforts to have this Court recognize the High Court judgment. (Doc. 69-1, pp. 36–
41). The Court disagrees.
Macfarlanes’s participation in the Alabama probate proceeding was
extremely limited. After Macfarlanes filed this action, Mr. Clark filed a motion for
declaratory relief before the Probate Court. (Doc. 5-1). Among other things, Mr.
Clark asked the Probate Court to declare that the High Court judgment obtained by
Macfarlanes “against the Administrator in his personal capacity is unenforceable.”
(Doc. 5-1, p. 2).
Macfarlanes opposed Mr. Clark’s motion, arguing that the
Probate Court did “not have personal or subject matter jurisdiction over
Macfarlanes and the issue of enforcement of its judgment against Clark.” (Doc.
17-2, p. 2). While the motion for declaratory relief was pending, Mr. Clark filed a
motion for an order of indemnification in which he sought to have Ms. Lange’s
estate indemnify “him individually for the cost of defending any and all actions
against him individually as well as any potential judgment against him.” (Doc. 211, p. 55).
Later, Mr. Clark filed additional support for his motion for
indemnification, asking the Probate Court, “pursuant to Code of Alabama Section
43-2-544(21), for exoneration from personal liability of Lange Clark, individually,
from any claim, action, or judgment by Macfarlanes, LLP.” (Doc. 21-2, p. 90).
The Probate Court granted Mr. Clark’s motions. (Doc. 21-1, pp. 93–95, 97–
99). In granting the motion for declaratory relief, the Probate Court qualified its
order by observing that Macfarlanes had not been served in the Alabama probate
proceeding and that “the court makes no attempt to issue a judgment against
Macfarlane[s] LLP.” (Doc. 21-2, p. 93). In the order on indemnification and
exoneration, the Probate Court noted:
The Court is informed there is no objection to the motion, including
none by Macfarlanes, LLP who previously made a limited appearance
opposing a Motion for Declaratory Judgment filed by Mr. Clark, was
informed of the pendency of the Motion for Indemnification, and was
granted a continuance to consider its position on the Motion for
(Doc. 21-2, p. 97).
In Mr. Clark’s version of events, “Macfarlanes consented to the exoneration
. . . .” (Doc. 69-1, p. 39). Proceeding from that premise, Mr. Clark concludes
“Macfarlanes’ position in this case is remarkably inconsistent with its position
taken in the Probate Court. Therefore, the first element of judicial estoppel has
been satisfied.” (Doc. 69-1, p. 39). The record belies Mr. Clark’s characterization
of Macfarlanes’s actions.
Macfarlanes was not a party to the Probate Court action; Macfarlanes made
a limited appearance to contest the Probate Court’s jurisdiction over the law firm
and the firm’s claim for fees against Mr. Clark. The Probate Court agreed, when
issuing the order on declaratory relief, that the order did not bind Macfarlanes.
Under those circumstances, the absence of an objection from Macfarlanes to Mr.
Clark’s motion for indemnification and exoneration is entirely consistent with
Macfarlanes’s position that the Probate Court could not exercise jurisdiction over
the firm; had MacFarlanes objected, the firm may well have voluntarily subjected
itself to the jurisdiction of the Alabama probate court (much like Mr. Clark
voluntarily participated in the High Court proceeding and, consequently, became
subject to that court’s jurisdiction). Macfarlanes took no position on Mr. Clark’s
motions for indemnification and exoneration, and as a result, Macfarlanes’s
position on the issue of indemnification and exoneration in this action is not clearly
inconsistent with a previous position. Mr. Clark’s judicial estoppel argument fails
at the first step.7
Mr. Clark’s equitable estoppel argument fares no better.
[F]or the doctrine of equitable estoppel to apply, a party must
demonstrate: (1) That the person against whom estoppel is asserted,
who usually must have knowledge of the facts, communicates
something in a misleading way, either by words, conduct, or silence,
with the intention that the communication will be acted on; (2) That
the person seeking to assert estoppel, who lacks knowledge of the
facts, relies upon the communication; and (3) That the person relying
would be harmed materially if the actor is later permitted to assert a
claim inconsistent with his earlier conduct.
Wehle v. Bradley, No. 1101290, 2015 WL 6618633, at *8 (Ala. Oct. 30, 2015)
(internal citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted).
Mr. Clark bases his equitable estoppel claim on Macfarlanes’s knowledge
that “Mr. Clark was acting solely in his capacity as Administrator” coupled with
Macfarlanes’s failure to “honor its agreement and public acknowledgments that
Mr. Clark was acting as Administrator.” (Doc. 69-1, pp. 42, 43). In terms of
reliance, Mr. Clark states he “relied on the fact that he signed the ‘Engagement
Letter’ ‘Lange Clark, Administrator of the Estate of Kathryn M. Lange’” and
Mr. Clark’s judicial estoppel argument also fails at the second and third steps. Characterizing
Macfarlanes’s inaction in a case to which it was not a party as “consenting to the exoneration”
turns the concept of personal jurisdiction on its head. (Doc. 69-1, p. 40). Macfarlanes fairly and
properly refrained from addressing the merits of the Probate Court proceeding because the firm
was not subject to the Probate Court’s jurisdiction. Macfarlanes did not gain an unfair advantage
or impose an unfair detriment on Mr. Clark by following settled jurisdictional principles.
“upon the fact that Macfarlanes accepted he was only acting as Administrator.”
(Doc. 69-1, p. 43).
Mr. Clark offers evidence that Macfarlanes was aware of his role as
administrator of Ms. Lange’s estate in Alabama, but no evidence that Macfarlanes
knew or believed that Mr. Clark was acting solely in his capacity as administrator
when he retained Macfarlanes. The engagement letter is silent on that point except
for the signature page, which the record suggests Macfarlanes received after the
firm terminated its relationship with Mr. Clark. (Doc. 10-3, pp. 10–18, 37–38, 41–
43). Mr. Clark’s inability to produce evidence of a representation by Macfarlanes
on which he relied is fatal to his equitable estoppel argument. See Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (“In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c)
mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and
upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will
bear the burden of proof at trial.”).
As an alternative to his estoppel theories, Mr. Clark offers public policy
arguments based on Alabama’s statutes regulating the conduct and liability of
administrators. Mr. Clark is on firmer footing with respect to the assertion that
laws duly enacted by the Alabama Legislature represent the public policy of the
State, but he faces a “stringent test for finding a public policy violation . . . .” Ala.
Code § 6-9-253 uniform comment 8.
Public policy is violated only if recognition or enforcement of the
foreign-country judgment would tend clearly to injure the public
health, the public morals, or the public confidence in the
administration of law, or would undermine that sense of security for
individual rights, whether of personal liberty or of private property,
which any citizen ought to feel.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In examining the statutes cited
by Mr. Clark, the Court heeds the admonition that the “words used in a statute
must be given their natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning,
and where plain language is used a court is bound to interpret that language to
mean exactly what it says.” City of Orange Beach v. Benjamin, 821 So. 2d 193,
196 (Ala. 2001) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
Mr. Clark begins by quoting Ala. Code § 43-2-130: “Civil actions may be
brought against executors or administrators in their representative character, in all
cases, in the county in which letters were granted. Service of process may be made
on them in any county in the state.” From this statutory text, Mr. Clark concludes
“venue of this action is only proper in the Probate Court.” (Doc. 69-1, p. 45).
Mr. Clark’s argument suffers from at least two fundamental flaws. First,
Macfarlanes brought suit against Mr. Clark in his individual capacity, not his
“representative character.” (Doc. 10-2, ¶ 2). As a result, § 43-2-130 is irrelevant.
Second, Mr. Clark converts the plain, permissive word “may” in the statute into the
word “shall,” a mandate.
Yet, the permissive nature of the venue statute is
recognized by the cases Mr. Clark cites as support. See Tolbert v. Tolbert, 903 So.
2d 103, 106 (Ala. 2004) (citing Ex parte Wiginton); Ex parte Wiginton, 743 So. 2d
1071, 1073 (Ala. 1999) (applying § 43-2-130 to an action against an executrix, but
also finding that venue would be proper in another county under Alabama Rule of
Civil Procedure 82(c)).
Next, Mr. Clark argues that under Ala. Code § 43-2-110,8 he cannot be held
liable for an amount “in excess of the assets which have come into his hands” as
administrator. (Doc. 69-1, p. 45). Section 43-2-110 provides: “No executor or
administrator is liable, except in the case provided by section 43-2-62, beyond the
amount of assets which have come to his hands or which have been lost, destroyed,
wasted, injured, depreciated or not collected by want of diligence on his part or an
abuse of his trust.”
What the case law makes clear—and Mr. Clark fails to mention—is that
§ 43-2-110 governs the liability of an executor or administrator to the estate. See
McAleer v. Durry, 593 So. 2d 1021, 1023 (Ala. 1992) (finding a special
administrator liable to the estate “in the amount of the value of the assets that came
into his hands and that were then lost because of his lack of diligence” and citing
§ 43-2-110); Am. States Ins. Co. v. Copeland, 534 So. 2d 275, 277 (Ala. 1988)
Mr. Clark refers to “Code of Alabama section 43-2-100,” but no such code section exists. The
text Mr. Clark quotes is drawn from Ala. Code § 43-2-110.
(citing § 43-2-110 and discussing the liability of an administrator to an estate);
Stone v. Curry, 512 So. 2d 66, 68 (Ala. 1987) (same). The Court finds no basis for
applying § 43-2-110 to this case concerning Macfarlanes’s efforts to collect unpaid
Furthermore, the record indicates that the amount sought by
Macfarlanes, $191,461.47 plus 8% interest from March 18, 2013, is less than the
amount of the assets that came into Mr. Clark’s hands as administrator of Ms.
Lange’s estate. (Doc. 33, pp. 14–15; Doc. 73-1, p. 2 (estimating Ms. Lange’s
Alabama estate to be worth $350,000)). As a result, if § 43-2-110 applied, the
provision would not act to bar or reduce Macfarlanes’s recovery.
Mr. Clark’s final statutory argument rests on Ala. Code § 43-2-843. (Doc.
69-1, pp. 45–47). Under § 43-2-843, “a personal representative, acting prudently
for the benefit of the interested persons, may properly . . . [p]rovide for exoneration
of the personal representative from personal liability in any contract entered into
on behalf of the estate.”
Ala. Code §§ 43-2-843, 43-2-843(21).
interprets this provision to mean that a personal representative may unilaterally and
after the fact exonerate himself from personal liability under any contract that he
has signed on behalf of the estate without respect to the terms of the contract. (See
Doc. 69-1, pp. 46–47).
Assuming for the sake of argument that Mr. Clark signed the engagement
letter with Macfarlanes only on behalf of the estate and that § 43-2-843(21) is
potentially applicable, Mr. Clark’s interpretation contradicts the plain meaning of
the statute and basic principles of contract law. By its terms, § 43-2-843(21)
permits a personal representative to provide for personal exoneration of the
personal representative in any contract entered into on behalf of the estate. Mr.
Clark did not provide for his exoneration in his contract with Macfarlanes and
therefore has no recourse to § 43-2-843(21). In fact, the substance of the letter
contains no information about the capacity in which Mr. Clark was acting or his
The after-the-fact signature page does not satisfy the
requirement of § 43-2-843(21). (See Doc. 10-3, pp. 10–23).
An exoneration provision in a contract provides to the parties with whom a
personal representative contracts on behalf of an estate notice that the personal
representative is acting solely in a representative capacity, and the statute
authorizes a personal representative to so limit his or her personal liability without
violating his fiduciary duty to the estate. Failure to provide advance notice of the
limited capacity in which the personal representative is acting leaves the estate
open to litigation over capacity issues and the personal representative subject to
Furthermore, “[o]ne party cannot unilaterally alter the terms of a contract
after the contract has been made. Both parties must mutually assent to a
modification.” Ex parte Amoco Fabrics & Fiber Co., 729 So. 2d 336, 340 (Ala.
1998) (internal citations omitted); see also Smiths Water Auth. v. City of Phenix
City, 436 So. 2d 827, 831 (Ala. 1983) (noting that the mutual assent of the parties
to a contract is necessary to modify the contract’s terms). Under Mr. Clark’s
interpretation of § 43-2-843(21), Mr. Clark would be free to declare himself
exonerated at any time, in spite of a contract’s silence or provisions to the contrary.
Such unfettered discretion to alter the terms of an agreement would render Mr.
Clark’s promises illusory and cause any contracts he entered into on behalf of the
estate to fail for lack of mutual obligation and lack of a meeting of the minds. See
Ryan's Family Steakhouse, Inc. v. Kilpatric, 966 So. 2d 273, 279–81 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2006) (discussing the requirement of mutuality of obligation).
Because Mr. Clark’s reading of § 43-2-843(21) would lead to absurd results,
the Court will not adopt Mr. Clark’s statutory interpretation. See City of Bessemer
v. McClain, 957 So. 2d 1061, 1076 (Ala. 2006) (applying absurd-results doctrine).
“Unilateral grumbling cannot modify a bilateral contract,” and neither can
unilateral declarations of personal exoneration. Kinmon v. J. P. King Auction Co.,
276 So. 2d 569, 570–71 (1973). Personal representatives, like other parties, are
bound by the contracts they make, and they are well advised to include in their
contracts protections on which they hope to rely in the future.
Mr. Clark bases his last public policy argument on the prohibition against
excessive fees found in the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct. (Doc. 69-1,
pp. 47–49). While Mr. Clark details his disagreement with many aspects of the
invoices he received from Macfarlanes, he does not explain how the Alabama
Rules of Professional Conduct, which were created to help the legal profession in
Alabama meet the obligations of self-regulation, represent the public policy of
Alabama or the United States. See Ala. R. Prof’l Conduct Preamble. The Court
will not endeavor to construct that argument on Mr. Clark’s behalf. See T.P. ex
rel. T.P., 792 F.3d at 1291.
In summary, Mr. Clark invokes doctrines and statutes of which Macfarlanes
does not run afoul and objections that are not based on public policy. None of Mr.
Clark’s arguments suggest that recognition of Macfarlanes’s claim “would tend
clearly to injure the public health, the public morals, or the public confidence in the
administration of law, or would undermine that sense of security for individual
rights, whether of personal liberty or of private property, which any citizen ought
to feel.” Ala. Code § 6-9-253 uniform comment 8 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court finds that the High Court judgment is not
repugnant to the public policy of Alabama or the United States.
C. Conflict with Another Final and Conclusive Judgment
A court may refuse recognition to a foreign-country judgment if “the
judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment . . . .” Ala. Code
§ 6-9-253(c)(4). Mr. Clark asserts that the High Court judgment conflicts with the
Probate Court’s orders on declaratory relief and indemnification and exoneration.
(Doc. 69-1, pp. 49–52). Before examining whether the Probate Court’s orders
conflict with the High Court judgment, the Court must determine whether the
Probate Court’s orders constitute final and conclusive judgments.
“A final judgment is an order ‘that conclusively determines the issues before
the court and ascertains and declares the rights of the parties involved.’”
Lunceford v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 641 So. 2d 244, 246 (Ala. 1994) (quoting
Bean v. Craig, 557 So. 2d 1249, 1253 (Ala. 1990)). Under the Alabama Rules of
Civil Procedure, unless a court expressly enters judgment pursuant to Rule 54,
any order or other form of decision, however designated, which
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to
revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the
claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
Ala. R. Civ. P. 54. A purported final judgment entered by a court may be deemed
void “[w]hen a party is not served or joined in an action and the trial court thus
acquires no jurisdiction over it . . . .” Campbell v. Taylor, 159 So. 3d 4, 10–11
The order on declaratory relief entered by the Probate Court made no
pretense of being a final judgment. (See Doc. 12-1, p. 2). The Probate Court did
not certify the order as final under Rule 54, and the order did not conclusively
determine the issues in the probate action or the rights of Mr. Clark and
Macfarlanes. On the contrary, the order “noted that Macfarlanes LLP was not
served in this matter and contest[s] the jurisdiction of any judgment against [it] by
this court.” (Doc. 12-1, p. 2). Although Mr. Clark requested a declaration that the
High Court judgment was unenforceable, the Probate Court granted Mr. Clark’s
motion only “as to the approval of the actions thus far by the Executor, Lange
Clark . . . .” (Doc. 5-1, p. 20; Doc. 12-1, p. 2). The Probate Court made “no
attempt to issue a judgment against Macfarlane[s] LLP.”
(Doc. 12-1, p. 2).
Accordingly, the Probate Court’s order on declaratory relief is not a final and
conclusive judgment with which the High Court judgment potentially could
conflict under § 6-9-253(c)(4).
Similarly, the Probate Court did not certify the order on indemnification and
exoneration as final under Rule 54, and the order did not purport to resolve the
probate action or the dispute between Macfarlanes and Mr. Clark. (See Doc. 18-1).
The order acknowledged that “Macfarlanes, LLP . . . previously made a limited
appearance opposing a Motion for Declaratory Judgment filed by Mr. Clark” and
gave no indication that Macfarlanes had been served or joined in the probate action
following that limited appearance. (Doc. 18-1, p. 2). Therefore, the Probate
Court’s order on indemnification and exoneration is not a final and conclusive
judgment for the purposes of § 6-9-253(c)(4).
In addition, even if this Court treated the Probate Court orders as final and
conclusive, the orders do not present a conflict that would prevent the recognition
of the High Court judgment. The Probate Court explicitly restricted the effect of
the order on declaratory relief to the legal relationship between Mr. Clark and the
Lange estate. (Doc. 12-2, p. 2). In contrast, the High Court judgment dealt only
with the legal relationship between Mr. Clark and Macfarlanes. (Doc. 10-22).
Because the judgment and order do not impose inconsistent obligations on Mr.
Clark, who is the only party common to both, they are not in conflict.
As for the order on indemnification and exoneration, the portion of the order
that deals with indemnification does not conflict with the High Court judgment.
(See Doc. 18-1, p. 2 (ordering that “the Estate of Kathryn M. Lange shall
indemnify Charles Lange Clark for any and all costs incurred in defending an
action against him filed by the English law firm Macfarlanes, LLP and/or any
potential judgment by Macfarlanes, LLP”)). The High Court held that Mr. Clark
owes Macfarlanes a debt, but did not address whether a third party such as the
Lange estate might, in turn, be obligated to reimburse Mr. Clark. (Doc. 10-22).
The effect of the portion of the Probate Court order in which “Charles Lange
Clark is exonerated for any personal liability entered into on behalf [of] the estate”
is less certain, but this Court will not presume that the Probate Court attempted to
affect the rights of a non-party, like Macfarlanes, with regard to which the Probate
Court repeatedly noted the bases for personal jurisdiction were lacking. The order
appears to use “exoneration” in the sense of a “right to be reimbursed by reason of
having paid money that another person should have paid,” which accords with the
indemnification of Mr. Clark by the Lange estate. Black’s Law Dictionary (10th
ed. 2014). Therefore, the Court will not deny recognition to Macfarlanes’s claim
on the ground that the High Court judgment conflicts with another final and
D. Contrary to an Agreement Between the Parties
A court need not recognize a foreign-country judgment if “the proceeding in
the foreign court was contrary to an agreement between the parties under which the
dispute in question was to be determined otherwise than by proceedings in that
foreign court . . . .” Ala. Code § 6-9-253(c)(5). Rather than direct the Court’s
attention to a forum selection clause that required Macfarlanes to bring suit
somewhere other than the High Court of Justice, Mr. Clark relies on a strained
interpretation of the engagement letter and terms of business provided by
Macfarlanes to make his argument under this provision of the Act. (Doc. 69-1, pp.
According to Mr. Clark, business term 14.8, which states, “[o]ur relationship
will be governed by the laws of England and will be subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the English courts,” does not apply to Macfarlanes and the person
signing the engagement letter. (Doc. 10-3, pp. 17, 22; Doc. 69-1, p. 53). Instead,
Mr. Clark asserts “[t]he provision only applied to Macfarlanes and its affiliates.”
(Doc. 69-1, p. 53). Mr. Clark reaches this conclusion through reliance on the
following portion of the terms of business:
References in these terms (and any related communications in which
we set out the basis on which we agree to act for you) to
‘Macfarlanes’, ‘we’, ‘us’, ‘our’ and ‘the firm’ are to Macfarlanes LLP
. . ., other entities controlled by Macfarlanes LLP through which it
carries out its business and any successor(s) in business of any such
(Doc. 10-3, p. 19; Doc. 69-1, pp. 31–33). A similar provision also appears in the
engagement letter: “We write to set out the basis on which Macfarlanes LLP has
agreed to act for you. References in this letter to ‘we’, ‘our’, ‘us’ and ‘the firm’
should be interpreted as references to Macfarlanes LLP and entities controlled by
Macfarlanes LLP through which it carries out its business.” (Doc. 10-3, p. 14).
In Mr. Clark’s reading, Macfarlanes’s engagement letter and terms of
business inform new clients that internal disputes that arise among Macfarlanes
and its affiliates will be decided in the English courts, while saying nothing about
the resolution of disputes between Macfarlanes and the client with whom
Macfarlanes is forming a legal relationship. If the Court were inclined to credit
such an interpretation, Mr. Clark would have shown—at most—that the forum
selection clause in the terms of business did not require his dispute with
Macfarlanes to be resolved in the English courts. Mr. Clark does not cite to any
portion of the engagement letter, terms of business, or any other agreement
between himself (in whatever capacity) and Macfarlanes that would prohibit
Macfarlanes from seeking relief in the High Court of Justice. Therefore, Mr. Clark
has not shown that the High Court judgment is contrary to an agreement between
himself and Macfarlanes, and the Court will not deny recognition to Macfarlanes’s
claim under § 6-9-253(c)(5).
E. Seriously Inconvenient Forum
Mr. Clark’s final argument that the Court should exercise its discretion and
refuse to recognize the High Court judgment rests on § 6-9-253(c)(6), which
allows a court to deny recognition to a foreign-country judgment if, “in the case of
jurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign court was a seriously
inconvenient forum for the trial of the action . . . .” Mr. Clark catalogues the
inconveniences of an English forum, (a depiction that is undercut by frequent
references in the record to Mr. Clark and his wife’s trips to England in connection
with Ms. Lange’s affairs), but does not address the basis for the High Court’s
jurisdiction. (Docs. 10-24, 19-1, 19-2; Doc. 69-1, pp. 53–55). Because the Court
has determined that the High Court acquired personal jurisdiction over Mr. Clark
through his voluntary participation in the debt collection proceeding, § 6-9253(c)(6) does not apply. Accordingly, the Court will not refuse recognition to the
High Court judgment on the ground the English courts were a seriously
As an alternative to recognition under the Act, Macfarlanes asserts that the
High Court judgment also may be recognized under principles of comity. (Doc.
33, ¶¶ 41–43). Because the Court concludes that Macfarlanes’s claim should be
recognized under the Act, the Court does not reach this argument.
The Court finds that Macfarlanes has established the basic requirements for
recognition of the High Court judgment under the Alabama Uniform ForeignCountry Money Judgments Recognition Act. The Court also finds that Mr. Clark
has failed to demonstrate the existence of any grounds that would prevent the
recognition of the High Court judgment or permit the Court to exercise its
discretion in that regard.
Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS
Macfarlanes’s renewed motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 35). The Court
DENIES WITH PREJUDICE Mr. Clark’s cross-motion for summary judgment.
(Doc. 69). The Court DENIES Macfarlanes’s motion to strike Mr. Clark’s surreply as moot. (Doc. 74). The Court will enter judgment against Mr. Clark by
Macfarlanes shall file a brief and evidentiary material in support of its
demand for attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs on or before August 5, 2016. Mr.
Clark shall file a response on or before August 10, 2016. Macfarlanes may file a
reply on or before August 15, 2016.
DONE and ORDERED this July 28, 2016.
MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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