Whyte v. Jefferson County Board of Health et al

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM OPINION Signed by Chief Judge Karon O Bowdre on 10/20/14. (SAC )

FILED
2014 Oct-20 PM 01:28
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CHARLINE WHYTE,
Plaintiff,
v.
JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF
HEALTH, JEFFERSON COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, MARK
WILSON, in his official and individual
capacity, DOLORES JOHNSON, in her
official and individual capacity, and
JOHNATHAN STANTON, in his
official and individual capacity,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:14-cv-00479-KOB

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter comes before the court on Defendant Jefferson County Board of Health
(“JCBH”) and Defendant Jefferson County Department of Health’s (“JCDH”) (collectively,
“Jefferson County”) “Third Rule 41(b) Motion to Dismiss and For Alternative Relief,” (Doc. 24),
and Defendants Dr. Mark Wilson, Dolores Johnson, and Jonathan Stanton’s (collectively, the
“Individual Defendants”) “Motion to Dismiss.” (Doc. 25). Plaintiff Charline Whyte sued
Jefferson County and the Individual Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq (“Title VII”)
alleging race discrimination, sex discrimination, a hostile work environment, and retaliation.
Jefferson County argues that the court should dismiss Whyte’s complaint, (Doc. 23), pursuant to
Rule 41(b) and Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because, in essence, the complaint
is too long and confusing. (Doc. 24). Jefferson County further argues that the court should

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dismiss the complaint for failure to comply with the court’s orders to remove “shotgun” style
pleading. (Doc. 24). The Individual Defendants argue that Whyte has abandoned her claims
against them and that the Individual Defendants should be dismissed. (Doc. 25).
Upon review of Whyte’s most recent complaint and Jefferson County and the Individual
Defendants’ motions, the court finds that Whyte’s complaint is sufficiently clear under Rule 8
and complies with the court’s prior orders. The court further finds that Whyte has abandoned her
claims against the Individual Defendants. Thus, the court DENIES Jefferson County’s motion
and GRANTS the Individual Defendants’ motion. The court DISMISSES the Individual
Defendants WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Finally, the court GRANTS Jefferson County twenty
one days from the date of the Order, filed concurrently with this Memorandum Opinion, to file a
responsive pleading.
I.

Background
Whyte filed a complaint against Jefferson County and the Individual Defendants on

March 18, 2014, (Doc. 1), and subsequently amended the complaint. (Doc. 3). Jefferson County
and the Individual Defendants filed a “Motion for More Definite Statement” pursuant to Rule
12(e). (Doc. 7). The court ordered Whyte to provide a more definite statement of the allegations
in her complaint by (1) removing the “shotgun”1 style pleading and (2) by stating which specific
facts and defendants related to each claim. (Doc. 13).

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A “shotgun” style complaint exists when “each count . . . adopts the allegations of all
preceding counts. Consequently, allegations of fact that may be material to a determination of
count one, but not count four, are nonetheless made a part of count four. . . . [I]t is virtually
impossible to know which allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for relief.”
Paylor v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 748 F.3d 1117, 1126 (11th Cir. 2014) quoting Anderson v. Dist.
Bd. of Trs. of Cent. Florida Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996).
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Whyte filed an “Amendment to Complaint and More Definite Statement,” (Doc. 14), that
incorporated certain paragraphs from her amended complaint, (Doc. 3), by reference. Jefferson
County and the Individual Defendants filed a “Rule 41(b) Motion to Dismiss and For Alternative
Relief.” (Doc. 15). The court did not dismiss the complaint. Instead, the court ordered Whyte to
(1) remove the “shotgun” style pleading in her complaint, (2) link specific facts and defendants to
each claim, and (3) re-file her complaint as one document with numbered paragraphs. (Doc. 16).
Whyte filed a second amended complaint. (Doc. 17). Jefferson County and the Individual
Defendants filed a “Second Rule 41(b) Motion to Dismiss and For Alternative Relief.” (Doc. 18).
The court gave Whyte one additional opportunity to (1) remove the “shotgun” style pleading and
(2) link specific facts and defendants to each claim. (Doc. 22).
Whyte has now filed a third amended complaint, which only lists the Jefferson County
entities as defendants. (Doc. 23). Jefferson County has now filed a “Third Rule 41(b) Motion to
Dismiss and For Alternative Relief.” (Doc. 24). The Individual Defendants have filed a “Motion
to Dismiss.” (Doc. 25).
II.

Analysis
A.

Whyte Followed the Court’s Orders

Jefferson County argues that Whyte has not complied with the court’s orders. “If the
plaintiff fails . . . to comply with . . . a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action
. . . against it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). The court previously ordered Whyte to (1) remove the
“shotgun” style pleading and (2) link specific facts and defendants to each claim. (Doc. 22).
On its face, Whyte’s complaint complies with the court’s orders to remove the “shotgun”
pleading and to link specific facts and defendants to each claim. (Doc. 23). Recognizing this fact,
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Jefferson County argues that Whyte’s complaint should be dismissed because Whyte “has
zoomed from one extreme to another” and now “incorporates by reference no preceding
paragraphs of the complaint in any of [her] counts.” (Doc. 24, ¶ 10(a)). Upon review of Whyte’s
complaint, the court finds that Whyte has sorted through her facts and indicated which facts and
defendants relate to which counts and has listed those facts and defendants with each count. (E.g.
Doc. 23, ¶¶ 62-90 (containing facts relating to Count I, Title VII Racial Discrimination - Failure
to Promote)). Whyte’s complaint is no longer a “shotgun” complaint. It complies with the court’s
prior orders.
B.

Whyte’s Complaint Complies With the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Jefferson County argues that Whyte does not comply with the requirements of Rule 8.
The underlying goal of our system of pleading is notice. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
require that the complaint provide “‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ that will give the
defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). A plaintiff must
provide the grounds of his entitlement, but Rule 8 generally does not require “detailed factual
allegations.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at
47). “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading
regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with
nothing more than conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009).
Here, Jefferson County argues that it is not on notice of Whyte’s claims because Whyte’s
complaint is long and the facts are too confusing. The court disagrees. Whyte has included much
more than mere “conclusions” in her complaint. Any further questions Jefferson County has
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about Whyte’s allegations and claims can be dealt with in discovery.
Jefferson County argues that Whyte’s allegations are not “simple, concise, and direct” as
required by Rule 8(d)(1) and that each claim for relief does not contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim” as required by Rule 8(a)(2). (Doc. 24, ¶ 9(a)). While Whyte’s complaint
contains many allegations, all are written in plain English in numbered paragraphs, are related to
the subject of the complaint, and are sufficiently concise. (E.g. Doc. 23, ¶¶ 91-93). Further,
Whyte has included short and plain statements of the legal basis for her claims. (E.g. Doc. 23, ¶¶
62, 91, 94, 107). If Jefferson County needs more explanation of why certain allegations are
included or why “the allegations . . . appear to contemplate relief different from what the title [of
each count] indicates,” (Doc. 24, ¶ 9(b)), Jefferson County is free to request that information in
discovery.
Further, Jefferson County argues that Whyte’s complaint contains “numerous allegations
related to actions and decisions under the control of a non-party.” (Doc. 24, ¶ 9(c)). If Jefferson
County needs more information about the actions of non-parties, Jefferson County is free to
pursue those avenues of inquiry in discovery.
Finally, Jefferson County argues that Whyte’s complaint is “neither short nor plain.”
(Doc. 24, ¶ 9(e)). Jefferson County uses as an example of this shortcoming a series of allegations
stated in the complaint concerning events from early August 2012 with seemingly contradictory
dates. (See Doc. 24, ¶ 9(e); Doc. 23, ¶¶ 33-36). The confusion over dates in these paragraphs
could amount to nothing more than a typo by the drafter. Our notice pleading standard does not
throw out complaints based on mere typos or contradictory dates. Rather, Jefferson County’s
factual questions can be answered in discovery.
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C.

Whyte Abandoned her Claims Against the Individual Defendants

The Individual Defendants (through Jefferson County) argue that Whyte’s complaint does
not clearly indicate which parties are named as defendants. (Doc. 24, ¶ 9(d); Doc. 25). Whyte’s
complaint lists only three parties (JCBH, JCDH, and Whyte) in its “parties” section. (Doc. 23, ¶¶
10-16). Further, her complaint only connects JCBH and JCDH to particular counts. (Doc. 23, ¶¶
62, 91, 94, 107). The court finds that Whyte has abandoned her claims against the Individual
Defendants who were named in her previous complaints.
III.

Conclusion
Defendant Jefferson County, the Individual Defendants, and Plaintiff Charline Whyte

should be happy that the issues in this case have been streamlined through relatively well-tailored
pleading. Whyte has focused her complaint on four counts against two defendants. This tailoring
will narrow the scope of discovery for the remaining parties. The court now cautions Jefferson
County to heed the Eleventh Circuit’s directions by not responding to Whyte’s complaint with a
“shotgun answer . . . [with] one-line affirmative defenses, none of which refers to a particular
count.” Paylor, 748 F.3d at 1127.
In summary, the court finds that Whyte’s complaint is sufficiently clear under Rule 8 and
complies with the court’s prior orders. The court further finds that Whyte has abandoned her
claims against the Individual Defendants. Thus, the court DENIES Jefferson County’s motion
and GRANTS the Individual Defendants’ motion. The court DISMISSES the Individual
Defendants WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Finally, the court GRANTS Jefferson County twenty
one days from the date of the Order, filed concurrently with this Memorandum Opinion, to file a
responsive pleading.
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DONE and ORDERED this 20th day of October, 2014.

____________________________________
KARON OWEN BOWDRE
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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