Craig v. Alabama Department of Corrections et al

Filing 38

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION. Signed by Judge L Scott Coogler on 9/29/2017. (PSM)

FILED
2017 Sep-29 AM 09:52
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MICHAEL JAMES CRAIG,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOSEPH HEADLEY, WARDEN,
Et al.,
Defendants.

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2:14-cv-00503-LSC

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
I.

Introduction
Michael James Craig (“Craig” or “Plaintiff”) is an inmate incarcerated by

the Alabama Department of Corrections (“ADOC”). He filed a pro se complaint
and amended complaints seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his rights under the Constitution or laws of the
United States and state law. (Docs. 1, 3, 13.) The named defendants who have not
already been dismissed from this lawsuit are all ADOC employees: Warden Joseph
Headley at St Clair Correctional Facility (“St. Clair”) 1; Warden Carter Davenport

1

Some of these ADOC employees have since transferred to other prisons or retired. For
these purposes the Court will identify the facility at which they worked during the time that
Plaintiff’s allegations take place.
1

at St. Clair; Chaplain Ossie Brown at St. Clair; Warden Gary Hetzel at Holman
Correctional Facility (“Holman”); Classification Specialist Supervisor William
DeSpain at Holman; Classification Specialist Hayden Glass Sizemore at Holman;
Captain Kevin White at Holman; Warden Lloyd Hicks at W. E. Donaldson
Correctional Facility (“Donaldson”); Warden Angela Miree at Donaldson;
Warden Cedric Specks at Donaldson; Classification Specialist Supervisor Lisa
Bonner at Donaldson; ADOC Regional Coordinator Grantt Culliver, and ADOC
Prison Commissioner Kim Thomas. 2 For the reasons that follow, the defendants’
motion for summary judgment (doc. 35) is due to be granted in its entirety and this
case dismissed with prejudice.
II.

Procedural History
In his three complaints totaling 118 pages, Plaintiff originally named as

defendants twenty-eight different ADOC employees located at four different
2

Although Plaintiff also named as defendants Warden Patrice Richie at St. Clair, Captain
Carl Sanders at St. Clair, and “Ms. Stinson” at Donaldson, he has failed to obtain service of his
complaints on them. Counsel for all defendants placed a statement in the record that Defendant
Carl Sanders is a former Correctional Captain who retired from ADOC on March 18, 2015,
Warden Patrice Richie has been on active duty Military Leave since November 2016 and is
currently serving on a Naval ship somewhere off the coast of Africa with an estimated return date
in October 2017, and there is currently no “Ms. Stinson” at Donaldson nor was there one during
the time(s) relevant to Plaintiff’s allegations. (Doc. 35 at 1 n.1.) Any claims against these
defendants are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice due to Plaintiff’s failure to obtain service
on them.

2

Alabama prisons and described events taking place over a period of four years, from
2011 through 2015. Plaintiff demanded monetary and injunctive relief from ADOC
and the corrections personnel in their official and individual capacities. (Doc. 1 at 4;
Doc. 3 at 18-24; Doc. 13).
On December 5, 2016, the magistrate judge assigned to this action entered a
Report & Recommendation recommending all claims against all defendants be
dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failing to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, with the exception of three claims:
(1) First Amendment retaliation claims against defendants Chaplain
Brown and Warden Headley at St. Clair,
(2) First Amendment conspiracy to retaliate claims against defendants
Chaplain Brown, Captain Sanders, and Warden Richie at St. Clair,
and
(3) Procedural Due Process claims against Holman defendants
Classification Specialist Sizemore, Classification Specialist Supervisor
DeSpain, Captain White, and Warden Hetzel, and against Donaldson
defendants Classification Specialist Supervisor Bonner, Ms. Stinson,
Warden Hicks, Warden Specks, and Warden Miree.
(Doc. 19.) Plaintiff filed objections to the Report & Recommendation. (Doc. 20.)
On March 27, 2017, this Court entered a Memorandum of Opinion and Order
adopting and accepting the magistrate judge’s Report & Recommendation in all
respects except with regard to the magistrate judge’s recommendation to dismiss
3

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment, negligence, and negligent supervision claims against
St. Clair defendants Captain Sanders, Warden Headley, Warden Davenport, as
well as ADOC Regional Coordinator Culliver and ADOC Commissioner Thomas.
(Doc. 22.) Accordingly, this Court dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a
claim all claims against all defendants except:
(1) First Amendment retaliation claims against St. Clair defendants
Chaplain Brown and Warden Headley,
(2) First Amendment conspiracy to retaliate claims against St. Clair
defendants Chaplain Brown, Captain Sanders, and Warden Richie,
(3) Procedural Due Process claims against Holman defendants
Classification Specialist Sizemore, Classification Specialist Supervisor
DeSpain, Captain White, and Warden Hetzel and against Donaldson
defendants Classification Specialist Supervisor Bonner, Ms. Stinson,
Warden Hicks, Warden Specks, and Warden Miree, and
(4) Eighth Amendment, negligence, and negligent supervision claims
against St. Clair defendants Captain Sanders, Warden Headley,
Warden Davenport, as well as ADOC Regional Coordinator Culliver
and ADOC Commissioner Thomas.
(Id.)
On April 10, 2017, the Court entered an Order for Special Report directing
the Clerk to forward a copy of the complaint to the remaining defendants and
directing the defendants to file a special report(s) addressing the plaintiff’s factual
allegations. (Doc. 23). The Court advised the defendants that the special reports
4

could be submitted under oath or accompanied by affidavits and, if appropriate, the
Court would consider them as motions for summary judgment filed pursuant to
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Id.) On August 4, 2017, the
defendants filed a special report, supplemented by affidavits and other evidence,
including prison records and internal memoranda. (Doc. 35). On August 16, 2017,
the Court notified the parties that it would construe the special report as a motion
for summary judgment and notified the plaintiff that he had twenty-one (21) days to
respond to the motion for summary judgment by filing affidavits or other material.
(Doc. 37). The Court also advised the plaintiff of the consequences of any default
or failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. (Id.) See Griffith v. Wainwright, 772
F.2d 822, 825 (11th Cir. 1985). That deadline has expired and the Court has
received no response from the plaintiff.
This matter is thus now before the Court on the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment.
III.

Standard of Review
Because the court has construed the defendants’ special reports as motions

for summary judgment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 governs the resolution of the motions.
Under Rule 56(a), summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is
5

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” In making that assessment, the court must view the evidence in a
light most favorable to the non-moving party and must draw all reasonable
inferences against the moving party. Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023
(11th Cir. 2000). The burden of proof is upon the moving party to establish his
prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by showing the absence of genuine
issues of material fact and that he is due to prevail as a matter of law. See Clark v.
Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). Unless the plaintiff, who
carries the ultimate burden of proving his action, is able to show some evidence
with respect to each element of his claim, all other issues of fact become
immaterial, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d
1530, 1532-33 (11th Cir. 1990). As the Eleventh Circuit has explained:
Facts in dispute cease to be “material” facts when the plaintiff fails to
establish a prima facie case. “In such a situation, there can be ‘no
genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element of the non-moving party’s case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” [citations omitted].
Thus, under such circumstances, the public official is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, because the plaintiff has failed to carry
the burden of proof. This rule facilitates the dismissal of factually
unsupported claims prior to trial.
6

Bennett, 898 F.2d at 1532.
However, any “specific facts” pled in a pro se plaintiff’s sworn complaint
must be considered in opposition to summary judgment. See Caldwell v. Warden,
FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Perry v. Thompson, 786
F.2d 1093, 1095 (11th Cir. 1986)). Additionally, because the plaintiff is pro se, the
court must construe the complaint more liberally than it would pleadings drafted by
lawyers. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). “Pro se pleading are held to a less
stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be
liberally construed.” Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006).
IV.

Summary Judgment Facts 3
Craig is serving a life sentence for murder and a fifteen-year concurrent

sentence for assault in the second degree. The assault conviction involved Craig
attacking another inmate with a weapon. In his twenty years of incarceration, Craig
has received thirty-nine disciplinaries with ten involving attacks upon or fights with
other inmates. (Doc. 35-9.)
A.

3

Events at St. Clair

Because Plaintiff did not respond to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the
following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s sworn complaints. See Caldwell, 748 F.3d at 1098. Based
on the foregoing summary judgment standard, the following facts are undisputed or, if disputed,
taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Factual disputes are addressed in footnote form.
7

Craig was incarcerated at St. Clair from September 13, 2005, until January
16, 2013. (Doc. 35-9.) He alleges that on October 15, 2011, inmate Jabari Bascomb
was murdered by other inmates at St. Clair, but he does not say that he saw it
happen or that it occurred in his dorm. He further alleges that around 3:30 a.m. on
April 27, 2012, Craig witnessed inmates at St. Clair strangle inmate John Abraham
Rutledge to death in “Dorm Q1, 18 cell.” (Doc. 1 at 5). 4 Some of the inmates were
not assigned to Q1 dorm, and entered the dorm by breaching security. (Id. at 24).
Craig explains that “the only dorms at [St. Clair that are] heavily secured are HDorm-drug program, and the predominately white inmate housed ‘faith based
character honor dorm[s], J-K, which [have] a rover at [a] desk in the hall at all
times, [and] rovers who frequent the floors.” (Id. at 6). By contrast, Q1 dorm,
which “hous[es] 80% black inmates, ha[s] zero hall rovers at a desk 24 hours per
day, and floor rovers only come through to conduct shakedowns for contraband,
count, [and] occasionally . . . dorm security walk through.” (Id.). This leaves “Q1
dorm residents . . . vulnerable to periodic, unchecked violence” such as that
suffered by Rutledge. (Id. at 5-6).

4

The plaintiff asserts Q1 dormitory is comprised of 48 cells, housing two inmates per cell.
(Doc. 1 at 6). He was housed in cell Q1-20. (Id. at 24).
8

Craig alleges that St. Clair Warden Headley and the “ADOC hierarchy,” or
St. Clair Warden Davenport, ADOC Regional Coordinator Culliver and ADOC
Commissioner Thomas, “became fully aware” of the lack of security “after
acknowledgment of back to back periodic violent incidents,” including these two
murders in 2011 and 2012. (Doc. 1 at 23-24, 59; Doc. 13 at 11). But Warden
Headley “and his superiors” were deliberately indifferent because, unlike inmates
in the drug program and honor dorms, they did not station a rover at a desk in the
hall of Q1 dorm at all times, and the rovers did not frequent the floors as often.
(Doc. 1 at 6, 24). 5 Craig also declares Commissioner Thomas’s response to the
5

ADOC Commissioner Thomas, ADOC Regional Coordinator Culliver, St. Clair Warden
Davenport, and St. Clair Warden Headley all specifically denied any knowledge of any of this.
Commissioner Thomas’s affidavit states as follows:
During 2011 and 2012 when the plaintiff was housed at the St. Clair Correctional
Facility (St. Clair), I served as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of
Corrections. I did not know the plaintiff and to my knowledge have not had any
contact with him. I have no personal knowledge of whether he was robbed by
other inmates when he was assigned to St. Clair. I have no personal knowledge
and can’t confirm or deny that he witnessed inmate on inmate violence. While I
served as Commissioner, I did not have personal knowledge of officers habitually
failing to man their assigned security post. It was not a custom or policy to
maintain lax security in any population and increased efforts were made constantly
to increase the department’s recruiting and training divisions and increase staff
retention. While Commissioner, I did not control the day-to-day operations of St.
Clair Correctional Facility. The operation of St. Clair, like all other institutions, is
delegated to the Warden and his or her staff. As Commissioner, I would have no
personal involvement in the daily treatment of inmates within the facility.
(Doc. 35-13.) Warden Davenport’s affidavit states as follows:
9

unsafe conditions at St. Clair was to tour the facility with the press in March 2012,
and issue a press release in June 2012 declaring that budget cuts and underfunding
were the cause of the conditions. (Id. at 59-60). Craig makes no mention of any
particular response from Warden Headley, Warden Davenport or ADOC Regional
Coordinator Culliver. Craig claims lack of funding is an overused excuse to cover
up mismanagement and to convince voters to allocate funding to the prison

The Plaintiff claims that I violated his Eighth Amendment rights by negligence
and negligent supervision. I aver that during the period 2011-2012, I was the
Correctional Warden Assigned to Saint Clair Correctional Facility. I applied the
resources of the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) in a manner
applicable to ADOC policies and procedures to the best of my ability. At no time
did I knowingly violate the defendant’s constitutional rights. I have no recollection
at this time of the defendant reporting to me any situation concerning these
allegations.
(Doc. 35-3.) ADOC Regional Coordinator Culliver’s affidavit states in relevant part:
[I]nmate Craig states in his complaint that defendant Culliver knowingly allowed
negligence to occur from supervisors and staff. This statement is false. Culliver
was a regional coordinator during this time period and made several visits a year to
St. Clair CF. During tours through the facility during this time period I do not
recall seeing officers off there post when they were not performing other task that
were assigned by the supervisor or were in the normal course of day to day
activities. In addition, Culliver discussed with the Warden on various occasions
staffing and made efforts to provide the facility with needed resources to provide
for protection of officers and staff assigned to the facility. The security staffing at
St. Clair CF during this period was around 76% of the budgeted 250 correctional
officer positions. Culliver has never taken a position of indifference of security
concerns at any correctional facility he was responsible for oversight for.
(Doc. 35-15.) Finally, Warden Headley testified that “all known incidents were documented in
accordance with ADOC policies and regulations. All security measures available were
implemented as appropriate. . . . I have no knowledge of inmate Craig’s allegations.” (Doc. 35-8.)
10

through legislation. (Id. at 60). ADOC Commissioner Thomas’s press bid for
funding was somewhat successful because during 2012, the Alabama Legislature
transferred millions from the “Alabama Trust Fund” to the “General Fund” for
allocation to the prisons.

(Id.).

Even so, Craig declares there were “zero

significant changes in the areas of understaffed, undersecured dorms.” (Id.).
About one week after Rutledge’s murder, all inmates in the St. Clair Q1
dorm were interviewed by an Internal Investigations (“I & I”) Officer. (Id.).
Because the interviews were taking place in clear view of the dorm’s residents,
Craig was tape recorded stating to the investigator that he had information to share
with her, but could not do so at that time because of the risk of being labeled a
snitch. (Id.). He asked to be interviewed confidentially at a “proper location.”
(Id.). “[C]ountless” other inmates did come forward as “informants,” and the
perpetrating inmates were “found guilty [of the murder] at an institutional level in
their disciplinaries.” (Id. at 51).
The same month (May 2012), Craig was robbed of his store goods by two
inmates “who didn’t sleep in Q1 Dorm.” (Id. at 7). There were no security rovers
present in Q1 dorm at that time. (Id.). Craig “had to validate as enemies” these
inmates before Warden Headley, a prison captain, and a prison classification
11

specialist. (Id.). The inmates were punished by being placed in isolation. (Doc. 13
at 16).

While in Warden Headley’s office, Craig “fully informed” Warden

Headley and the prison captain that he witnessed Rutledge’s murder, heard
Antonio Nichols and Lil Yo’ Hawkins discuss why they “called the hit’ on
Rutledge,” (doc. 1 at 49), and he stated he was willing to testify at trial (id. at 7).
Warden Headley stated would “get back” with the plaintiff, and “‘I & I would
probably re-interview [him], just not now.’” (Id. at 7).
In July 2012, Craig wrote to Warden Headley to express his concern about
the undersecured conditions in Q1 dorm, and asked to be accepted into the St.
Clair Faith Honor Dorm. (Id.). The request was denied at that time due to a clause
in the Honor Dorm Regulations. (Id.). In late October 2012, Craig informed
Warden Headley in writing that he had completed a “re-entry workshop” and
inquired about the Rutledge investigation. (Id.). Warden Headley determined that
Craig had earned the privilege to live in the honor dorm and Craig was transferred
to it. (Id. at 7-8).
Conditions in the honor dorm were more secure, but Craig “continued to
fight mental debilitation, and thrive for progress” because of two minor incidents.
(Id. at 8). Once, an inmate attempted to manipulate him into “switching cell
12

assignments.” (Id.). Craig reported this incident to Chaplain Brown and a prison
captain, and the manipulative inmate “was moved.” (Id.). On another occasion, a
“white inmate racist” physically threatened him “‘over a country music
program.’” (Id.). This time, Craig reported the matter to Chaplain Brown and a
lieutenant. (Id.). The racist inmate was moved and signed a living agreement with
Craig. (Id.).
On December 28, 2012, Chaplain Brown conducted an on-the-spot honor
dorm meeting to resolve racial conflict concerning control of television
programming.

(Id.).

Chaplain Brown allowed inmate dorm representative

McKinney to co-chair the meeting, whereupon McKinney “was allowed to
manipulate the honor dorm handbook” and “flat out lie, claiming the inmates
could actually control t.v. programming –via cable box, without the warden’s
consent.” (Id. at 8-9). At the meeting, Chaplain Brown granted Craig permission
to speak, and Craig stated the dorm reps were lying to Chaplain Brown and
manipulating regulations to wield “false authority” over black inmates and deny
them access to black programming. (Id. at 9). When McKinney, still acting as cochair, continued to repeat his lies, Craig walked out of the meeting and went back
to his dorm. (Id.).
13

In his dorm, Craig drafted a complaint about the matter addressed to,
among others, Wardens Headley and Davenport. (Id.). He asked for inmate
signatures as witnesses to the unfair politics in the dorm. (Id.). Craig asserts one of
the dorm representatives informed Chaplain Brown that he was preparing the
complaint and collecting signatures, but does not provide any factual detail. (Id.).
Later, the prison captain approached Craig and asked to him to go into the hallway.
(Id.). When he did, Chaplain Brown was waiting and told Craig he was going to
have to move from the dorm because “it look like you gon’ be trouble[.]” (Id.).
Craig asked what he had done, but was instructed to pack his belongings.
(Id. at 9-10). Upon arriving at the shift office, Craig again asked why he was being
moved. (Id. at 10). He informed the prison captain that the real reason he was
being kicked out of the dorm was because Chaplain Brown’s dorm reps were
manipulators and were using the honor dorm as a front to traffic heroin and cell
phones, as well as keep the dorm predominantly Caucasian. (Id.).
Craig also asked to see the warden who was the honor dorm’s administrating
liaison. (Id.). Before her, Craig explained how inmate McKinney had been given
improper authority to co-chair the dorm meeting, and then manipulated the
meeting “to hide the fact [that] he [and] other inmates had been illegally
14

controlling the institution[‘]s programming-cable box.” (Id.). Craig does not
allege he repeated to this warden his accusations concerning drug and cell phone
trafficking or the race-motivated-behavior by the dorm reps. The warden called
Chaplain Brown into her office and asked him who gave the inmates the authority
to manipulate the cable box at will, to which he responded that he had just been
notified of it and was investigating the matter. (Id.).
She also asked Chaplain Brown what problem he had with Craig, and
Chaplain Brown replied, “I ain’t got no problem with Craig, it’s just that he walked
out of the dorm meeting.”

(Id. at 10-11).

Craig responded, “After Destry

McKinney lied to your face, while co-chairing the meeting, I simply returned to my
respective dorm rightfully.” (Id. at 11).
The warden asked Craig to step out of her office, and after she, the prison
captain, and Chaplain Brown conferred for twenty minutes, the captain came out
and stated Craig would be reassigned to another dorm. (Id.). Craig refused to go to
his reassignment because of its violent, unmanned atmosphere, reminded the
captain of the Rutledge murder, and stated, “What kind of prison are you guys
running?” (Id.). When asked, Craig refused to tell the names of the perpetrator
inmates because he was “out in the open” where other inmates would pass by and
15

could hear him.

(Id. at 11-12).

Craig was then charged with a violation of

Administrative Regulation #505, creating a security hazard. (Id. at 12, 24). Craig
was placed into segregation that same day. 6
At the January 8, 2013, disciplinary hearing on Craig’s violation of
Administrative Regulation #505, Craig alleges the lieutenant testified “‘she was
only following orders of [the captain], and had no record of [Craig] actually
6

Chaplain Brown denies any recollection of these particular events, testifying:
In response to the inmate Michael Craig’s (Plaintiff) claim, I the defendant, Ossie
T. Brown have been an ADOC Chaplain for several years now. I once served as
Chaplain at St. Clair Correctional Facility and I now preside here at Elmore
Correctional Facility. During my tenure at St. Clair C.F. just as here at Elmore
C.F., as Chaplain I interact with inmates on a daily basis with many of issues
ranging from religion, death, counseling, P.R.E.A. or Faith Based Honor Dorm. I,
as Chaplain have no knowledge of the claims that have been presented by the
Plaintiff. According to Alabama Department of Corrections Administrative
Regulation AR-460, I have the authorization to move inmates into the Faith Based
Honor Dorm, as well as move them out. There are certain criteria that an inmate
has to meet in order to be moved into a Faith Based Honor Dorm and inmates are
required to meet certain standards in order to remain in the Faith Based Honor
Dorm. I have had many residents moved out of the Faith Based Honor Dorm due
to several issues, such as gambling, smoking, behavior that is unbecoming of a
resident, or simply lying to an ADOC Official. If an inmate breaks a major Faith
Based Honor Dorm rule or receives disciplinary action from the ADOC, he will be
removed from the Faith Based Honor Dorm. These types of incidents occur on a
daily basis, some more serious than others. To this end, I have no particular
recollection of what the Plaintiff is referring to, in that this incident allegedly
occurred 3 to 4 years ago. Finally, prior to my being appointed Chaplain with the
ADOC, I retired as a military Chaplain with the rank of Lt. Colonel, and this is the
first time that I know of, where my integrity has been questioned in regard to
prejudicial issues, retaliation and/or negative issues dealing with my job as
Chaplain.

(Doc. 35-2.)
16

violating any rules whatsoever, while living in the ‘faith honor dorm.’” (Doc. 1 at
12; Doc. 3 at 8). According to Craig, the lieutenant also stated that the captain told
her to write in the report that Craig had cursed Chaplain Brown. (Id.). She
admitted, in response to Craig’s question, that St. Clair dorms L through Q did
“not have security rovers, at all times, on the floor, as required by legal standards.”
(Id. at 14).
At the hearing, Craig submitted a sworn statement on his behalf identifying
by name the five inmates “who [already had been] found guilty at the institutional
level in [the] Rutledge murder.” (Id. at 25). He stated Rutledge had been
identified as a snitch by inmates Antonio Nichols and “Lil Yo” Hawkins, and these
inmates hired inmates Mitchell Crosby, Michael Mays and James Woods
(hereinafter “the five inmates”) to kill Rutledge, and Craig offered to take a
polygraph test. (Doc. 3 at 3). Craig further declared the five inmates had been
“prematurely released from administrative segregation between November &
December 2012, and were being housed in St. Clair Correctional Facility, W.E.
Donaldson Correctional Facility, Kilby Correctional Facility and Holman
Correctional Facility.” (Doc. 1 at 25). Craig announced that now it was “no longer

17

safe” for him to be housed at any of the facilities where the inmates he had just
accused were located. (Doc. 3 at 2-3).
The hearing officer found Craig had not committed a “violation of any kind
[and] should not have been removed from” the honor dorm.” (Id. at 12). He also
found the accusation that Craig cursed Chaplain Brown was false based on
Chaplain Brown’s own admittance. (Id.). The officer wrote on the disciplinary
report that there was “not enough evidence [for Inmate Craig] to be moved from
Honor Dorm. Inmate Craig did name the inmates that were released to population
that made him feel unsafe to live in other population dormitories.” (Id. at 66-67).
Warden Headley approved the hearing officer’s decision. (Id. at 12).
The moment he was found innocent of the infraction, Craig says he “was
supposed to be served [a] ‘validation committee’ form” so that a protective
custody review could be done “to assess placing [him] at a facility” where none of
the five inmates he had written statements against in an ongoing murder
investigation were located, and to validate these individuals as enemies. (Id. at 27).
However, Warden Headley did not give him such a form and did not return Craig
to the honor dorm. (Id. at 12, 27). Instead, Warden Headley “opted to keep”
Craig in “disciplinary seg isolation lock-up” because he allegedly was concerned
18

shift office personnel might read copies of the disciplinary report and leak Craig’s
statements to inmates. (Id. at 12-13). Warden Headley informed Craig that I & I
would interview him. (Id. at 13). On January 17, 2013, Craig was transferred to
Kilby temporarily on an I & I hold. (Id. at 39).
B.

Events at Kilby

On January 18, 23, and 29, 2013, I & I investigators interviewed Craig and
Craig underwent two polygraph examinations concerning the Rutledge murder.
(Doc. 1 at 13, 18, 50; Doc. 3 at 4). Craig alleges that the investigators began their
discussion with him by asking him if his testimony about being an eyewitness to the
Rutledge murder at his disciplinary hearing for his alleged violation of
Administrative Regulation #505 was a ploy by him to ensure that he was moved to a
placement within the prisons that he desired. (Doc. 1 at 50.) Craig alleges that he
then informed the investigators that he had informed Warden Headley and others
back in May and July 2012 about witnessing the murder. Craig asserts that Warden
Headley had withheld his eyewitness reports about the murder from the I & I
investigators and lied about the reports to them, so the investigators were
suspicious about the timing of Craig submitting his sworn statement about the
murder at his disciplinary hearing. (Doc. 1 at 49-50; Doc. 3 at 21.) Craig also alleges
19

that the investigators were not interested in investigating Warden Headley’s
“withholding” of Craig’s “key evidence” as an “eyewitness” to murder but
instead wanted to cover up the murder to avoid civil liability. (Doc. 1 at 49-50; Doc.
3 at 21). Craig further alleges that regardless of whether the investigators believed
him, as an inmate who has given the type of documented testimony he gave to
them, they should have immediately validated the five inmates as his enemies, and
instructed that he be transferred to “a proper protective security placement”
where none of the five inmates were housed. (Id. at 54, 56). Instead, Craig alleges,
the I & I investigators, St. Clair Warden Headley, and other ADOC officials
“colluded” to transfer him to a segregation unit at Holman on February 15, 2013,
where inmate “[Antonio] Nichols [and] his Blood gang minions” were living in
population. (Id. at 21, 25-26, 41 and 55). Craig also learned that inmate Michael
Mays also had been housed at Holman, but was transported to Kilby the same day
Craig was transported to Holman. (Doc. 1 at 55). In fact, Craig was assigned the
same segregation cell at Holman that Mays had occupied. (Id.).
C.

Events at Holman

As soon as Craig arrived at Holman, he wrote a letter to the Holman
administrative warden concerning the circumstances leading up to his transfer, but
20

received no response. (Doc. 1 at 41, 46). Approximately one week after his arrival,
Classification Specialist Sizemore was conducting cell cleanup. (Doc. 1 at 41, 4647). Craig asked for some disinfectant, and Sizemore accused him of “telling an
officer how to do his job.” (Id. at 47). Sizemore then stated, “‘We don’t give
disinfectants down here!!--, now go ahead and be the ‘snitch you are,’ and write a
scribe on me to my supervisors!” (Id.). Sizemore refused Craig clean up detail
entirely and repeated the snitch comment so loudly adjacent inmates could hear it.
(Id.). Other inmates agreed to sign affidavits stating they heard Sizemore make the
comments. (Id.).
The next day Craig wrote a request form to two Holman wardens and
Holman Captain White. (Id.). He admits being paranoid about some deeper
meaning to Classification Specialist Sizemore’s comment because of the Rutledge
situation, but asserts that even if that was not the case, it was a “flagrant” act for
Sizemore to use the word snitch in that environment. (Id.). He received no
response to his request forms, so on March 4, 2013, Craig sent a formal complaint
to Sizemore’s supervisors, the warden and Captain White, but again received no
response. (Id.).

21

From February 15, 2013, the day he arrived at Holman, until mid-March
2013, Craig asked Captain White, among others, if inmate Antonio Nichols was
housed at the facility as they walked through the unit during weekly “seg board.”
(Id. at 41). They never gave him an answer. (Id.).
On March 20, 2013, Craig met with Warden Hetzel, Classification Specialist
Sizemore, an unknown classification specialist, and a psychiatric counselor for an
“Annual Progress Review Hearing.” (Id.). Craig asserts he received an unfair
hearing on his Administrative Regulation #505 violation and an unfair decision “all
based on his ‘isolation segregation time’ since December 28, 2012.” (Id.). Craig
does not reveal why he claims the hearing was unfair, explain the nature of the
decision he received, or detail why the decision was unfair. To show that he had
not been living in isolation because of his own wrongdoing, Craig displayed the
disciplinary report containing his statement about the five inmates. (Id. at 42).
Classification Specialist Sizemore stated, “‘Give us 90 days in population here, to
show you can live in population with adjusting well” as “you have by actual score”
a lower security status and low risk assessment, and “I’ll recommend a transfer to a
lower security prison.” (Id.). Craig explains this meant that although he had a
lower security score (level 4), and extremely low risk assessment (level 6), he
22

would not be transferred to a level 4 facility until he lived in population at Holman
for 90 days. (Id. at 16). Craig alleges he agreed to move to population because he
assumed the Holman defendants had communicated with the I & I investigators
and Warden Headley at St. Clair, and would not send him to population if one of
the five inmates was being housed there. (Id. at 42-43).
On March 22, 2013, Craig was released into population at Holman. (Id. at
45). At 11:30 a.m., Craig was approached by inmate Antonio Nichols, and Nichols
informed Craig that he had received a text from Michael Mays at Kilby the week
Craig and Mays were transferred. (Id.). Mays reported that Craig was cooperating
with authorities and had named the five inmates involved in the murder. (Id.).
Nichols gave Craig a warning by stating, “You tellin’ on me, Slim, & Yo’ & em? I
knew a ni--a was lyin’ on you. What you doin’ down here? Man[], I was
spooked!!” (Id. at 17). This made Craig apprehensive, and he became more so
upon being approached by Nichols’ “gang and drug circle” when returning to his
dorm, but does not provide any details as to this encounter. (Id. at 45).
Craig immediately reported the encounters, voluntarily returned to
segregation, and was given “a protective custody validation form,” which he
signed. (Id.). The next day, Craig wrote a letter to I & I headquarters. (Id. at 57).
23

He reported the Nichols encounter and referred to the contents of the letter as a
“Dire Notice/Compromised Safety.” (Id.). He received no response. (Id.).
Although he says he was supposed to be informed of his protective custody
status request within 72 hours, Craig remained in segregation for approximately
one month without a response. (Id.). During an April 17, 2013, segregation board
weekly review, Warden Hetzel, Captain White and Classification Specialist
Supervisor DeSpain ignored Craig’s request for a status update. (Id.). Craig again
showed the defendants his written statement against the five inmates.

(Id.).

DeSpain “reluctantly” and “scarcely” read Craig’s statement, and then
sarcastically “read out loud so apparently, inmates housed in adjacent cells, next to
[Craig], could hear him [say], quote-unquote, “‘Oh yeah! I see it. You did name
inmates you’re afraid of in an investigation; now are you ready to go back to
‘pop?’” (Id. at 46). DeSpain then laughed and handed the paperwork back to
Craig while Warden Hetzel and Captain White stood and did nothing. (Id.).
DeSpain’s actions purportedly caused inmates in neighboring cells to taunt Craig
and added fuel to the rumor mill spread by Nichols that Craig was cooperating with
law enforcement. (Id.).

24

Craig chose to remain in segregation. (Id. at 80). Through August 2013,
Classification Specialist Sizemore and Warden Hetzel accused him of refusing to
live in population as the reason he was being held in “continued isolation
segregation.” (Id. at 80-81). On August 9, 2013, Sizemore wrote Craig and stated
that he should have gone to population while Antonio Nichols himself was briefly
segregated for possessing thousands of dollars’ worth of heroin. (Id. at 81). Craig
declares he refused to do so because Nichols’ gang members were in population.
(Id.). Craig remained in segregation until his transfer to Donaldson in October
2013. (Doc. 3 at 8). Craig asserts he had to remain in segregation because Sizemore
and Hetzel treated his eyewitness testimony to the Rutledge murder as “‘invalidnoncredible,’” and refused to transfer him anywhere else but the three maximum
security facilities (Holman, Donaldson or St. Clair). (Id. at 80, 82). He alleges that
Hetzel, Sizemore and DeSpain attempted to pretend that he did not have a
“‘legitimate ‘enemy’ issue, via Antonio Nichols” for “the entire ten months” he
was housed at Holman. (Doc. 3 at 5). Therefore, when he repeatedly requested
updates on his protective custody status, he believes that Sizemore “conspired”
with Warden Headley, Warden Hetzel, Classification Specialist Supervisor

25

DeSpain and Captain White by “refus[ing] to acknowledge the legitimacy of the
issue.” (Id. at 81). 7

7

The Holman defendants either deny specific recollection of these events or remember
things differently. Classification Specialist Sizemore gives the most detailed account, stating in
her affidavit:
Inmate Michael Craig was received at Holman Correctional Facility on
February 15, 2013 and placed in the facility’s segregation unit due to a hold from
the Investigations and Intelligence Division of the Alabama Department of
Corrections. On March 07, 2013 Correctional Warden III Gary Hetzel advised me
via email that the hold on inmate Craig had been released per Mr. Ed Sasser of the
Investigations and Intelligence Division. Mr. Sasser advised that inmate Craig
could be released from segregation. Inmate Craig was subsequently approved for
release into population at Holman Correctional Facility on March 20, 2013 by the
Institutional Segregation Review Board. Inmate Craig signed a waiver of liability
for placement in population on March 20, 2013. Inmate Craig was released to
population on March 22, 3013. He was returned to segregation on March 22, 2013
due to claims he feared for his safety in population. Inmate Craig subsequently
claimed to have an enemy in general population and could not live therein. Inmate
Craig named one (1) inmate at Holman Correctional Facility as his enemy. On
April 24, 2013, the Institutional Enemy Validation Committee validated inmate
Craig’s enemy claim. Inmate Craig was housed in segregation due to his validated
enemy residing in population from April 24, 2013, until April 27, 2013, at which
time his enemy was placed in the segregation unit for unrelated reasons. Due to
Inmate Craig’s enemy being in segregation, inmate Craig was offered the
opportunity for placement in population and declined. Inmate Craig continued to
refuse placement in population despite not having a validated enemy therein.
Inmate Craig was classified in medium custody with approval for
placement at a security level five (5) institution during the period of time he was
housed at Holman Correctional Facility, a security level five (5) institution.
Inmate Craig did not have approval for placement at a lower security level facility,
and therefore, could not be transferred to a lower security level facility during the
period of time he was housed at Holman Correctional Facility.
Inmate Craig’s claims regarding his safety were addressed, the
Institutional Enemy Validation Committee validated inmate Craig’s enemy claims
which required the inmates to be housed separately for the duration of their
respective incarcerations. Inmate Craig received an annual Classification Progress
26

Review which was finalized on March 20, 2013. In inmate Craig’s Progress
Review it was clearly noted that inmate Craig had spent a great deal of time in
solitary confinement and that his demonstrated ability to reside in a population
setting was
needed prior to consideration for placement at a lower level facility.
Inmate Craig was reviewed weekly by the Institutional Segregation Review
Board during the time he was housed at Holman Correctional Facility. Inmate
Craig received a Semi-Annual Classification Progress Review on September 24,
2013 advising him that no changes to his security level and custody were
recommended. He was transferred from Holman Correctional Facility on October
18, 2013.
(Doc. 35-7.) Classification Specialist Sizemore also prepared a memo, dated July 8, 2013, due to
the difficulties Craig was causing, writing:
Inmate Craig has recently contacted Classification Specialist Hayden Glass
[Sizemore] via written correspondence and alleged a multitude of allegations
against Holman Classification staff and other ADOC employees. Inmate Craig was
advised that he had not filed a Classification Appeal regarding the Specialist’s
decision on his annual progress review. Inmate Craig was provided with an appeal
form and such is attached.
Inmate Craig has demanded to be reduced to SL-4, to be immediately transferred
to a SL-4 facility, and to be immediately placed in an honor dorm setting. Inmate
Craig alleges that he was removed from St. Clair’s “faith dorm” erroneously and
repeatedly cites SCCF-12-02134-1, of which, he was found not guilty. However,
inmate Craig claimed that there were multiple inmates at St. Clair who were his
enemies and initially refused to name them and was placed in segregation. Inmate
Craig later named enemies; however, said enemies were not housed at St. Clair at
the time of inmate Craig’s claim to fear his safety as a result of their presence at
St. Clair.
Inmate Craig claimed to have enemies at Holman as a result of his claim that he
witnessed the death of inmate John Rutledge B/264227 at St. Clair in April 2012
(actually occurred on 05/05/12). Classification Specialist Hayden Glass validated
two (2) enemies of inmate Craig based upon his allegations, and such is dated
April 24, 2013. One (1) enemy of inmate Craig, inmate Michael Mays
B/224014AR was transferred from Holman to Kilby on the same date that inmate
Craig was transferred to Holman from Kilby (02/15/13). After the enemy
validations were complete, inmate Antonio Nichols B/157833 was placed in
segregation on 04/25/13. Inmate Craig does not have any validated enemies in the
27

Holman population. However, inmate Craig has repeatedly refused population on
weekly Institutional Segregation Review Board rounds from April 2013 —
present.
AlaCourt reviews do not note any active cases on inmates Mays or Nichols.
Inmate Craig has made multiple claims that be testified against them in “free
world court,” but no records exist to validate inmate Craig’s claim.
The Classification Specialist’s recommendation was based upon inmate Craig’s
extensive disciplinary history, significant amount of time spent in segregation, and
not being housed at a SL-4 facility in over ten (10) years.
Inmate Craig repeatedly cites SCCF-12-02134-1, of which, he was found not guilty
of intentionally creating a security, safety, or health hazard. The inmate was found
not guilty on the grounds that, “not enough evidence for Inmate Craig to be
removed from the honor dorm. Inmate Craig did name that were released to
population that made him feel unsafe to live in other population dormitories.”
The Specialist’s review reveals that the inmates that inmate Craig claimed to fear
were not housed at St. Clair at the time of his claim. The only inmate that inmate
Craig names who was present at St. Clair was inmate Roger Calhoun W/144435,
with whom, inmate Craig had already signed a compatibility statement/living
agreement with.
IMAS records indicate that inmate Craig was housed in St. Clair’s “faith dorm”
from 10/12/12 until 12/28/12. He was placed in St Clair’s segregation unit on
12/28/12 citing he feared for his life. He was transferred to Kilby on 01/16/13 for I
& I purposes and remained in segregation at Kilby. He was then transferred to
Holman on 02/15/13. Inmate Craig was processed at Holman and placed in a
segregation cell due to an R-9 dated 01/16/13 stating that he was under an I & I
hold and no other documentation stating the hold had been released. Per Ed
Sasser with ADOC’s I & I Division, inmate Craig was released from I & I hold
status after his polygraph was completed. (See email in vault, dated 03/07/13).
After said documentation was received, inmate Craig was reviewed by the
Institutional Segregation Review Board and recommended for release from
segregation. Per established ADOC policies, inmate Craig voluntarily signed a
Holman Living Agreement on 03/19/13. Inmate Craig’s annual progress review
was presented on 03/20/13. During said review, inmate Craig advised
Classification Specialist Hayden Glass and Correctional Warden III Gary Hetzel
that he did not have any issues residing in population. Inmate Craig was released
to population on 03/22/13 at 7:21AM and was placed back in segregation on that
date at 2:33PM. Per records, inmate Craig was placed in segregation at 12:30PM
after advising Holman correctional staff that he feared for his safety in population.
28

Per HCF-13-00367, inmate Craig stated that inmate Antonio Nichols B/157833
approached him and questioned him regarding inmate Craig, “testifying against
inmate Nichols in free world court.”
On April 24, 2013 Classification Specialist Hayden Glass validated two enemies of
inmate Craig based upon statements given at the disciplinary hearing for SCCF12-02134-1, specifically, inmate Antonio Nichols B/157833 and inmate Michael
Mays B/224014AR. Inmate Nichols was reclassified to Close custody on
06/05/12 at St. Clair citing his involvement in the death of inmate John Rutledge
on 05/04/12. IMAS records indicate that inmate Nichols had been placed in
segregation in early 2012 and was transferred to Kilby on 08/22/12 and to Holman
on 11/27/12. Per Classification Assistant Director Stephanie Atchison (retired) on
12/12/12, “It has been determined by ADOC legal that the action taken against
this inmate (Nichols) is voided and his custody should be returned to medium.”
Inmate Mays was reclassified to Close custody at Kilby due to assaulting an officer
on 10/01/12. The custody recommendation was made on 11/01/12. Inmate Mays
was transferred to Kilby on 06/15/12 and to Holman on 01/16/13. Inmate Mays
was transferred to Kilby on 02/15/13.
In April 2013, Psychological Associate II Shelia Brown advised Classification
Specialist Hayden Glass that she had spoken to inmate Craig in segregation and
that he expressed his concerns regarding having enemies at Holman. The issue
was addressed at a monthly mental health multidisciplinary meeting in April 2013,
at which time Classification Specialist Hayden Glass advised the members present
that enemy validations had been completed based upon the information in inmate
Craig’s file and that inmate Craig did not have any validated enemies in the
Holman population.
Inmate Craig’s movement history, as reflected in IMAS, indicates that he was
housed in segregation for majority, if not all 2008-2010. Per 1/20/2010 progress
review, inmate Craig was released from segregation on 12/07/10. Inmate Craig
apparently resided in a population setting at St. Clair from 12/08/10 until
12/28/12. Inmate Craig was reviewed on 12/20/2010 (finalized 02/24/11) with no
changes recommended. Inmate Craig was reviewed again on 02/27/12 and was
recommended for SL- 4. CRBA’s Johnson and Baggett denied SL-4 placement
Per CRBA Johnson on 3/05/12, “Greatly improved institutional behavior, but
based on overall record, Craig appears to be appropriately assigned. No changes.
Remain medium custody at St. Clair, etc.”
Inmate Craig is currently classified as Medium/SL-5 and housed in
Administrative Segregation due to his refusal to reside in the Holman population
29

D.

Events at Donaldson

On October 18, 2013, Craig was transferred to Donaldson, where yet another
of the five inmates (“Lil Yo” Hawkins) was being housed. (Doc. 3 at 8). At weekly
segregation board reviews on October 23, and October 30, 2013, Warden Hicks
“feigned” that he wasn’t aware of the St. Clair disciplinary charge and Craig’s
statements about the five inmates. (Id. at 9). Craig fully briefed Warden Hicks and
Classification Specialist Supervisor Bonner about these matters, informed them the
five inmates were at the three maximum security prisons (where other inmates are
also frequently swapped in and out), and stated there had been months of
“endemic ‘snitch label’ rumor mills . . . circulating heavily between the three max
institutions,” but Hicks and Bonner ignored this information in violation of
ADOC’s safety protocols. (Id.). Instead, Hicks and Bonner informed Craig, “‘We
despite not having any validated enemies in said population. The Specialist
remains firm on the 03/20/13 recommendation that inmate Craig demonstrate an
ability to reside in population, at Holman, prior to any consideration for SL-4
recommendation.
(Doc. 35-5 at 13-16.) Similarly, Warden Hetzel stated that while he was at Holman, the
Segregation Review Board met every week to review each inmate’s case. He said the placement
of inmates into specific classification levels and the relocation of inmates to other facilities was
not within his authority, but that he could make recommendations. He did not remember making
any recommendations to reduce or increase the custody or classification of Craig or to relocate
him. (Doc. 35-9.) Classification Specialist Supervisor DeSpain denied specific recollection of the
events that Craig complained of at Holman. (Doc. 35-4.) Captain White said that he also did not
have any knowledge of these events because he was employed by Childersburg Community Work
Center during that time. (Doc. 35-14.)
30

don’t care, we’re not transferring you to a lower security level, unless you . . . . –
you’ll remain indefinite, continually in seg’” unless you try “general population
here at Donaldson, Holman, or St. Clair.” (Id. at 9-10). Craig declares that Hicks
and Bonner falsely pretended that he is “an inmate who seeks to manipulate their
regulations [and] authority,” or that his “overall claims” are misfortunate, isolated
events. (Doc. 13 at 10).
On January 20, 2014, Craig “was ordered to be placed in W.E. Donaldson
prison population.” (Doc. 3 at 11). Craig concedes that a validated enemy (inmate
Williams, who is not one of the five inmates) had been transferred away from
Donaldson, but complains that un-validated enemy “Lil Yo” Hawkins (one of the
five inmates) was still being housed there. (Id.). When Craig discovered this fact
through another inmate, he reported it to the shift office, but the sergeant told
Craig all he could do was transfer him to another dorm. (Id.).
Craig was transferred to another dorm and wrote a complaint to mental
health personnel complaining about the stress associated with the constant fear of
being harmed due to the conditions of his forced placement. (Id.). Craig got no
response. Craig alleges Classification Specialist Supervisor Bonner, Warden
Specks, and Warden Miree, among others, refused to validate the five inmates and
31

insisted Craig either remain in population or go to segregation. (Id. at 8). Craig
chose to remain in population at Donaldson until August 1, 2015, when he notified
the Court that he had been transferred to Limestone Correctional Facility, in
Capshaw, Alabama. (Doc. 17). Per prison records, Craig remained at Limestone
until January 21, 2016, when he was transferred to Draper Correctional Center in
Elmore, Alabama, but that on February 21, 2017, he was transferred back to
Holman, where he remains. (Doc. 35-9 at 19-20.)
V.

Discussion
A.

Overview of Plaintiff’s Three Remaining Claims

Craig alleges that the conditions of confinement at St. Clair violate the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. He
supports this conclusion with allegations that conditions are unnecessarily
dangerous as evidenced by the death of inmate John Rutledge and the death of
another inmate as well as the fact that Craig had twice been robbed of his store
goods, things purchased from a prison commissary. Craig avers that these
conditions exist because the correctional officers do not report to their assigned
posts and often do not rove the Q dorm to prevent problems and violence between
inmates. Craig further avers that St. Clair defendants Warden Headley and Warden
32

Davenport, as well as ADOC Regional Coordinator Culliver and ADOC
Commissioner Thomas knew about unsafe conditions but were deliberately
indifferent and failed to make changes despite the substantial risk of harm to Craig.
Craig also alleges that St. Clair defendant Chaplain Brown conspired to and
did violate his First Amendment rights by removing him from the Faith Based
Honor Dorm in retaliation for his activity of preparing a complaint about prison
conditions and unfair politics, and that St. Clair defendant Warden Headley
similarly conspired to and did violate his First Amendment rights by refusing to
later reinstate him to the honor dorm and instead transferring him to a segregation
unit at Holman in retaliation for
The final claim that remains in this action is Craig’s allegation that for the
eight months he was housed at Holman, Holman defendants Captain White,
Warden Hetzel, Classification Specialist Sizemore, and Classification Specialist
Supervisor DeSpain gave him a “Hobson’s choice”8 of remaining in isolation
segregation indefinitely or risking his life in population for 90 days in order to earn
a transfer to a lower security level facility, even though his security score and risk
See N.L.R.B. v. CER, Inc., 762 F.2d 482, 486 n.7 (11th Cir. 1985) (defining “Hobson’s
choice” as “the choice of taking either that which is offered or nothing; the absence of a real
choice or alternative [after Thomas Hobson (1544-1631), of Cambridge, England, who rented
horses and gave his customer only one choice, that of the horse nearest the stable door]”)
(quoting Random House Dictionary of the English Language 675 (unabridged ed. 1969)).
33
8

assessment level already met the requirements for a lower security level. He further
alleges that they transferred him to Donaldson, where inmate Hawkins, another of
his enemies, was housed. Craig argues these actions violated his Fourteenth
Amendment Procedural Due Process rights. He continues his allegations with
regard to his time at Donaldson, asserting that Donaldson defendants Classification
Specialist Supervisor Bonner, Warden Hicks, Warden Specks, and Warden Miree
violated his rights in the same way.
B.

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment, Negligence, and Negligent
Supervision Claims for Deliberate Indifference to Unsafe and
Undersecured Conditions in the St. Clair Population Dorms in
2011 and 2012 Against St. Clair Defendants Warden Headley and
Warden Davenport and ADOC Regional Coordinator Culliver and
ADOC Commissioner Thomas are Due to be Dismissed for
Failure to State a Claim

Only those conditions which deny inmates “the minimal civilized measure of
life’s necessities” are grave enough to violate the Eighth Amendment. Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). The Eighth Amendment proscribes those
conditions of confinement which involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of
pain. Id. at 346. Specifically, it is concerned with “deprivations of essential food,
medical care, or sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for prison
confinement.” Id. at 348 (citation omitted). Prison conditions which may be
34

“restrictive and even harsh, are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for
their offenses against society” and, therefore, do not necessarily constitute cruel
and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. Id.
Conditions, however, may not be “barbarous” nor may they contravene society’s
“evolving standards of decency.” Id. at 345–46. Although the Constitution “does
not mandate comfortable prisons . . . neither does it permit inhumane ones.”
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349).
A prison official has a duty under the Eight Amendment to “provide humane
conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive
adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable
measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (quoting
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–527 (1984)). For liability to attach, the
challenged prison condition must be “extreme” and must pose “an unreasonable
risk of serious damage to [the inmate’s] future health.” Chandler v. Crosby, 379
F.3d 1278, 1289–90 (11th Cir. 2004). In addition, a correctional official may be held
liable under the Eighth Amendment for acting with “deliberate indifference” to an
inmate’s safety when the official knows the inmate faces “a substantial risk of
serious harm” and with such knowledge disregards the risk by failing to take
35

reasonable measures to abate it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828. “A plaintiff must also
show that the constitutional violation caused his injuries.” Marsh v. Butler County,
268 F.3d 1014, 1028 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (emphasis added). To determine
whether conditions of confinement constitute cruel and unusual punishment
violative of the Eighth Amendment, the court must look to “the effect” the
conditions have upon the inmate. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 366. “Nothing so amorphous
as ‘overall conditions’ can rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment when
no specific deprivation of a single human need exists.” Wilson, 501 U.S. 294, 305
(1991).
Further, Plaintiff seeks to hold Wardens Headley and Davenport and ADOC
officials Culliver and Thomas liable in their roles as supervisors. To recover
individually from one who acts in a supervisory capacity, Plaintiff must show that
he is liable either through his personal participation in the acts comprising the
alleged constitutional violation or the existence of a causal connection linking his
actions with the violation. Hill v. Dekalb Regional Youth Facility, 40 F. 3d 1176, 1192
(11th Cir. 1994). A causal connection can be shown when there is a history of
widespread abuse that should put the supervisor on notice of the problem, and the
supervisor nevertheless fails to take corrective measures. Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.
36

3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999). Such a connection could also be shown when an
improper custom or policy established by the supervisor results in deliberate
indifference to constitutional rights. Rivas v. Freeman, 940 F. 2d 1491, 1495 (11th
Cir. 1991).
Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim is due to be dismissed because he has
not alleged that he suffered a physical injury caused by the St. Clair defendants’
indifference to unsafe conditions. Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e et seq., “to reduce the number of frivolous cases filed by
imprisoned plaintiffs, who have little to lose and excessive amounts of free time
with which to pursue their complaints.” Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th
Cir. 2002). To effectuate this purpose, Congress placed various restrictions on the
ability of prisoners to seek judicial relief and the form such relief may take. Included
among these restrictions is 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), which is entitled “Limitation on
recovery” and provides in full: “No Federal civil action may be brought by a
prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or
emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical
injury or the commission of a sexual act (as defined in section 2246 of Title 18”).
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). The Eleventh Circuit has interpreted this provision to bar
37

suits for compensatory and punitive damages by prisoners who have not alleged a
physical injury. See Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1290 (11th Cir. 1999), reh’g en
banc granted and opinion vacated, 197 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir. 1999), opinion reinstated in
relevant part, 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000); Al-Amin v. Smith, 637 F.3d 1192 1197
(11th Cir. 2011); Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 532 (11th Cir. 2002) (construing
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) as barring a prisoner from obtaining compensatory damages
for solely mental or emotional harm while he is in custody). However, prisoners in
such situations may still sue for injunctive and declaratory relief as well as nominal
damages. See Harris, 190 F.3d at 1290; Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th
Cir. 2003) (recognizing that 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) does not preclude a prisoner
from seeking nominal damages if he can establish that he has suffered a
constitutional injury).
The only even tangible injury Plaintiff alleges on this claim is the loss of his
“store goods” which were stolen from him by two other inmates at St. Clair, and
he has certainly not alleged to have suffered any physical injury or sexual abuse.
Rather, Plaintiff seeks relief solely for mental and emotional injuries. Further, this
Court has already dismissed Plaintiff’s requests for injunctive and declaratory relief
to remedy such injuries because Plaintiff is no longer housed at St. Clair. (Doc. 22.)
38

See Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Absent class
certification, an inmate’s claim for injunctive and declaratory relief in a section
1983 action fails to present a case or controversy once the inmate has been
transferred.”); Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1267 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The general
rule in our circuit is that a transfer or a release of a prisoner from prison will moot
that prisoner’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief.”), abrogated on other
grounds by Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 (2011). Nor has Plaintiff sought nominal
damages.
Simply put, in the absence of Plaintiff alleging that he suffered any physical
injury, his request for compensatory and punitive damages to remedy his alleged St.
Clair Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against ADOC
Commissioner Thomas, ADOC Regional Coordinator Culliver, Warden
Davenport, and Warden Headley is barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Because
compensatory and punitive damages were the only type of damages Plaintiff sought
(and could possibly seek, given his transfer from St. Clair) on this claim, the Eighth
Amendment claim fails to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In the absence of a cognizable Federal claim,
this Court will not exercise jurisdiction over any negligence or negligent
39

supervision claim pursuant to state law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (a district court
may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it “has dismissed all claims
over which it has original jurisdiction”); Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086,
1089 (11th Cir. 2004) ( “We have encouraged district courts to dismiss any
remaining state claims when . . . the federal claims have been dismissed prior to
trial . . . .”).
C.

Plaintiff’s First Amendment Retaliation and Conspiracy to
Retaliate Claims Against St. Clair Defendant Chaplain Brown
with Regard to his Removal from the Honor Dorm and Against St.
Clair Warden Headley with Regard to his Failure to Reinstate
Him to the Honor Dorm

Plaintiff has not alleged that he suffered a physical injury with regard to these
claims either. Thus, for the reasons stated in the previous section, this claim is also
due to be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) as barred by 28 U.S.C. §
1997e(e).
Additionally, the Court notes that the magistrate judge, in conducting the
initial screening of Plaintiff’s complaints pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, construed
these claims as Fifth Amendment retaliation and conspiracy to retaliate. Indeed,
the Eleventh Circuit has held that prison officials cannot take adverse action
against an inmate in retaliation for the inmate filing lawsuits and administrative
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grievances. Wildberger v. Bracknell, 869 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir. 1989). An inmate must
establish three elements to prevail on a retaliation claim. Bennett v. Hendrix, 423
F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 2005). The inmate must prove that: (1) “his speech or
act was constitutionally protected”; (2) “the defendant’s retaliatory conduct
adversely affected the protected speech”; and (3) “there is a causal connection
between the retaliatory actions and the adverse effect on speech.” Id. To establish
causation, the plaintiff must show that the defendant was “subjectively motivated
to discipline” the plaintiff for exercising his First Amendment rights. Smith v.
Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir. 2008). To establish a prima facie case of §
1983 conspiracy, a plaintiff must show, among other things, that the defendants
“reached an understanding to violate [his] rights.” Strength v. Hubert, 854 F.2d
421, 425 (11th Cir. 1988). The magistrate judge opined that Plaintiff had made out
the prima facie case as against Chaplain Brown by alleging that Chaplain Brown and
others removed him from the honor dorm in retaliation because Chaplain Brown
knew Plaintiff was preparing a complaint about prison conditions and unfair
politics, and as against Warden Headley by alleging that Warden Headley and
others refused to reinstate him to the St. Clair honor dorm but instead decided to
transfer him to a segregation unit at Holman in retaliation for the statements he
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made to Warden Headley about witnessing the Rutledge murder. The Court
accepted that analysis and recommendation for screening purposes in its
Memorandum of Opinion. (Doc. 22).
However, the facts, at least with regard to Chaplain Brown’s removal of
Plaintiff from the honor dorm, paint an entirely different issue than one of Freedom
of Speech and retaliation. Rather, the undisputed facts show that Chaplain Brown
called a meeting to resolve racial conflict over control of TV programming in the
honor dorm, and Craig 1) challenged the Chaplain’s authority to allow another
inmate to co-chair the meeting, 2) openly challenged the statements of the co-chair,
McKinney, as lies, and 3) left that meeting without being dismissed. Plaintiff was
disruptive and failed to submit to the proper authorities. As admitted by Plaintiff,
Chaplain Brown told the Warden immediately thereafter, “I ain’t got no problem
with Craig, it’s just that he walked out of the dorm meeting.” Craig continued to be
insubordinate, however, by responding to Chaplain Brown and in the presence of
the Warden, “After Destry McKinney lied to your face, while co-chairing the
meeting, I simply returned to my respective dorm rightfully.”
In evaluating the challenged conduct of prison officials, a court must keep in
mind the paramount concerns of maintaining order and discipline in an often
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dangerous and unruly environment. Ort v. White, 813 F.2d 318, 322 (11th Cir.
1987). See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 351 (in considering whether the Eighth Amendment
has been violated, courts must be mindful that such inquiries “‘spring from
constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact
rather than a court’s idea of how best to operate a detention facility.’”) (quoting
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979)). While this deference “‘does not insulate
from review actions taken in bad faith or for no legitimate purpose, it requires that
neither judge nor jury freely substitute their judgment for that of officials who have
made a considered choice.’” Ort, 813 F.2d at 322. “When an order is given to an
inmate there are only so many choices available to the correctional officer. If it is an
order that requires action by the institution, and the inmate cannot be persuaded to
obey the order, some means must be used to compel compliance, such as a
chemical agent or physical force.” Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1267 (7th Cir.
1984).
Craig was insubordinate, disruptive by his behavior challenging authority,
and the reasonable solution was to remove him from the honor dorm, where he had
no constitutional right to be. Plaintiff’s self-serving allegation that an unnamed
inmate informed Chaplain Brown that Plaintiff was preparing a complaint about
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prison conditions and unfair politics does not suffice to create a jury question
because, from the face of Plaintiff’s filings, Chaplain Brown had a non-retaliatory
reason for Craig’s removal. The discussion was obviously not one of conspiracy,
but one of how to deal with a disruptive inmate.
D.

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process
Claims for Indefinite Isolation Segregation Against Holman
Defendants Classification Specialist Sizemore, Classification
Specialist Supervisor DeSpain, Captain White, and Warden
Hetzel, and Against Donaldson Defendants Classification
Specialist Supervisor Bonner, Warden Hicks, Warden Specks,
and Warden Miree

Plaintiff has not alleged that he suffered a physical injury with regard to these
claims either. Thus, for the reasons stated in the previous sections, Plaintiff’s
denial of procedural due process claim against the Donaldson defendants is also
due to be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) as barred by 28 U.S.C. §
1997e(e), because Plaintiff may not seek compensatory or punitive damages, has
not sought nominal damages, and can no longer seek injunctive relief considering
he is no longer housed at Donaldson. However, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s
request for injunctive relief on this claim against the Holman defendants arguably
survives, so that claim cannot be dismissed for failure to state a claim on its face.
More specifically, upon recent review of the case activity, the Court acknowledges
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that at the time that the Memorandum of Opinion was entered in March 2017,
Plaintiff had actually been transferred back to Holman about one month prior.
Presumably, then, Plaintiff is again subject to the Holman defendants’ alleged
denial of his procedural due process rights which he alleges takes the form of giving
him a Hobson’s choice of remaining in segregation indefinitely or risking his life at
the hands of his enemies in general population at Holman. See Smith, 502 F.3d at
1267 (concluding that the prisoner’s claim for injunctive relief, which was properly
found to be moot by the district court because at the time of the district court’s
ruling the prisoner was no longer incarcerated, is now no longer moot because the
prisoner was subsequently re-incarcerated). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for
injunctive relief with regard to the Holman denial of procedural due process claim
was arguably dismissed in error. However, any error was harmless because, as
discussed in below, said claim is due to be dismissed on its merits.
The Due Process Clause protects against deprivations of “life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Plaintiff does not
claim to be deprived of life or property. Therefore, he is only entitled to due
process if he was deprived of a liberty interest within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court has stated that there are two
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circumstances in which a prisoner can be deprived of a liberty interest beyond the
deprivation associated with the prisoner’s confinement. See Sandin v. Conner, 515
U.S. 472, 484 (1995). First, a liberty interest may arise from the “Due Process
Clause of its own force,” which extends procedural safeguards to a prisoner when
his liberty is restrained in a way that exceeds the sentence imposed by the court. Id.
Second, states may create liberty interests by conferring certain benefits to
prisoners, the deprivation of which “impose[s] atypical and significant hardship on
the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. In this vein, the
Supreme Court has held that there is no right inherent in the Constitution to be
free from confinement in disciplinary segregation. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 478, 487.
Therefore, an inmate possesses a liberty interest related to his or her confinement
in disciplinary segregation only if the State has created a liberty interest and
deprived him of certain benefits. Id. at 478.
In Sandin, the Supreme Court compared the conditions of confinement in
disciplinary segregation, administrative segregation, which is considered to be a
non-disciplinary classification that prevents an inmate’s contact with the general
population, and the general population, and found that a prisoner’s thirty-day
confinement in disciplinary segregation did not implicate a state-created liberty
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interest because it did not present an “atypical and significant hardship on the
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” 515 U.S. at 484. The
plaintiff in Sandin was a convicted murderer and a kidnapper, sentenced to an
indeterminate term of thirty years to life in a maximum security prison. Id. at 47475. Rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that solitary confinement automatically
triggered due process protection, the Court noted that even inmates in the general
population were confined to their cells for twelve to sixteen hours a day, depending
upon their classification. Id. at 486 & n.8. Therefore, the deprivations endured by
the plaintiff in disciplinary segregation were not “atypical” or “significant” and
“did not work a major disruption in his environment.” Id. at 486. Craig has not
described the conditions of administrative or disciplinary segregation as compared
to the general population conditions at Holman. Therefore, he has failed to
establish a state-created liberty interest in freedom from segregation confinement at
Holman.
However, the more extended duration of Craig’s confinement in
administrative segregation at Holman does distinguish these facts from Sandin (ten
months as opposed to 30 days in Sandin). The Eleventh Circuit addressed this
issue in Al-Amin v. Donald, 165 F. App’x 733, 739 (11th Cir. 2006), noting that
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“segregation may not be used as a pretext for indefinite confinement of an inmate.
Prison officials must engage in some sort of periodic review of the confinement of
such inmates.” Id. (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 477 n.9). Plaintiff’s own allegations
reveal Holman defendants Classification Specialist Sizemore, Classification
Specialist Supervisor DeSpain, Captain White, and Warden Hetzel did engage in
periodic review of his segregation status. Classification Specialist Sizemore’s
affidavit and memo dated July 8, 2013, supports this fact. In addition, despite
everything that Plaintiff avers, he spent most of his time in segregation at Holman
because he refused to live in the population even when one of his enemies was not
present or was in segregation. Plaintiff’s claim lacks merit as he has not established
how the conditions of segregation created a major disruption in his environment
pursuant to Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487.
VI.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (doc.

35) is due to be granted and Plaintiff’s claims are due to be dismissed with
prejudice. A separate closing order will be entered.

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DONE and ORDERED on September 29, 2017.

_____________________________
L. Scott Coogler
United States District Judge
160704

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